Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Physical Security Systems”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

Cyber100 Compass: Quantification of Cybersecurity Risks for Systems Transitioning to High Levels of Renewables (Final Report)

The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Model-based Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning for Improved Physical Security Design: A Prototype

Prior work in FY24 developed an adversarial AI agent aid in path analysis of physical protection systems. This agent, trained using a model-based reinforcement learning algorithm, was able to successfully learn the most vulnerable path in facilities. It was able to extend the current state of practice for physical protection design by exhibiting dynamic behavior based on current environmental conditions. Whereas PathTrace largely performs a static, graph-based analysis, the AI agent was able to make decisions based on relative position in the facility, current conditions (was the adversarial agnet discovered?), and proximity to secondary targets. The agent demonstrated some novel capabilities, but had limitations that need to be resolved before it can be used for production purposes. For example, the adversarial agent generalizes poorly and takes a relatively long time to train. Nonetheless, there is still considerable promise for developing the adversarial agent further in order to explore even richer, more dynamic behaviors (e.g., adversary motivations, environmental debris, and more). This work considers a complementary idea; development of a planning agent. The planning agent is envisioned as an auto-complete-like tool that can help accelerate security system design by human experts. The agent would respect existing barriers and sensors placed by a human expert while offering cost-effective suggestions (i.e., implicitly balancing effectiveness with cost) to improve the design. The goal is for this agent to be part of an expert’s toolbox, not to totally upend the current state-of-practice, or to displace human experts. The ultimate goal would be concurrent training of both the adversarial and planning agent together, to learn entirely through self-play. This would represent an entirely new way of performing system deign. We selected a hierarchical, model-based reinforcement learning algorithm to serve as the planning agent. This is an extension of concepts used in the prior FY24 adversarial agent work. There, we had a single agent acting an environment. Here, we have two different sub-agents (policies), working together, to form a complete agent. There is a manager policy, which can select abstract goals on slower time scales, and a worker, which performs primitive actions to reach goals selected by the manager. It is worth noting that this class of algorithm is challenging to work with. From our understanding, our work is one of the first successful uses of model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) in nuclear energy1 , and likely the first hierarchical model-based reinforcement learning application in nuclear energy. Further, this work is one of the first known attempts to apply AI to perform a design tasks in nuclear energy. Consequently, there were significant implementation challenges and the bulk of the work was focused on successful implementation and algorithm design. The results presented here are very low technology readiness level as a consequence of the lack of related literature, but still represent a significant step forward in the pursuit of applied AI for design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Basic Energy Sciences Roundtable: Foundational Science for Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies (Brochure)

Basic research to identify and understand the fundamental principles governing carbon dioxide removal processes of capture, conversion, and storage is essential for achieving zero carbon emissions by 2050. In March 2022, the Office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES)—in coordination with the US Department of Energy (DOE) technology Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, and Nuclear Energy—held a roundtable titled, “Foundational Science for Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies,” to discuss the scientific and technical barriers for CO 2 capture, conversion, and storage. Five priority research opportunities were identified to address these scientific and technical challenges and accelerate progress toward the realization of zero carbon emissions. The PROs are as follows: 1) Master Interfacial Processes of CO2 Transport and Reactivity Across Multiple Length and Time Scales; 2) Create Materials that Simultaneously Exhibit Multiple Properties for CO 2 Capture and Release or Conversion; 3) Discover Unconventional Pathways for Energy-Efficient CO 2 Capture, Release, and Conversion; 4) Control Multiphase Interactions Required for CO 2 Conversion into Minerals and Materials; and 5) Achieve Predictive Understanding of Coupled Processes in Complex Subsurface Geologic Systems for Secure Carbon Storage.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System

SAND2023-05661O The proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) provides grid-edge situational awareness for cybersecurity defense by capturing real-time distributed energy resource (DER) network traffic and performance data with a novel approach that improves the detection and prevention of cyber-physical attacks. The PIDMS addresses the grid-edge security gap with real-time analysis of both network traffic and photovoltaic performance data to deliver a novel, cyber-physical intrusion detection system (IDS) approach that increases the accuracy and effectiveness of detection and mitigation. This hybrid IDS analysis enables dual monitoring that increases the workload of the adversary; both cyber and physical data would have to be simultaneously spoofed to evade detection. Furthermore, monitoring and analyzing cyber data are insufficient in some cases. For example, in an insider threat aimed at disrupting inverter grid-support functions where proper credentials and authentication are achieved, only the altered PV performance would indicate abnormal behavior. All in all, the PIDMS provides novel capabilities for: • Distributed, real-time cyber-physical detection and mitigation analysis • Cybersecurity defense for grid-edge systems • Analysis framework that can provide situational awareness across the transmission, distribution, and DER systems The PIDMS sensor is designed to collect cyber-physical data, process the data using machine-learning algorithms, detect abnormal events, and deploy mitigations. With these goals, the main functional PIDMS objectives are: • Capability to collect cyber-physical data • Onboard storage of cyber-physical data • Peer-to-peer communication • Computationally efficient machine-learning algorithms • Online cyber-physical data analysis • Alerting/visualization capabilities • Mitigation deployment capability with bump-in-the-wire (BITW) implementation Each of these functional objectives enable PIDMS to perform effective cyber-physical intrusion detection and mitigation. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Jones, Christian↗

