GAPS LIST SPACE CROP PRODUCTION INTERVIEW EVALUATION
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The Space Crop Production (SCP) Program at the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is aimed at achieving nutrient supplementation and moving towards caloric independence from Earth by growing crops for astronauts. However, growing crops outside of Earth’s orbit creates many new challenges. The KCS SCP Project Scientists have developed a method of organizing these challenges, called the Gaps List. This Gaps List is a dynamic, taxonomically arranged list of missing knowledge and technologies needed to reach production goals. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the effectiveness and current research coverage of the Gaps List by using it to document KSC SCP Program research. It was determined that there are several needs within the SCP Program that are not being met, as well as, many deficiencies within the Gaps List. Gaps involving hardware were largely unrecognized by both the KSC researchers and the funding sources that would typically support them. The KSC SCP Project will require more engineering and physical sciences support to fill those gaps. The Gaps List was found to be out of date and in need of rearrangement. A recommendation from this review was that the Gaps List be reassessed at regular intervals to ensure all gaps, and relevant research topics are included. To better understand the gaps within the list, any assessment needs to include a measure of priority, dependency, and breadth. These measures may be included within or alongside the current taxonomical arrangement of the Gaps List.
The product of a summer internship at KSC evaluating the space crop production gaps list. Slides have previosuly gone through export control. This is a lightning talk for the NC Space grant symposium.
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BACKGROUND Extravehicular activity (EVA) is one of the most dangerous and cognitively demanding actions that astronauts can execute, and the cognitive demands associated with future exploration EVA on the Moon and Mars are expected to be higher compared to EVA currently conducted from the International Space Station (ISS). Decrements in cognitive performance present an important risk to crew safety during exploration mission class EVA. Yet there is currently insufficient characterization of the cognitive capabilities required prior to, during, and following EVA. Furthermore, it is unclear which cognitive domains are most important for conducting mission critical decisions with crew safety implications. To address this gap, we conducted a cognitive task analysis of exploration EVA to characterize the cognitive capabilities, critical safety decisions, and contributing factors (e.g., lunar communications delay) important to monitor for optimal performance in future exploration EVA. This cognitive task analysis was conducted through interviews with astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA research and operations. Interviews focused on exploration EVA and elicited feedback on the cognitive capabilities required for specific EVA tasks and subtasks. The information from this cognitive task analysis will help close the gap in our understanding of the key cognitive capabilities required for safe decision-making during exploration mission class EVA on the Moon and Mars. METHOD We used an applied cognitive task analysis method1 over the course of interviews with a total of 15 NASA astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA. Each interview was led by a scientist with expertise in cognitive neuroscience from the Behavioral Health & Performance (BHP) Laboratory at NASA Johnson Space Center. Notes were taken by a research coordinator in the BHP Laboratory and interviews were recorded on Microsoft Teams to ensure the accuracy of notetaking. In the first interview protocol, participants were asked about the specific tasks and cognitive demands associated with EVA. This provided a high-level overview of the steps involved in the major tasks conducted during exploration EVA, as well as which of the steps require the most cognitive skill. Next, participants completed a knowledge audit, which employs a set of probes designed to describe types of domain knowledge of skill and elicit appropriate examples. In the second interview protocol, completed with a separate set of subject matter experts, interviewees were asked to complete a simulated incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) scenario2, which provided specific context that allowed probing around relevant issues such as situational awareness and potential errors. Experts were then asked to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) underlying each EVA task and to provide ratings on the importance and cognitive demand of each KSA. Finally, participants also described the most likely and consequential critical safety incidents related to decrements in cognitive performance during exploration EVA and assessed the impact of lunar communication delay on cognitive performance. RESULTS & DISCUSSION Interviews for this cognitive task analysis are nearly complete and results will be presented in full at IWS 2025. Results will include a summary of all expert ratings of EVA tasks and subtasks, qualitative summaries of content from each interview part, and a discussion of future directions for products addressing cognitive performance monitoring and cognitive domain mapping in exploration EVA.
