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INFORMATION: Special Report on "Selected Department of Energy Program Efforts to Implement the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was enacted on February 17, 2009, to jumpstart the economy by creating or saving millions of jobs, spurring technological advances in health and science, and investing in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received over $32.7 billion in Recovery Act funding for various science, energy, and environmental programs and initiatives. As of November 2009, the Department had obligated $18.3 billion of the Recovery Act funding, but only $1.4 billion had been spent. The Department's Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, Environmental Management, Science, and Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability received the majority of funding allocated to the Department, about $32.3 billion. Obligating these funds by the end of Fiscal Year 2010, as required by the Recovery Act, and overseeing their effective use in succeeding years, represents a massive workload increase for the Department's programs. The effort to date has strained existing resources. As has been widely acknowledged, any effort to disburse massive additional funding and to expeditiously initiate and complete projects increases the risk of fraud, waste and abuse. It is, therefore, important for the Department's program offices to assess and mitigate these risks to the maximum extent practicable. In this light, we initiated this review as an initial step in the Office of Inspector General's charge to determine whether the Department's major program offices had developed an effective approach for identifying and mitigating risks related to achieving the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. The Department's program offices included in our review identified risks and planned mitigation strategies that, if successfully implemented and executed, should help achieve the goals and objectives of the Recovery Act. While each office identified risks unique to its respective areas of responsibility, there were a number of risks shared in common. These included the mechanical and substantive requirements related to the award and distribution of funds; program and project performance monitoring; and, program and project execution activities. In particular, the offices self-identified common risks such as: (1) The inability to award and distribute funds in a timely manner to achieve the goals of the Recovery Act; (2) The sufficiency of monitoring procedures and resources to, among other things, prevent and detect fraud, waste and abuse throughout the performance period of financial assistance awards and contracts; and (3) The inherent cost, schedule and performance risks associated with first-of-a-kind, innovative research and demonstration projects. Our review confirmed that the Department had begun to implement a number of strategies designed to mitigate these and other program-specific risks. Our testing, however, identified challenges to the effective implementation of these mitigation strategies that need to be addressed if the Department is to meet the goals and objectives established by the Recovery Act. At the time of our review: (1) Program staffing resources, critical to the success of all other mitigation strategies, remained inadequate both in numbers and qualifications (certifications and training) for positions in procurement and acquisition, project management, and monitoring and oversight functions; (2) Performance measures for achieving Recovery Act goals such as distributing funds in an expeditious manner had not always been established and included in performance plans, and, in financial assistance and contract documents; and (3) Programs had not consistently demonstrated that previously reported deficiencies, identified through audits, inspections, investigations and other oversight activities, had been considered in designing mitigation strategies for the Recovery Act related risks. As we noted in our Special Report on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act at the Department of Energy (OAS-RA-09-01, March 2009) these sorts of deficiencies, which were described in the March 2009 report, had adversely impacted the success of earlier Departmental projects. We concluded that consideration of these previously encountered internal control weaknesses was essential if the Department was to avoid the same or similar problems in executing the Recovery Act programs/projects. During the course of our audit we identified other internal control weakness indicators. When brought to their attention by the Office of Inspector General audit staff, program officials acted promptly to address these problems by modifying or improving their risk mitigation strategies. For instance, we found that the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, responsible for $16.8 billion in Recovery Act program activities, took steps to strengthen its merit review process to avoid potential conflict of interest concerns.