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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

NEFTSec: Networked federation testbed for cyber-physical security of smart grid: Architecture, applications, and evaluation

As today's power grid is evolving into a densely interconnected cyber-physical system (CPS), a high fidelity and multifaceted testbed environment is needed to perform cybersecurity experiments in a realistic grid environment. Traditional standalone CPS testbeds lack the ability to emulate complex cyber-physical interdependencies between multiple smart grid domains in a real-time environment. Therefore, there are ongoing research and development (R&D) efforts to develop an interconnected CPS testbed by sharing geographically dispersed testbed resources to perform distributed simulation while analysing simulation fidelity. This paper presents a networked federation testbed for cybersecurity evaluation of today's and emerging smart grid environments. Specifically, it presents two novel testbed architectures, including cyber federation and cyber-physical federation, identifies R&D applications, and also describes testbed building blocks with experimental case studies. It also presents a novel co-simulation interface algorithm to facilitate distributed simulation within cyber-physical federation. The resources available at the PowerCyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University (ISU) and the US Army Research Laboratory are utilised to develop this platform for performing multiple experimental case studies pertaining to wide-area protection and control applications in power system. Finally, experimental results are presented to analyse the simulation fidelity and real-time performance of the testbed federation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

FALCON: Framework for Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control Systems

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used to control physical processes in critical infrastructure. These systems are used in a wide variety of operations such as water treatment, power generation and distribution, and manufacturing. While the safety and security of these systems are of serious concern, recent reports have shown an increase in targeted attacks aimed at manipulating physical processes to cause catastrophic consequences. This trend emphasizes the need for algorithms and tools that provide resilient and smart attack detection mechanisms to protect ICS. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection framework for ICS based on a deep neural network. The proposed methodology uses dilated convolution and long short-term memory (LSTM) layers to learn temporal as well as long term dependencies within sensor and actuator data in an ICS. The sensor/actuator data are passed through a unique feature engineering pipeline where wavelet transformation is applied to the sensor signals to extract features that are fed into the model. Additionally, this paper explores four variations of supervised deep learning models, as well as an unsupervised support vector machine (SVM) model for this problem. The proposed framework is validated on Secure Water Treatment testbed results. This framework detects more attacks in a shorter period of time than previously published methods.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a reference design to assist in the selection of security practices in power electronics design. A prototype will be developed from this reference design for evaluation. This evaluation will include a brief cost/benefit analysis to gauge the efficacy of implementing each layer of security throughout the power electronics design process. This thesis will also describe the obstacles and effectiveness of integrating a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) into a cyber-hardened grid-connected device. The TPM device is a secured crypto processor that assists in generating, storing, and restricting the use of cryptographic keys. The emphasis of this research is to establish integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality within a system by providing a baseline of security concerns for segments of the system. This research considers communication, control, and hardware level securities. The scope of this thesis will review the necessary security methods as well as consider the effects these methods have on the embedded system, to assess the desired security to responsiveness trade off. Applying this approach to a design process will alleviate various unknowns of appending security to a power electronics design. This thesis describes the specific vulnerabilities introduced within this grid-edge environment, and how the liabilities within the system can be mitigated. Initially, common security techniques will be considered to establish a guideline to benchmark performance and resource costs of the system. The foundation will be a non-hardened power electronic system platform with industry standard communication protocols. Several security techniques and attack vectors will then be evaluated to contribute to the base level platform. Other fail-safe features take place to gauge progress of the selected approach, non-inclusive to the TPM. Collectively, this investigation will determine a valid experiment by appraising and categorizing resource allocation, performance overhead, and monetary cost analysis results into a reference design. The prototype will then demonstrate methods to relieve common threats that are purposefully implemented into the design.

Blair, Nicholas Paul↗
DOE OSTI2026

PowerModelsGAT-AI: Physics-Informed Graph Attention for Multi-System Power Flow With Continual Learning

Solving the alternating current power flow equations in real time is essential for secure grid operation, yet classical Newton–Raphson solvers can be slow under stressed conditions. Existing graph neural networks for power flow are typically trained on a single system and often degrade on different systems. We present PowerModelsGAT-AI, a physics-informed graph attention network that predicts bus voltages and generator injections. The model uses bus-type-aware masking to handle different bus types and balances multiple loss terms, including a power-mismatch penalty, using learned weights. We evaluate the model on 14 benchmark systems (4 to 6,470 buses) and train a unified model on 13 of these under contingency conditions with up to two branch outages, achieving an average normalized mean absolute error of 0.89% for voltage magnitudes and R 2 >0.99 for voltage angles. We also show continual learning: when adapting a base model to a new 1,354-bus system, standard fine-tuning causes severe forgetting with error increases exceeding 1000% on base systems, while our experience replay and elastic weight consolidation strategy keeps error increases below 2% and in some cases improves base-system performance. Interpretability analysis shows that learned attention weights correlate with physical branch parameters (susceptance: r=0.38 ; thermal limits: r=0.22 ), and feature importance analysis supports that the model captures established power flow relationships.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runtime Monitoring with R2U2 for Aircraft Systems with Neural Networks

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for real-time system monitoring and software health management of cyber-physical systems. During system operation, R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and its vital components and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, fast reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are key components of R2U2 and designed for minimal computational footprint. R2U2 has been implemented in software supporting ROS, NASA's cFS/cFE, and Simulink and as an FPGA configuration. The synergistic combination of monitors and observers in R2U2 makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. In this presentation, I will give a detailed overview of the R2U2 architecture and its features and will discuss the application of R2U2 for safety-monitoring of a neural-network based autonomous centerline tracking system (ACT) for autonomous aircraft.

