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At least 199 records · Page 11

Advanced Technology and a Resilient Electric Grid

Making the electric grid cleaner and more resilient will require investing in a variety of new and emerging technologies. Advanced technologies including hydrogen, small modular nuclear reactors, and energy storage will all have a role to play in modernizing the electric grid. A diverse energy supply helps to keep the lights on and protects critical infrastructure, however it will also be important to assess the potential vulnerabilities and risks that come with unfamiliar and new technologies. This webinar will feature experts on resilience planning around advanced technologies from multiple sectors and share resources for states as they seek to modernize and decarbonize their electric grid.

advanced technology↗

JHR Project: a future Material Testing Reactor working as an International user Facility: The key-role of instrumentation in support to the development of modern experimental capacity

Research and development on fuel and material behaviour under irradiation is a key issue for sustainable nuclear energy in order to meet specific needs by keeping the best level of safety. These needs mainly deal with a constant improvement of performances and safety in order to optimize the fuel cycle and hence to reach nuclear energy sustainable objectives. A sustainable nuclear energy requires a high level of performances in order to meet specific needs such as: - Pursuing improvement of the performances and safety of present and coming water cooled reactor technologies. This will require a continuous R and D support following a long-term trend driven by the plant life management, safety demonstration, flexibility and economics improvement. Experimental irradiations of structure materials are necessary to anticipate these material behaviours and will contribute to their optimisation. - Upgrading continuously nuclear fuel technology in present and future nuclear power plants to achieve better performances and to optimise the fuel cycle keeping the best level of safety. Fuel evolution for generation II, III and III+ is a key stake requiring developments, qualification tests and safety experiments to ensure the competitiveness and safety: experimental tests exploring the full range of fuel behaviour determine fuel stability limits and safety margins, as a major input for the fuel reliability analysis. To perform such accurate and innovative progress and developments, specific and ad hoc instrumentation, irradiation devices, measurement methods are necessary to be set up inside or beside the material testing reactor (MTR) core. These experiments require beforehand in situ and on line sophisticated measurements to accurately determine different key parameters such as thermal and fast neutron fluxes and nuclear heating in order to precisely monitor and control the conducted assays. The new Material Testing Reactor JHR (Jules Horowitz Reactor) currently under construction at CEA Cadarache research centre in the south of France will represent a major Research Infrastructure for scientific studies regarding material and fuel behavior under irradiation. It will also be devoted to medical isotopes production. Hence JHR will offer a real opportunity to perform R and D programs regarding needs above and hence will crucially contribute to the selection, optimization and qualification of these innovative materials and fuels. The JHR reactor objectives, principles and main characteristics associated to specific experimental devices associated to measurement techniques and methodology, their performances, their limitations and field of applications will be presented and discussed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Technical basis for extending storage of the UK's advanced gas-cooled reactor fuel

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Agency has recently declared a date for cessation of reprocessing of oxide fuel from the UK's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs). This will fundamentally change the management of AGR fuel: from short term storage followed by reprocessing to long term fuel storage followed, in all likelihood, by geological disposal. In terms of infrastructure, the UK has an existing, modern wet storage asset that can be adapted for centralised long term storage of dismantled AGR fuel under the required pond water chemistry. No AGR dry stores exist, although small quantities of fuel have been stored dry as part of experimental programmes in the past. These experimental programmes have shown concerns about corrosion rates.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Design Readiness And Maturity Assessment (DRAMA) Tool for Advanced Reactors

Abstract – This research is developing a formal, repeatable method to assess the readiness and maturity of an advanced nuclear reactor design for licensing and deployment. This design readiness and maturity assessment (DRAMA) tool will be capable of determining the readiness of the design and of all parties needed to bring a particular advanced reactor design to fruition. Beneficiaries and stakeholders include the design team, research organizations (required to collect needed data and develop design tools), standards organizations, research facilities to support gathering of needed data, supply chain and construction organizations, and everyone responsible for legal and regulatory infrastructure (including defining import-export requirements). Recent experience has shown that even the most experienced engineering and construction organizations, with decades of experience in the nuclear power business, have had significant challenges in bringing designs to completion, licensing the designs, and constructing new plants. For new entries into the field, simply understanding the unique environmental and regulatory requirements have been daunting. A significant part of the challenge is that new entries into the market do not know what they don't know. This tool will provide design teams a better understanding of their readiness to proceed to licensing (and other steps in the process), while at the same time providing a valuable metric for other interested organizations, such as funding agencies, national regulators, and international markets. The DRAMA tool will provide an assessment of the likelihood of successfully completing licensing and deployment and will also create the capability to assess the ability of regulatory infrastructure and the supply chain to support the deployment of any design or class of designs. It will also help prioritize research and policy efforts to improve the likelihood of deployment of the next generation of advanced reactors.

