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At least 199 records · Page 11

Implementation of a realistic artificial data generator for crash data generation

In this paper, a framework is outlined to generate realistic artificial data (RAD) as a tool for comparing different models developed for safety analysis. The primary focus of transportation safety analysis is on identifying and quantifying the influence of factors contributing to traffic crash occurrence and its consequences. The current framework of comparing model structures using only observed data has limitations. With observed data, it is not possible to know how well the models mimic the true relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Further, real datasets do not allow researchers to evaluate the model performance for different levels of complexity of the dataset. RAD offers an innovative framework to address these limitations. Hence, we propose a RAD generation framework embedded with heterogeneous causal structures that generates crash data by considering crash occurrence as a trip level event impacted by trip level factors, demographics, roadway and vehicle attributes. Within our RAD generator we employ three specific modules: (a) disaggregate trip information generation, (b) crash data generation and (c) crash data aggregation. For disaggregate trip information generation, we employ a daily activity-travel realization for an urban region generated from an established activity-based model for the Chicago region. We use this data of more than 2 million daily trips to generate a subset of trips with crash data. For trips with crashes crash location, crash type, driver/vehicle characteristics, and crash severity. The daily RAD generation process is repeated for generating crash records at yearly or multi-year resolution. In conclusion, the crash databases generated can be employed to compare frequency models, severity models, crash type and various other dimensions by facility type - possibly establishing a universal benchmarking system for alternative model frameworks in safety literature.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Joint Development of SAS4A Code in Application to Oxide-fueled LFR Severe Accident Analysis

The scope of this project was to pursue specific SAS4A liquid-metal cooled reactor (LMR) safety analysis software extensions to simulate postulated accidents with fuel failures for oxide-fueled Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFRs). Since most U.S. LMR experience is on sodium-cooled fast reactor options based on past testing and operation experience with EBR-II and FFTF, the DOE’s legacy fast reactor safety analysis capabilities were focused on metal-fueled pool-type concepts with sodium coolant. In recent years, Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) has decided to pursue an LFR design as one of their next generation nuclear technology options because of its favorable safety and economics attributes. Oxide fuel is considered among other fuel options due to previous WEC experience with this fuel form. Development of this new technology requires the availability of adequately accurate computational tools, some of which can be adapted from versions of similar software used for analysis of other LMRs. Although Argonne National Laboratory’s (ANL) SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis software suite (shortened as SAS4A code hereafter for brevity) has the basic capabilities to model LFR system designs, the SAS4A code modules used in the analysis of accidents with fuel/cladding failures lack appropriate models for the unique phenomena that govern as-irradiated oxide-fuel damage mechanisms in lead coolant. Therefore, the objective of this project was to extend the capabilities of SAS4A with mechanistic oxide-fuel failure models in lead coolant for margin to failure assessments, analysis of failure modes, location and timing of failures under different accident scenarios consistent with the whole-plant dynamic response including the reactivity feedback, and assessment of the potential for fuel damage propagation due to potential fission gas jet and fuel-fragment/molten fuel impingement to neighboring fuel pins in an assembly. This report provides mainly a summary of Argonne’s technical contributions in the joint project, but the reports and publications by the Participant team are included as references at the end of the report.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enhancing Operational Safety via Agentic Dialogue Hazard Identification Analysis

Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems demand reliable hazard identification. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating safety analysis tasks, single-turn, monolithic inference is brittle: it lacks the self-correction, deliberation, and contextual refinement that safety engineers apply iteratively. In this paper, we introduce HAZDIAL, a framework that investigates whether structured agentic dialogue (multi-agent, multi-turn interactions) improves the quality of NLP-based hazard identification over single-pass baselines. We systematically compare two dialogue modalities: adversarial debate and constructive discussion, and propose an genetic algorithm-based agentic interaction optimization. We evaluate all configurations against a curated golden dataset using standard classification metrics (accuracy, precision, recall, F1) and a novel dialogue metrics. This work advances the intersection of dialogue systems, multi-agent reasoning, and AI safety, providing empirical evidence for dialogue-driven hazard analysis.

