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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

A 3S Risk Assessment Approach for Nuclear Power: Safety, Security, and Safeguards

Safety-focused risk analysis and assessment approaches struggle to adequately include malicious, deliberate acts against the nuclear power industry's fissile and waste material, infrastructure, and facilities. Further, existing methods do not adequately address non- proliferation issues. Treating safety, security, and safeguards concerns independently is inefficient because, at best, it may not take explicit advantage of measures that provide benefits against multiple risk domains, and, at worst, it may lead to implementations that increase overall risk due to incompatibilities. What is needed is an integrated safety, security and safeguards risk (or "3SR") framework for describing and assessing nuclear power risks that can enable direct trade-offs and interactions in order to inform risk management processes — a potential paradigm shift in risk analysis and management. These proceedings of the Sandia ePRA Workshop (held August 22-23, 2017) are an attempt to begin the discussions and deliberations to extend and augment safety focused risk assessment approaches to include security concerns and begin moving towards a 3S Risk approach. Safeguards concerns were not included in this initial workshop and are left to future efforts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Nuclear Safeguards Reporting System Requirements Specification

States enter into safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to fulfill their nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Each nonnuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [1] is required, pursuant to Article III, to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. This document aims to provide information regarding the system requirements of software designed for comprehensive safeguards reporting.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Coupling interests in small modular reactors (SMR) as efficient and effective method to meet increasing energy demands with a growing aversion to cost and schedule overruns traditionally associated with the current fleet of commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), SMRs are attractive because they offer a significant relative cost reduction to current-generation nuclear reactors—increasing their appeal around the globe. Sandia's Global Nuclear Assurance and Security (GNAS) research perspective reframes the discussion around the "complex risk" of SMRs to address interdependencies between safety, safeguards, and security. This systems study provides technically rigorous analysis of the safety, safeguards, and security risks of SMR technologies. The aim of this research is three-fold. The first aim is to provide analytical evidence to support safety, safeguards, and security claims related to SMRs (Study Report Volume I). Second, this study aims to introduce a systems-theoretic approach for exploring interdependencies between the technical evaluations (Study Report Volume II). The third aim is to demonstrate Sandia's capability for timely, rigorous, and technical analysis to support emerging complex GNAS mission objectives.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantum Sensing and its Potential for Nuclear Safeguards

Quantum sensing has the potential to provide ultrasensitive measurements of physical phenomenon. Unlike quantum computing, quantum sensing is available now, though in general at research laboratories. A notable commercially-available quantum sensing device is the ubiquitous Superconducting Quantum Interference Device (SQUID), which can measure faint magnetic fields such as found in the human brain. Quantum sensing is used for direct measurement of environmental phenomenon, such as electromagnetic fields and accelerations, which then are used for certain applications. For example, quantum sensing of accelerations is useful for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. It is not clear, however, how quantum sensing can be useful for nuclear safeguards. This report provides first a background in quantum sensing, followed by a survey of potential safeguards utilizations of quantum sensing. Several potential safeguards applications are identified and explored.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards-Informed Hybrid Imagery Dataset [Poster]

Deep Learning computer vision models require many thousands of properly labelled images for training, which is especially challenging for safeguards and nonproliferation, given that safeguards-relevant images are typically rare due to the sensitivity and limited availability of the technologies. Creating relevant images through real-world staging is costly and limiting in scope. Expert-labeling is expensive, time consuming, and error prone. We aim to develop a data set of both realworld and synthetic images that are relevant to the nuclear safeguards domain that can be used to support multiple data science research questions. In the process of developing this data, we aim to develop a novel workflow to validate synthetic images using machine learning explainability methods, testing among multiple computer vision algorithms, and iterative synthetic data rendering. We will deliver one million images – both real-world and synthetically rendered – of two types uranium storage and transportation containers with labelled ground truth and associated adversarial examples.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Evaluation of Three Dimensional Scene Reconstruction Tools for Safeguards Applications

Over the past 5 years, advances in digital imaging and image processing have enabled everyday computing hardware, such as that found on laptops and even phones, to easily create 3D models of scenes from a series of still images. This field is broadly known as photogrammetry. For safeguards applications, a safeguards inspector could evaluate a 3D model of a facility (such as an enrichment plant or the top of a reactor) constructed from multiple photos instead of reviewing each photo individually. This report compares the detailed capabilities of a particular commercial offering (Quidient) that Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has investigated in depth with the general capabilities provided in the industry and recommends areas where the general technology could be pursued for potential safeguards applications.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