Arndt, Steven↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: Characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State staff, State Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative have participated in nine of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 13 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

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Heat Transfer Salts for Nuclear Reactor Systems - Chemistry Control, Corrosion Mitigation, and Modeling

The concept of a molten salt reactor has existed for nearly sixty years. Previously all work was done during a large collaborative effort at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, culminating in a research reactor which operated for 15,000 hours without major error. This technical success has garnished interest in modern, high temperature, reactor schemes. Research using molten fluoride salts for nuclear applications requires a steady supply of high grade molten salts. There is no bulk supplier of research grade fluoride salts in the world, so a facility which could provide all the salt needed for testing at the University of Wisconsin had to be produced. Two salt purification devices were made for this purpose, a large scale purifier, and a small scale purifier, each designed to clean the salts from impurities and reduce their corrosion potential. As of now, the small scale has performed with flibe salt, hydrogen, and hydrogen fluoride, yielding clean salt. This salt is currently being used in corrosion testing facilities at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Wisconsin. Working with the beryllium based salts requires extensive safety measures and health monitoring to prevent the development of acute or chronic beryllium disease, two pulmonary diseases created by an allergic reaction to beryllium in the lungs. Extensive health monitoring, engineering controls, and environment monitoring had to be set up with the University of Wisconsin department of Environment, Health and Safety. The hydrogen fluoride required for purification was also an extreme health hazard requiring thoughtful planning and execution. These dangers have made research a slow and tedious process. Simple processes, such as chemical handling and clean-up, can take large amounts of ingenuity and time. Other work has complemented the experimental research at Wisconsin to advance high temperature reactor goals. Modeling work has been performed in house to re-evaluate thermophysical properties of flibe and flinak. Pacific Northwest National Laboratories has focused on evaluating the fluorinating gas nitrogen trifluoride as a potential salt purification agent. Work there was performed on removing hydroxides and oxides from flinak salt under controlled conditions. Lastly, the University of California Berkeley has spent considerable time designing and simulating reactor components with fluoride salts at high temperatures. Despite the hurdles presented by the innate chemical hazards, considerable progress has been made. The stage has been set to perform new research on salt chemical control which could advance the fluoride salt cooled reactor concept towards commercialization. What were previously thought of as chemical undesirable, but nuclear certified, alloys have been shown to be theoretically compatible with fluoride salts at high temperatures. This preliminary report has been prepared to communicate the construction of the basic infrastructure required for flibe, as well as suggest original research to performed at the University of Wisconsin. Simultaneously, the contents of this report can serve as a detailed, but introductory guide to allow anyone to learn the fundamentals of chemistry, engineering, and safety required to work with flibe salt.

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2021 Annual Report Laboratory Directed Research & Development

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program is an essential pathway for innovation, capability growth, and research staff development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This program enables timely and agile response to national security, energy, and environmental challenges that motivate INL’s mission to discover and demonstrate innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy options as well as securing our critical infrastructure. This report highlights INL’s LDRD projects concluding in fiscal year (FY) 2021 which included innovative research and development (R&D) across INL’s five science and technology initiatives: nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced design and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Overview of the Government of Canada Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program - 13551

