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The intent of this document is to provide guidance on when and what type of -SEE tests should be performed on a device under test (OUT) based on orbit, technology, existing data, and application. It is NOT intended to provide a detailed guideline for how to perform proton SEE radiation tests on electronics.
There is a need to derive a power spectral density (PSD) envelope for nonstationary acceleration time histories, including launch vehicle data, so that components can be designed and tested accordingly. This paper presents the results of the three methods for an actual flight accelerometer record. Guidelines are given for the application of each method to nonstationary data. The method can be extended to other scenarios, including transportation vibration.
A key parameter in modeling differential spacecraft charging is the resistivity of insulating materials. This determines how charge will accumulate and redistribute across the spacecraft, as well as the time scale for charge transport and dissipation. Existing spacecraft charging guidelines recommend use of tests and imported resistivity data from handbooks that are based principally upon ASTM methods that are more applicable to classical ground conditions and designed for problems associated with power loss through the dielectric, than for how long charge can be stored on an insulator. These data have been found to underestimate charging effects by one to four orders of magnitude for spacecraft charging applications. A review is presented of methods to measure the resistive of highly insulating materials, including the electrometer-resistance method, the electrometer-constant voltage method, the voltage rate-of-change method and the charge storage method. This is based on joint experimental studies conducted at NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Utah State University to investigate the charge storage method and its relation to spacecraft charging. The different methods are found to be appropriate for different resistivity ranges and for different charging circumstances. A simple physics-based model of these methods allows separation of the polarization current and dark current components from long duration measurements of resistivity over day- to month-long time scales. Model parameters are directly related to the magnitude of charge transfer and storage and the rate of charge transport. The model largely explains the observed differences in resistivity found using the different methods and provides a framework for recommendations for the appropriate test method for spacecraft materials with different resistivities and applications. The proposed changes to the existing engineering guidelines are intended to provide design engineers more appropriate methods for consideration and measurements of resistivity for many typical spacecraft charging scenarios.
The procedure is described which was used to train automatic data processing (ADP) analysts to process ERTS 1 imagery from a 5 nm by 6 nm area in Delisle, Canada, and to estimate wheat acreage using training fields provided by photointerpreters. The exercise also served to evaluate and test current large area crop inventory experiment (LACIE) procedures.
The objective of EVMS surveillance is to ensure that the management control processes that support the performance measurement baseline (PMB) are in place, compliant with the EVMS guidelines, are routinely being used, and provide timely and reliable data. The PMB is a triple constraint where the constraints are schedule, budget and scope. For Surveillance, NASA uses the DCMA EVM Compliance Metrics (DECM) Tests that are aligned with the EIA-748 EVM Standard. Guidelines 6 is Scheduling Work, and DECM has 23 Tests for evaluating if the IMS supports project goals in its planning, statusing and forecasting. This session will focus on the Test Metric that analyzes forecast start/finish dates riding the status date of the IMS for two or more consecutive months as an example of how surveillance works in concert with IMS health checks. It will cover how to run the test to recognize trends and how this test helps ensure that the forecast is credible in support of critical path analysis.
A draft Military Handbook prepared under the sponsorship of the USAF Space Division is presently being distributed throughout the U.S. for review by the aerospace community. This comprehensive document provides recommended guidelines for the acquisition and analysis of structural dynamics and aeroacoustic data, and is intended to reduce the errors and variability commonly found in flight, ground and laboratory dynamic test measurements. In addition to the usual variety of measurement problems encountered in the definition of dynamic loads, the development of design and test criteria, and the analysis of failures, special emphasis is given to certain state-of-the-art topics, such as pyroshock data acquisition and nonstationary random data analysis.
Payloads to be launched on the space shuttle/space tug/sortie lab combinations are discussed. The payloads are of four types: (1) expendable, (2) ground refurbishable, (3) on-orbit maintainable, and (4) sortie. Economic comparisons are limited to the four types of payloads described. Additional system guidelines were developed by analyzing two payloads parameterically and demonstrating the results on an example satellite. In addition to analyzing the selected guidelines, emphasis was placed on providing economic tradeoff data and identifying payload parameters influencing the low cost approaches.
The crop estimation analysis procedures documentation of the AgRISTARS - Foreign Commodity Production Forecasting Project (FCPF) is presented. Specifically it includes the technical/management documentation of the remote sensing data analysis procedures prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the FCPF communication/documentation standards manual. Standard documentation sets are given arranged by procedural type and level then by crop types or other technically differentiating categories.
Aerospace structures utilize innovative, lightweight composite materials for exploration activities. These structural components, due to various reasons including size limitations, manufacturing facilities, contractual obligations, or particular design requirements, will have to be joined. The common methodologies for joining composite components are the adhesively bonded and mechanically fastened joints and, in certain instances, both methods are simultaneously incorporated into the design. Guidelines and recommendations exist for engineers to develop design criteria and analyze and test composites. However, there are no guidelines or recommendations based on analysis or test data to specify a torque or torque range to apply to metallic mechanical fasteners used to join composite components. Utilizing the torque tension machine at NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center, an initial series of tests were conducted to determine the maximum torque that could be applied to a composite specimen. Acoustic emissions were used to nondestructively assess the specimens during the tests and thermographic imaging after the tests.
