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Upgrade and Certification of the Los Alamos National Laboratory SHENC 2011 - 12270

Nondestructive assay measurements of Transuranic (TRU) waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) required the addition of a standard waste box (SWB) assay system. A Super High Efficiency Neutron Counter (SHENC) located at Hanford was identified to be relocated to LANL. After careful evaluation of waste streams at LANL, it was determined that the current configuration of the SHENC was not sufficient to quantify certain waste streams. At LANL, there is still a large amount of waste that needs to be retrieved and repackaged within SWB's to meet agreements with the State of New Mexico. Prior to relocating the SHENC, the only assay systems available were High Efficiency Neutron Counters having only a 55-gallon drum capacity. Further analyses indicated that the SHENC system should be capable of quantitative gamma measurements that are to be linked, and combined, with the neutron measurements. The SHENC system was therefore augmented with a new high-resolution gamma spectroscopy system using BE5030 detectors and upgraded gamma electronics. The neutron side of the system was also upgraded with an advanced shift register (JSR-15), an improved Programmable Logic Controller and NDA-2000 software. This report will include calibration of both the neutron and gamma modalities of the SHENC system and how the modality results are combined to produce a single assay result. Preliminary performance results will be discussed based on both mock and real waste measurements. Discussions will also include a complete description of the adjustable parameters as well as the calibration plan, techniques and validations including calibration confirmation based on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP-WAC). The SHENC was successfully upgraded to efficiently measure the complex waste streams at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A new PLC was successfully added to the system for Add-A-Source control. A new shift register was added to the SHENC (JSR-15) which provides more flexibility if replacement is required. The addition of the density based calibration on the gamma modality of the system increases the effectiveness of the SHENC for high alpha-n producing waste. Upgrading the system to new software also helped to standardize the program at Los Alamos. Only one new procedure was initiated for the integration of the SHENC. Add-A-Source measurements were effectively integrated with the system based on the confirmation results and positive results during two Department of Energy Performance Demonstration Program Box Cycles. Total measurement uncertainty estimates were completed for both the gamma modality and the neutron modality of the system. The SHENC was reviewed by both the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency in 2011. The certification letter for the SHENC was issued on November 16, 2011. With the certification letter issued to the Central Characterization Project the SHENC can perform waste measurements on SWB's at Los Alamos for shipment to WIPP. (authors)

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Remote Handled Hot Cell Facility and Other Research Transuranic Waste (Debris)

This acceptable knowledge (AK) Summary Report has been prepared for the Central Characterization Program (CCP) for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste generated and managed by Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The waste described in this report was predominately generated in the SNL/NM Hot Cell Facility (HCF) during the removal and packaging of experimental material and decontamination operations in Building 6580 at Technical Area (TA)-V. The waste stream also includes a very small amount of waste (estimated at less than 1 gram of fuel similar to that used for research at the HCF) originating from classified research at TA-I. In addition, the waste also includes secondary waste termed by SNL/NM as process generated waste (PGW), created during repackaging operations for this waste at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF). The waste has been stored at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) Dense Pack Storage Facility within TA-V or the Manzano Bunkers located at Manzano Base within Kirtland Air Force Base. All of the waste is being repackaged at the AHCF. This report was prepared in accordance with CCP-TP-005, CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation (Reference 1), to implement the AK requirements of DOE/WIPP-02-3214, Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan (WCPIP) (Reference 2); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Waste Analysis Plan (WIPP-WAP) (Reference 3); and DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP-WAC) (Reference 4).

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for RCRA Constituent Analysis of Solidified Wastes (Rev 8)

The Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) constituents distributes test samples for analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and metals in solid matrices. Each distribution of test samples is termed a PDP cycle. These evaluation cycles provide an objective measure of the reliability of measurements performed for transuranic (TRU) waste characterization. The primary documents governing the conduct of the PDP are the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD; DOE/CBFO-94-1012) and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) contained in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (NM4890139088-TSDF) issued by the New Mexico Environment Department. The WAP requires participation in the PDP; the PDP must comply with the QAPD and the WAP. This plan implements the general requirements of the QAPD and the applicable requirements of the WAP for the RCRA PDP. Participating laboratories demonstrate acceptable performance by successfully analyzing single- blind performance evaluation samples (subsequently referred to as PDP samples) according to the criteria established in this plan. PDP samples are used as an independent means to assess laboratory performance regarding compliance with the WAP quality assurance objectives (QAOs). The concentrations of analytes in the PDP samples address levels of regulatory concern and encompass the range of concentrations anticipated in waste characterization samples. The WIPP requires analyses of homogeneous solid wastes to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements. These analyses must be performed by laboratories that demonstrate acceptable performance in this PDP. These analyses are referred to as WIPP analyses, and the samples on which they are performed are referred to as WIPP samples. Participating laboratories must analyze PDP samples using the same procedures used for WIPP samples.

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Reconsolidated Salt as a Geotechnical Barrier - 16535

Salt as a geologic medium has several attributes favorable to long-term isolation of waste placed in mined openings. Salt formations are largely impermeable and induced fractures heal as stress returns to equilibrium. Permanent isolation also depends upon the ability to construct geotechnical barriers that achieve nearly the same high-performance characteristics attributed to the native salt formation. Salt repository seal concepts often include elements of reconstituted granular salt. As a specific case in point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant recently received regulatory approval to change the disposal panel closure design from an engineered barrier constructed of a salt-based concrete to one that employs simple run-of-mine salt and temporary bulkheads for isolation from ventilation. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is a radioactive waste disposal repository for defense related transuranic elements mined from the Permian evaporite salt beds in southeast New Mexico. Its approved shaft seal design incorporates barrier components comprising salt-based concrete, bentonite, and substantial depths of crushed salt compacted to enhance reconsolidation. This paper will focus on crushed salt behavior when applied as drift closures to isolate disposal rooms during operations. Scientific aspects of salt reconsolidation have been studied extensively. The technical basis for geotechnical barrier performance has been strengthened by recent experimental findings and analogue comparisons. The panel closure change was accompanied by recognition that granular salt will return to a physical state similar to the halite surrounding it. Use of run-of-mine salt ensures physical and chemical compatibility with the repository environment and simplifies ongoing disposal operations. Our current knowledge and expected outcome of research can be assimilated with lessons learned to put forward designs and operational concepts for the next generation of salt repositories. Mined salt repositories have the potential to isolate permanently vast inventories of radioactive and hazardous wastes. (authors)

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Reconsolidated Salt as a Geotechnical Barrier

Salt as a geologic medium has several attributes favorable to long-term isolation of waste placed in mined openings. Salt formations are largely impermeable and induced fractures heal as stress returns to equilibrium. Permanent isolation also depends upon the ability to construct geotechnical barriers that achieve nearly the same high-performance characteristics attributed to the native salt formation. Salt repository seal concepts often include elements of reconstituted granular salt. As a specific case in point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant recently received regulatory approval to change the disposal panel closure design from an engineered barrier constructed of a salt-based concrete to one that employs simple run-of-mine salt and temporary bulkheads for isolation from ventilation. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is a radioactive waste disposal repository for defense-related transuranic elements mined from the Permian evaporite salt beds in southeast New Mexico. Its approved shaft seal design incorporates barrier components comprising salt-based concrete, bentonite, and substantial depths of crushed salt compacted to enhance reconsolidation. This paper will focus on crushed salt behavior when applied as drift closures to isolate disposal rooms during operations. Scientific aspects of salt reconsolidation have been studied extensively. The technical basis for geotechnical barrier performance has been strengthened by recent experimental findings and analogue comparisons. The panel closure change was accompanied by recognition that granular salt will return to a physical state similar to the halite surrounding it. Use of run-of-mine salt ensures physical and chemical compatibility with the repository environment and simplifies ongoing disposal operations. Our current knowledge and expected outcome of research can be assimilated with lessons learned to put forward designs and operational concepts for the next generation of salt repositories. Mined salt repositories have the potential to isolate permanently vast inventories of radioactive and hazardous wastes.