Das, Sanjay [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000542591915)↗

Application of Constellation's best estimate alternate source term methodology

Safety analyses for a nuclear power plants need to consider postulated accidents that results in a risk of accidental release of radiation. The regulations require plant specific safety analysis reports to include an evaluation of the requirements of 10CFR50.67. Such a safety analysis report mandates limits such that calculated radiological consequences at certain locations do not exceed established limits in 10CFR50.67 following a postulated release of radioactivity. Analyses should demonstrate, with reasonable assurance, that these prescribed limits are complied with. Conventional methodologies utilize conservative approaches to address lack of uncertainty quantification in the utilized approaches, methods, and/or inputs. These built-in excess conservatisms often result in with compounding effects and hence overly conservative results in the estimated radiological consequences, which leads to inaccurate margin evaluation for operation and accident mitigation. Therefore, evaluating accurate dose consequences is needed for both operational and safety reasons. This paper illustrates the use of the best estimate source term (BEAST) methodology to the case of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) dose analysis.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Constellation's best estimate alternate source term methodology overview

Safety analyses for a nuclear power plants need to consider postulated accidents that results in at risk of accidental release of radiation. The regulations require plant specific safety analysis reports to include an evaluation of the requirements of 10CFR50.67. Such a safety analysis report mandates limits such that calculated radiological consequences relative to certain dose locations do not exceed a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) limits following a postulated release of radioactivity. Calculations are performed to estimate the radiological consequences, in terms of dose, to people and equipment to ensure the estimated doses are within the prescribed limits. Analysis should demonstrate, with reasonable assurance, that these prescribed limits are complied with. Conventional methodologies utilize conservative approaches to address lack of uncertainty quantification in the utilized approaches, methods, and/or inputs. These built-in excess conservatisms often result in compounding effects and hence overly conservative results in the estimated radiological consequences, which leads to inaccurate margin evaluation for operation and accident mitigation. Therefore, evaluating accurate dose consequences is needed for both operational and safety reasons. The research documented in this paper provides an overview of Constellation's Best Estimate Alternate Source Term (BEAST) Methodology. BEAST methodology relies upon the use of realistic yet bounding input distributions for key analysis parameters, which replaces use of conservative deterministic singular inputs that bound overall analysis domain. This approach enables evaluating a more accurate accident analysis response, while enabling a bounding licensing basis envelope via more accurate quantification of uncertainty in the application. Therefore, built-in margin for a given scenario is more accurately evaluated.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

VADER: A Tool for Criticality Safety Validation

The purpose of criticality safety is to prevent any inadvertent criticality from occurring during the handling or storage of fissile material. Calculations are frequently used to demonstrate that a sufficient subcritical margin exists. Validation is a key aspect of the evaluation process, establishing the suitability, accuracy, and associated uncertainty of the computational method and data to be used for the intended application. The validation process is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 in order to investigate the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. The validation parameters that are traditionally applied to safety analysis calculations are the bias and the bias uncertainty . The bias is the deviation of the average k eff of the validation suite from unity. The bias uncertainty accounts for the statistical uncertainty in the bias based on the standard deviation, sample size, and distribution of k eff values of the validation suite. The values of bias and bias uncertainty ensure that the systems predicted to be subcritical by the computational method will indeed be subcritical. The bias and bias uncertainty are often combined to determine an upper subcritical limit (USL) or computational margin that can then be applied to safety analysis calculations. Many methods have been developed by different organizations to calculate the bias and bias uncertainty for various types of criticality analyses. Each of these methods typically requires that the validity of various underpinning statistical assumptions be confirmed to demonstrate that the method is appropriate for the analysis of a given validation suite. An example of the validation decision making flow is shown in Fig.1. As shown in Fig. 1, the analyst performing the validation fits a trend line to the data and performs a test to determine if the trend was a statistically better representation of the data than if it were treated as an uncorrelated sample. If the trend line is a better representation of the data, then the analyst uses any one of a number of trending techniques to determine the bias and bias uncertainty. If a trend is not an appropriate representation of the data, then the analyst proceeds to perform a normality assessment for the data. If the normal assumption can be shown to be acceptable, then the analyst calculates the bias and bias uncertainty with the parametric technique. If the assumption of normality cannot be justified, then the nonparametric technique is used. Once the decision flow has been followed and the appropriate technique has been selected, the bias and bias uncertainty is typically combined with an administrative margin to determine a USL below which calculated values of k eff for safety analysis models can be considered subcritical. The calculations used in each decision are often performed with spreadsheets or with small programs available at various sites performing criticality analyses. Expertise in understanding and interpreting the results must be maintained to perform these calculations. This can often be an error-prone process. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently developing the Validation and Data Evaluation Resource (VADER) to simplify and automate the criticality safety validation process and to provide a software quality assurance pedigree to the calculational methods used. This paper discusses the use of the Fulcrum user interface with VADER, the anticipated initial capabilities of VADER to perform validation analyses, and the output from the code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

