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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Security component with fiber Bragg grating

A fiber Bragg grating (FBG) security component for single-party and multi-party monitoring is provided. The security component includes an optical fiber having a plurality of Bragg gratings. The Bragg gratings provide a spectral response that is randomized based on the manufacture of the security component. For single-party use, the spectral response provides a reproducible spectral signature when interrogated with an optical signal. For multi-party use, each party applies a known optical interrogation signal to the security component and applies an external stress known only to the respective monitoring party. The resulting shift in the spectral signature is unique to each monitoring party, making it extremely difficult to successfully counterfeit the security component's response for all such parties.

Ziock, Klaus-Peter↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for control system security

A component security device may be disposed at an interface between a component and a cyber-physical system. The disclosed component security device may be physically and/or electrically coupled between the component and infrastructure of the cyber-physical system, such as a backplane, bus, and/or the like. The component security device may be configured to monitor the component, and selectively isolate the component from the cyber-physical system. Since the component security device is interposed at the interface of the component, the component security device may be capable of isolating the component regardless of whether the component has been compromised (e.g., regardless of whether the component is capable of complying with system commands).

Rieger, Craig G.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Sustaining Nuclear Security Education Through INSEN

The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) was established in 2010 with a mission to enhance global nuclear security through nuclear security-focused educational initiatives. INSEN is a partnership through which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), academic and research institutions, and other stakeholders cooperate to promote effective and sustainable nuclear security education. INSEN currently comprises 206 members (institutions) from 72 member states and 14 observers. This paper provides an overview of its role in developing and promoting nuclear security education

Metwally, Walid↗
DOE OSTI2024

UAS IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY

Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have been an area of focus for the Office of International Nuclear Security within the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and other foreign and domestic organizations for several years. This emerging technology provides significant capabilities to the nuclear security realm, but there are many things to consider when implementing them into an established security design or network. The goal of this paper is to discuss some of the benefits, challenges, and lessons learned with using UAS at nuclear facilities and during transport of material. Generic examples of UAS implementation will be used to facilitate a publicly releasable paper and presentation. The paper will start with a summary of the types and capabilities of UAS to provide a better understanding for people unfamiliar with current and new capabilities of these systems. Since there are many different types and sizes of UAS, this paper will focus on drones 55 lb and smaller. Then some of the use cases of UAS for security and challenges of employing them will be covered. Finally, lessons learned and some best practices that Oak Ridge National Laboratory has discovered from research, development, testing, and evaluation will be summarized.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2024

Gender Mainstreaming in Nuclear Security: Strategies for Incorporating Gender Equality by Design in the IAEA Milestones Approach

Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗
DOE OSTI2026

Smart Inverters, Dumb Risk: Taking Control of IBR Security in the Digital Age

This presentation addresses the security challenges posed by Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) in the modern energy landscape. The presentation highlights the vulnerabilities and risks associated with IBRs, including the potential for cyber-attacks, the impact of insecure defaults, and the systemic risks posed by supply chain dependencies. Key topics covered include: 1) The increasing digital transformation in energy systems and the associated security risks. 2) Specific vulnerabilities in IBRs, including weak passwords, hardcoded credentials, and insecure web application interfaces. 3) The implications of persistent connectivity and the strategic risks posed by foreign-manufactured components. 4) The role of regulatory frameworks, such as NERC CIP, in addressing these challenges and the limitations of current oversight. 5) Practical solutions for mitigating risks, including secure design practices, vendor risk assessments, and the importance of strong passwords and role-based access control. The presentation underscores the necessity of a comprehensive, system-of-systems approach to securing IBRs, emphasizing the need for collaboration across various stakeholders, including operators, developers, and regulators, to ensure the resilience and security of the energy grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2023

A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems

Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. Furthermore, the impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating software defined networking solutions to reduce the digital attack surface of nuclear security systems

Most nuclear security systems used today were not designed for today’s threat environment. Systems that were intended to be stand alone are now interconnected. Devices that have a single purpose are built on multi-purpose platforms and communication protocols that, while effective, have no ability to authenticate authorized versus unauthorized commands. These attributes provide an attacker significant ability to affect the system, pivot throughout the interconnected networks, and remain undetected if he/she is able to compromise a single node. Software defined networking (SDN) has been used for years by information technology (IT) cloud service providers to quickly provision or remove servers or other systems to meet changing demand. The same concept has recently been applied to operational technology (OT) systems to enable very fast failover on critical systems that have stringent and deterministic (<5ms) transmit/receive times. By carefully engineering the communication flows through a network using preplanned routes and specific pathways it is possible to achieve deterministic and extremely reliable message delivery even when components fail. This engineering approach to network design has added security benefits including securing the networking control plane, eliminating network scanning and mapping, inhibiting ARP spoofing and host masquerading, eliminating unauthorized network pivoting and enabling greater situational awareness on the network. SDN in OT environments is new but early testing in electrical power and other critical infrastructure has shown it to be a very powerful tool for building reliable networks and reducing the digital attack surface of the network. The authors tested a software defined network switch on a simple physical protection system with components commonly found in nuclear security systems and found improved mitigations to denial of service attacks, lateral movement and network reconnaissance. The paper details the tests and their results.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, software defined↗
DOE OSTI2025