The psychiatric exclusion criteria for astronauts are based on NASA Medical Psychiatric Standards for space flight. Until recently, there were no standardized methods to evaluate disqualifying psychopathology in astronaut applicants. Method: One hundred and six astronaut applicants who had passed the intitial screening were evaluated for Axis 1 and Axis 2 DSM-3-R diagnoses using the NASA structured psychiatric interview. The interview consisted of three parts: (1) an unstructured portion for obtaining biographical and historical information, (2) the schedule for effective disorders-lifetime version (SASDL), specially modified to include all disqualifying Axis 1 mental disorders; and, (3) the personality assessment schedule (PAS) also modified to evaluate for Axis 2 disorders. Results: Nine of 106 candidates (8.5 percent) met diagnostic criteria for six Axis 1 disorders (including V code) or Axis 2 disorders. Two of these disorders were disqualifying for the applicants. 'Near' diagnoses (where applicants met at least 50 percent of the listed criteria) were assessed to demonstrate that clinicians using the interview were able to overcome applicants' reluctance to report symptomatomatology. Conclusion: The use of the NASA structured interview was effective in identifying past and present psychopathology in a group of highly motivated astronaut applicants. This was the first time a structured psychiatric interview had been used in such a setting for this purpose.
This report represents a systematic effort to describe how NASA's new technology reporting system operates today, and how that system might be enhanced. Although the system has run for more than two decades, it is not well documented in terms of organization, operational practices, or other program benchmarks. The study seeks to identify and assess incentives or disincentives to reporting, program management, program follow through, and the feasibility of various means for improving the general process. Initially, it was hoped that the study team might uncover the kind of information that would permit the determination of some 'average' sequence of events (or a time line) from the point of identifying a solution to technical 'need' to the point where its solution was actually reported to NASA. Information regarding this objective proved to be too elusive, primarily because early probes revealed that con- tractor awareness of the new technology requirements generally was too poor to provide useful information. The report that follows is based primarily upon documents furnished by NASA Headquarters, by Field Center technology utilization officers, and interviews with persons knowledgeable about the system. Visits were made to seven Field Centers: Ames Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Other documents were furnished by officials of major aerospace corporations. Detailed interviews were conducted with Field Center technology utilization officials, project engineers or scientists, patent counsels, and other Field Center officials who had knowledge about the new technology reporting system. Interviews also were conducted with knowledgeable officials from a number of the primary aerospace companies. Numeric data was obtained from regular NASA reports, from original sources such as, NASA Tech Briefs, or from contractor reports. I am indebted to dozens of persons in both NASA and industry who took time to assist in the data collection by being interviewed, and through answering follow up questions on the telephone. Individuals interviewed and their affiliations are shown in Appendix A. I am most grateful to them for their kind assistance. A note of thanks is due to the other members of the DRI study team: Jody Briles, Kathy Hirst, and Joel Johnson. The responsibility for this report, its accuracy, and the nature of the observations and conclusions rest solely with the author. Text or citations in the numbered footnotes are to be found at the end of each chapter.
The International Space Station (ISS) is operated by a multi-national, multi-organizational team that is dispersed across multiple locations, time zones, and work schedules. At NASA, both junior and senior mission control personnel have had to find ways to address the leadership challenges inherent in such work, but neither have had systematic training in how to do so. The goals of this study were to examine the major leadership challenges faced by ISS mission control personnel and to highlight the approaches that they have found most effective to surmount them. We pay particular attention to the approaches successfully employed by the senior personnel and to the training needs identified by the junior personnel. We also evaluate the extent to which responses are consistent across the junior and senior samples. Further, we compare the issues identified by our interview survey to those identified by a standardized questionnaire survey of mission control personnel and a contrasting group of space station crewmembers. We studied a sample of 14 senior ISS flight controllers and a contrasting sample of 12 more junior ISS controllers. Data were collected using a semi-structured qualitative interview and content analyzed using an iterative process with multiple coders and consensus meetings to resolve discrepancies. To further explore the meaning of the interview findings, we also conducted new analyses of data from a previous questionnaire study of 13 American astronauts, 17 Russian cosmonauts, and 150 U.S. and 36 Russian mission control personnel supporting the ISS or Mir space stations. The interview data showed that the survey respondents had substantial consensus on several leadership challenges and on key strategies for dealing with them, and they offered a wide range of specific tactics for implementing these strategies. Interview data from the junior respondents will be presented for the first time at the meeting. The questionnaire data showed that the US mission control sample reported a level of support from their management that compared favorably to national norms. American mission control personnel and Russian crewmembers reported higher supervisor support than American crewmembers and Russian mission control personnel. We will present the specific issues underlying these findings and compare and contrast the results from the two datasets. Although specific to space station personnel, our results are consistent with recent management, cultural, and aerospace research. We aim to use our results to improve training for current and future mission control personnel.