SAM Finite Volume Method Development Status Update: GCR Application, Restart, and MultiApp

The System Analysis Module (SAM) is being developed as a modern system analysis code for advanced non-light-water-reactor safety analysis under the U.S. DOE NEAMS program. Previous feasibility studies have demonstrated that a staggered-grid finite volume method (SG-FVM), implemented under the MOOSE framework, can deliver more than an order of magnitude speedup over the existing continuous Galerkin finite element method (CG-FEM) solver for liquid-cooled, incompressible but thermally expandable flow systems. This work extends the previous effort to compressible, gas-cooled reactor applications, where pressure couples directly into the mass equation adding additional nonlinearity into the equation system. New code capabilities are implemented for pebble bed high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (PB-HTGR) analysis, including a pebble bed CoreChannel component, built-in pebble bed effective thermal conductivity model and channel-to-channel crossflow model. The capabilities are tested, benchmarked, and demonstrated for problems with increased level of model and physical complexities, including the HTTU effective thermal conductivity test, the SANA passive cooling test, and a demonstration case using the GPBR200 reactor design covering steady-state operation, DLOFC and PLOFC transients. Across all cases, the SG-FVM solver demonstrated strong robustness and efficiency, and the solutions agree well with reference results and data. The finding of this work proves that SG-FVM is a viable and efficient solver pathway for compressible, gas-cooled reactor system analysis in SAM. In addition, work has been done to successfully support SAM-FVM recover/restart code feature that is essential to reactor safety analysis applications, and MultiApp code feature that is essential to multi-scale and multi-physics simulations. In summary, this work continued from previous feasibility studies, and further demonstrated that the SG-FVM will serve as a strong foundation for SAM’s advanced solver algorithm for future deployment.

Zou, Ling↗

Portable Wireless LAN Device and Two-Way Radio Threat Assessment for Aircraft VHF Communication Radio Band

This document summarizes the safety analysis performed on a Flight Guidance System (FGS) requirements model. In particular, the safety properties desired of the FGS model are identified and the presence of the safety properties in the model is formally verified. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the entire project, while Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the problem domain, the nature of accidents, model based development, and the four-variable model. Chapter 3 outlines the approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of the traditional safety analysis techniques and illustrates how the hazardous conditions associated with the system trace into specific safety properties. Chapter 5 presents the results of the formal methods analysis technique model checking that was used to verify the presence of the safety properties in the requirements model. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the study, first and foremost that model checking is a very effective verification technique to use on discrete models with reasonable state spaces. Additional supporting details are provided in the appendices.

Nguyen, Truong X.↗

Safety Benefit Analysis of Conformance Monitoring for Situation Awareness in UTM

This work presents an analytical approach to address situations in drone operations when strategic coordination alone cannot ensure safety, requiring support from the Conformance Monitoring for Situation Awareness service and potentially other deconfliction services. This study focuses on evaluating the impact of off-nominal operations on both UA-to-UA collision risk and ground injury risk. It first establishes a relationship between the likelihood of off-nominal flights and the effectiveness of strategic coordination. The analysis then derives operational conditions where strategic coordination alone is insufficient to meet target safety requirements, particularly when the likelihood of off-nominal operations exceeds a certain threshold. The results indicate that higher operational tempo or density requires a lower likelihood of offnominal operations for strategic coordination to remain effective and meet safety targets. These findings provide quantitative operational thresholds for when CMSA services are necessary. This work contributes to the safety case for both strategic coordination and CMSA services, offering analysis on when CMSA should be employed to support strategic coordination in achieving the desired safety levels. It also establishes a framework for incorporating other deconfliction services in future safety case analyses.

Strategic deconfliction↗

Safety Benefit Analysis of Conformance Monitoring for Situation Awareness in UTM

This work presents an analytical approach to address situations in drone operations when strategic coordination alone cannot ensure safety, requiring support from the Conformance Monitoring for Situation Awareness service and potentially other deconfliction services. This study focuses on evaluating the impact of off-nominal operations on both UA-to-UA collision risk and ground injury risk. It first establishes a relationship between the likelihood of off-nominal flights and the effectiveness of strategic coordination. The analysis then derives operational conditions where strategic coordination alone is insufficient to meet target safety requirements, particularly when the likelihood of off-nominal operations exceeds a certain threshold. The results indicate that higher operational tempo or density requires a lower likelihood of offnominal operations for strategic coordination to remain effective and meet safety targets. These findings provide quantitative operational thresholds for when CMSA services are necessary. This work contributes to the safety case for both strategic coordination and CMSA services, offering analysis on when CMSA should be employed to support strategic coordination in achieving the desired safety levels. It also establishes a framework for incorporating other deconfliction services in future safety case analyses.