Nuclear legacy liabilities have resulted from more than 60 years of nuclear research and development carried out on behalf of Canada. The liabilities are located at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario and Whiteshell Laboratories in Manitoba, as well as three shutdown prototype reactors in Ontario and Quebec that are being maintained in a safe storage state. Estimated at about $7.4 billion (current day dollars), these liabilities consist of disused nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, a wide variety of buried and stored waste, and contaminated lands. In 2006, the Government of Canada adopted a long-term strategy to deal with the nuclear legacy liabilities and initiated a five-year, $520 million start-up phase, thereby creating the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). The Government of Canada renewed the NLLP in 2011 with a $439-million three-year second phase that ends March 31, 2014. The projects and activities carried out under the Program focus on infrastructure decommissioning, environmental restoration, improving the management of legacy radioactive waste, and advancing the long-term strategy. The NLLP is being implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding between Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and AECL whereby NRCan is responsible for policy direction and oversight, including control of funding, and AECL is responsible for implementing the program of work and holding and administering all licences, facilities and lands. (authors)

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02-16 Digital Engineering

48% of large projects finish on budget 8.5% of large projects finish on budget and on schedule 0.5% finish on budget and schedule, while delivering the expected benefits/promises Nuclear related infrastructure is one of the worst offenders

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A New Consolidated Storage Facility for Used Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County, Texas - 16418

On February 6, 2015, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) announced its plan to file a license application with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF). Upon issuance of the license, WCS would be authorized to receive Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) and reactor related Greater Than Class C Low Level Radioactive Waste (referred hence forth as UNF) at the CISF in late 2020. WCS based its decision to license a CISF based on strong support from the State of Texas and the local community's willingness to host such a facility in Andrews County, Texas. WCS' decision to license a CISF in a supportive community is consistent with the consent-based licensing approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. WCS intends to use existing technology developed by AREVA and NAC International that have already been approved by the NRC to transport UNF from existing commercial nuclear reactors across the nation for interim storage at its 14,000 acre site in Andrew County, Texas. In the pre-application licensing meetings held with the NRC, WCS underscored that UNF would be removed first from the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites and transported to the CISF. Approximately eighty percent of the UNF currently residing at the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites can be safely placed into the storage systems developed by AREVA and NAC International that are currently licensed by the NRC. WCS plans to store up to 40,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) at the CISF that would be constructed in eight phases over the next 20 years. WCS intends to submit its license application for the CISF to the NRC by April 2016. The license application will request authorization to possess up to 5,000 MTHM of UNF for Phase One which can accommodate storing the fuel located at over ten shutdown decommissioned reactor sites. As discussed with the NRC, the license application will be developed following NRC regulatory guidance to comply with the technical requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste. In addition, to filing the license application, WCS is also seeking legislative changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requiring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to take title of the UNF at the commercial nuclear reactor sites. Under such legislative changes, the DOE would also be responsible for the transport of UNF to the CISF. In addition to preparing the CISF License Application, WCS and its partners AREVA and NAC International are prepared to work with DOE to facilitate the development of the UNF transportation infrastructure in the timeframe needed to support CISF operations. The WCS site and technical approach give it several advantages which uniquely position it to become the first successful commercial CISF in the U.S. These advantages include: broad consent-based support at the local, state, and Congressional level; an operating waste disposal site with an existing transportation infrastructure; and the use of already licensed systems to address 80% of the UNF currently in dry storage at shutdown sites in the U.S. WCS firmly believes this initiative will provide an economically viable option for consolidated interim storage of UNF until a permanent geologic repository becomes available. (authors)

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 14 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State representatives, State Regional Group representatives, Tribal representatives, and a Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in eleven of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 14 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Palisades, Pilgrim, Three Mile Island, Oyster Creek, Indian Point, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

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NBSR reactor control room upgrade - 215

The maintenance and modernization of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) reactor, known as the NBSR, is an ongoing process to endure until the eventual decommissioning of the reactor. As part of the renovation effort, the reactor control system is to be upgraded. Following some initial outsourcing efforts, the NBSR reactor control system upgrade has been restructured to be implemented by in-house means. The beginning stage of the upgrade involved the development of a simulator environment based on a PC system and digitization of the majority of nuclear reactor monitoring data. The NBSR reactor surveillance data consists of approximately thirteen hundred input/output points, including analog/digital sensor signals, signal conditioners, and relay logic. The aim of the current phase is to implement a new reactor data acquisition and display system (RDS) and lay out the infrastructure for the upgrade of the reactor control system (RCS). Key design criteria are to implement a reliable, redundant, diverse, modular and candid system where any complex digital manipulations are taken outside of the control room. Basically, the data analytics and custom codes are separated from reactor operation control and decision making logic. Furthermore, the new RDS is designed such that it could be maintained internally by NCNR personnel. The RDS is unique in design and modularity, minimizing custom codes and testing, making it ideal for research reactors. (authors)