Monitoring, Controlling and Safeguarding Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facilities with Optical and Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-useable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resourceintensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify offnormal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

controlling↗
DOE OSTI2014

Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Enhancing Research Reactor Safeguards Through the Use of Mailbox Declarations

There are historic examples in several States of research reactors being misused to produce undeclared nuclear material. However, misuse of a State’s research reactor has typically only been discovered after further investigation into the State’s non-compliance related to other undeclared activities. Light water research reactors are typically designed with sample irradiation ports, where the introduction of fertile material can illicitly produce fissile material. Additionally, some light water reactors continue to be fueled by highly enriched uranium, which is a more significant safeguards concern by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Heavy water and graphite reactors can be used for illicit plutonium production, which is of particular proliferation concern. Because research reactors are designed for flexible operations and small research reactors are less frequently inspected by the IAEA than other nuclear facilities (depending on power and fuel type, it could several years between inspections), the likelihood of timely detection by the IAEA of misuse of the research reactor is low. During a 2013 workshop on safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom made recommendations to the IAEA on how safeguards could be strengthened for such facilities. One of the recommendations was to assess the use of “mailbox” declarations coupled with short notice random inspections or unannounced inspections by the IAEA at research reactors. An electronic mailbox declaration refers to the use of a secure information repository into which an operator submits operating reports. The near real time submittal of information enables the IAEA to better implement randomized short notice inspections. These mailboxes are not used for collecting and submitting State reports to the IAEA, but for collecting and transmitting operator data. The use of mailboxes, in conjunction with short notice random inspections, is in routine use for some other facility types. This paper assesses the potential for the practical application of mailbox declarations for various research reactor types and how the approach could be effectively used. Potential diversion scenarios are described and operator data records are discussed in connection to mailbox declarations, including discussion of how the data could indicate research reactor misuse.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

LASER-BASED MEASUREMENT TOOLS FOR FUTURE ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a long history of testing and using laser-based technologies for a variety of safeguards applications. Notable laser-based on-site applications include: 3-dimensional laser range (3DLR) instruments, used for facility design information and verification (DIV); laser measurements to verify unique labels and detect signs of tampering; and laser spectroscopy, for non-contact process monitoring. The IAEA is also evaluating analytical laboratory instruments, such as laser-ablation inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) for interrogating individual particles to determine uranium isotopic ratios in collected environment samples. Recent laser technology advancements will likely continue to fuel future IAEA adoption of new and novel laser-based safeguards tools. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is currently developing one such tool, called laser ablation, absorption ratio spectrometry (LAARS), for quantitative measurements of uranium material. LAARS uses three tunable diode lasers to simultaneously measure atomic 235U and 238U absorption in an ablation plume created by a fourth pulsed laser. Commercial availability of compact pulsed ablation lasers and the extreme wavelength accuracy and stability of PNNL’s tunable diode laser architecture play a pivotal role in achieving high fidelity LAARS assay measurements. The LAARS method is ultimately targeted for either on-site or laboratory-based 235U relative abundance measurements of destructive assay (DA) samples in support of uranium enrichment plant safeguards. DA samples are currently collected on-site, and then shipped to an analytical laboratory for mass spectrometric assay, because the measurement uncertainty requirements for this application are quite challenging. This paper will present the key elements of the LAARS laser system design, recent assay results on collected uranium hexafluoride (UF6) DA samples, and future operational configurations that may provide immediate on-site DA inspection results or rapid laboratory DA sample screening to prioritize further analysis by mass spectrometry.

IAEA, Safeguards, Uranium Enrichment Plants↗
DOE OSTI2021

Enabling Computation on Sensitive Data in International Safeguards with Privacy-Preserving Encryption Techniques

Privacy-preserving machine learning is a field of study that explores how to protect and preserve the privacy of sensitive data while allowing the data to be used by machine learning algorithms. This field has had substantial industry investment due to heightened concerns about privacy in the technology industry, with a focus in two broad application areas: financial services and healthcare. Numerous privacy-preserving methods have also been proposed for international safeguards, but they have been difficult to enact because the data they require is con- sidered sensitive or proprietary by the nuclear facility operator. This work examines how current privacy-preserving approaches might be used to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use that data to contribute to a safeguards conclusion about a state while giving nuclear operators confidence that their sensitive data is adequately protected. This paper begins by exploring several broad categories of privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, secure enclaves, and zero-knowledge proofs. Then we discuss some of the security considerations related to using these methods, potential use cases, and a conceptual system design for applying privacy-preserving methods in international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