Impact of Extreme Weather Events on Physical Protection System Effectiveness for a Hypothetical Small Modular Reactor Facility: Systems Analysis and Considerations

This report will summarize the group's work to provide recommendations to secure nuclear facilities before, during and after an extreme weather event. Extreme weather events can have drastic impacts to nuclear facilities as seen by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Recent hurricanes in the United States including Hurricane Harvey demonstrate the devastating effects these storms can have on infrastructure and the surrounding communities. The group is attempting to identify the gaps that potential small modular reactor (SMR) facilities will need to address in order to provide adequate site security before, during and after extreme weather events. This effort proceeded in three parts to provide insights and recommendations to secure Small Modular Reactor facilities for extreme weather events:(1) a literature review of academic articles as well as relevant documents including the existing regulatory framework and recommendations from the IAEA, NRC, and DOE, (2) subject matter expert interviews from a wide variety of security backgrounds, and (3) modeling and simulation on a hypothetical SMR facility. Special attention was paid to the interactions between stakeholders and nuclear facility design considerations, particularly the topics of safety and security. Engineering design issues from safety and security perspectives were discussed and included in simulation. Each step informed the proceeding, with the result including full tabletop scenarios of EWE impacts to security system effectiveness on the hypothetical model. This systems-level analysis provides results to inform recommendations to secure SMR facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Physical Safety and Security at Electric Vehicle Charging Sites

This help sheet provides an overview of physical safety and security design elements for public EV charging stations and general best practices that can be considered for the safety and comfort of charging station customers.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,ENERGY PLANNING, POLIC↗

Resilience of Urban Transport Network-of-Networks under Intense Flood Hazards Exacerbated by Targeted Attacks

Natural hazards including floods can trigger catastrophic failures in interdependent urban transport network-of-networks (NoNs). Population growth has enhanced transportation demand while urbanization and climate change have intensified urban floods. However, despite the clear need to develop actionable insights for improving the resilience of critical urban lifelines, the theory and methods remain underdeveloped. Furthermore, as infrastructure systems become more intelligent, security experts point to the growing threat of targeted cyber-physical attacks during natural hazards. Here we develop a hypothesis-driven resilience framework for urban transport NoNs, which we demonstrate on the London Rail Network (LRN). We find that topological attributes designed for maximizing efficiency rather than robustness render the network more vulnerable to compound natural-targeted disruptions including cascading failures. Our results suggest that an organizing principle for post-disruption recovery may be developed with network science principles. Our findings and frameworks can generalize to urban lifelines and more generally to real-world spatial networks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE VTO funded project DE- EE0008451, where ABB Inc. (ABB), in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratory (INL), APS Global (APS), and XOS Trucks (XOS) pursued the development of a cyber-resilient extreme fast charging (XFC) management system. This project entitled Cybersecurity for Grid Connected eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) Station (CyberX) focuses on a resilient architecture for smart charging EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) device control and Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) features that can be added at the charging site depot level to increase cybersecurity. The project was split into two budget periods focused first on developing the threat model and resilient control concepts and second on testing, improving, and validating those developed resilient control algorithms and features with a focus on key vulnerabilities identified during the threat assessment portion of the project. During the first budget period of the CyberX project, the ABB led team focused on activities to identify, model, and quantitatively prioritize high-impact attack scenarios with potential cyber-physical effects while also modeling and developing concepts for a resilient control system that could securely address integration of DERs and other resources with EV charging. Development of the security focused XFC management system (XMS) was accomplished first by offline simulation using a developed XFC station or depot with 480V input level and simulating measurement inputs to monitoring and control systems in concept development. A representative distribution grid model was developed supporting an EV charging site model with BESS and 6 general EV charging models. These EV charging models allowed multiple configurations of charging level, multiple connected protection and measurement devices, and simulation function to show general compromise of EV, BESS, and protection features based on parallel threat analysis. During the second budget period, the EV site and supporting systems model was developed in more detail and converted from offline model to real-time to real-time with EV charging hardware in the loop (HIL). The resilient control architecture developed as concept in the first part of the project was further tested and validated for integration of local energy resources and XFC charging station site equipment while maintaining cybersecure operating principles. The proposed resilient architecture for smart charging and cybersecurity features consists of two main concepts developed and tested within the project. The first concept is an XFC management system (XMS) consisting of a hardware gateway, software platform, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or Distribution Management System integration components. The second concept is a Coordinated Anomaly Detection System (CADS) which forms a primarily software-related subsystem of the total CyberX solution focused on monitoring system measurements, estimation of measurement states, and predicting current at the utility point of interaction based on machine learning for anomaly detection.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Hybrid Cyber-attack Detection in Photovoltaic Farms