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Audit Report on "The Department's Management of the ENERGY STAR Program"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) authorized about $300 million in consumer rebate incentives for purchases of products rated under the 'ENERGY STAR' Program. ENERGY STAR, a voluntary labeling program established in 1992, provides consumers with energy efficiency data for a range of products so that they can make informed purchase judgments. The overall goal of the program is to encourage consumers to choose energy efficient products, advancing the nationwide goal of reducing energy consumption. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) managed the ENERGY STAR Program on a stand-alone basis until 1996 when it joined forces with the Department of Energy (Department). A Memorandum of Cooperation expanded the ENERGY STAR product categories, giving the Department responsibility for overseeing eight product categories such as windows, dishwashers, clothes washers, and refrigerators, while EPA retained responsibility for electronic product categories and heating, ventilating, and cooling equipment. Each agency is responsible for setting product efficiency specifications for those items under its control and for ensuring the proper use of the ENERGY STAR label in the marketplace. In August 2007, the EPA Office of Inspector General issued an audit report identifying significant control weaknesses in EPA's management of ENERGY STAR. The Department, concerned by the findings at EPA and eager to improve its own program, developed an approach to verify adherence to product specifications, ensure proper use of the ENERGY STAR label in the marketplace, and improve the establishment of product specifications. As evidenced by the commitment of $300 million in Recovery Act funds, the ENERGY STAR Program plays an important role in the U.S. efforts to reduce energy consumption. We initiated this audit to determine whether the Department had implemented the actions it announced in 2007 to strengthen the Program. The Department had not implemented planned improvements in the ENERGY STAR Program. Our audit revealed that officials had not: (1) Developed a formal quality assurance program to help ensure that product specifications were adhered to; (2) Effectively monitored the use of the ENERGY STAR label to ensure that only qualifying products were labeled as compliant; and (3) Formalized procedures for establishing and revising product specifications and for documenting decisions regarding those specifications. In our judgment, the delay in the Department's planned improvements in its management of the ENERGY STAR Program could reduce consumer confidence in the integrity of the ENERGY STAR label. Such loss of credibility could reduce energy savings, increase consumer risk, and diminish the value of the recent infusion of $300 million for ENERGY STAR rebates under the Recovery Act.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Special Report on Review of "The Department of Energy's Quality Assurance Process for Prime Recipients' Reporting for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was established to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, spur technological advances in health and science, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy (Department) will receive an unprecedented $37 billion in Recovery Act funding to support a variety of science, energy, and environmental initiatives. The majority of the funding received by the Department will be allocated to various recipients through grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and other financial instruments. To ensure transparency and accountability, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires that recipients report on their receipt and use of Recovery Act funds on a quarterly basis to FederalReporting.gov. OMB also specifies that Federal agencies should develop and implement formal procedures to help ensure the quality of recipient reported information. Data that must be reported by recipients includes total funding received; funds expended or obligated; projects or activities for which funds were obligated or expended; and the number of jobs created and/or retained. OMB requires that Federal agencies perform limited data quality reviews of recipient data to identify material omissions and/or significant reporting errors and notify the recipients of the need to make appropriate and timely changes to erroneous reports. As part of a larger audit of recipient Recovery Act reporting and performance measurement and in support of a Government-wide review sponsored by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, we completed an interim review to determine whether the Department had established a process to ensure the quality and accuracy of recipient reports. Our review revealed that the Department had developed a quality assurance process to facilitate the quarterly reviews of recipient data. The process included procedures to compare existing information from the Department's financial information systems with that reported to FederalReporting.gov by recipients. In addition, plans were in place to notify recipients of anomalies and/or errors exposed by the quality assurance process. While the Department has made a good deal of progress in this area, we did, however, identify several issues which could, if not addressed, impact the effectiveness of the quality assurance process.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Special Report on the "Department of Energy's Efforts to Meet Accountability and Performance Reporting Objectives of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act"

