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At least 199 records · Page 11

Conjunction Assessment at NASA

The number of objects in orbit is growing exponentially The space environment today is very different from a decade ago and continues to evolve very rapidly - Historically, space operations were domain of large governmental entities. - Commercial space operators are becoming commonplace and have different business models than government actors - CubeSats are cost effective and accessible for everyone, even down to elementary schools - Challenge in educating new space actors on best practices and availability of data and tools Technology enabling this access has rapidly evolved, while no regulatory framework has been established to ensure that space can be used safely by all.

Conjunction Assessment↗

Public-Private Leadership Forum; 21st Century Power Partnership

The PPLF convenes stakeholders from across the power sector, spanning electricity supply, delivery, and end-use, and plays a key role in guiding the strategic direction of the Power Partnership. In addition, PPLF members support the implementation of activities set out in the Power Partnership Program of Work. Taken together, the activities of the PPLF span the dynamic landscape of power challenges and opportunities, with a focus on business models, ?nancial tools, and regulatory frameworks.

21ST CENTURY POWER PARTNERSHIP↗

GLOBAL WOOD PELLET INDUSTRY AND MARKET – CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK

The wood pellet use in the heating and electricity sector has recorded a steady growth in the last years. IEA bioenergy task 40 carried out an update of the situation on the national pellet markets in the most relevant pellet producing countries and the global development as well. Various country specific data is collected and compiled for more than 30 countries, containing updated information about regulatory framework, production, consumption, price trends, quality standards and trade aspects. The analysis confirmed the positive development in terms of production and consumption of wood pellets in almost all countries. In 2015 more than 26 Mt of wood pellets have been produced and consumed worldwide. Technologies and markets become more mature. Increased international pellet trade needs to be supported by adequate frame condition not only for commerce, but also with regard to sustainability issues.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Development of Criticality Safety Validation Guidance for NRC-Regulated Activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k eff calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1. Inappropriate critical experiment selection 2. Insufficient trending analysis 3. Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties 4. Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis 5. Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses 6. Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data 7. Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites 8. Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty 9. Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses 10. Inadequate validation analysis documentation the final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Crossing the Barriers: An Analysis of Permitting Barriers to Geothermal Development and Potential Improvement Scenarios

Developers have identified many non-technical barriers to geothermal power development, including permitting. Activities required for permitting, such as the associated environmental reviews, can take a considerable amount of time and delay project development. This paper discusses the impacts to geothermal development timelines due to the permitting challenges, including the regulatory framework, environmental review process, and ancillary permits. We identified barriers that have the potential to prevent geothermal development or delay timelines and defined improvement scenarios that could assist in expediting geothermal development and permitting timelines and lead to the deployment of additional geothermal resources by 2030 and 2050: (1) the creation of a centralized federal geothermal permitting office and utilization of state permit coordination offices as well as (2) an expansion of existing categorical exclusions applicable to geothermal development on Bureau of Land Management public lands to include the oil and gas categorical exclusions passed as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. We utilized the Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) and the Geothermal Electricity Technology Evaluation Model (GETEM) to forecast baseline geothermal deployment based on previous analysis of geothermal project development and permitting timelines. The model results forecast that reductions in geothermal project timelines can have a significant impact on geothermal deployment. For example, using the ReEDS model, we estimated that reducing timelines by two years, perhaps due to the creation of a centralized federal geothermal permitting office and utilization of state permit coordination offices, could result in deployment of an additional 204 MW by 2030 and 768 MW by 2050 - a 13% improvement when compared to the business as usual scenario. The model results forecast that a timeline improvement of four years - for example with an expansion of existing categorical exclusions coupled with the creation of a centralized federal geothermal permitting office and utilization of state permit coordination offices - could result in deployment of an additional 2,529 MW of geothermal capacity by 2030 and 6,917 MW of geothermal capacity by 2050 - an improvement of 116% when compared to the business as usual scenario. These results suggest that reducing development timelines could be a large driver in the deployment of geothermal resources.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Integrated Decision Methodology for Final Disposal of Radioactive Sources

