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At least 199 records · Page 11

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DOE OSTI2013

Incorporating Equipment Condition Assessment in Risk Monitors for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs) can complement the current fleet of large light-water reactors in the USA for baseload and peak demand power production and process heat applications (e.g., water desalination, shale oil extraction, hydrogen production). The day-to-day costs of aSMRs are expected to be dominated by operations and maintenance (O&M); however, the effect of diverse operating missions and unit modularity on O&M is not fully understood. These costs could potentially be reduced by optimized scheduling, with risk-informed scheduling of maintenance, repair, and replacement of equipment. Currently, most nuclear power plants have a “living” probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which reflects the as-operated, as-modified plant and combine event probabilities with population-based probability of failure (POF) for key components. “Risk monitors” extend the PRA by incorporating the actual and dynamic plant configuration (equipment availability, operating regime, environmental conditions, etc.) into risk assessment. In fact, PRAs are more integrated into plant management in today’s nuclear power plants than at any other time in the history of nuclear power. However, population-based POF curves are still used to populate fault trees; this approach neglects the time-varying condition of equipment that is relied on during standard and non-standard configurations. Equipment condition monitoring techniques can be used to estimate the component POF. Incorporating this unit-specific estimate of POF in the risk monitor can provide a more accurate estimate of risk in different operating and maintenance configurations. This enhanced risk assessment will be especially important for aSMRs that have advanced component designs, which don’t have an available operating history to draw from, and often use passive design features, which present challenges to PRA. This paper presents the requirements and technical gaps for developing a framework to integrate unit-specific estimates of POF into risk monitors, resulting in enhanced risk monitors that support optimized operation and maintenance of aSMRs.

Advanced Small Modular Reactors↗

DOE OSTI2026

Probability of Hydrogen Ignition: A Landscape Review and Gaps Assessment

The primary hazard of a leak from a hydrogen system is due to the immediate or delayed ignition of the fuel leading to a jet flame or explosion. Therefore, understanding the hydrogen ignition probability is critical for analyzing the risk of hydrogen systems. This report reviews the current understanding of hydrogen ignition mechanisms and methods for modeling their probability. The stoichiometry, ignition strength, and ignition source temperature are all important characteristics that can affect both the probability of ignition and the outcome of the subsequent combustion event. A brief review of diffusion ignition demonstrates that ignition probability models must account for seemingly spontaneous ignition of hydrogen in addition to scenarios where the ignition source is readily identified. State-of-the art models for both immediate and delayed ignition probabilities are presented, including different physical aspects of the scenarios (e.g., flow rate, ignition source characteristics) that are considered in the different modeling approaches. Current models often fail to account for the unique properties of hydrogen compared to other fuels, and most lack rigorous validation with hydrogen as a fuel. A fault tree framework is proposed to systematically evaluate the probability of ignition by integrating various ignition mechanisms and their uncertainties. Furthermore, this type of framework could enable additional insights into the most important mechanisms and would enable uncertainty quantification in risk assessment modeling. Recommendations for future research include the need for experimental validation of ignition models and the development of comprehensive methodologies that incorporate the specifics of hydrogen behavior in real-world scenarios.

hydrogen↗

NASA NTRS1974

Operations analysis (study 2.1). Contingency analysis

Future operational concepts for the space transportation system were studied in terms of space shuttle upper stage failure contingencies possible during deployment, retrieval, or space servicing of automated satellite programs. Problems anticipated during mission planning were isolated using a modified 'fault tree' technique, normally used in safety analyses. A comprehensive space servicing hazard analysis is presented which classifies possible failure modes under the catagories of catastrophic collision, failure to rendezvous and dock, servicing failure, and failure to undock. The failure contingencies defined are to be taken into account during design of the upper stage.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1980

Reliability/safety analysis of a fly-by-wire system

An analysis technique has been developed to estimate the reliability of a very complex, safety-critical system by constructing a diagram of the reliability equations for the total system. This diagram has many of the characteristics of a fault-tree or success-path diagram, but is much easier to construct for complex redundant systems. The diagram provides insight into system failure characteristics and identifies the most likely failure modes. A computer program aids in the construction of the diagram and the computation of reliability. Analysis of the NASA F-8 Digital Fly-by-Wire Flight Control System is used to illustrate the technique.

Brock, L. D.↗

NASA NTRS1981

System safety in Stirling engine development

The DOE/NASA Stirling Engine Project Office has required that contractors make safety considerations an integral part of all phases of the Stirling engine development program. As an integral part of each engine design subtask, analyses are evolved to determine possible modes of failure. The accepted system safety analysis techniques (Fault Tree, FMEA, Hazards Analysis, etc.) are applied in various degrees of extent at the system, subsystem and component levels. The primary objectives are to identify critical failure areas, to enable removal of susceptibility to such failures or their effects from the system and to minimize risk.