Strategic deconfliction↗

HFIR LEU High Density Silicide Dispersion Optimized Design Steady-State Heat Transfer Analyses

Steady-state heat transfer simulations of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) with the low-enriched uranium (LEU) high-density silicide dispersion Optimized fuel design were performed to support comprehensive performance and safety metric studies concerning this design. The LEU Optimized design operates at 95 MW to maintain HFIR’s current highly enriched uranium (HEU) core performance level at 85 MW. Full cycle Mode 1 full flow Case 1 (inlet temperature), Case 2 (flux-to-flow), and Case 3 (inlet pressure) safety limit analyses were performed to assess the margins to critical heat flux. Under the prescribed conditions, this LEU design meets the safety limit and limiting control setting requirements outlined in HFIR’s documented safety analysis; however, the safety margins are less than those for the 85 MW HEU core, and several assumptions were made where fuel fabrication and qualification data are currently lacking for the silicide fuel design. Effects of changes to pertinent fuel fabrication assumptions and uncertainty factors on thermal safety margins were also evaluated, showing that the margins are sensitive to many of these parameters. Power and pressure perturbations were also performed, indicating that significant steady-state thermal margins could be gained by increasing the coolant inlet pressure.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Real-Time Monitoring and Prediction of Airspace Safety

The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) has reached an extremely high level of safety in recent years. However, it will only become more difficult to maintain the current level of safety with the forecasted increase in operations, and so the FAA has been making revolutionary changes to the NAS to both expand capacity and ensure safety. Our work complements these efforts by developing a novel model-based framework for real-time monitoring and prediction of the safety of the NAS. Our framework is divided into two parts: (offline) safety analysis and modeling part, and a real-time (online) monitoring and prediction of safety. The goal of the safety analysis task is to identify hazards to flight (distilled from several national databases) and to codify these hazards within our framework such that we can monitor and predict them. From these we define safety metrics that can be monitored and predicted using dynamic models of airspace operations, aircraft, and weather, along with a rigorous, mathematical treatment of uncertainty. We demonstrate our overall approach and highlight the advantages of this approach over the current state-of-the-art through simulated scenarios.

safety metrics↗

Reliability and Safety Assessment of Urban Air Mobility Concept Vehicles

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with several configurations of multicopter concept vehicles supplied by NASA. Functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) are performed for each of the eight vehicle configurations under review. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configurations (turboshaft, electric, hybrid electric), notional thrust control systems (rpm control and collective control), and navigation control systems for the concept vehicles were to support the reliability and safety analysis and to assess whether a mission can be completed safely. Two kinds of analyses are performed: static safety analysis which enable the quantification of the likelihood of individual events, and dynamic safety analyses which allows the investigation of multiple time-dependent failures. Their objective is to quantify the likelihood of catastrophic failures.

Urban Air Mobility↗

SAM Theory Manual

The System Analysis Module (SAM) is an advanced and modern system analysis tool under development at Argonne National Laboratory for advanced non-LWR reactor safety analysis. It aims to provide fast-running, modest-fidelity, whole-plant transient analyses capabilities, which are essential for fast turnaround design scoping and engineering analyses of advanced reactor concepts. While SAM is being developed as a system-level modeling and simulation tool, advanced modeling techniques being implemented include a reduced-order three-dimensional module, pseudo 3-D conjugate heat transfer modeling in reactor core, flexible and multi-scale modeling of heat transfer between fluid and structures, in addition to the advances in software environments and design, and numerical methods. SAM aims to be a generic system-level safety analysis tool for advanced non-LWRs, including Liquid-Metal-cooled fast Reactors (LMR), Molten Salt Reactors (MSR), Fluoride-salt-cooled High- temperature Reactors (FHR), and High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGR). SAM takes ad- vantage of advances in physical modeling, numerical methods, and software engineering to enhance its user experience and usability. It utilizes an object-oriented computational framework (MOOSE), and its underlying meshing and finite-element library and linear and non-linear solvers, to leverage the modern advanced software environments and numerical methods. This document provides the theoretical and technical basis of the code to help users understand the underlying physical models (such as governing equations, closure models, and component models), system modeling approaches, numerical discretization and solution methods, and the overall capabilities in SAM. As new code capabilities and features are added, the SAM Theory Manual will be updated periodically to keep it consistent with the state of the development.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