Radioactive sources are used throughout the world, and their beneficial uses are many. Sources are at the core of many applications in different branches of industry, medicine, agriculture and research. Sources are present in a very wide range of equipment that is used for, inter alia, cancer treatment, killing bacteria in food, sterilizing medical supplies, measuring instruments such as gauges used to measure soil moisture and soil density and many other components, irradiating seeds for enhancing food production, protecting buildings from lightning strikes, mapping underground sources of water, prospecting for oil and gas reserves, measuring density of soil for construction projects, or even detecting smoke. At their “cradle” and when in use, radioactive sources are usually properly managed and controlled. It is when a source has reached the end of its useful life when they are at a higher risk of being under inadequate control, poorly managed, or even becoming orphan. Sources that have reached the end of their useful life must be carefully and safely managed. The “grave” of disused sources needs a proper disposal process to prevent them from posing a potential threat to people or the environment. To protect the public and the environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation, and to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan, a “cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources is essential, as promoted by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This approach requires a national policy and strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure. Many IAEAMember States have expressed the need for effective solutions to this challenge. There is also a gap related to the life cycle costs of potential disposal practices. This paper proposes a multi-attribute decision making methodology to compare disposal options using both economic and non-economic criteria leading to a preferred option for disposal and a strategy for final disposal of disused radioactive sources that is specific and optimized for each IAEA Member State.

Beatty, Randy↗

ANS Summary of Safety Design Strategy for the Versatile Test Reactor

This paper describes the unique challenges with developing and documenting the Safety Design Strategy for the Versatile Test Reactor in the following key areas: 1. Identification of the key safety goals in the VTR facility design and operation that are to ensure adequate protection of the public, workers, and environment as required by 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management.” These goals are fulfilled by an approach that applies defense-in-depth (DID) by applying various layers (or levels) of protection to prevent the release of radioactive and hazardous materials. 2. Early identification of the hazards that are normally associated with a large fast reactor facility can result from postulated failure conditions in one or more of the reactor systems or from operational errors. 3. Identification of the key decisions that must be made during the initial project life cycle that will affect the eventual design and construction of the VTR and enable clarity in safety expectations. 4. Identification of the applicable regulatory framework requirements for demonstrating compliance with safety basis requirements in 10 CFR 830 Subpart B for the VTR. 5. Application of the proposed Licensing Modernization Program (LMP) recommendations for advanced non-LWR reactors as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development.”

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

Study of treatment as an alternative WM pathway: examples of I-graphite and metallic components such as steam generators - 15212

EDF is working continuously to optimize and secure its waste management pathways, leading in some case to develop appropriate treatment solutions that could be implemented parallel to reference solutions, complementary or as alternative solutions to already existing paths. This approach is illustrated by the examples of steam generators replaced during the operation of French PWR power plants, and of irradiated graphite (stacks and sleeves), coming from the decommissioning of UNGG reactors, which have been shut down. Concerning graphite wastes, the near surface disposal facility intended for this waste does not exist yet, and is currently giving rise to the research of a suitable site, and an evaluation of its performances. While accompanying ANDRA (French national agency for nuclear waste management), in charge of the development of the facility, and while waiting for more data to be available, EDF is continuing the consolidation of graphite wastes radiological inventory, and is working on the development of an alternative management solution, based on a thermal treatment process. Depending on the nature of the treatment, and on the choice of operating parameters, this treatment may contribute to reduce graphite wastes volume and/or promote its acceptance in a disposal facility. Reducing the radiological inventory by decontamination is one of the means to achieve these objectives. Concerning replaced steam generators, nearly 200 of them will have been removed by 2030, and stored on site waiting for their treatment, which represents about 65 000 tons of metal. Initially intended to be cut and packed on NPPs' sites during their dismantling, EDF is studying the economic value of having the steam generators treated in a centralized facility, which allows reducing the volume of final wastes by optimizing cutting operations, while considering recycling after melting. However, this studied pathway implies a number of difficulties to be overcome. In particular, the shipment of such large components to a centralized facility may be complex. Moreover, French regulatory framework does not allow recycling outside nuclear industry, therefore limiting recycling opportunities to storage containers for radioactive wastes. (authors)