Strengthening U.S. National Security Through Advanced Energy Innovation

NREL's work in strategic energy security is focused on keeping the United States secure and its citizens safe by applying expertise in advanced energy systems and technologies to prevent energy system disruptions from any source, natural or human. NREL pursues national security objectives by providing partners an accurate understanding of national and international security implications of global energy trends; novel installation, facility, and operational energy solutions; access to NREL R&D capabilities to incorporate advanced energy technologies and biomaterials into mission requirements; and the ability to test future technologies using large-scale grid modeling.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

A coupled human–natural system analysis of freshwater security under climate and population change

Limited water availability, population growth, and climate change have resulted in freshwater crises in many countries. Jordan’s situation is emblematic, compounded by conflict-induced population shocks. Integrating knowledge across hydrology, climatology, agriculture, political science, geography, and economics, we present the Jordan Water Model, a nationwide coupled human–natural-engineered systems model that is used to evaluate Jordan’s freshwater security under climate and socioeconomic changes. The complex systems model simulates the trajectory of Jordan’s water system, representing dynamic interactions between a hierarchy of actors and the natural and engineered water environment. A multiagent modeling approach enables the quantification of impacts at the level of thousands of representative agents across sectors, allowing for the evaluation of both systemwide and distributional outcomes translated into a suite of water-security metrics (vulnerability, equity, shortage duration, and economic well-being). Model results indicate severe, potentially destabilizing, declines in freshwater security. Per capita water availability decreases by approximately 50% by the end of the century. Without intervening measures, >90% of the low-income household population experiences critical insecurity by the end of the century, receiving <40 L per capita per day. Widening disparity in freshwater use, lengthening shortage durations, and declining economic welfare are prevalent across narratives. To gain a foothold on its freshwater future, Jordan must enact a sweeping portfolio of ambitious interventions that include large-scale desalinization and comprehensive water sector reform, with model results revealing exponential improvements in water security through the coordination of supply- and demand-side measures.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Four-Layer Cyber-Physical Security Model for Electric Machine Drives Considering Control Information Flow

Despite the IEEE Power Electronics Society (PELS) establishing Technical Committee 10 on Design Methodologies with a focus on the cyber-physical security of power electronics systems, a holistic design methodology for addressing security vulnerabilities remains underdeveloped. This gap largely stems from the limited integration of computer science and power/control engineering studies in this interdisciplinary field. Addressing the inadequacy of unilateral cyber or control perspectives, this article presents a novel four-layer cyber-physical security model specifically designed for electric machine drives. Central to this model is the innovative control information flow (CIF) model, residing within the control layer, which serves as a pivotal link between the cyber layer's vulnerable resources and the physical layer's state-space models. By mapping vulnerable resources to control variable space and tracing attack propagation, the CIF model facilitates accurate impact predictions based on tainted control laws. The effectiveness and validity of this proposed model are demonstrated through hardware experiments involving two typical cyber-attack scenarios, underscoring its potential as a comprehensive framework for multidisciplinary security strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide an overview of best practices for nuclear security planning requirements to include building a nuclear security plan and a concept of operations. It will introduce best practices for nuclear security planning to include the following: (1) Develop a Nuclear Security Plan, (2) Review 10 key elements of a Concept of Operations, (3) Estimate resources for an MPE, and (4) Capture lessons learned and best practices.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-109, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-109, the Mercury Fire Station/Maintenance/Housing Office (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15235) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-109 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-109 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-109 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains some aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-113, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-113 in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15236), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition of Building 23-113 is part of the long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury on the NNSS for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (the Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-113 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. Therefore, the purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-113 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that although Building 23-113 is significant at the local level for its important role as a recreational facility on the NNSS, the building lacks sufficient integrity to convey its significance. It is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP at any level. The building remains eligible as a contributing element to the MHD.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Building 23-620, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J-3 Office, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Summary Report for the 2019 Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosted students from across the United States at the 6th Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School 17-28 June 2019. The summer school provided students with a unique understanding of nuclear security challenges faced in the field and exposed them to the technical foundations, analyses, and insight that will be required by future leaders in technology development and implementation. The course heavily emphasized laboratory and field demonstrations including measurements of special nuclear material. Student evaluations and feedback from student advisors indicates that the summer school achieved its objectives of 1) exposing students to the range of nuclear security applications for which radiation detection is necessary, 2) articulating the relevance of student research into the broader context, and 3) growing student interest in careers in nuclear security.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