ESTABLISHING ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Drawing upon globally recognized efforts by a variety of institutions, the paper develops a practical and defensible framework for consideration and use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the adoption of credible ethical standards for autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS). The analysis is based on a future hypothetical AIS that identifies signatures of misuse, diversion, and other research and development (R&D). The hypothetical system serves as an exemplar for subject matter expert (SME) workshop participants to begin to answer ethical AIS questions around how these systems should be governed and maintained, what the internal and external considerations associated with artificial intelligence (AI) tools are, and where the boundaries between ethical and non-ethical uses are. The ethical AIS workshop explored several important topics: (a) Recommendations that can be currently implemented by the IAEA, (b) Proposed defensible criteria and metrics aligned with an ethical AI for safeguards implementation, (c) Discussion of future needs and capabilities, and (d) Derive appropriate next steps and actions to support filling current technological, operational, and cultural gaps and realizing an effective ethical AI for safeguards framework. The Establishing Ethical Guidelines for Applying AI to IAEA Safeguards project creates awareness in the community of the ethical AIS approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

DASAO: software tool for the management of safeguards, waste and decommissioning

Decommissioning of nuclear facilities is a complex process involving operations such as detailed surveys, decontamination and dismantling of equipment's, demolition of buildings and management of resulting waste and nuclear materials if any. This process takes place in a well-developed legal framework and is controlled and followed-up by stakeholders like the Safety Authority, the Radwaste management Agency and the Safeguards Organism. In the framework of its nuclear waste and decommissioning program and more specifically the decommissioning of the BR3 reactor, SCK-CEN has developed different software tools to secure the waste and material traceability, to support the sound management of the decommissioning project and to facilitate the control and the follow-up by the stakeholders. In the case of Belgium, it concerns the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, the National Agency for radioactive waste management and fissile material and EURATOM and IAEA. In 2005, Belgonucleaire decided to shutdown her Dessel MOX fuel fabrication plant and the production stopped in 2006. According to the final decommissioning plan ('PDF') approved by NIRAS, the decommissioning works should start in 2008 at the earliest. In 2006, the management of Belgonucleaire identified the need for an integrated database and decided to entrust SCK-CEN with its development, because SCK-CEN relies on previous experience in comparable applications namely already approved by authorities such as NIRAS, FANC and EURATOM. The main objectives of this integrated software tool are: - simplified and updated safeguards; - waste and material traceability; - computerized documentation; - support to project management; - periodic and final reporting to waste and safety authorities. The software called DASAO (Database for Safeguards, Waste and Decommissioning) was successfully commissioned in 2008 and extensively used from 2009 to the satisfaction of Belgonucleaire and the stakeholders. SCK-CEN is now implementing a simplified release of the software for the management of the decommissioning of the Thetis reactor. Its decommissioning will start in March 2013 and will be completed by the end of 2014. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(α,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay α particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(α,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-α-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (α,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(α,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (α,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre Dame (UND), will focus on three specific items: (1) making a precision (better than 10 %) determination of the absolute cross section of the 19F(α,n)22Na reaction as a function of energy; (2) determining the spectrum of neutrons and γ-rays emitted from 19F(α,n)22Na over an energy range pertinent to NDA; and (3) performing simulations with this new cross section to extract the neutron yield (neutrons/gram/second) and resulting neutron- and gamma ray-spectra when α particles interact with fluorine nuclei in actinide samples, to aid in the design and reduce uncertainty of future NDA measurements and simulations.

VANDLE, HPGe gamma-ray detector, liquid neutron de↗
DOE OSTI2018

Developing Design Criteria for Safeguards Seals for Spent Fuel Transportation Casks

Current designs for spent fuel transportation casks cannot ensure a cask's integrity during shipment, nor is there any verifiable means of maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) on a cask's contents. Spent fuel destined for encapsulation plants or geological repositories requires additional containment and surveillance (C/S) measures during shipment. Following final safeguards accountancy measurements on spent fuel assemblies, the shipment of verified assemblies will require unprecedented reliance on maintaining CoK on the fuel inside transport casks. Such increased reliance is due to the lack of reverification of spent fuel following encapsulation into disposal canisters and by meeting the requirement of dual C/S measures during such fuel shipments according to recommendations made by the Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert group. By designing spent fuel transportation casks with effective seals integrated into their design, CoK can be more effectively maintained than by ad hoc C/S measures because seal integration ensures that a cask has not been tampered with. Externally applied seals might not be able to provide such assurance for currently designed spent fuel transportation casks, although some combination of seals, detectors, and/or a technology that can verify canister integrity might provide this assurance. This paper examines the design criteria for integrating safeguards seals into transportation casks and provides recommendations for near-term applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Data – Benchmarking 19 F(α,n) Yield Data for Nuclear Safeguards