Bankaitis, H.↗

NASA NTRS1982

Models for evaluating the performability of degradable computing systems

Recent advances in multiprocessor technology established the need for unified methods to evaluate computing systems performance and reliability. In response to this modeling need, a general modeling framework that permits the modeling, analysis and evaluation of degradable computing systems is considered. Within this framework, several user oriented performance variables are identified and shown to be proper generalizations of the traditional notions of system performance and reliability. Furthermore, a time varying version of the model is developed to generalize the traditional fault tree reliability evaluation methods of phased missions.

Wu, L. T.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Space reliability technology - A historical perspective

The progressive improvements in reliability of launch vehicles is traced from the Vanguard rocket to the STS. The Vanguard, built with minimal redundancy and a high mass ratio, was used as an operational vehicle midway through its test program in an attempt to meet the perceived challenge represented by the Sputnik. The fourth Vanguard failed due to inadequate contamination prevention and lack of inspection ports. Automatic firing sequences were adopted for the Titan rockets, which were an order of magnitude larger than the Vanguard and therefore had room for interior inspections. Qualification testing and reporting were introduced for components, along with X ray inspection of fuel tank welds. Dual systems were added for flight critical components when the Titan became man-rated for the Gemini program. Designs incorporated full failure mode effects and criticality analyses for the Apollo program, which exposed the limits of applicability of numerical reliability models. Fault tree analyses and program milestone reviews were initiated. The worth of man-in-the-loop in space activities for reliability was demonstrated with the rescue of Skylab after solar panel and meteoroid shield failures. It is now the reliability of the payload, rather than the vehicle, that is questioned for Shuttle launches.

Cohen, H.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Diagnostic reasoning in digital systems

Described is an efficient method for fault diagnosis in digital systems based on the technique of reasoning. The methodology operates on the observed erroneous behavior and the structure of the system. The behavior consists of the error(s) observed on the circuit's output lines and specific values on the circuit's input lines. The techniques described improve on previously published research on diagnostic reasoning in two ways. Previous work has stressed system independent techniques which could be used to diagnose any faulty system whose structure can be represented. By concentrating on the specific case of diagnosing faulty digital circuits, it is possible to simplify the representation of the structure of the system. This representation, in the form of an AND/OR fault tree, efficiently abstracts the structure of a faulty digital system. More importantly, a method for partitioning the digital system is introduced which can considerably reduce the runtime complexity of a diagnosis.

Thearling, Kurt Henry↗

NASA NTRS1989

STS-27R OV-104 Orbiter TPS damage review team, volume 1

Following the return to earth on December 2, 1988, of Orbiter OV-104, Atlantis, it was observed that there was substantial Thermal Protection System (TPS) tile damage present on the lower right fuselage and wing. Damage sites were more numerous than on previous flights and conversely, there was almost no damage present on Atlantis' left side. A review team investigated the cause beginning with a detailed inspection of the Atlantis TPS damage, and a review of related inspection reports to establish an indepth anomaly definition. An exhaustive data review followed. A fault tree and several failure scenarios were developed. Finally, the failure scenarios were categorized as either not possible, possible but not probable, or probable. This and other information gained during the review formed the basis for the team's findings and recommendations. The team concluded that the most probable cause of the severe STS-27R Orbiter tile damage is that the ablative insulating material covering the RH SRB Nose Cap dislodged and struck the Orbiter tile near 85 seconds into flight and possibly that debris from other sources, including repaired insulation and missing joint cork, caused minor tile damage. Findings are presented, and recommendations that are believed pertinent to minimizing the potential for inflight debris are described.

Thomas, John W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

An approach to solving large reliability models

This paper describes a unified approach to the problem of solving large realistic reliability models. The methodology integrates behavioral decomposition, state trunction, and efficient sparse matrix-based numerical methods. The use of fault trees, together with ancillary information regarding dependencies to automatically generate the underlying Markov model state space is proposed. The effectiveness of this approach is illustrated by modeling a state-of-the-art flight control system and a multiprocessor system. Nonexponential distributions for times to failure of components are assumed in the latter example. The modeling tool used for most of this analysis is HARP (the Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor).

Boyd, Mark A.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Neural computing for numeric-to-symbolic conversion in control systems

A type of neural network, the multilayer perceptron, is used to classify numeric data and assign appropriate symbols to various classes. This numeric-to-symbolic conversion results in a type of information extraction, which is similar to what is called data reduction in pattern recognition. The use of the neural network as a numeric-to-symbolic converter is introduced, its application in autonomous control is discussed, and several applications are studied. The perceptron is used as a numeric-to-symbolic converter for a discrete-event system controller supervising a continuous variable dynamic system. It is also shown how the perceptron can implement fault trees, which provide useful information (alarms) in a biological system and information for failure diagnosis and control purposes in an aircraft example.

