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NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Judging Edward Teller: A Closer Look at One of the Most Influential Scientists of the Twentieth Century

Much has been written about Edward TEller, but little of it is objective. Given, on the one hand, his position as one of the most inventive theoretical physicists of the 20th century, and on the other, his central role in the development and advocacy of thermonuclear weapons, one might imagine it impossible at this point in history to write a scholarly, impartial account of Teller's life and his impact. Now, however, Istvan Hargittai, a prominent Hungarian physical chemist and historian of science, has written a balanced, thoughtful, and beautifully research biography that comes closest. Hargittai is uniquely qualified for this difficult task. Coming a generation and a half later from a similar Hungarian-Jewish background, Hargittai understands well the influences and terrible events that shaped Teller. The advent of virulent, political anti-Semitism, first in Hungary and then in Germany, made Teller twice a refugee. Both Teller and Hargittai lost close family in the Holocaust; Hargittai was himself liberated from a Nazi concentration camp as a child. While Teller was in the US by then, his and Hargittai's surviving family members in Hungary suffered mistreatment at the hands of the postwar Hungarian Communist dictatorship. Hargittai's informed Eastern European perspective also provides a fresh viewpoint to the cold war context of the second half of Teller's career. Furthermore, Hargittai's own scientific work in molecular structure clearly makes him appreciate of Teller's breakthroughs in that field in the 1930s.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience

Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

P Reactor Grouting

Filling the P Reactor with grout. This seals the radioactive material and reduces the environmental footprint left from the Cold War. Project sponsored by the Recovery Act at the Savannah River Site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comments for A Conference on Verification in the 21st Century

The author offers 5 points for the discussion of Verification and Technology: (1) Experience with the implementation of arms limitation and arms reduction agreements confirms that technology alone has never been relied upon to provide effective verification. (2) The historical practice of verification of arms control treaties between Cold War rivals may constrain the cooperative and innovative use of technology for transparency, veification and confidence building in the future. (3) An area that has been identified by many, including the US State Department and NNSA as being rich for exploration for potential uses of technology for transparency and verification is information and communications technology (ICT). This includes social media, crowd-sourcing, the internet of things, and the concept of societal verification, but there are issues. (4) On the issue of the extent to which verification technologies are keeping pace with the demands of future protocols and agrements I think the more direct question is ''are they effective in supporting the objectives of the treaty or agreement?'' In this regard it is important to acknowledge that there is a verification grand challenge at our doorstep. That is ''how does one verify limitations on nuclear warheads in national stockpiles?'' (5) Finally, while recognizing the daunting political and security challenges of such an approach, multilateral engagement and cooperation at the conceptual and technical levels provides benefits for addressing future verification challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (Abbreviated Version)

Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. This report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Formic Acid Free Flowsheet Development To Eliminate Catalytic Hydrogen Generation In The Defense Waste Processing

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes legacy nuclear waste generated at the Savannah River Site (SRS) during production of plutonium and tritium demanded by the Cold War. The nuclear waste is first treated via a complex sequence of controlled chemical reactions and then vitrified into a borosilicate glass form and poured into stainless steel canisters. Converting the nuclear waste into borosilicate glass canisters is a safe, effective way to reduce the volume of the waste and stabilize the radionuclides. Testing was initiated to determine whether the elimination of formic acid from the DWPF's chemical processing flowsheet would eliminate catalytic hydrogen generation. Historically, hydrogen is generated in chemical processing of alkaline High Level Waste sludge in DWPF. In current processing, sludge is combined with nitric and formic acid to neutralize the waste, reduce mercury and manganese, destroy nitrite, and modify (thin) the slurry rheology. The noble metal catalyzed formic acid decomposition produces hydrogen and carbon dioxide. Elimination of formic acid by replacement with glycolic acid has the potential to eliminate the production of catalytic hydrogen. Flowsheet testing was performed to develop the nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet as an alternative to the nitric-formic flowsheet currently being processed at the DWPF. This new flowsheet has shown that mercury can be reduced and removed by steam stripping in DWPF with no catalytic hydrogen generation. All processing objectives were also met, including greatly reducing the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) product yield stress as compared to the baseline nitric/formic flowsheet. Ten DWPF tests were performed with nonradioactive simulants designed to cover a broad compositional range. No hydrogen was generated in testing without formic acid.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Going Extreme For Small Solutions To Big Environmental Challenges