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Complications Associated with Long-Term Disposition of Newly-Generated Transuranic Waste: A National Laboratory Perspective

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a multipurpose national laboratory delivering specialized science and engineering solutions for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Sponsorship of INL was formally transferred to the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) by Secretary Spencer Abraham in July 2002. The move to NE, and designation as the DOE lead nuclear energy laboratory for reactor technology, supports the nation’s expanding nuclear energy initiatives, placing INL at the center of work to develop advanced Generation IV nuclear energy systems; nuclear energy/hydrogen coproduction technology; advanced nuclear energy fuel cycle technologies; and providing national security answers to national infrastructure needs. As a result of the Laboratory’s NE mission, INL generates both contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic (TRU) waste from ongoing operations. Generation rates are relatively small and fluctuate based on specific programs and project activities being conducted; however, the Laboratory will continue to generate TRU waste well into the future in association with the NE mission. Currently, plans and capabilities are being established to transfer INL’s contact-handled TRU waste to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) for certification and disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Remote-handled TRU waste is currently placed in storage at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). In an effort to minimize future liabilities associated with the INL NE mission, INL is evaluating and assessing options for the management and disposition of all its TRU waste on a real-time basis at time of generation. This paper summarizes near-term activities to minimize future re handling of INL’s TRU waste, as well as, potential complications associated with the long-term disposition of newly-generated TRU waste. Potential complications impacting the disposition of INL newly-generated TRU waste include, but are not limited to: 1) required remote-handled TRU packaging configuration(s) vs. current facility capabilities, 2) long-term NE mission activities, 3) WIPP certification requirements, and 4) budget considerations.

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Boxed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program

Each testing and analytical facility performing waste characterization activities for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) participates in the Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) to comply with the Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC) (DOE/WIPP-02-3122) and the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (CBFO-94-1012). The PDP serves as a quality control check for data generated in the characterization of waste destined for WIPP. Single-blind audit samples are prepared and distributed to each of the facilities participating in the PDP. Different PDPs evaluate the analyses of simulated headspace gases (HSGs), constituents of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and transuranic (TRU) radionuclides using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques.

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Drummed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program

Each testing and analytical facility performing waste characterization activities for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) participates in the Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) to comply with the Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC) (DOE/WIPP-02-3122) and the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (CBFO-94-1012). The PDP serves as a quality control check for data generated in the characterization of waste destined for WIPP. Single blind audit samples are prepared and distributed to each of the facilities participating in the PDP. The PDP evaluates analyses of simulated headspace gases, constituents of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and transuranic (TRU) radionuclides using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques.

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Mitigation of Hydrogen Gas Generation from the Reaction of Uranium Metal with Water in K Basin Sludge and Sludge Waste Forms

Prior laboratory testing identified sodium nitrate and nitrite to be the most promising agents to minimize hydrogen generation from uranium metal aqueous corrosion in Hanford Site K Basin sludge. Of the two, nitrate was determined to be better because of higher chemical capacity, lower toxicity, more reliable efficacy, and fewer side reactions than nitrite. The present lab tests were run to determine if nitrate’s beneficial effects to lower H2 generation in simulated and genuine sludge continued for simulated sludge mixed with agents to immobilize water to help meet the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance drainable liquid criterion. Tests were run at ~60°C, 80°C, and 95°C using near spherical high-purity uranium metal beads and simulated sludge to emulate uranium-rich KW containerized sludge currently residing in engineered containers KW-210 and KW-220. Immobilization agents tested were Portland cement (PC), a commercial blend of PC with sepiolite clay (Aquaset II H), granulated sepiolite clay (Aquaset II G), and sepiolite clay powder (Aquaset II). In all cases except tests with Aquaset II G, the simulated sludge was mixed intimately with the immobilization agent before testing commenced. For the granulated Aquaset II G clay was added to the top of the settled sludge/solution mixture according to manufacturer application directions. The gas volumes and compositions, uranium metal corrosion mass losses, and nitrite, ammonia, and hydroxide concentrations in the interstitial solutions were measured. Uranium metal corrosion rates were compared with rates forecast from the known uranium metal anoxic water corrosion rate law. The ratios of the forecast to the observed rates were calculated to find the corrosion rate attenuation factors. Hydrogen quantities also were measured and compared with quantities expected based on non-attenuated H2 generation at the full forecast anoxic corrosion rate to arrive at H2 attenuation factors. The uranium metal corrosion rates in water alone and in simulated sludge were near or slightly below the metal-in-water rate while nitrate-free sludge/Aquaset II decreased rates by about a factor of 3. Addition of 1 M nitrate to simulated sludge decreased the corrosion rate by a factor of ~5 while 1 M nitrate in sludge/Aquaset II mixtures decreased the corrosion rate by ~2.5 compared with the nitrate-free analogues. Mixtures of simulated sludge with Aquaset II treated with 1 M nitrate had uranium corrosion rates about a factor of 8 to 10 lower than the water-only rate law. Nitrate was found to provide substantial hydrogen mitigation for immobilized simulant sludge waste forms containing Aquaset II or Aquaset II G clay. Hydrogen attenuation factors of 1000 or greater were determined at 60°C for sludge-clay mixtures at 1 M nitrate. Hydrogen mitigation for tests with PC and Aquaset II H (which contains PC) were inconclusive because of suspected failure to overcome induction times and fully enter into anoxic corrosion. Lessening of hydrogen attenuation at ~80°C and ~95°C for simulated sludge and Aquaset II was observed with attenuation factors around 100 to 200 at 1 M nitrate. Valuable additional information has been obtained on the ability of nitrate to attenuate hydrogen gas generation from solution, simulant K Basin sludge, and simulant sludge with immobilization agents. Details on characteristics of the associated reactions were also obtained. The present testing confirms prior work which indicates that nitrate is an effective agent to attenuate hydrogen from uranium metal corrosion in water and simulated K Basin sludge to show that it is also effective in potential candidate solidified K Basin waste forms for WIPP disposal. The hydrogen mitigation afforded by nitrate appears to be sufficient to meet the hydrogen generation limits for shipping various sludge waste streams based on uranium metal concentrations and assumed waste form loadings.

