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System and method associated with expedient detection and reconstruction of cyber events in a compact scenario representation using provenance tags and customizable policy

A system associated with detecting a cyber-attack and reconstructing events associated with a cyber-attack campaign, is disclosed. The system performs various operations that include receiving an audit data stream associated with cyber events. The system identifies trustworthiness values in a portion of data associated with the cyber events and assigns provenance tags to the portion of the data based on the identified trustworthiness values. An initial visual representation is generated based on the assigned provenance tags to the portion of the data. The initial visual representation is condensed based on a backward traversal of the initial visual representation in identifying a shortest path from a suspect node to an entry point node. A scenario visual representation is generated that specifies nodes most relevant to the cyber events associated with the cyber-attack based on the identified shortest path.A corresponding method and computer-readable medium are also disclosed.

Source record↗

Improving Cyber Situational Understanding

Effective cybersecurity operations require the ability to analyze large amounts of information to assess security risks and formulate defensive strategies against adversaries. This has become more complex in recent years as the sprawl and interconnectivity of devices grows through implementation of virtualization, cloud computing, and Internet of Things (IoT). The amount of data and analysis required for effective cybersecurity command and control decisions far exceeds humans’ capacity to perform manually. We characterize the analysis problem as cyber situational understanding. The research presented to improve cyber situational understanding focuses on vulnerability analysis and threat intelligence. Regarding vulnerabilities, entities must analyze and plan work for between thousands and tens of thousands of software vulnerabilities annually. Entities heavily use network firewalls to limit vulnerability exposure. As a result, some of these vulnerabilities permit exposure to adversarial exploitation, whereas others are inaccessible and therefore present negligible risk of exploitation. Distinguishing between high and low risk software vulnerabilities requires a deep understanding of the vulnerability, network firewall protection, and characteristics of the targeted device. This problem is solved by extracting network service features from vulnerability data features using both machine-learning and natural language processing. Then, the network firewall topology is parsed to determine which vulnerabilities are reachable by adversaries. Ultimately, a state-based safety analysis ascertains which vulnerabilities are unsafe. A related vulnerability analysis problem occurs in cybersecurity operations when associating an entity’s hardware and software assets to public vulnerability databases. Assets often reveal hardware and software through installation artifacts and network service identification, and entities store these artifacts in inventory databases. However, software and hardware vendors apply a standard Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) naming convention when publicly reporting vulnerabilities. Associating these two datasets often requires many hours to days of manual inspection. The proposed solution automates the mapping approach of human analysts using fuzzy matching techniques, natural language processing, and, ultimately, machine learning to present a small set of recommendations for mapping the two datasets. The result significantly reduces human analysis time and reduces the occurrence of false positives in vulnerability notifications. Finally, cyber threat intelligence (CTI) requires associating cyber observable artifacts, such as IP addresses, URIs, and file hashes, with cyber threat tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, most CTI data is compartmentalized across multiple organizations and cannot be shared due to the legal and reputational risk with cyber threat being associated with the entity. The approach to solving this problem inovlves using a distributed ledger with anonymous token spending and authentication. This allows a consortium of semi-trusted entities to share the workload of curating CTI for a threat sharing community’s cooperative benefit.

Huff, Philip↗

Gamification for Measuring Cyber Security Situational Awareness

Cyber defense competitions arising from U.S. service academy exercises, offer a platform for collecting data that can inform research that ranges from characterizing the ideal cyber warrior to describing behaviors during certain challenging cyber defense situations. This knowledge could lead to better preparation of cyber defenders in both military and civilian settings. This paper describes how one regional competition, the PRCCDC, a participant in the national CCDC program, conducted proof of concept experimentation to collect data during the annual competition for later analysis. The intent is to create an ongoing research agenda that expands on this current work and incorporates augmented cognition and gamification methods for measuring cybersecurity situational awareness under the stress of cyber attack.

Cyber Defense Competitions, CCDC, cyber defender, ↗

Defensive Islanding to Enhance the Resilience of Distribution Systems Against Cyber-Induced Failures

The extensive integration of communication, computation, and control technologies into cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs) has increased the vulnerabilities of CPPSs to cyberattacks. This calls for developing solutions that assess and reduce the impacts of cyber-induced failures on CPPSs. This paper proposes a defensive islanding strategy to isolate impacted parts of the CPPS and form self-sufficient islanded grids with an objective of minimum load curtailment. The defensive islanding aims to split a power system into smaller grids to improve its resilience against a potential extreme event. A clustering approach that leverages the hierarchical spectral clustering method is utilized for the optimal defensive islanding. The proposed approach captures the fragility behavior and loading conditions of power system components due to cyber-induced failures. A graphical-based coupling framework is used to map the impacts of cyber failures into operation of power system components. The proposed method is demonstrated on a modified 33-node distribution feeder system integrated with distributed energy resources. The amount of load curtailment and radiality constraints have been used to evaluate the performance of the proposed clustering strategies. The results show the capability of the proposed algorithm to create islands considering the cyber-induced failures for enhanced resilience.