In 2015, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formed a multi-center, interdisciplinary team of engineers from three different aeronautics research centers who were tasked with improving NASA autonomy research capabilities. This group was subsequently named the Aeronautics Autonomy Testbed Capability (AATC) team. To aid in confronting the autonomy research directive, NASA contracted IDEO, a design firm, to provide consultants and guides to educate NASA engineers through the practice of design thinking, which is an unconventional method for aerospace design processes. The team then began learning about autonomy research challenges by conducting interviews with a diverse group of researchers and pilots, military personnel and civilians, experts and amateurs. Part of this design thinking process involved developing ideas for products or programs known as concepts that could enable real world fulfillment of the most important latent needs identified through analysis of the interviews. The concepts are intended to be sacrificial, intermediate steps in the design thinking process and are presented in this report to record the efforts of the AATC group. Descriptions are provided in present tense to allow for further ideation and imagining the concept as reality as was attempted during the teams discussions and interviews. This does not indicate that the concepts are actually in practice within NASA though there may be similar existing programs independent of AATC. These concepts were primarily created at two distinct stages during the design thinking process. After the initial interviews, there was a workshop for concept development and the resulting ideas are shown in this work as from the First Round. As part of succeeding interviews, the team members presented the First Round concepts to refine the understanding of existing research needs. This knowledge was then used to generate an additional set of concepts denoted as the Second Round. Some concepts were created by a single person in a few minutes while others were refined by the entire team over several weeks. Thus, certain ideas are more detailed than others but those from the second round are not necessarily more comprehensive than the first round concepts. Primarily, as reported here in the Second Round section, the designs serve to encompass more of the high level end user research needs which were not necessarily known to the team during the prior workshop. In the figures provided throughout this report, illustrations are often provided to represent a concept. Nearly all of the images are informal sketches or renderings and this casualness should, hopefully, not be held to negate the potential insights available within the concepts.
To identify best practices for the improvement of software engineering on projects, NASA's Offices of Chief Engineer (OCE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) formed a team led by Heather Rarick and Sally Godfrey to conduct this benchmarking study. The primary goals of the study are to identify best practices that: Improve the management and technical development of software intensive systems; Have a track record of successful deployment by aerospace industries, universities [including research and development (R&D) laboratories], and defense services, as well as NASA's own component Centers; and Identify candidate solutions for NASA's software issues. Beginning in the late fall of 2010, focus topics were chosen and interview questions were developed, based on the NASA top software challenges. Between February 2011 and November 2011, the Benchmark Team interviewed a total of 18 organizations, consisting of five NASA Centers, five industry organizations, four defense services organizations, and four university or university R and D laboratory organizations. A software assurance representative also participated in each of the interviews to focus on assurance and software safety best practices. Interviewees provided a wealth of information on each topic area that included: software policy, software acquisition, software assurance, testing, training, maintaining rigor in small projects, metrics, and use of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, as well as a number of special topics that came up in the discussions. NASA's software engineering practices compared favorably with the external organizations in most benchmark areas, but in every topic, there were ways in which NASA could improve its practices. Compared to defense services organizations and some of the industry organizations, one of NASA's notable weaknesses involved communication with contractors regarding its policies and requirements for acquired software. One of NASA's strengths was its software assurance practices, which seemed to rate well in comparison to the other organizational groups and also seemed to include a larger scope of activities. An unexpected benefit of the software benchmarking study was the identification of many opportunities for collaboration in areas including metrics, training, sharing of CMMI experiences and resources such as instructors and CMMI Lead Appraisers, and even sharing of assets such as documented processes. A further unexpected benefit of the study was the feedback on NASA practices that was received from some of the organizations interviewed. From that feedback, other potential areas where NASA could improve were highlighted, such as accuracy of software cost estimation and budgetary practices. The detailed report contains discussion of the practices noted in each of the topic areas, as well as a summary of observations and recommendations from each of the topic areas. The resulting 24 recommendations from the topic areas were then consolidated to eliminate duplication and culled into a set of 14 suggested actionable recommendations. This final set of actionable recommendations, listed below, are items that can be implemented to improve NASA's software engineering practices and to help address many of the items that were listed in the NASA top software engineering issues. 