Here, to address the cyber-physical security in PV farms, a hybrid cyber-attack detection is proposed in this manuscript. To secure PV farms, the proposed method integrates model-based and data-driven methods by fusing the detection score at the device and system levels. First, a model-based cyber-attack detection method is developed for each PV inverter. A residual between the estimation of the Kalman filter and measurement is calculated. By leveraging the calculated residual from all inverters, a squared Mahalanobis distance is developed for device detection score generation. At the system level, a convolutional neural network (CNN) is proposed to detect cyber-attack using the waveform data at the point of common coupling (PCC) in PV farms. To improve the CNN detection accuracy, a set of well-designed features are extracted from the raw waveform data. Finally, a weighted detection score fusion method is proposed to combine device and system detection scores by using their complementary strength. The feasibility and robustness of the proposed method are validated by testing cases and a comparative experiment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Deliberate Motion Analytics Applied to CUAS Sensor Fusion

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program in the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) seeks to identify new technology solutions for safeguards and security challenges associated with domestic deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Research in the ARSS program is investigating alternative physical protection system (PPS) approaches that leverage new detection technologies. This report shows test results from a new form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is called deliberate motion analytics (DMA) when used to spatially and temporally fuse active radar and passive radio frequency (RF) detection that significantly improves detection of uncrewed aircraft systems (UASs). DMA is designed to filter out false positive alarms yet provide highly reliable intrusion detection at nuclear power plants (NPPs) and advanced small modular reactor (ASMR) perimeters. This form of AI is considered to be an enabling technology for security of the future and supports the ARSS investigation of alternative PPSs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. Two theft scenarios (an outsider attack and insider diversion) as well as a sabotage scenario were examined in order to optimize the security design. Security metrics are presented. This work fits into a larger Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Towards 5G-Enabled Operational Technology for Process Monitoring and Network Slicing

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are deployed to monitor physical processes in critical cyber-enabled services like power generation. However, CPS ecosystems are typically designed without robust security. While it is important to ensure optimal performance of the Operational Technology (OT) environments, security cannot be overlooked. To modernize traditional OT services, 5G technology is being integrated. 5G technology offers low latency and high availability, making it a suitable infrastructure for managing and monitoring physical processes. How-ever, integrating 5G mechanisms into large-scale OT networks introduces new implementation and performance challenges. Therefore, this paper presents a 5G-enabled CPS architecture (5G-CPS) that describes the necessary components, services, and communication protocols and conducts feasibility study to integrate 5G technology in industrial control system networks to understand the performance merits. The 5G-CPS architecture aims to minimize implementation and operational challenges associated with integrating 5G technology into constrained OT.

Aguayo, Jared M.↗

Inferring adversarial behaviour in cyber‐physical power systems using a Bayesian attack graph approach

Abstract Highly connected smart power systems are subject to increasing vulnerabilities and adversarial threats. Defenders need to proactively identify and defend new high‐risk access paths of cyber intruders that target grid resilience. However, cyber‐physical risk analysis and defense in power systems often requires making assumptions on adversary behaviour, and these assumptions can be wrong. Thus, this work examines the problem of inferring adversary behaviour in power systems to improve risk‐based defense and detection. To achieve this, a Bayesian approach for inference of the Cyber‐Adversarial Power System (Bayes‐CAPS) is proposed that uses Bayesian networks (BNs) to define and solve the inference problem of adversarial movement in the grid infrastructure towards targets of physical impact. Specifically, BNs are used to compute conditional probabilities to queries, such as the probability of observing an event given a set of alerts. Bayes‐CAPS builds initial Bayesian attack graphs for realistic power system cyber‐physical models. These models are adaptable using collected data from the system under study. Then, Bayes‐CAPS computes the posterior probabilities of the occurrence of a security breach event in power systems. Experiments are conducted that evaluate algorithms based on time complexity, accuracy and impact of evidence for different scales and densities of network. The performance is evaluated and compared for five realistic cyber‐physical power system models of increasing size and complexities ranging from 8 to 300 substations based on computation and accuracy impacts.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