This chapter is devoted to the scale, scope, and specific issues confronting the cleanup and long-term disposal of the U.S. nuclear legacy generated during WWII and the Cold War Era. The research reported is aimed at complex microbiological interactions with legacy waste materials generated by past nuclear production activities in the United States. The intended purpose of this research is to identify cost effective solutions to the specific problems (stability) and environmental challenges (fate, transport, exposure) in managing and detoxifying persistent contaminant species. Specifically addressed are high level waste microbiology and bacteria inhabiting plutonium laden soils in the unsaturated subsurface.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Collaboration in long-term stewardship at DOE Hanford Site

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site comprises approximately 1,517 km{sup 2} (586 mi{sup 2}) of land in southeastern Washington. The site was established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for the nation's nuclear weapons program. As the Cold War era came to an end, the mission of the site transitioned from weapons production to environmental cleanup. As the River Corridor area of the site cleanup is completed, the mission for that portion of the site will transition from active cleanup to continued protection of environment through the Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program. The key to successful transition from cleanup to LTS is the unique collaboration among three (3) different DOE Programs and three (3) different prime contractors with each contractor having different contracts. The LTS Program at the site is a successful model of collaboration resulting in efficient resolution of issues and accelerated progress that supports DOE's Richland Office 2015 Vision for the Hanford Site. The 2015 Vision for the Hanford Site involves shrinking the active cleanup footprint of the surface area of the site to approximately 20 mi{sup 2} on the Central Plateau. Hanford's LTS Program is defined in DOE's planning document, Hanford Long-Term Stewardship Program Plan, DOE/RL-2010-35 Rev 1. The Plan defines the relationship and respective responsibilities between the federal cleanup projects and the LTS Program along with their respective contractors. The LTS Program involves these different parties (cleanup program and contractors) who must work together to achieve the objective for transition of land parcels. Through the collaborative efforts with the prime contractors on site over the past two years, 253.8 km{sup 2} (98 mi{sup 2}) of property has been successfully transitioned from the cleanup program to the LTS Program upon completion of active surface cleanup. Upcoming efforts in the near term will include transitioning another large parcel that includes one of the six (6) cocooned reactors on site. These accomplishments relied upon the transparency between DOE cleanup programs and their contractors working together to successfully transition the land while addressing the challenges that arise. All parties, the three different DOE Programs and their respective prime contractors are dedicated to working together and continuing the progress of transitioning land to LTS, in alignment with the Program Plan and compliant with contractual requirements. This paper highlights the accomplishments and collaborative efforts to address the challenges faced as work progresses from the cleanup to transitioning of land parcels to LTS Program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

SRS K-AREA MATERIAL STORAGE - EXPANDING CAPABILITIES

In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Scientific Solutions to Nuclear Waste Environmental Challenges