1. Develop and implement standard contract language for software procurements. 2. Advance accurate and trusted software cost estimates for both procured and in-house software and improve the capture of actual cost data to facilitate further improvements. 3. Establish a consistent set of objectives and expectations, specifically types of metrics at the Agency level, so key trends and models can be identified and used to continuously improve software processes and each software development effort. 4. Maintain the CMMI Maturity Level requirement for critical NASA projects and use CMMI to measure organizations developing software for NASA. 5.onsolidate, collect and, if needed, develop common processes principles and other assets across the Agency in order to provide more consistency in software development and acquisition practices and to reduce the overall cost of maintaining or increasing current NASA CMMI maturity levels. 6. Provide additional support for small projects that includes: (a) guidance for appropriate tailoring of requirements for small projects, (b) availability of suitable tools, including support tool set-up and training, and (c) training for small project personnel, assurance personnel and technical authorities on the acceptable options for tailoring requirements and performing assurance on small projects. 7. Develop software training classes for the more experienced software engineers using on-line training, videos, or small separate modules of training that can be accommodated as needed throughout a project. 8. Create guidelines to structure non-classroom training opportunities such as mentoring, peer reviews, lessons learned sessions, and on-the-job training. 9. Develop a set of predictive software defect data and a process for assessing software testing metric data against it. 10. Assess Agency-wide licenses for commonly used software tools. 11. Fill the knowledge gap in common software engineering practices for new hires and co-ops.12. Work through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) program with universities in strengthening education in the use of common software engineering practices and standards. 13. Follow up this benchmark study with a deeper look into what both internal and external organizations perceive as the scope of software assurance, the value they expect to obtain from it, and the shortcomings they experience in the current practice. 14. Continue interactions with external software engineering environment through collaborations, knowledge sharing, and benchmarking.
The objectives of this study is to verify if the exposure to greater nighttime radiance is associated with changes in the sleep/wake schedule and with greater sleep disturbances. Methods: The target population was the adults (18 years and older) living in California, USA. This represents 24 million of inhabitants. A total of 3,104 subjects participated in the survey (participation rate 85.6%). The participants were interviewed by telephone using the Sleep-EVAL system. The interviews covered several topics including sleeping habits, sleep quality, sleep disturbances, physical symptoms related to menopause. Chronic insomnia was defined as difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep for at least 3 months. Global nighttime light emissions have been collected by the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program's Operational Linescan System (DMSP/OLS) sensors. We extracted the radiance calibrated nighttime lights corresponding to the date of the interviews for a three by three window centered on each coordinate corresponding to an interview address. Results: Dissatisfaction with sleep quantity and/or quality was associated with an increased nighttime radiance (p=0.02). Similarly, excessive sleepiness accompanied with impaired functioning was significantly associated with an increased nighttime radiance (p (is) less than 0.0001). The association remained significant after controlling for age, gender and use of a night lamp in the bedroom. Confusional arousals were also significantly associated with an increased nighttime radiance (p (is) less than 0.0001). Bedtime hour was linearly increasing with the intensity of nighttime radiance: the later the bedtime, the greater the nighttime radiance (p (is) less than 0.0001). Similarly, wakeup time became progressively later as the nighttime radiance increased (p (is) less than 0.0001). Both associations remained significant after controlling for age, gender and use of a night lamp in the bedroom. Circadian Rhythm Disorders were the only sleep disorder significantly associated with increased nighttime radiance (p (is) less than 0.0001). Exposure to increased nighttime light radiance appeared to cause a shift in the sleep/wake schedule, excessive sleepiness and Circadian Rhythm Disorders.