Passino, Kevin M.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Flammability and sensitivity of materials in oxygen-enriched atmospheres; Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium, Las Cruces, NM, Apr. 11-13, 1989. Volume 4

The present volume discusses the ignition of nonmetallic materials by the impact of high-pressure oxygen, the promoted combustion of nine structural metals in high-pressure gaseous oxygen, the oxygen sensitivity/compatibility ranking of several materials by different test methods, the ignition behavior of silicon greases in oxygen atmospheres, fire spread rates along cylindrical metal rods in high-pressure oxygen, and the design of an ignition-resistant, high pressure/temperature oxygen valve. Also discussed are the promoted ignition of oxygen regulators, the ignition of PTFE-lined flexible hoses by rapid pressurization with oxygen, evolving nonswelling elastomers for high-pressure oxygen environments, the evaluation of systems for oxygen service through the use of the quantitative fault-tree analysis, and oxygen-enriched fires during surgery of the head and neck.

Stoltzfus, Joel M.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Program Models Propagation Of Failures

FIRM is software tool for identification of failure and management of risk based on directed-graph ("digraph") approach. Three core algorithms optimized for processing singletons and doubletons and also handle tripletons. FIRM identifies loops in digraphs and displays direct failure paths between any two nodes. Solves for reachability for given node without computing reachability for entire digraph. Represents hybrid between schematic-diagram and fault-tree approaches. Written in C.

Hackler, Donald B.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Hubble Space Telescope: SRM/QA observations and lessons learned

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Optical Systems Board of Investigation was established on July 2, 1990 to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). Specifically, the board was tasked to ascertain what caused the spherical aberration and how it escaped notice until on-orbit operation. The error that caused the on-orbit spherical aberration in the primary mirror was traced to the assembly process of the Reflective Null Corrector, one of the three Null Correctors developed as special test equipment (STE) to measure and test the primary mirror. Therefore, the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) investigation covers the events and the overall product assurance environment during the manufacturing phase of the primary mirror and Null Correctors (from 1978 through 1981). The SRM&QA issues that were identified during the HST investigation are summarized. The crucial product assurance requirements (including nonconformance processing) for the HST are examined. The history of Quality Assurance (QA) practices at Perkin-Elmer (P-E) for the period under investigation are reviewed. The importance of the information management function is discussed relative to data retention/control issues. Metrology and other critical technical issues also are discussed. The SRM&QA lessons learned from the investigation are presented along with specific recommendations. Appendix A provides the MSFC SRM&QA report. Appendix B provides supplemental reference materials. Appendix C presents the findings of the independent optical consultants, Optical Research Associates (ORA). Appendix D provides further details of the fault-tree analysis portion of the investigation process.

Rodney, George A.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

The implementation of the HST system safety program is detailed. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. Attention is given to the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used, i.e., hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis, and to how they are coupled with engineering and test analysis for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, are presented as examples of this safety process.

Bahr, N. J.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Computer aided reliability, availability, and safety modeling for fault-tolerant computer systems with commentary on the HARP program

Many of the most challenging reliability problems of our present decade involve complex distributed systems such as interconnected telephone switching computers, air traffic control centers, aircraft and space vehicles, and local area and wide area computer networks. In addition to the challenge of complexity, modern fault-tolerant computer systems require very high levels of reliability, e.g., avionic computers with MTTF goals of one billion hours. Most analysts find that it is too difficult to model such complex systems without computer aided design programs. In response to this need, NASA has developed a suite of computer aided reliability modeling programs beginning with CARE 3 and including a group of new programs such as: HARP, HARP-PC, Reliability Analysts Workbench (Combination of model solvers SURE, STEM, PAWS, and common front-end model ASSIST), and the Fault Tree Compiler. The HARP program is studied and how well the user can model systems using this program is investigated. One of the important objectives will be to study how user friendly this program is, e.g., how easy it is to model the system, provide the input information, and interpret the results. The experiences of the author and his graduate students who used HARP in two graduate courses are described. Some brief comparisons were made with the ARIES program which the students also used. Theoretical studies of the modeling techniques used in HARP are also included. Of course no answer can be any more accurate than the fidelity of the model, thus an Appendix is included which discusses modeling accuracy. A broad viewpoint is taken and all problems which occurred in the use of HARP are discussed. Such problems include: computer system problems, installation manual problems, user manual problems, program inconsistencies, program limitations, confusing notation, long run times, accuracy problems, etc.

Shooman, Martin L.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether control mechanism and to prepare a detailed plan for hardware inspection, test, and analysis including any appropriate hardware disassembly.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1993

Reliability studies of integrated modular engine system designs

A study was performed to evaluate the reliability of Integrated Modular Engine (IME) concepts. Comparisons were made between networked IME systems and non-networked discrete systems using expander cycle configurations. Both redundant and non-redundant systems were analyzed. Binomial approximation and Markov analysis techniques were employed to evaluate total system reliability. In addition, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Analyses (PHA), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were performed to allow detailed evaluation of the IME concept. A discussion of these system reliability concepts is also presented.

Hardy, Terry L.↗