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At least 199 records · Page 11

Systems Health Monitoring: Integrating FMEA into Bayesian Networks

The foreseeable high traffic density suggests that a large number of electric propulsion systems will enter the airspace, and that they will also operate at high frequency, e.g., large number of take offs and landings per unit time. The reliability of such critical systems is therefore key to ensure high safety standards in the low-altitude airspace. Diagnostic systems, which aim at identifying incipient faults, can mitigate unexpected failures or lower-than-expected reliability by performing early fault detection by monitoring the systems. A key element of fault diagnosis is fault detection and isolation (FDI), which complexity increases with the complexity of the system itself, namely the number of subsystems and components, interactions among sub-systems, and the number of sensors available. The proposed approach leverages combination of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) integrated with Bayesian networks, thus introducing dependability structures into a diagnostic framework to aid FDI. Faults and failure events from the FMEA are mapped within a Bayesian network, where network edges replicate the links embedded within FMEAs. The integrated framework enables the fault isolation process by identifying the probability of occurrence of specific faults or root causes given evidence observed through sensor signals. In this work, sub systems of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) type vehicle like avionics, structures, power-train etc. are taken into account to show the approach at the system level. This work integrates early design phase in the development of UAM type vehicles with diagnostic tools, which are often developed later in the product life-cycle, or retrofitted at a later time on systems. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) derived for the system in the design phase is embedded within a Bayesian network (BN).

UAM↗

Generation and analysis of large reliability models

An effort has been underway for several years at NASA's Langley Research Center to extend the capability of Markov modeling techniques for reliability analysis to the designers of highly reliable avionic systems. This effort has been focused in the areas of increased model abstraction and increased computational capability. The reliability model generator (RMG), a software tool which uses as input a graphical, object-oriented block diagram of the system, is discussed. RMG uses an automated failure modes-effects analysis algorithm to produce the reliability model from the graphical description. Also considered is the ASSURE software tool, a parallel processing program which uses the ASSIST modeling language and SURE semi-Markov solution technique. An executable failure modes-effects analysis is used by ASSURE. The successful combination of the power of graphical representation, automated model generation, and parallel computation leads to the conclusion that large system architectures can now be analyzed.

Aerospace electronics↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (EPG/PRSD) subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baselines with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison are documented for the Orbiter EPG/PRSD hardware. The comparison produced agreement on all but 27 FMEAs and 9 CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of IOA findings and NASA FMEAs can be partially explained by the different approaches used by IOA and NASA to group failure modes together to form one FMEA. Also, several IOA items represented inner tank components and ground operations failure modes which were not in the NASA baseline.

Ames, B. E.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 2

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Barickman, K.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

Collision avoidance for CTV: Requirements and capabilities

Collision avoidance must be ensured during Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CTV) operations near the space station. The design of the Collision Avoidance Maneuver (CAM) will involve analysis of CTV failure modes during rendezvous and proximity operations as well as analysis of possible problems external to the CTV, but that would require CTV to execute a CAM. In considering the requirements and design of the CAM for the CTV, the CAM design for the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) is a useful reference point from which some lessons can be learned and many CTV design options can be set forth.

Nosek, Thomas↗

Discovery and Analysis of Rare High-Impact Failure Modes using Adversarial RL-Informed Sampling

Adaptive learning agents have tremendous potential to handle critical tasks currently performed by humans. Unfortunately, due to their complexity, it can be difficult to verify that these learning agents do not have critical failure modes. Standard verification and validation methods often do not apply directly to learning agents and Monte Carlo methods have difficulty covering even a small fraction of the state space, especially in multiagent systems or over long time horizons. To overcome this difficulty, we demonstrate an adaptive stress-testing method based on reinforcement learning of correlations that raise the probability of failure. This approach has three key properties: (1) it is able to find rare failure modes with far greater sample efficiency than Monte Carlo methods, (2) it can estimate the true probability of a failure mode despite the inherent bias in the learning method, and (3) it is capable of learning and resampling compact representations of multimodal failure spaces. These properties are important in practice as we need to find disparate failure modes while accounting for their actual relevance. This is a significant advantage over traditional adaptive stress testing methods that give abstract likelihoods of particular failure instances, but cannot estimate the probability of a broader failure mode. We test our algorithm on a simple problem from the aviation domain where an autonomous aircraft lands in gusty wind conditions. The results suggest that we can find failure modes with far fewer samples than the Monte Carlo approach and simultaneously estimate the probability of failure.

reinforcement learning↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗

Detecting Hidden Failure Modes in Critical, Embedded Software

This experience report describes a method that has been used successfully to detect hidden failure modes in critical, embedded spacecraft software. The method is an adaptation of an earlier, controversial approach called failure modes and effects analysis. The adapted method was found to be well-suited to identifying latent software design weaknesses involving complex system interactions and dependencies in the two applications described here. This experience may be useful for other high-integrity software systems in which the possibility of hidden failure modes is a major concern.

detecting software failure design analysis↗

Spacecraft reliability/maintainability optimization.