In support of the Flight Trial (FT-2) of NASA's prototype of the Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) concept, observations were conducted at the air traffic facilities to identify and assess the main factors that affect the acceptability of pilot requests by air traffic controllers. Two observers shadowed air traffic controllers at the Atlanta (ZTL) and Jacksonville (ZJX) air traffic control centers as the test flight pilot made pre-scripted requests to invoke acceptability issues and then they interviewed the observed and other controllers voluntarily. Fifty controllers were interviewed with experience ranging from one to thirty-five years. All interviewed controllers were enthusiastic about the technology and accounting for sector boundaries in pilot requests, particularly if pilots can be made aware of high workload situations. All interviewed controllers accept more than fifty percent of pilot requests; forty percent of them reject less than ten percent of requests. The most common reason for rejecting requests is conflicting with traffic followed by violating letters of agreement (LOAs) and negatively impacting neighboring sector workload, major arrival and departure flows and flow restrictions. Thirty-six requests were made during the test, eight of which were rejected due to: the aircraft already handed off to another sector, violating LOA, opposing traffic, intruding into an active special use airspace (SUA), intruding into another center, weather, and unfamiliarity with the requested waypoint. Nine requests were accepted with delay mostly because the controller needed to locate unfamiliar waypoints or to coordinate with other controllers.
INTRODUCTION: Longitudinal analysis on how spaceflight affects human health requires significant amounts of data. Missing data, especially if missing in a non-random fashion, could be a significant challenge to the success and validity of ongoing occupational surveillance and research. Astronaut occupational health data have been collected since 1959 in various formats and as part of several flight programs. As a result of changing methodologies over this span, epidemiologists in the NASA Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH) project regularly compile data sets with important exposure or outcome data missing. METHODS: NASA medical records of astronauts participating in voluntary annual LSAH examinations were reviewed and compiled to develop Individual Exposure Profiles (IEP) for each astronaut. These data were supplemented by an interview. If the interview yielded medically relevant information absent from the medical record, that information was considered an update. The IEPs were analyzed to identify trends regarding the characteristics of astronauts who provided updates and what kinds of information were consistently being updated. RESULTS: To date, 190 astronauts have participated in the IEP project. Medical information was updated for 119 individuals during these interviews. The astronauts' likelihood of updating their record upon interview was not significantly related to their spaceflight experience, era of active spaceflight, or duration of longest spaceflight. The most commonly updated categories of medical information were issues encountered during spaceflights, including CO2 symptoms, vision changes, back pain, headaches, and space motion sickness. DISCUSSION: The most commonly updated categories correspond to areas where LSAH has ongoing analysis efforts and therefore do not appear to have been reported at random. This presentation will address identification of missing astronaut health data and trends, forward work identified by the IEP project and how this information may be used for future LSAH data gap analyses.
INTRODUCTION Astronaut crew medical officers (CMO) undergo additional, specialized training to provide medical support onboard the International Space Station (ISS). CMO training focuses on utilizing resources on-station and optimizing communication with ground-based expertise to manage both common minor conditions as well as emergency/trauma situations. As NASA moves towards future Artemis and exploration class missions, we sought CMO perspectives on past, present, and future CMO training and medical resourcing to help inform mission planners regarding medical risk mitigation considerations. We present an interview-based qualitative assessment of CMO preparedness for the International Space Station with the aim to help iterate future training flows for Low Earth Orbit, Artemis, and exploration-class missions. METHODS A semi-structured interview tool was developed to assess CMO experience and their recommendations for future mission training considerations. Participants were recruited from former or current US astronauts who were designated as CMO and subsequently flew to the International Space Station. 10 former CMOs took part in the study. Interview transcripts were deidentified and evaluated for qualitative thematic analysis by two independent coders with NVivo Software suite (Lumivero, Denver, CO), and emergent themes were compiled. RESULTS Former CMO crew expressed appropriate preparedness for current ISS medical capabilities and requirements. They identified the role of the CMO as serving as a healthcare extender to ground-based flight surgeons for ISS and other LEO missions. Individuals with prior medical experience were preferred though not felt to be necessary for LEO missions. For exploration class missions with limitations in ground communication, a physician-as-CMO and more rigorous training curricula for both the CMO and astronaut crew were desired. DISCUSSION Former NASA astronaut crew were interviewed to retrospectively assess their preparedness as ISS crew medical officers and hypothesize future medical knowledge, skill, and ability needs. Along with medical operations subject matter expert opinion and advanced probabilistic risk assessment modeling, past CMO experience can help inform future CMO training considerations and responsibilities for future Artemis and exploration class missions.