Runtime Monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2020

Load altering attack-tolerant defense strategy for load frequency control system

Cyber attacks are emerging threats to every information-oriented energy management system. By violating the cyber systems, the hacker can disrupt the security and stability due to the strong coupling between the cyber and physical facilities. In this paper, one type of cyber attacks designated as the load altering attack is studied for the power system frequency control, and corresponding defense strategies are proposed to improve the frequency control performance. Considering the difficulty of the application of model-based controller into large-scale power systems, a novel model-free defense framework is for the first time presented. Under this framework, both active defense and passive defense strategies are designed. The former assumes that the defender has the initiative to learn different attack scenarios. Adaptive defense strategies are implemented using the online attack identification information and off-line trained strategy pool. The latter assumes that the defender passively tolerates various attack scenarios via the pre-trained off-line strategy. Both approaches prove to be effective through validation based on the IEEE benchmark systems. The proposed defense framework and defense strategies can be extended to other energy control systems to enhance their attack tolerance capability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data-driven Cyberattack Detection for Photovoltaic (PV) Systems through Analyzing Micro-PMU Data

With increasing exposure to software-based sensing and control, Photovoltaic (PV) systems are facing higher risks of cyber attacks. Here, to ensure the system stability and minimize potential economic losses, it is imperative to monitor operating states and detect attacks at the early stage. To meet this demand, Micro-Phasor Measurement Units (μPMU) are increasingly popular in monitoring distribution networks. However, due to the relatively low sampling rate, μPMU has not yet been used to detect and classify cyber-attacks in power electronics enabled smart grid. To our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to use μPMU to detect cyber attacks that degrade the performance of power electronics systems. We propose to apply data-driven methods on micro-PMU data to implement attack detection. We have evaluated data-driven methods, including decision tree (DT), K-nearest neighbor (KNN), support vector machine (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), long short-term memory (LSTM) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed CNN model achieves the required performances with the highest 99.23% accuracy and 0.9963 F 1 score.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Reactor Safeguards Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Volatile Memory Extraction- Based Approach for Level 0-1 CPS Forensics

Most security analyzers operate on system state that is far removed from end-point components in cyber-physical systems (CPS) identified as level 0-1 in the Purdue Architecture Reference Architecture (PERA) [1]. For example, many operate on system logs and other data dumps to disks. Tremendous value that can be gained in cyber security forensics if low level details such as dynamic changes to volatile memory can be extracted and provided to more sophisticated analysis tools. However, obtaining detailed and dynamic system state at the level of volatile memory is extremely challenging [2]. Here, we attempt to apply IT memory forensic mechanisms to CPS end-point devices and statistically evaluate them. Our focus is to extract volatile and dynamically changing internal information form CPS 0-1 level devices, and design preliminary schemes to exploit that extracted information. This new capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. As a case study for our ongoing research, we apply the proposed methodology to Modicon PLC using Modbus protocol. We extract the memory layout and subject the device to read operations at the most critical regions of memory. Similarly, write operations are initiated to carefully determine memory locations (for example, bytes that hold the firmware version number). This capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. Also, the ability to dynamically make controlled modifications to specific memory locations opens the potential for new mechanisms such as taint analysis and watermarking.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Security Analysis for Nuclear Reactor Control Systems (Final Technical Report)

This project investigated the cyber-security impacts of moving from an all analog, point-to-point, instrumentation and control (I&C) system to a digital I&C system based on Modbus and a shared communication medium. A formalism called a hybrid attack graph was expanded to support the nuclear research reactor system. The hybrid attack graph allows one to check a system for vulnerabilities, in this case cyber-security vulnerabilities, and to document the attack vectors (scenarios) causing those vulnerabilities. In parallel, a simulation of the system was developed to model both the physical reactor parameters and operations, as well as the network interconnects and communications. This simulation platform was modeled on the nuclear research reactor located at Washington State University. The simulation platform provided a sandbox to evaluate and quantify the impact of identified and proposed vulnerabilities in the system and to determine the effectiveness of countermeasures at stopping these attacks. The simulation and hybrid attack graph tools were integrated to provide a streamlined process of generating attack scenarios, playing those scenarios out in the simulation, and then analyzing the results to correlate system state to states in the hybrid attack graph. This process was used to (1) quantify the impact of attack scenarios and (2) to determine if the system moved through the hybrid attack graph as anticipated. The hybrid attack graph tool was extended and customized to produce a tool to automatically identify critical assets (CAs) and critical digital assets (CDAs) as defined by NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71. This tool was verified using the nuclear research reactor at Washington State University. Finally, a series of educational modules covering the findings of the different aspects of this research have been created.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