cyber-induced failures↗

A Four-Layer Cyber-Physical Security Model for Electric Machine Drives Considering Control Information Flow

Despite the IEEE Power Electronics Society (PELS) establishing Technical Committee 10 on Design Methodologies with a focus on the cyber-physical security of power electronics systems, a holistic design methodology for addressing security vulnerabilities remains underdeveloped. This gap largely stems from the limited integration of computer science and power/control engineering studies in this interdisciplinary field. Addressing the inadequacy of unilateral cyber or control perspectives, this article presents a novel four-layer cyber-physical security model specifically designed for electric machine drives. Central to this model is the innovative control information flow (CIF) model, residing within the control layer, which serves as a pivotal link between the cyber layer's vulnerable resources and the physical layer's state-space models. By mapping vulnerable resources to control variable space and tracing attack propagation, the CIF model facilitates accurate impact predictions based on tainted control laws. The effectiveness and validity of this proposed model are demonstrated through hardware experiments involving two typical cyber-attack scenarios, underscoring its potential as a comprehensive framework for multidisciplinary security strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Real-Time Federated Cyber-Transmission-Distribution Testbed Architecture for the Resiliency Analysis

With the ongoing automation driven by the push toward the smart electric grid and the advancement in associated cyber infrastructure, the interaction between physical [electric transmission and distribution (T&D) systems], cyber (communication, automation, and control), and human (grid operators and decision-makers) is increasingly becoming more complex. This creates the requirement of analyzing the effect of the transmission system on the distribution system and vice versa with consideration of the additional complexity of the cyber infrastructure. Such an integrated testbed will also help with resiliency analysis, where resiliency refers to the ability of the system to continue serving energy to the critical loads even with limited extreme contingencies. Interaction of the physical power grid with the cyber layer can be effectively modeled using real-time (RT) simulator for developing and validating various operational and control algorithms. Testbeds using RT simulators with multiple capabilities have been developed at different institutions. Still, no single existing testbed can offer full scalability while simultaneously meeting high fidelity requirements for resiliency experimentation. Co-simulating federated testbed assets can provide a scalable experimentation platform that can be leveraged for verification and validation. In this article, an architecture is developed for federated cyber-physical testbed. A local federation with two real-time simulators is developed: real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and OPAL-RT have been interfaced using VILLAS framework for end-to-end testing. Also, a real-time linear predictor is developed and integrated here to address the communication latency impact on geographically allocated federated RT simulation. Finally, resiliency analysis tools are formulated and utilized for T&D systems. Finally as an illustrative use case, the resiliency of a T&D test system is simulated, and the results are analyzed. A 179-bus Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) transmission system is developed using OPAL-RT/ HYPERSIM, and a modified IEEE 13 node feeder system is modeled in RTDS/RSCAD and interfaced for resiliency analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Impact of cyber attacks on distributed compressive sensing based state estimation in power distribution grids

Modern power distribution grids suffer from multiple vulnerabilities due to the tight integration between the physical system and the cyber infrastructure. Sophisticated and malicious cyber attacks continue to adversely impact the grid operation leading to performance degradation, service interruption, and grid failure. State estimation plays an essential role in grid monitoring and advancing cyber-attack situational awareness. In this regard, this paper first proposes a distributed compressive sensing (CS) state estimation approach for an unobservable distribution grid. Further, the proposed distributed CS approach divides the distribution grid into sub-areas to perform local state estimation. Then an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based iterative information exchange among neighboring areas is employed to complete the estimation process. In this estimation process, the impact of loss of measurement data, false data injection (FDI), replay, and neighborhood cyber-attacks is analyzed. Extensive simulations are performed on the IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus standard networks to demonstrate the algorithm’s robustness to the aforementioned cyber-attacks. A quantitative analysis of computational complexity and simulation time of the distributed CS based approach is also presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NEFTSec: Networked federation testbed for cyber-physical security of smart grid: Architecture, applications, and evaluation