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Challenges of mine remediation programmes in developing countries - a life cycle perspective - 15371

This paper analyses some challenges of environmental rehabilitation (ER) projects in developing countries that the authors have encountered over the past two decades in many parts of the world, discusses the reasons and proposes ways to mitigate them. In the life cycle of an ER project, some stages that are particularly decisive for the lasting rehabilitation success are considered here: (1) site characterisation/baseline studies, (2) justification and development of remediation objectives, site end states and a remediation strategy, and (3) the after-care phase. This paper argues that the time available in many ER projects in developing countries using international funding is very often insufficient, and discusses the reasons for some of the most important bottlenecks: (1) time realistically required to produce thorough baseline data and obtain historic site information that are indispensable to develop a robust remediation design, (2) lack of an adequate legal and regulatory framework, overlapping and/or conflicting provisions of national standards and discrepancies with international best practice, (3) unmanaged stakeholder expectations regarding the actual health and environmental risks, justification and prioritisation of remedial actions, and the achievable remediation end state. Insufficient resources for after-care, monitoring and, if required, corrective action is another major issue that, in the experience of the authors, jeopardises the sustainability of remediation success. Consequently by applying the lessons learnt from previous ER projects in developing (and developed) countries and taking them on board during the programming phase of new ER projects, international funding agencies could greatly help to avoid these obstacles. (authors)

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Immediate Dismantling of a Large Fleet of LWR NPPs: Consequences for Spent Fuel and Waste Management - 16027

The experience feedback shows that the complete dismantling of one Light Water Reactor (LWR) unit is an activity now globally well under control (reactor pressure vessel and its internals removal and cutting included). However some specific industrial difficulties may arise in view of the dismantling of numerous LWR units simultaneously. Indeed more than 300 LWR units are currently operated worldwide, which have been commissioned these last 50 years. So in some countries, many units may be permanently shut down over a period of few years in the next decades. Such a situation addresses the issue of the overall management of large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and decommissioning waste for the concerned units. For example, in France, the legislative and regulatory framework for the nuclear facilities favors their dismantling 'as soon as possible' after their permanent shutdown which implies as well to limit the duration of the transition period from operation to decommissioning. Furthermore 58 LWR units have been commissioned between 1977 and 1999 in France - on average more than 2 units per year. In this context, the operator (Electricite de France - EDF) plans to remove quickly the SNF then to perform dismantling actions immediately after the permanent shutdown of the LWR units. One issue is to remove the SNF from all the relevant units, even if this removal is simultaneous in many units (permanently shut down or still under operation). Similar issue has to be taken into account regarding the management of the radioactive waste (RW) produced by the dismantling and clean-up actions, notably the RW that cannot be disposed of in a near surface repository. One method followed by the French technical support organization (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire - IRSN) to analyze these issues is the use of estimates of flows of SNF and RW. These estimates are based notably on a phasing-scenario and a planning template defined for the decommissioning of the units of one nuclear power plant (NPP) and coupled to an overall schedule for phase out all the units of the fleet. The estimates relative to the next decades can be compared to the current experience feedback of flows of SNF and RW for units under operation, in order to identify risks when facing decommissioning. The risks highlighted are driven by key parameters (as duration of the main dismantling actions) of the estimates which can be adapted to minimize their impact. On this basis, it is possible to identify the key-factors to dismantle each unit of NPPs and phase out the fleet regarding SNF and RW management. It is noteworthy that this work needs to be done in any case upstream the studies and the implementation of dismantling actions. Finally it can be underlined that another issue is the human resources (staff, skills and knowledge) necessary to perform all the decommissioning actions, but this aspect is not addressed in the present paper. (authors)