The purpose of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, spur technological advances in health and science, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy will receive an unprecedented $38 billion in Recovery Act funding to support a variety of science, energy, and environmental initiatives. The Recovery Act requires transparency and accountability over these funds. To this end, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance requiring the Department to compile and report a wide variety of funding, accounting, and performance information. The Department plans to leverage existing information systems to develop accounting and performance information that will be used by program managers and ultimately reported to Recovery.gov, the government-wide source of Recovery Act information, and to OMB. The Department's iManage iPortal, a system that aggregates information from a number of corporate systems, will serve as the main reporting gateway for accounting information. In addition, the Department plans to implement a methodology or system that will permit it to monitor information reported directly to OMB by prime funding recipients. Furthermore, performance measures or metrics that outline expected outcomes are being developed, with results ultimately to be reported in a recently developed Department-wide system. Because of the significance of funds provided and their importance to strengthening the Nation's economy, we initiated this review to determine whether the Department had taken the steps necessary to ensure that Recovery Act funds can be appropriately tracked and are transparent to the public, and whether the benefits of the expenditures can be properly measured and reported clearly, accurately, and in a timely manner. Although not yet fully mature, we found that the Department's efforts to develop, refine, and apply the control structure needed to ensure accurate, timely, and reliable reporting to be both proactive and positive. We did, however, identify certain issues relating to Recovery Act performance management, accounting and reporting accuracy, and timeliness that should be addressed and resolved. In particular, at the time of our review: (1) Program officials had not yet determined whether existing information systems will be able to process anticipated transaction increases associated with the Recovery Act; (2) System modifications made to the Department's performance management system to accommodate Recovery Act performance measures had not yet been fully tested and verified; (3) The ability of prime and sub-recipients to properly segregate and report both accounting and performance information had not been determined; (4) There was a lack of coordination between Headquarters organizations related to aspects of Recovery Act reporting. For example, we observed that the Offices of Fossil Energy and Program, Analysis and Evaluation were both involved in developing job creation estimates that could yield significantly different results; and, (5) A significant portion (91 of 142, or 64 percent) of the performance measures developed for the Recovery Act activities were not quantifiable. In some instances, Project Operating Plans had not been finalized and we were not able to verify that all needed performance measures had been developed. Furthermore, the Department had not developed specific metrics to measure federal and contractor jobs creation and retention, an essential Recovery Act objective. The Department had devoted a great deal of time and resources to identifying and mitigating Recovery Act-related risks. For example, the Department developed a risk assessment tool that is intended to assist programs in identifying risks that can prevent its Recovery Act projects from meeting their intended goals. We also found that program staff and management officials at multiple levels were actively engaged in designing Recovery Act-related control and accountability programs. These efforts ranged from updating existing information systems to developing matrices designed to ensure that all required reporting and performance elements were addressed. Each of these activities required substantial effort and was accomplished within a relatively short period. Further, we noted that the Office of the Chief Financial Officer had been instrumental in helping impacted program elements identify issues that could adversely affect the Department's ability to execute its accounting, reporting, and performance monitoring responsibilities. While much has been done, additional work is necessary if the Department is to successfully manage Recovery Act-related risks. For example, as previously noted, OMB has issued guidance establishing Recovery Act monitoring and reporting requirements.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