As today's power grid is evolving into a densely interconnected cyber-physical system (CPS), a high fidelity and multifaceted testbed environment is needed to perform cybersecurity experiments in a realistic grid environment. Traditional standalone CPS testbeds lack the ability to emulate complex cyber-physical interdependencies between multiple smart grid domains in a real-time environment. Therefore, there are ongoing research and development (R&D) efforts to develop an interconnected CPS testbed by sharing geographically dispersed testbed resources to perform distributed simulation while analysing simulation fidelity. This paper presents a networked federation testbed for cybersecurity evaluation of today's and emerging smart grid environments. Specifically, it presents two novel testbed architectures, including cyber federation and cyber-physical federation, identifies R&D applications, and also describes testbed building blocks with experimental case studies. It also presents a novel co-simulation interface algorithm to facilitate distributed simulation within cyber-physical federation. The resources available at the PowerCyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University (ISU) and the US Army Research Laboratory are utilised to develop this platform for performing multiple experimental case studies pertaining to wide-area protection and control applications in power system. Finally, experimental results are presented to analyse the simulation fidelity and real-time performance of the testbed federation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Physical Event Emulation-Based Transmission-and-Distribution Co-Simulation for Situational Awareness of Grid Anomalies (SAGA)

Energy management of transmission and distribution networks (T&D) is becoming more challenging with the accelerated adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs)-such as distributed photovoltaic generation and battery energy storage systems (BESS)-on the electric grid. To better analyze the impacts of DERs on both transmission and distribution systems, a comprehensive T&D co-simulation platform is developed. Further, with DERs more actively participating in system operation-e.g., by providing real-time grid services-their cyber vulnerability needs to be better understood to maintain system reliability. This paper discusses a cyber-physical events emulation-based T&D co-simulation platform to perform comprehensive cyber events emulations, physical simulation, and analysis of interdependent impacts. Results from the case studies-which show how cyber events on a synthetic distribution network can impact operations on the transmission and distribution network-validate that the proposed T&D cosimulation platform can perform cyber-physical events emulation and produce response in near realtime; therefore, with extensive simulation using the proposed co-simulation platform, the system operators can accumulate adequate training data for system situational awareness of grid anomalies.

anomalies detection↗

Resilient Cyber Infrastructure for the Minimum Wind Curtailment Remedial Control Scheme

Integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) has been significantly increasing in the electric power grid. One of the predominant renewable energy sources, wind energy, possess a significant challenge for grid operations, due to its intermittency, uncertainty and variability. In changing operating conditions with wind uncertainty, part of wind may need to be curtailed for the safe utilization of the transmission system. In order to minimize the wind power curtailment and to keep the power flow on a transmission line under limits, a cyber resilient Distributed Remedial Action Scheme (DRAS) is developed in this paper. The RAS is formulated as an optimization problem, considering the real power flow constraints of the transmission lines and given wind variability. In this paper, DRAS is developed to operate even with failures in the computing nodes to make it cyber-resilient. Distributed simplex algorithm is used for optimization in the distributed RAS. The DRAS is implemented in a decentralized platform called Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS) to enable cyber resiliency of DRAS. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through offline simulations of the New England 39 bus system and online simulations of IEEE 14 bus test system. In conclusion, a cyber physical test bed utilizing Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), and BeagleBones has been used for the online simulation and validation of the developed cyber-resilient RAS.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Toward a Visualization-Supported Workflow for Cyber Alert Management using Threat Models and Human-Centered Design

Cyber network analysts follow complex processes in their investigations of potential threats to their network. Much research is dedicated to providing automated tool support in the effort to make their tasks more efficient, accurate, and timely. This tool support comes in a variety of implementations from machine learning algorithms that monitor streams of data to visual analytic environments for exploring rich and noisy data sets. Cyber analysts, however, often speak of a need for tools which help them merge the data they already have and help them establish appropriate baselines against which to compare potential anomalies. Furthermore, existing threat models that cyber analysts regularly use to structure their investigation are not often leveraged in support tools. We report on our work with cyber analysts to understand they analytic process and how one such model, the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix [32], is used to structure their analytic thinking. We present our efforts to map specific data needed by analysts into the threat model to inform our eventual visualization designs. We examine data mapping for gaps where the threat model is under-supported by either data or tools. We discuss these gaps as potential design spaces for future research efforts. We also discuss the design of a prototype tool that combines machine-learning and visualization components to support cyber analysts working with this threat model.