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The Importance of Experience Based Decommissioning Planning - 16242

Decommissioning of a nuclear facility is an extensive and multidisciplinary task which involves the management and technical actions associated with ceasing operation and thereafter the step by step transfer of the facility from an operating plant to an object under decommissioning. The decommissioning phase includes dismantling of systems and components, decontamination and clearance, demolition of buildings, remediation of any contaminated ground and finally a survey of the site. Several of these activities generate radioactive or potentially radioactive waste which has to be managed properly prior to clearance or disposal. What makes decommissioning of nuclear installations unique is to a large extent the radioactive waste management. No other industries have that complex regulatory frameworks for waste management. If a decommissioning project in the nuclear industry does not consider the waste aspects to the extent required, there is a large risk of failure causing a reduced trust by the regulators and other stakeholders as well as cost and schedule overruns. This paper will give an overview of important aspects and findings gathered during decades of planning and conducting decommissioning and nuclear facility modernization projects. (authors)

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Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

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Low- and Intermediate-Active Waste Management in the Federal Republic of Germany - 16567

Waste with negligible heat generation (low- and intermediate-active waste) generated in Germany is to be emplaced in the Konrad repository. As the start of operation of the Konrad repository is expected in 2022, regulations have been developed that allow a longer storage period while keeping the same high level of safety. The guidelines for the storage of radioactive waste with negligible heat-generation have become part of the regulatory framework and its enforcement is thoroughly guided by the responsible Federal Ministry. Radioactive waste generated during the operation or the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities has to be stored by the operator until the Konrad repository is available. In contrast, radioactive waste generated from other industrial, medical and research applications including spent nuclear sources, initially has to be delivered to a Land collecting facility and has to be registered, treated and stored there. The Land collecting facilities will deliver the resulting waste packages to the disposal facility as of 2022. While the operation of the Land Collecting Facilities is a task of the responsible Laender authorities, the operation of the repository Konrad is a federal task. The interaction of the involved different parties will be described. This paper will focus on the management of low- and intermediate-active waste. It will give an insight to the expected amounts and different kinds of waste streams. The different concepts for collecting and qualification procedures for waste packages depending on the origin of the waste will be presented. (authors)

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Development of criticality safety validation guidance for NRC-regulated activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k{sub eff} calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1) Inappropriate critical experiment selection; 2) Insufficient trending analysis; 3) Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties; 4) Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis; 5) Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses; 6) Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data; 7) Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites; 8) Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty; 9) Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses; and 10) Inadequate validation analysis documentation. The final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancement Activities in Canada

In the immediate aftermath of the common-cause seismic and tsunami events that triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, the nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), requested that all Cass I nuclear facilities re-examine the safety cases for their nuclear facilities. Lessons-learned task forces were established by the CNSC, and the nuclear utilities, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Bruce Power (BP), and New Brunswick Power (NBP). The purposes of these independent task forces was to develop relevant lessons learned issues for the Candu nuclear power plants operating in Canada and to identify actions that could enhance safety. Subsequently, a CNSC Integrated Action Plan was developed to address the recommendations arising from the CNSC Task Force Report, and the licensees aligned their actions with this plan. The actions were grouped into four categories, as follows. 1. Strengthening defence in depth; Actions included re-assessment of a site-specific external hazards using PSA; physical plant changes to add further cooling water make-up capability to heat sinks; development of new Canadian standards and updated regulatory documents that address requirements for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA), Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Period Safety Review (PSR); development of a new and novel methodology for assessing multi-unit risk that is consistent with the IAEA construct of defence-in-depth (including a safety goal hierarchy and complementary risk analysis methods that address 'Black Swan' events); enhanced management of hydrogen combustion challenges; and enhanced Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). 2. Enhancing emergency response; Actions included provision of Emergency Mitigation Equipment (EME) such as transportable diesel-driven pumps or fire engines, transportable diesel generators for AC and instrument power; pre-installed connections to in-plant equipment via easily accessible and protected quick-connect points for water and electrical power; upgraded emergency response centres; enhanced communication systems and protocols; and enhanced emergency response programs, training and exercises. 3. Improving the regulatory framework and processes; 4. Enhancing international collaboration. Actions assigned under categories 3 and 4 were placed upon the regulator. This presentation will focus on the assigned actions in categories 1 and 2. The underlying motivation, objectives, and safety benefits associated with the actions will be described within the context of broader aspects of severe accident mitigation in water-cooled reactors. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Technical Advances for Sustainable Remediation: In Situ Monitoring and Climate Resiliency - 18436