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Characterization Data Package for Containerized Sludge Samples Collected from Engineered Container SCS-CON-210

This data package contains the K Basin sludge characterization results obtained by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory during processing and analysis of four sludge core samples collected from Engineered Container SCS-CON-210 in 2010 as requested by CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company. Sample processing requirements, analytes of interest, detection limits, and quality control sample requirements are defined in the KBC-33786, Rev. 2. The core processing scope included reconstitution of a sludge core sample distributed among four to six 4-L polypropylene bottles into a single container. The reconstituted core sample was then mixed and subsampled to support a variety of characterization activities. Additional core sludge subsamples were combined to prepare a container composite. The container composite was fractionated by wet sieving through a 2,000 micron mesh and a 500-micron mesh sieve. Each sieve fraction was sampled to support a suite of analyses. The core composite analysis scope included density determination, radioisotope analysis, and metals analysis, including the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit metals (with the exception of mercury). The container composite analysis included most of the core composite analysis scope plus particle size distribution, particle density, rheology, and crystalline phase identification. A summary of the received samples, core sample reconstitution and subsampling activities, container composite preparation and subsampling activities, physical properties, and analytical results are presented. Supporting data and documentation are provided in the appendices. There were no cases of sample or data loss and all of the available samples and data are reported as required by the Quality Assurance Project Plan/Sampling and Analysis Plan.

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Project Plan, Status, and Lessons Learned for the LANL 3,706 m{sup 3} TRU Waste Campaign - 13085

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is currently engaged in a campaign to disposition 3,706 m{sup 3} of transuranic (TRU) waste stored above grade at its Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility before June 30, 2014. This campaign includes complete removal of all non-cemented above-grade TRU waste that was in storage on October 1, 2011, and is defined as 3,706 m{sup 3} of material. TRU waste containers were placed into storage up to 40 years ago, and most of the older containers must be remediated to address compliance issues before the waste can be characterized, certified as meeting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and shipped for disposition. More than half of the remaining TRU waste volume stored above grade is contained within oversize boxes that contain waste items that must be repackaged or size reduced. Facilities and major types of equipment needed to remediate and characterize the TRU waste inventory include two additional oversize box processing lines that are being brought into service as Nuclear Hazard Category III facilities in fiscal year (FY) 2013. Multiple work shifts are scheduled for most remediation lines in FY 2013. An integrated risk-based project management schedule for all disposition activities has been developed that is based on a 'Solution Package' approach. Inventories of containers that have issues in common were compiled into about 15 waste categories and about 75 'Solution Packages' that identify all of the activities needed to disposition the inventory of TRU waste in storage. Scheduled activities include all precursor activities to begin remediation, remediation processing, characterization and certification to the WIPP WAC, and shipping of containers to WIPP. Other industrial processing practices that have been adopted to improve efficiency include staging of containers for remediation, characterization, and shipping; establishment of a transportation center; and load management practices for transportation payloads. Progress and accomplishments during FY 2012 are reviewed, and plans for FY 2013 are presented in some detail. Lessons learned on adoption of industrial processing practices are also discussed. (authors)