ARRA additions to the north slope of Alaska.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provides scientific infrastructure and data archives to the international Arctic research community through a national user facility, the ARM Climate Research Facility, located on the North Slope of Alaska. The ARM sites at Barrow and Atqasuk, Alaska have been collecting and archiving atmospheric data for more than 10 years. These data have been used for scientific investigation as well as remote sensing validations. Funding from the Recovery Act (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) will be used to install new instruments and upgrade existing instruments at the North Slope sites. These instruments include: scanning precipitation radar; scanning cloud radar; automatic balloon launcher; high spectral resolution lidar; eddy correlation flux systems; and upgraded ceilometer, AERI, micropulse lidar, and millimeter cloud radar. Information on these planned additions and upgrades will be provided in our poster. An update on activities planned at Oliktok Point will also be provided.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

25 years of environmental remediation in the general separations area of the Savannah river site: lessons learned about what worked and what did not work in soil and groundwater cleanup - 15270

The Savannah River Site, which is owned and administered by the US Department of Energy, covers approximately 900 square kilometers. The General Separation Area is located in the center of the site and includes: radioactive material chemical separations facilities, radioactive waste tank farms, radioactive seepage basins, and the radioactive waste burial grounds. Radioactive wastes were disposed in the General Separation Area from the mid-1950's through the mid-1990's. Operations at the F Canyon began in 1954 and at H Canyon began in 1955. Waste water disposition to the F and H Seepage Basins began soon after operations started in the canyons. The Old Radioactive Waste Burial Ground began operations in 1952 to manage solid waste that could be radioactive from all the site operations, and ceased receiving waste in 1972. The Mixed Waste Management Facility and Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility received radioactive solid waste from 1969 until 1995. Environmental legislation enacted in the 1970's through 1990's led to changes in waste management and environmental cleanup practices. The US Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the Clean Water Act in 1972; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in 1976; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act was enacted by Congress in 1980; and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act was signed into law in 1992. Environmental remediation at the Savannah River Site essentially began with a 1987 Settlement Agreement between the Savannah River Site and the State of South Carolina. The site manages several of the larger groundwater remedial activities under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for facilities recognized early on as environmental problems. All subsequent remediation projects are managed under a tri-party agreement (Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) through the Federal Facilities Agreement. Environmental remediation activities during the past 25 years have stabilized and capped seepage basins as well as consolidated and capped waste units and burial grounds in the General Separation Area. Groundwater activities include: pump and treat systems in the groundwater, installation of deep subsurface barrier systems to manage groundwater flow, in situ chemical treatments in the groundwater, and captured contaminated groundwater discharges at the surface for management in a forest irrigation system. Concentrations of contaminants in the aquifers beneath the General Separation Area and in surface water streams in the General Separation Area have decreased over the past 25 years. Closure of 65 waste sites and 4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act facilities has been successfully accomplished. Environmental clean-up has progressed to the stage where most of the work involves monitoring, optimization, and maintenance of existing remedial systems. Many lessons have been learned in the process of remediating the General Separations Area. Geo-textile covers outperform low permeability clay caps, especially with respect to the amount of repairs required to upkeep the drainage layers as the caps age. Passive and enhanced natural processes to address contamination are much more cost effective than pump and treat systems. Forest irrigation can be very effective in water management situations with non-accumulative contaminants such as tritium and volatile organic contaminants. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Economic Impact of Fuel Cell Deployment in Forklifts and for Backup Power under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act or ARRA), the United States Department of Energy (DOE) funded several projects to deploy polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cells in forklift and backup power applications. DOE invested $\$$9.7 million to deploy fuel cells in forklifts and an additional $\$$11.8 million was contributed through industry cost shares, for a total investment of $\$$21.5 million in forklift projects. DOE invested $\$$18.5 million to deploy fuel cells in backup power projects and an additional $\$$30.8 million was contributed through industry cost shares, for a total investment of $\$$49.3 million in backup power projects.

Mintz, M.↗

Field Sampling Plan for Closure of the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant Lagoon 3 and Land Application Area