The Hidden Cost of Nuclear Weapons The Cold War arms race drove an intense plutonium production program in the U.S. This campaign produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium over 40 years. The epicenter of plutonium production in the United States was the Hanford site, a 586 square mile reservation owned by the Department of Energy and located on the Colombia River in Southeastern Washington. Plutonium synthesis relied on nuclear reactors to convert uranium to plutonium within the reactor fuel rods. After a sufficient amount of conversion occurred, the rods were removed from the reactor and allowed to cool. They were then dissolved in an acid bath and chemically processed to separate and purify plutonium from the rest of the constituents in the used reactor fuel. The acidic waste was then neutralized using sodium hydroxide and the resulting mixture of liquids and precipitates (small insoluble particles) was stored in huge underground waste tanks. The byproducts of the U.S. plutonium production campaign include over 53 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored in 177 large underground tanks at Hanford and another 34 million gallons stored at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This legacy nuclear waste represents one of the largest environmental clean-up challenges facing the world today. The nuclear waste in the Hanford tanks is a mixture of liquids and precipitates that have settled into sludge. Some of these tanks are now over 60 years old and a small number of them are leaking radioactive waste into the ground and contaminating the environment. The solution to this nuclear waste challenge is to convert the mixture of solids and liquids into a durable material that won't disperse into the environment and create hazards to the biosphere. What makes this difficult is the fact that the radioactive half-lives of some of the radionuclides in the waste are thousands to millions of years long. (The half-life of a radioactive substance is the amount of time it takes for one-half of the material to undergo radioactive decay.) In general, the ideal material would need to be durable for approximately 10 half-lives to allow the activity to decay to negligible levels. However, the potential health effects of each radionuclide vary depending on what type of radiation is emitted, the energy of that emission, and the susceptibility for the human body to accumulate and concentrate that particular element. Consequently, actual standards tend to be based on limiting the dose (energy deposited per unit mass) that is introduced into the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility to establish standards for nuclear waste disposal to protect the health and safety of the public. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA to establish radiation protection standards for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository for nuclear wastes. The standards for Yucca Mountain were promulgated in 2008, and limit the dose to 15 millirem per year for the first 10,000 years, and 100 milirem per year between 10,000 years and 1 million years (40 CFR Part 197; http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/2008factsheet.html). So, the challenge is two-fold: (1) develop a material (a waste form) that is capable of immobilizing the waste over geologic time scales, and (2) develop a process to convert the radioactive sludge in the tanks into this durable waste form material. Glass: Hard, durable, inert, and with infinite chemical versatility Molten glass is a powerful solvent liquid, which can be designed to dissolve almost anything. When solidified, it can be one of the most chemically inert substances known to man. Nature's most famous analogue to glass is obsidian, a vitreous product of volcanic activity; formations over 17 million years old have been found. Archaeologists have found man-made glass specimens that are five thousand years old.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vascular flora of the Rocky Flats area, Jefferson County, Colorado, USA

The Rocky Flats Site (Site) is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility near Golden, Colorado that produced nuclear weapons components during the Cold War. Like many federal properties that have been off-limits to public access for decades, it has become a refugia for biodiversity as surrounding landscapes have been lost to agriculture and urbanization. A floristic study of the area was conducted on approximately 2,505 ha (6,189 ac) and includes the parcels currently managed and operated by DOE and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge). A flora of 630 species of vascular plants in 84 families and 340 genera was documented, including 12 species endemic to the southern Rocky Mountains and seven species considered rare or imperiled by the Colorado Natural Heritage Program. The flora of the Site is characterized by a predominantly Western North American floristic element, however, an Adventive floristic element contributes the greatest number of species. The vegetation is dominated by xeric tallgrass prairie and mixed grass prairie, with areas of wetland, shrubland, and riparian woodland.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Extraction Well Operation at the Fernald Preserve, Harrison, Ohio – 16177