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Waste Generator Instructions: Key to Successful Implementation of the US DOE's 435.1 for Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions (LA-UR-12-24155) - 13218

In times of continuing fiscal constraints, a management and operation tool that is straightforward to implement, works as advertised, and virtually ensures compliant waste packaging should be carefully considered and employed wherever practicable. In the near future, the Department of Energy (DOE) will issue the first major update to DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. This update will contain a requirement for sites that do not have a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste certification program to use two newly developed technical standards: Contact-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions and Remote-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions. The technical standards are being developed from the DOE O 435.1 Notice, Contact-Handled and Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Packaging, approved August 2011. The packaging instructions will provide detailed information and instruction for packaging almost every conceivable type of transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal at WIPP. While providing specificity, the packaging instructions leave to each site's own discretion the actual mechanics of how those Instructions will be functionally implemented at the floor level. While the Technical Standards are designed to provide precise information for compliant packaging, the density of the information in the packaging instructions necessitates a type of Rosetta Stone that translates the requirements into concise, clear, easy to use and operationally practical recipes that are waste stream and facility specific for use by both first line management and hands-on operations personnel. The Waste Generator Instructions provide the operator with step-by-step instructions that will integrate the sites' various operational requirements (e.g., health and safety limits, radiological limits or dose limits) and result in a WIPP certifiable waste and package that can be transported to and emplaced at WIPP. These little known but widely productive Waste Generator Instructions (WGIs) have been used occasionally in the past at large sites for treatment and packaging of TRU waste. The WGIs have resulted in highly efficient waste treatment, packaging and certification for disposal of TRU waste at WIPP. For example, a single WGI at LANL, combined with an increase in gram loading, resulted in a mind boggling 6,400% increase in waste loading for {sup 238}Pu heat source waste. In fact, the WGI combined with a new Contact Handled (CH) TRU Waste Content (TRUCON) Code provided a massive increase in shippable wattage per Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) over the previously used and more restrictive TRUCON Code that have been used previously for the heat source waste. In fact, the use of the WGI process at LANL's TA-55 facility reduced non-compliant drums for WIPP certification and disposal from a 13% failure rate down to a 0.5% failure rate and is expected to further reduce the failure rate to zero drums per year. The inherent value of the WGI is that it can be implemented in a site's current procedure issuance process and it provides documented proof of what actions were taken for each waste stream packaged. The WGI protocol provides a key floor-level operational component to achieve goal alignment between actual site operations, the WIPP TRU waste packaging instructions, and DOE O 435.1. (authors)

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Multi-Year Work Plan to De-Inventory TRU Waste Stored at LANL - 12121

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) continues to accelerate disposition of transuranic (TRU) waste stored at its Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility. The current focus is on complete removal of all non-cemented above-grade Legacy and newly-generated TRU waste that was in storage on October 1, 2011, by no later than June 30, 2014. This inventory of above-grade TRU is defined as 3,706 m{sup 3} of material. Legacy TRU waste containers were placed into storage up to 40 years ago, and most of the older containers must be remediated to address compliance issues before the waste can be characterized, certified as meeting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and shipped for disposition. More than half of the remaining TRU waste volume stored above grade is contained within oversize boxes that contain waste items that must be repackaged or size reduced. Facilities and major types of equipment needed to remediate and characterize the TRU waste inventory are largely in place, but two additional oversize box processing lines are being implemented in 2012. Multiple work shifts are planned for most remediation lines in 2013. An integrated risk-based project management schedule for all disposition activities has been developed that is based on a 'Solution Package' approach. Inventories of containers that have issues in common were compiled into about 15 waste categories and about 70 'Solution Packages' that identify all of the activities needed to disposition the inventory of TRU waste in storage. Scheduled activities include all precursor activities to begin remediation, remediation processing, characterization and certification to the WIPP WAC, and shipping of containers to WIPP. Processing of the 3,706 m{sup 3} is projected to result in about 4,500 55-gallon (208 L) drums and 1,000 standard waste boxes that will be shipped to WIPP. About 385 shipments from LANL to WIPP are projected before June 30, 2014, to ship these containers, at a rate of 5 to 6 shipments a week. (authors)