Description of a procedure to develop a methodology to optimize man-serviced systems for reliability and maintainability. The spacecraft systems are analyzed using failure modes and effects analysis and maintenance analysis, component mean-time-between failure, duty cycle, type of redundancy, and cost information to develop parametric data on various time intervals. Included are crew time-to-repair, cost, weight, and volume effects of increasing subsystem reliability above the baseline. Results are presented for space systems using the existing data from a research and applications module. These results show the minimum cost of sustaining mission operations.

Sharmahd, J. N.↗

Failure-Tolerant Avionics for Crewed Space Systems Recommended Best Practices

This paper provides an overview of some of the major steps needed to mature and justify the design of an avionics system for crewed spacecraft. It is organized as a collection of artifacts or pieces of evidence that NASA needs to assess the system at design reviews, including a functional failure modes and effects analysis (FFMEA), fault containment region (FCR) definitions, the failure hypothesis, and reliability analysis. This paper is intended as a reference for designers working on NASA crewed spaceflight projects, reliability engineers responsible for avionics system assessments, and program managers wanting to understand what evidence is required at design reviews to ensure crew safety and mission success.

Avionics↗

Uncovering Hazards Using a Multi-Objective Optimization to Explore the Faulty State-Space

Considering resilience when designing complex engineered systems is crucial to ensure the system is safe under unexpected hazardous scenarios. Traditional risk-based approaches, such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are useful for designing the system to mitigate hazardous scenarios that can be identified by the designer, but often require experience or prior knowledge of system failures to generate. More recently, researchers have developed simulation tools that enable the designer to model large sets of hazardous scenarios (driven by both internal faults and external factors) through simulation. While these tools enable a wider scope of fault modes to be evaluated (e.g., by injecting combined set of fault modes or injecting modes at different times), the resulting assessments (like FMEA) still require knowledge of the specific modes to be evaluated. However, failure to analyze a wide variety of fault scenarios can lead to an incomplete picture of the system resilience, especially to "surprise events'' which may be difficult for the designer to identify and predict beforehand. To overcome this challenge, previous work developed a fault sampling approach for resilience simulations which would procedurally-generate a wide variety of potential faults by systematically perturbing the health states of the system. While the resulting fault modes generated covered a much larger space hazards than would be otherwise considered (and identified many unique failure trajectories which would not have otherwise been identified), it also significantly increased the computational cost of the analysis and resulted in the simulation and analysis of a large set of essentially duplicate scenarios. Additionally, as the number of dimensions in the faulty state-space increases, the full elaboration of possible modes becomes computationally infeasible, justifying the use of a more targeted search. To resolve this limitation, this work proposes the use of a multiobjective optimization algorithm to search the health state space for potential fault modes that are both (1) hazardous and (2) unique. To solve this type of problem, this work proposes the use of a cooperative co-evolutionary algorithm. To demonstrate this approach, it will be applied to a model of an autonomous rover which uses line markings to navigate, focusing on potential hazards in the drive system which could cause the rover to crash. To determine the merit of the approach, it will further be compared with the previously-presented range elaboration approach and a random mode generation approach on the basis of computational efficiency and found modes.

Resilience↗

Characterization and Failure Analysis of 650 V Enhancement-Mode GaN HEMT for Cryogenically-Cooled Power Electronics

In order to evaluate the feasibility of newly developed GaN devices in a cryogenically-cooled converter, this paper characterizes a 650 V enhancement-mode Gallium-Nitride high-electron-mobility transistor (GaN HEMT) at cryogenic temperatures. The characterization includes both static and dynamic behaviors. The results show that this GaN HEMT is an excellent device candidate to be applied in cryogenic-cooled applications. For example, transconductance at cryogenic temperature (93 K) is 2.5 times higher than one at room temperature (298 K), and accordingly, peak di/dt during turn-on transients at cryogenic temperature is around 2 times of that at room temperature. Moreover, the on-resistance of the channel at cryogenic temperature is only one-fifth of that at room temperature. The corresponding explanations of performance trends at cryogenic temperatures are also given from the view of semiconductor physics. In addition, several device failures were observed during the dynamic characterization of GaN HEMTs at cryogenic temperatures. The ultra-fast switching speed induced high di/dt and dv/dt at cryogenic temperatures amplifies the negative effects of parasitics inside the switching loop. Based on failure waveforms, two failure modes were classified, and detailed failure mechanisms caused by ultra-fast switching speed are given in this paper.

Static and dynamic characterization↗