This field sampling plan describes sampling of the soil/liner of Lagoon 3 at the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant. The lagoon is to be closed, and samples obtained from the soil/liner will provide information to determine if Lagoon 3 and the land application area can be closed in a manner that renders it safe to human health and the environment. Samples collected under this field sampling plan will be compared to Idaho National Laboratory background soil concentrations. If the concentrations of constituents of concern exceed the background level, they will be compared to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preliminary remediation goals and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels. If the concentrations of constituents of concern are lower than the background levels, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels, or the preliminary remediation goals, then Lagoon 3 and the land application area will be closed. If the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels and/or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preliminary remediation goals are exceeded, additional sampling and action may be required.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INFORMATION: Audit Report on "Accounting and Reporting for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by the Department of Energy's Funding Recipients"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was established to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received approximately $37 billion through the Recovery Act to support a variety of science, energy and environmental initiatives. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance for carrying out stimulus-related activities which requires, among other things, that recipients ensure funds provided by the Recovery Act are clearly distinguishable from non-Recovery Act funds in all reporting systems and that recipients' actions are transparent to the public. To meet these requirements, the Department's recipients must clearly and accurately track and report on 18 separate data elements. In addition, the Department was to develop and implement a process to ensure that recipient information reported to the public was free from material omissions and significant reporting errors. Our recent report (OAS-RA-10-01, October 2009) noted that the Department had developed a quality assurance process to facilitate the quarterly reviews of recipient data and planned to test it during the first quarterly reporting cycle. To determine whether the Department's quality assurance process was effective, we examined information reported by recipients of Departmental funding as of September 30, 2009. We also sought to determine whether the Department's prime contractors were prepared to track and report on Recovery Act activities. The Department had taken a number of actions designed to ensure the accuracy and transparency of reported Recovery Act results. This process identified potential anomalies with information reported by 1,113 of 2,038, or 55 percent of recipients. We view the Department's data quality assurance efforts as both timely and significant. As noted by our audit testing, however, opportunities exist to strengthen the process. In particular: (1) Site officials did not always ensure that anomalies, once identified during the quality assurance process, were actually resolved. For example, the Department's process identified that about 740 of the approximately 10,000 jobs reported in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 as created/retained were for projects reported as having no funds spent. Although these problems were referred to site officials for follow-up and/or correction, the information was never actually changed; (2) The Department did not always utilize the correct basis when evaluating the accuracy of 'funds provided' data submitted by grant recipients. For example, in its analysis process, the Department used data reflecting 'funds obligated' rather than the correct amount of 'total grant awards'. This generated a number of potential false positives; and, (3) Duplicate reports by certain recipients, resulting in overstatements of as much as $137 million of the more than $18 billion obligated, were not corrected. We observed that the Department had taken prompt action to ensure that its prime facility management contractors could properly report Recovery Act information. Notably, the seven contractors in this category included in our review had modified their accounting systems, as necessary, to ensure that they could accurately track and report on Recovery Act activities. The systems at each of these entities had been restructured so that they: (i) could separate Recovery Act and non-Recovery Act funds; and, (ii) had adequate processing capacity to handle the projected increase in transactions. We found the Department's decision to limit its reviews to the four elements that it considered to be critical (award amount, invoiced amount, jobs created/retained, and project status) to be reasonable. We concluded, however, other elements or dependent relationships should not be completely excluded from review. Beyond its initial development and implementation of its quality assurance process, the Department had taken steps to improve its ability to ensure that Recovery Act information was both accurate and transparent to the public. Specifically, officials changed the quality assurance plan based on initial data reviews. Department officials also informed us that they are in the process of updating their quality assurance process to meet new OMB requirements. For example, recent guidance directed agencies to focus on certain data elements, such as award number and recipient name, during their quality assurance reviews. In addition, subsequent to our review, the Department added two more data elements and comparisons to its quarterly assurance process, including an analysis of costs/expenditures and a comparison of the recipient reported project status to the Department's data contained in its financial system.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Special Report "The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Department of Energy"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was signed into law on February 17, 2009, as a way to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, spur technological advances in science and health, and invest in the Nation's energy future. This national effort will require an unprecedented level of transparency and accountability to ensure that U.S. citizens know where their tax dollars are going and how they are being spent. As part of the Recovery Act, the Department of Energy will receive more than $38 billion to support a number of science, energy, and environmental initiatives. Additionally, the Department's authority to make or guarantee energy-related loans has increased to about $127 billion. The Department plans to disburse the vast majority of the funds it receives through grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and other financial instruments. The supplemental funding provided to the Department of Energy under the Recovery Act dwarfs the Department's annual budget of about $27 billion. The infusion of these funds and the corresponding increase in effort required to ensure that they are properly controlled and disbursed in a timely manner will, without doubt, strain existing resources. It will also have an equally challenging impact on the inherent risks associated with operating the Department's sizable portfolio of missions and activities and, this is complicated by the fact that, in many respects, the Recovery Act requirements represent a fundamental transformation of the Department's mission. If these challenges are to be met successfully, all levels of the Department's structure and its many constituents, including the existing contractor community; the national laboratory system; state and local governments; community action groups and literally thousands of other contract, grant, loan and cooperative agreement recipients throughout the Nation will have to strengthen existing or design new controls to safeguard Recovery Act funds.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Preliminary Audit Report on "Management Controls over the Commonwealth of Virginia's Efforts to Implement the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Weatherization Assistance Program"