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Approach for the isotopic characterization of irradiated start-up sources for disposal at WIPP - 15674

The National Nuclear Security Administration, Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/ Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) requires an approved final disposition pathway for sealed irradiated startup sources with uncertain irradiation histories. To create this path a reliable method is required to determine yields of transmutation, fission and activation products contained within the source at the time of disposal. Because of the uncertain histories of these sources, a number of likely histories are modeled with the code ORIGEN in order to establish the bounds of the radioisotope yields. The ORIGEN simulations are confirmed with gamma spectroscopy, specifically examining the activities of several fission and transmutation isotopes. These calculations, coupled with other previously established characterization techniques for transuranic neutron sources, will be used to establish a waste profile that is in compliance with Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria. (authors)

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Criticality Safety Aspects of Higher Fissile Gram Equivalent at the AMWTF - 19296

Operating since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTF) has used high-tech characterization equipment, robotics, and automated treatment processes to accomplish its mission. The facility was designed to treat contact handled waste up to 325 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE). As the lower fissile mass drums and boxes were treated and shipped for disposal, other high fissile mass containers needed to be treated and shipped. The facility's mission evolved to include treating containers with up to 3,000 FGE. The nuclear criticality safety group has worked diligently with operations to increase AMWTF's fissile mass limits. As operations change across the Department of Energy facility, the nuclear criticality safety groups must work with operations to meet the mission. How Fluor Idaho LLC is accomplishing this task with respect to criticality safety is the subject of this paper. The signature piece of equipment at AMWTF is the Supercompactor, a giant hydraulic ram capable of exerting 4 million pounds of force that can reduce a 55-gal drum to a 5-inch puck. By compacting waste, the Department of Energy can put more waste into the limited storage space of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Compaction also reduces the number of trips required to transport waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. There are two box-lines with hydraulic manipulators, nondestructive assay systems for drums and boxes, along with real-time-radiography. The plant's operations are highly automated. As time passed, AMWTF was tasked to treat drums that were not treatable with current operations. Based on analysis and experience of the nuclear criticality safety personnel, we have changed the fissile limits while maintaining a critically safe environment for the facility. Credit was taken for form, geometry, and lack of moderation in the material being treated. As the need arose to process higher FGE containers, more controls were identified for the treatment process. Criticality safety evaluations were expanded to 1,000 FGE for operational flexibility. Those evaluations included the box-line, the hot maintenance cell, and conveyors. Later, criticality safety evaluations were written to allow tanks to be processed in a box-line, as well as the use of a port in the box-line. Criticality safety evaluations for the box-line, hot maintenance cell, and conveyor were expanded to 3,000 FGE. The criticality safety officer is onsite and actively involved in operations. By expanding the nuclear criticality safety operating parameters, the AMWTF will meet the 2008 Record of Decision in which the Department of Energy directed 8,700 cubic meters of waste to be treated at the facility. (author)

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Mine Ventilation Rate Monitoring Annual Report

Module IV of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) requires WIPP to develop and implement a mine ventilation flow rate monitoring plan (MVRMP). The MVRMP requires ventilation flow rate measurements for the total underground repository and each active disposal room to ensure that the airflows meet HWFP conditions. HWFP Condition IV.F.4.b requires that an annual report be submitted, beginning 12 (twelve) months after the issuance of the permit, that describes the implementation of the MVRMP and presents the results of the monitoring activities. This document was prepared to fulfill the annual reporting requirement for the period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009.

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Boxed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program (Rev. 3)

Each testing and analytical facility performing waste characterization activities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) participates in the Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) to comply with the Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC) (DOE/WIPP-02-3122) and the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (DOE/CBFO-94-1012). The PDP serves as a quality control check for data generated in the characterization of waste destined for WIPP.

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