Recent advances in sustainable remediation techniques show promise as solutions for contaminant removal in soil and groundwater media. Although passive remediation (or natural attenuation) has gained momentum as an acceptable technique, there are still challenges in regulatory frameworks as well as in public acceptance. Leaving contaminants in subsurface requires increased burden of proof to show that plumes are stable and residual contaminants do not pose a significant health risk. Climate changes and frequent extreme climate events contribute another level of complexity and make it difficult to demonstrate system stability and predict future plume conditions. In this study, we show two coupled approaches to tackle this challenge: (1) in situ groundwater monitoring based on advanced sensor and data analytics technologies (i.e., Big Data), and (2) state-of-art modeling for optimizing monitoring and site closure strategies. In the new monitoring approach, in situ sensors are used to continuously measure the key variables that control contaminant plume mobility and its spatial and temporal distribution (such as pH, redox potential, electrical conductivity, and groundwater level). Coupled with a limited number of groundwater sampling, the data analytics methods - data mining and machine learning - allow us to estimate contaminant concentrations, and also to detect any significant changes associated with the plume mobility. In parallel, the state-of-art numerical flow and reactive transport model - ASCEM software under DOE Office of Environmental Management - provides a physical and mechanistic understanding of the system behavior, and predicts the long-term plume migration for optimizing the monitoring and closure strategies. In particular, we focus on the effects of extreme precipitation or drought on the site closure as well as monitoring strategies. We demonstrate this approach at the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area, where groundwater is contaminated by various radionuclides, including uranium, tritium and technetium. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Evidence-Based Critique of U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy Using Data from Reactor and Cyclotron Sites - 18568

Concrete at nuclear facilities becomes radioactive when it is exposed to a neutron flux, and when such facilities are vacated, decommissioning activities are enacted to make the site safe for reuse. These activities generate wastes that the public expects to be managed in their best interest. This paper provides side-by-side comparisons of concrete bio-shielding encountered at typical reactor and cyclotron decommissioning projects. Three sites are considered, and results from characterization samples are used to demonstrate that the wastes generated by such sites are similar in terms of content and risk. First, the dose potential represented by each waste is determined from mass-based radioactivity concentration with the RESRAD-BUILD computer code. The resulting doses are translated into population-risk estimates by applying dose-response predictions from the National Academy of Sciences' 2006 BEIR VII report. In terms of possible adverse health outcomes, the risk of solid cancer or leukemia associated with the wastes this paper examines is 8 to 50 extra cases per 100,000 persons. The regulatory framework applicable to each site is also reviewed, and the waste management strategies used at each site are contrasted. This paper demonstrates that the wastes it examines are virtually indistinguishable. Contrary to this finding, the wastes are regulated, managed, and disposed in very different manners according to current U.S. nuclear waste policy. The value of this paper is that the side-by-side comparisons it presents provides an opportunity to examine the risk-benefit of existing policies in terms of the benefits or disparities they represent. (author)

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