Cyber Security↗

Modeling and Detection of Future Cyber-Enabled DSM Data Attacks

Demand-Side Management (DSM) is an essential tool to ensure power system reliability and stability. In future smart grids, certain portions of a customer’s load usage could be under the automatic control of a cyber-enabled DSM program, which selectively schedules loads as a function of electricity prices to improve power balance and grid stability. In this scenario, the security of DSM cyberinfrastructure will be critical as advanced metering infrastructure and communication systems are susceptible to cyber-attacks. Such attacks, in the form of false data injections, can manipulate customer load profiles and cause metering chaos and energy losses in the grid. The feedback mechanism between load management on the consumer side and dynamic price schemes employed by independent system operators can further exacerbate attacks. To study how this feedback mechanism may worsen attacks in future cyber-enabled DSM programs, we propose a novel mathematical framework for (i) modeling the nonlinear relationship between load management and real-time pricing, (ii) simulating residential load data and prices, (iii) creating cyber-attacks, and (iv) detecting said attacks. In this framework, we first develop time-series forecasts to model load demand and use them as inputs to an elasticity model for the price-demand relationship in the DSM loop. This work then investigates the behavior of such a feedback loop under intentional cyber-attacks. We simulate and examine load-price data under different DSM-participation levels with three types of random additive attacks: ramp, sudden, and point attacks. We conduct two investigations for the detection of DSM attacks. The first studies a supervised learning approach, with various classification models, and the second studies the performance of parametric and nonparametric change point detectors. Results conclude that higher amounts of DSM participation can exacerbate ramp and sudden attacks leading to better detection of such attacks, especially with supervised learning classifiers. We also find that nonparametric detection outperforms parametric for smaller user pools, and random point attacks are the hardest to detect with any method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Network Intrusion Detection and Visualization using Aggregations in a Cyber Security Data Warehouse

The challenge of achieving situational understanding is a limiting factor in effective, timely, and adaptive cyber-security analysis. Anomaly detection fills a critical role in network assessment and trend analysis, both of which underlie the establishment of comprehensive situational understanding. To that end, we propose a cyber security data warehouse implemented as a hierarchical graph of aggregations that captures anomalies at multiple scales. Each node of our pro-posed graph is a summarization table of cyber event aggregations, and the edges are aggregation operators. The cyber security data warehouse enables domain experts to quickly traverse a multi-scale aggregation space systematically. We describe the architecture of a test bed system and a summary of results on the IEEE VAST 2012 Cyber Forensics data.

anomaly detection↗

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

Embracing the Cloud for Better Cyber Security

The future of cyber security is inextricably tied to the future of computing. Organizational needs and economic factors will drive computing outcomes. Cyber security researchers and practitioners must recognize the path of computing evolution and position themselves to influence the process to incorporate security as an inherent property. The best way to predict future computing trends is to look at recent developments and their motivations. Organizations are moving towards outsourcing their data storage, computation, and even user desktop environments. This trend toward cloud computing has a direct impact on cyber security: rather than securing user machines, preventing malware access, and managing removable media, a cloud-based security scheme must focus on enabling secure communication with remote systems. This change in approach will have profound implications for cyber security research efforts. In this work, we highlight existing and emerging technologies and the limitations of cloud computing systems. We then discuss the cyber security efforts that would support these applications. Finally, we discuss the implications of these computing architecture changes, in particular with respect to malware and social engineering.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber Security Testing and Training Programs for Industrial Control Systems

Service providers rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to manage the flow of water at dams, open breakers on power grids, control ventilation and cooling in nuclear power plants, and more. In today's interconnected environment, this can present a serious cyber security challenge. To combat this growing challenge, government, private industry, and academia are working together to reduce cyber risks. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a key contributor to the Department of Energy National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), both of which focus on improving the overall security posture of ICS in the national critical infrastructure. In support of the NSTB, INL hosts a dedicated SCADA testing facility which consists of multiple control systems supplied by leading national and international manufacturers. Within the test bed, INL researchers systematically examine control system components and work to identify vulnerabilities. In support of the CSSP, INL develops and conducts training courses which are designed to increase awareness and defensive capabilities for IT/Control System professionals. These trainings vary from web-based cyber security trainings for control systems engineers to more advanced hands-on training that culminates with a Red Team/ Blue Team exercise that is conducted within an actual control systems environment. INL also provides staffing and operational support to the DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Security Operations Center which responds to and analyzes control systems cyber incidents across the 18 US critical infrastructure sectors.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System for Cyber-Intrusion Detection in a Smart Grid

The evolution of the power grid has brought increasing deployment of advance metering infrastructure, penetration of intelligent electronic devices, and integration of physical power system components with information and communications technologies. With the fast-expanding connectivity, cyber vulnerabilities arise due to the use of internet-based communication systems. These systems are targets of cyber-intrusions which attempt to disturb the normal power system functions. Traditional intrusion detection algorithms have been developed without an explicit model of the cyber components. In this paper, an algorithm to detect false data injections in the power system is proposed considering both cyber and physical models of the power system. The algorithm is based on an Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) which collects information from state variables of the cyber-physical system to meet the performance requirements of the grid. Simulations of the proposed approach using the IEEE 13-bus test system validate the effectiveness of this artificial intelligence-based algorithm.

Adaptive Neuro Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS), cyb↗