The Fernald Preserve, a former uranium processing facility that produced high-purity uranium metal products during the Cold War, is located in southwest Ohio. The facility became a US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) site in November 2006, following completion of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act environmental remediation and site restoration (with the exception of groundwater). When the site was turned over to LM, approximately 76.5 ha of the Great Miami Aquifer remained contaminated with uranium above the final remediation level of 30 μg/L. Here, uranium contamination is being removed from groundwater in the Great Miami Aquifer through a pump-and-treat operation, which is predicted to continue until 2033. Twenty extraction wells pump about 30 million liters per day. Operation of the system is impacted by iron in the groundwater that promotes iron fouling of the well pumps, motors, and screens. The design of the well field evolved over 21 years and reflected a conservative system that could respond to a wide range of pumping conditions. For instance, some of the extraction wells were sized with pumps and motors that would allow the well to pump up to 1890 L/min (500 gpm) if warranted. The added flexibility, though, came at the cost of operational efficiency. We describe the efforts that have been taken by LM since the Fernald site was transferred to LM to mitigate the operational impacts from the iron fouling aquifer conditions and improve the efficiency of the well-field operation. Variable-frequency drives were installed at six wells to replace flow control valves. Several wells with oversized pumps and motors were changed from 24-hour per day operation to 8-hour per day operation to allow the pumps to operate closer to their design flow rates. Pumps and motors were “right-sized” at many wells to improve pumping efficiency. The process used to rehabilitate (or clean) well screens was improved, and a process was developed to clean pumps without having to pull them from the well. To reduce pressure drops, improvements were also made to the configuration of the discharge piping. A new control system was installed for each well to allow local control and local tracking of energy used. The amount of energy used daily compared to number of gallons pumped provides a method to assess pump performance and determine when action is necessary to restore well pump efficiency. Additionally, the metrics being employed to help quantify well-field efficiency improvements are described, and the benefits achieved by proactively managing the pump-and-treat operation are presented.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Applications of Ecological Engineering Remedies for Uranium Processing Sites, USA

The U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) is responsible for remediation of environmental contamination and long-term stewardship of sites associated with the legacy of nuclear weapons production during the Cold War in the United States. Protection of human health and the environment will be required for hundreds or even thousands of years at many legacy sites. USDOE continually evaluates and applies advances in science and technology to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of surface and groundwater remedies (USDOE 2011). This paper is a synopsis of ecological engineering applications that USDOE is evaluating to assess the effectiveness of remedies at former uranium processing sites in the southwestern United States. Ecological engineering remedies are predicated on the concept that natural ecological processes at legacy sites, once understood, can be beneficially enhanced or manipulated. Advances in tools for characterizing key processes and for monitoring remedy performance are demonstrating potential. We present test cases for four ecological engineering remedies that may be candidates for international applications.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Virtues of Nuclear Ignorance

Americans of a certain age are well acquainted with one of Ronald Reagan’s pithier maxims: “Trust, but verify.” It is a translation of a Russian proverb, and Reagan used it often in his dealings with the Soviet Union over nuclear disarmament, as both countries chipped away tentatively at their Cold War stockpiles. For him, the saying encapsulated the idea that a good treaty would require rigorous inspections, to insure that neither side was dragging its feet or, worse, disposing of decoy bombs, rather than real ones. But how should the process of verification work? If a U.S. scientist were allowed to dismantle a Russian warhead personally, he or she could identify it as legitimate fairly easily, even if it differed in design from American models. But, in doing so, the scientist would necessarily learn many classified details about the weapon, something that the Russians would never consent to. (Nor would the Americans, if their roles were swapped.)

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Keeping Classified Information Secret in the World of Quantum Computing

Quantum computing is a technology that promises to revolutionize computing by speeding up key computing tasks in are as such as machine learning and solving otherwise intractable problems.Some influential American policymakers, scholars, and analysts are extremely concerned about the effects quantum computing will have on national security. Similar to the way space technology was viewed in the context of the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, scientific advancement in quantum computing is seen as a race with significant national security consequences, particularly in the emerging US-China rivalry.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Plutonium Pit Production

A plutonium pit is a key component of a nuclear weapon. During the Cold War, the United States produced approximately 1,000 pits per year at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. Rocky Flats was closed in 1992 and today the United States does not have the capability to manufacture new pits at the rate needed to maintain the nuclear deterrent. A delay in revitalizing this capability will eventually necessitate a larger, more expensive recapitalization effort in the future.

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