In order to meet the demands of the current global economy, a study of agile teams at NASA was conducted by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to explore how the Agency can become more adaptable and flexible due to several influences, including the maturity and availability of digital tools and NASA’s increased reliance on commercial providers. NESC Technical Discipline Teams (TDTs) perform annual studies to understand the needs of their stakeholders, establish a state of the discipline, and inform strategic planning efforts. As part of the 2022 interview series, the Systems Engineering TDT utilized the dissertation work of Dr. Jackelynne Silva-Martinez that focused on NASA agile teams. The Systems Engineering TDT partnered with the Software and Human Factors TDTs on the formulation of interview questions and subsequent solicitation of customer inputs, which helped attract diverse agile teams across the Agency. 34 participants were interviewed, including civil servants and contractors, with open-ended questions related to their teams’ adoption and transition to agile. Participants were also questioned about their perceptions of the implementation of agile approaches across the Agency. Results showed a consistent framing of agile as incremental knowledge growth, a way of showing progress, and as the incorporation of frequent customer feedback. However, participants emphasized a lack of a common understanding of agile across the Agency, which sometimes caused managers and engineers to be reluctant to accept and support them. Results also showed the most successful agile teams had formal training with over five years of agile experience, used retrospectives, and tailored their agile processes for their specific situation and needs. This paper provides details of the interview responses gathered in the study and suggests actions for NASA to become more agile.
Every two years, NASA conducts an in-depth assessment of the satellite Earth observation data needs of U.S. federal civilian agencies submitted through the Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG) survey. The SNWG assessment occurs at the nexus of science and people: in the 2022 assessment, over 100 scientists across NASA, NOAA, and USGS were organized to interview over 165 end users at 29 agencies about their unique satellite needs, brainstorm a range of solutions to meet those needs, and communicate back to agencies about resources available for meeting their needs. The innovative approaches to communication, organization, and team make-up that will be described in this talk are vital to the success of the SNWG assessment. As the first major step in evaluating a satellite need, the tri-agency assessment team interviews the agency SMEs who submitted the survey to understand how satellite data could help inform their decision-making process or enable them to fulfill their key responsibilities. In preparation, NASA utilizes social scientists to provide training to all assessment participants on how to hold a discovery-centered interview, including starting with a purpose, creating a welcoming space, exploring all aspects and edges of the need, and brainstorming possible solutions to meet the need. After the interviews, assessment participants propose and review solutions across all thematic areas, seeking those that will help multiple agencies. During the selection process, agencies expected to benefit from a new solution have an opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed activity and are invited to co-design the solution with NASA, should it be implemented. The organization of needs and solutions takes place in Asana, a workflow management tool adapted for the SNWG assessment, and the Report Generation Tool (RGT) enables assessment teams to collaboratively write reports that are returned to each agency with information on current and upcoming resources that help meet their needs.
An extensive study of aircraft noise is currently being conducted in Oslo, Norway. The traffic at Oslo Airport Fornebu that includes both national and international flights, totals approximately 350 movements per day: 250 of these are regular scheduled flights with intermediate and large size aircraft, the bulk being DC9 and Boeing 737. The total traffic during the summer of 1989 was expected to resemble the maximum level to which the regular traffic will increase before the new airport can be put into operation. The situation therefore represented a possibility to study the noise impact on the communities around Fornebu. A comprehensive social survey was designed, including questions on both aircraft and road traffic noise. A random sample of 1650 respondents in 15 study areas were contacted for an interview. These areas represent different noise levels and different locations relative to the flight paths. The interviews were conducted in a 2 week period just prior to the transfer of charter traffic from Gardemoen to Fornebu. In the same period the aircraft noise was monitored in all 15 areas. In addition the airport is equipped with a permanent flight track and noise monitoring system. The noise situation both in the study period and on an average basis can therefore be accurately described. In August a group of 1800 new respondents were subjected to identical interviews in the same 15 areas, and the noise measurement program was repeated. Results of the study are discussed.
A preliminary draft questionnaire concerning community response to sonic booms was developed. Interviews were conducted in two communities that had experienced supersonic overflights of the SR-71 airplane for several years. Even though the overflights had ceased about 6 months prior to the interviews, people clearly remembered hearing sonic booms. A total of 22 people living in central Utah and 23 people living along Idaho/Washington state border took part in these interviews. The draft questionnaire was constantly modified during the study in order to evaluate different versions. Questions were developed which related to annoyance, startle, sleep disturbance, building vibration, and building damage. Based on the data collected, a proposed community response survey response instrument was developed for application in a full-scale sonic boom study.