The Department of Energy's (Department) Weatherization Assistance Program received $5 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) to improve the energy efficiency of homes, multi-family rental units and mobile homes owned or occupied by low-income persons. Subsequently, the Department awarded a three-year Weatherization Assistance Program grant for $94 million to the Commonwealth of Virginia (Virginia). This grant provided more than a ten-fold increase in funds available to Virginia for weatherization over that authorized in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. Corresponding to the increase in funding, the Recovery Act increased the limit on the average amount spent to weatherize a home (unit) from $2,500 to $6,500. Virginia's Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) administers the Recovery Act grant through 22 local community action agencies. These agencies (sub-grantees) are responsible for determining applicant eligibility, weatherizing homes, and conducting home assessments and inspections. Typical weatherization services include installing insulation; sealing ducts; tuning and repairing furnaces; and, mitigating heat loss through windows, doors and other infiltration points. Virginia plans to use its Recovery Act Weatherization funding to weatherize about 9,193 units over the life of the grant - a significant increase over the 1,475 housing units that were planned to be completed in FY 2009. Given the significant increase in funding and the demands associated with weatherizing thousands of homes, we initiated this audit to determine if Virginia had adequate safeguards in place to ensure that the Weatherization Program was managed efficiently and effectively. The State of Virginia's DHCD had not implemented financial and reporting controls needed to ensure Weatherization Program funds are spent effectively and efficiently. Specifically, DHCD had not: (1) Performed on-site financial monitoring of any of its sub-grantees under the Recovery Act; (2) Reviewed documentation supporting sub-grantee requests for reimbursements to verify the accuracy of amounts charged; (3) Periodically reconciled amounts paid to sub-grantees to the actual cost to weatherize units; (4) Maintained vehicle and equipment inventories as required by Federal regulations and state and Federal program directives; and (5) Accurately reported Weatherization Program results to the Department. Exacerbating weaknesses in DHCD's financial controls, the Department's most recent program monitoring visit to Virginia, made in 2008 before passage of the Recovery Act, did not include a required financial review. Hence, the financial control weaknesses discussed above were not detected and had not been addressed. As described in this report, these control and reporting weaknesses increase the risk that Recovery Act objectives may not be achieved and that fraud, waste or abuse can occur and not be detected in this critically important program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Audit Report on "The Department of Energy's American Recovery and Reinvestment Act -- Florida State Energy Program"

The Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) provides grants to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to support their energy priorities through the State Energy Program (SEP). The SEP provides Federal financial assistance to carry out energy efficiency and renewable energy projects that meet each state's unique energy needs while also addressing national goals such as energy security. Federal funding is based on a grant formula that takes into account population and energy consumption. The SEP emphasizes the state's role as the decision maker and administrator for the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) expanded the SEP, authorizing $3.1 billion in grants. Based on existing grant formulas and after reviewing state-level plans, EERE made awards to states. The State of Florida's Energy Office (Florida) was allocated $126 million - a 90-fold increase over Florida's average annual SEP grant of $1.4 million. Per the Recovery Act, this funding must be obligated by September 30, 2010, and spent by April 30, 2012. As of March 10, 2010, Florida had expended $13.2 million of the SEP Recovery Act funds. Florida planned to use its grant funds to undertake activities that would preserve and create jobs; save energy; increase renewable energy sources; and, reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To accomplish Recovery Act objectives, states could either fund new or expand existing projects. As a condition of the awards, EERE required states to develop and implement sound internal controls over the use of Recovery Act funds. Based on the significant increase in funding from the Recovery Act, we initiated this review to determine whether Florida had internal controls in place to provide assurance that the goals of the SEP and Recovery Act will be met and accomplished efficiently and effectively. We identified weaknesses in the implementation of SEP Recovery Act projects that have adversely impacted Florida's ability to meet the goals of the SEP and the Recovery Act. Specifically: (1) Florida used about $8.3 million to pay for activities that did not meet the intent of the Recovery Act to create new or save existing jobs. With the approval of the Department, Florida used these funds to pay for rebates related to solar energy projects that had been completed prior to passage of the Recovery Act; (2) State officials did not meet Florida's program goals to obligate all Recovery Act funds by January 1, 2010, thus delaying projects and preventing them from achieving the desired stimulative economic impact. Obligations were delayed because Florida officials selected a number of projects that either required a lengthy review and approval process or were specifically prohibited. In June 2009, the Department notified Florida that a number of projects would not be approved; however, as of April 1, 2010, the State had not acted to name replacement projects or move funds to other projects; (3) Florida officials had not ensured that 7 of the 18 award requirements for Recovery Act funding promulgated by the Department had been passed down to sub-recipients of the award, as required; and, (4) Certain internal control weaknesses that could jeopardize the program and increase the risk of fraud, waste and abuse were identified in the Solar Energy System Incentives Program during our September 2009 visit to Florida. These included a lack of separation of duties related to the processing of rebates and deficiencies in the written procedures for grant managers to review and approve rebates. From a forward looking perspective, absent aggressive corrective action, these weaknesses threaten Florida's efforts to meet future Recovery Act goals. In response to our review, Florida took corrective action to incorporate the additional award requirements in sub-recipient documents. It also instituted additional controls to correct the internal control weaknesses we identified. More, however, needs to be done with respect to Department oversight. This report details the circumstances surrounding these program issues and outlines actions that, in our opinion, will help Florida achieve its SEP Recovery Act-funded goals.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Designing a Successful Transportation Project: Lessons Learned from the Clean Cities American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Projects

The largest source of funding for alternative fuel vehicle and infrastructure projects in the U.S. Department of Energy's Clean Cities program's history came from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act). In 2009, the 25 cost-share projects totaled nearly $300 million in federal government investment. This effort included the involvement of 50 Clean Cities coalitions and their nearly 700 stakeholder partners who provided an additional $500 million in matching funds to support projects in their local communities. In total, those 25 projects established 1,380 alternative fueling stations and put more than 9,000 alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles on the road. Together, these projects displaced 154 million gasoline gallon equivalents (GGE) of petroleum and averted 254,000 tons of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while supporting U.S. energy independence and contributing to regional economic development. During post-project interviews, project leaders consistently cited a number of key components - ranging from technical and logistical factors, to administrative capabilities - for accomplishing an effective and impactful project. This report summarizes the high-level project design and administrative considerations for conducting a successful transportation project.

arra, doe, recovery act,clean cities, alternative ↗

Designing a Successful Transportation Project: Lessons Learned from the Clean Cities American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Projects

The largest source of funding for alternative fuel vehicle and infrastructure projects in the U.S. Department of Energy's Clean Cities program's history came from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act). In 2009, the 25 cost-share projects totaled nearly $300 million in federal government investment. This effort included the involvement of 50 Clean Cities coalitions and their nearly 700 stakeholder partners who provided an additional $500 million in matching funds to support projects in their local communities. In total, those 25 projects established 1,380 alternative fueling stations and put more than 9,000 alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles on the road. Together, these projects displaced 154 million gasoline gallon equivalents (GGE) of petroleum and averted 254,000 tons of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while supporting U.S. energy independence and contributing to regional economic development. During post-project interviews, project leaders consistently cited a number of key components - ranging from technical and logistical factors, to administrative capabilities - for accomplishing an effective and impactful project. This report summarizes the high-level project design and administrative considerations for conducting a successful transportation project.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