The Shuttle Hypervelocity Impact Database documents damage features on each Orbiter thought to be from micrometeoroids (MM) or orbital debris (OD). Data is divided into tables for crew module windows, payload bay door radiators and thermal protection systems along with other miscellaneous regions. The combined number of records in the database is nearly 3000. Each database record provides impact feature dimensions, location on the vehicle and relevant mission information. Additional detail on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site is provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Guidelines are described which were used in determining whether impact damage is from micrometeoroid or orbital debris impact based on the findings from scanning electron microscopy chemical analysis. Relationships assumed when converting from observed feature sizes in different shuttle materials to particle sizes will be presented. A small number of significant impacts on the windows, radiators and wing leading edge will be highlighted and discussed in detail, including the hypervelocity impact testing performed to estimate particle sizes that produced the damage.
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.
Today's launch vehicles complex electronic and avionic systems heavily utilize the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuit (IC). FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MIL-STD-1553B, and in control signal commands such as in solenoid/servo valves actuations. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for a launch vehicle, the guidelines will account for hardware, firmware, and radiation induced failures. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the IC, FPGA memory and clock. The firmware portion will provide guidelines on the high level FPGA programming language and ways to account for software/code reliability growth. The radiation portion will provide guidelines on environment susceptibility as well as guidelines on tailoring other launch vehicle programs historical data to a specific launch vehicle.
The Technology Capability Level-2 National Campaign (TCL2nc) was conducted at six different test-sites located across the USA, during May and June of 2017. The campaign resulted in over 240 data collection flights using 24 different aircraft and involving 23 flight crews. Flights not only varied in duration, but also in the environments and terrains over which they flew. The TCL2nc highlighted beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and altitude-stratified operations, and saw five partners bring their own, independently built, UAS Service Supplier (USS) for use during the flight tests. This document presents data collected during the TCL2nc that informs the 'Operator' section of the 'Requirements/Best Practices' from the UTM Technical Capability Matrix and Guidelines to Operate (Rios, version as of March 2017). A review of the data collected indicated that although teams were well qualified on paper (in terms of both completing training and having experience with flying UAS vehicles), greater consideration should be given to the unique perspectives and backgrounds of future UAS operators. Overall, teams looked at a variety of sources for information, including USS client-displays, and participants became more mindful of the need to be aware of other vehicles, highlighting the value of reporting information. Observations found that flight crews' time to respond to a UTM issue depended heavily on the team structure, communication efficiency, and crew procedures. These points are discussed in more detail below.
The Technology Capability Level-2 National Campaign (TCL2nc) was conducted at six different test sites located across the USA, during May and June of 2017. The campaign resulted in over 250 data collection flights using 26 different aircraft and involving 23 flight crews. Flights not only varied in duration, but also in the environments and terrains over which they flew. The TCL2nc highlighted beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and altitude-stratified operations, and saw five partners bring their own, independently built, UTM Service Supplier (USS) for use during the flight tests. This document presents data collected during the TCL2nc that informs the 'Operator' section of the 'Requirements/Best Practices' from the UTM Technical Capability Matrix and Guidelines to Operate (Rios, version as of March 2017). A review of the data collected indicated that although teams were well qualified on paper (in terms of both completing training and having experience with flying UAS vehicles), greater consideration should be given to the unique perspectives and backgrounds of future UAS operators. Overall, teams looked at a variety of sources for information, including USS client-displays, and participants became more aware of the need to be aware of other vehicles, highlighting the value of reporting information. Observations found that flight crews' time to respond to a UTM issue depended heavily on the team structure, communication efficiency, and crew procedures.
During the YF-16 and F-16 developmental wind tunnel test program, numerous variations in nose and forebody strakes were investigated. These data were reviewed, and the strake aerodynamic characteristics coalesced into design guidelines for the application of strakes to fighter aircraft. The design guides take the form of general equations governing the modification of forebody strakes to obtain a linear pitching moment curve and the calculation of the resulting lift and drag increments. Additionally, qualitative comments are made concerning the effects of strake geometry on lateral/directional stability. It is concluded that the generation of incremental strake lift is primarily dependent upon the area affected by the strake-induced vortex and that strake planform is of secondary importance. Forebody strakes have small beneficial effects on lateral/directional stability if properly designed; however, significant gains are easily attained with nose strakes.
Individual Spacelab experiments are responsible for developing their CRT display formats and interactive command scenarios for payload crew monitoring and control of experiment operations via the Spacelab Data Display System (DDS). In order to enhance crew training and flight operations, it was important to establish some standardization of the crew/experiment interface among different experiments by providing standard methods and techniques for data presentation and experiment commanding via the DDS. In order to establish optimum usage guidelines for the Spacelab DDS, the capabilities and limitations of the hardware and Experiment Computer Operating System design had to be considered. Since the operating system software and hardware design had already been established, the Display and Command Usage Guidelines were constrained to the capabilities of the existing system design. Empirical evaluations were conducted on a DDS simulator to determine optimum operator/system interface utilization of the system capabilities. Display parameters such as information location, display density, data organization, status presentation and dynamic update effects were evaluated in terms of response times and error rates.
As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions, it is envisioned that crews will behave more autonomously as compared to low-Earth orbit missions. When considering long duration exploration missions, Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) identified the following benefits and challenges presented on this slide. As missions operate further from Earth, the communication latency between the spacecraft and Mission Control Center will increase requiring the crew to take a more active role in reacting to daily planning. However, one of the key challenges for crew self-scheduling is that we do not want to overwhelm astronauts who are not expert mission planners. This leads to our primary research objective: to first, characterize the human performance envelope for the task of planning and scheduling in the context of human spaceflight operations, then, develop countermeasure aids to mitigate adverse performance effects due to plan complexity, and finally, inform performance standards and guidelines based on research results. Our next steps are to finish summarizing our findings from the experiment in conference papers and our upcoming yearly report. In the upcoming year, we will continue to collect data in analog missions and begin summarizing our recommended standards and guidelines.