Fluorine compounds of U and Pu are ubiquitous in the nuclear fuel cycle, so F(α,n) neutrons are an important signature and quantitative source term that needs to be understood for physics-based interpretation of nondestructive assay measurements. Historically there have been large differences in the basic nuclear data for this reaction reported by various groups. UF 6 is the most prominent material in the nuclear fuel cycle, with the potential for short-term production into weaponizable form. Verification of bulk quantities, natural feed, depleted tails, and especially low enriched product in cylinders is particularly important. The principal physical measurement is neutron counting. For enriched material, the 19 F(α,n) reaction, driven by 234U, is the dominant source of neutrons. Basic nuclear data, cross sections, needed to calculate the yield, as well as information on the source spectrum for sensitivity studies are sparse and highly discrepant. This limits defensible physics-based performance evaluations. The same applies to holdup and criticality studies in which hydrated uranyl fluoride is the material of interest which accumulates in enrichment facilities. In the future we anticipate that the physics community will have made improved accelerator-based measurements and undertaken a more thorough evaluation and adjustment of all relevant available data. But in the short term, this does not help the safeguards community face the pressing real-world nondestructive assay requirements. To address this need, we have performed quality neutron measurements on UF6 materials using well-known material and high-capability neutron counters. A robust determination of the n/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 was generated along with a scientifically defensible uncertainty analysis. The weighted average value of the neutron yield is 509 n/s/g 234 U with a random uncertainty of approximately 1%. Dominant sources of systematic uncertainty are in the efficiency determination where we incur approximately 1.1% relative standard deviation associated with the 252 Cf reference source and about 0.9% uncertainty coming from the uncertainty in the F(α,n) spectrum. The stated uncertainties are an order of magnitude better than current data based on accelerator data reported in the literature. Aside from being of immediate and direct use by the safeguards community, this result will serve as an enduring integral benchmark for subsequent data evaluations that will need to match it in order to be credible. In addition to yield normalization, safeguards users of F(α,n) data also need guidance of the neutron emission spectrum. We have generated a neutron emission using a modified version of the well-known SOURCES 4C code, updated with new alpha stopping power coefficients, and a blended microscopic cross section data set. The yield and spectra are available in a form that MCNP users can readily use.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Updates to Relevance Vector Machine: Multiclass Classification, Variable Selection, and Proof-of-Concept Application to Safeguards Fresh Fuel Verification using List-Mode Neutron Collar Data

To expand the capabilities of safeguards authorities to verify the integrity of fresh fuel assemblies, Oak Ridge National Laboratory has retrofit the existing electronics of the JCC-71 uranium neutron coincidence collar, which contains 18 3 He neutron detectors and an external 241 AmLi(α, n) neutron interrogation source arranged to surround a fresh nuclear fuel assembly. The new electronics system allows analysts to record list-mode neutron multiplicity data in addition to the singles and doubles rates that are currently measured. Based on previous proof-of-concept research, analysis of these new data will identify off-normal fuel configurations in an assembly and characterize or localize the specific partial fuel defects. The purpose of this report it to document the analysis algorithm development and then to demonstrate its capability for the safeguards verification of fresh fuel assemblies using list mode neutron collar data. To analyze the complex list-mode data collected with the upgraded uranium neutron collar, multivariate classification algorithms are being developed using a novel classification method, the relevance vector machine. This approach may be applied to multiclass problems to estimate the probability that test data belongs to one of many possible classes of data. In addition, our method identifies the most useful variables/channels for making predictions, which illuminates the basis for the model’s predictions, and this interpretability is largely unique among data analytics methods. Variable selection occurs during model training and parameter tuning and does not need any external hyperparameter tuning routines. Finally, we apply the modified relevance vector machine to a simulated dataset of list-mode neutron collar data generated with the radiation transport code MCNP. The method can correctly identify off-normal fuel configurations, categorize the data according to four fuel defect scenarios, and rank the channels in the data according to prediction utility. For nuclear safeguards applications, it is concluded that this method has the potential to increase the sensitivity and reliability to detect missing fuel rods from a standard 17 x 17 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly. Within this analysis, “off-normal” (i.e., missing fuel rods) were correctly classified in 17 simulated test scenarios with one quarter (25%) of the fresh fuel rods missing using a training data set of 58 simulated measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