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Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education From the SW Consortium

This report describes the final expenditures for the INIE project during FY 08/09. (There were no expenditures during FY09/10 or during FY10/11.) To see the list of accomplishments done using the INIE funds, please see the reports included here. The last of the FY 07/08 funds were brought forward and used to complete two distance education modules teaching reactor experiments. These modules and parts from the modules are still being used and are being disseminated off-campus as a part of our distance education effort. The second largest expenditure was sending students to the ANS to present student papers on work that they had done the previous year underwritten by INIE funds. The remaining expenditures were IDC charges and minor travel expenses to give students a tour of a medical facility. Once again we wish to express of sincere appreciation of the INIE program and hope that the return on investment is appreciated by the DOE. Although INIE has come to a close, looking back at all the Consortium has accomplished is astounding. And, as was hoped, these funds have proved to be a springboard for continuing work, particularly at Texas A&M. With the resurgence of nuclear power, the utilities have realized that the nuclear workforce in the near future will be too small for the task of bringing dozens of new plants on line and have turned their attention to the URRs to help feed the workforce pipeline. The distance education modules developed at the A&M are soon to be broadcast throughout the country to help train a new generation of nuclear workers. Our students at the Nuclear Science Center at being snapped up by the nuclear power plants after graduating. Our research projects at A&M have all ended with new data, new ways of looking at old problems, and produced a covey of good students. I want to say 'Thanks' with utmost sincerity because without the INIE funds our efforts would yield a small fraction of the accomplishments you see in this report.

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Joint probability safety assessment for NPP defense infrastructure against extreme external natural hazards

With the increasing tendency of natural hazards, the typhoon, hurricane and tropical Cyclone induced surge, wave, precipitation, flood and wind as extreme external loads menacing Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) in coastal and inland provinces of China. For all of planned, designed And constructed NPP the National Nuclear Safety Administration of China and IAEA recommended Probable Maximum Hurricane /Typhoon/(PMH/T), Probable Maximum Storm Surge (PMSS), Probable Maximum Flood (PMF), Design Basis Flood (DBF) as safety regulations for NPP defense infrastructures. This paper discusses the joint probability analysis of simultaneous occurrence typhoon induced extreme external hazards and compare with IAEA 2006-2009 recommended safety regulation design criteria for some NPP defense infrastructures along China coast. (authors)

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Status of GTA Gear Inspection after Testing in Sodium

The Mechanisms Engineering Test Loop (METL) is an intermediate-scale liquid metal experimental facility that provides purified reactor-grade (R-grade) sodium to various experimental test vessels. In these test vessels, components that are required to operate in an advanced fast reactor can be tested in a prototypical sodium environment. Experiments conducted in METL significantly assist in the development and maturation of systems and components for advanced reactors. The METL facility consists of multiple test segments including: a purification and diagnostic loop (cold trap was designed after EBR-II), two 18” diameter test vessels with 150 L capacities capable of operating in static or dynamic flow at 538°C, two 28” diameter test vessels with 644 L capacities capable of operating in static or dynamic flow at 650°C, a 3,180 L dump tank with 21 instrumentation ports, and the infrastructure to expand capacity in the future.

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Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

IER-539 CED-1: Preliminary Design of a New Horizontal Split Table

This report presents the preliminary design (CED-1) of IER-539, focused on a new Horizontal Split Table (HST) critical assembly machine. The Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) funds critical experiment R&D and its Mission and Vision document identifies a long-standing technical gap of a general purpose HST. HSTs have historically been used for experiments that are impractical to assemble on a vertical lift machine (VLM), usually due to their large physical size or weight. While many HSTs were historically employed in the US (including at LLNL), there are currently no surviving HSTs in the US. While there are two critical experiments facilities remaining in the US, the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC) operated by LANL and the Critical Experiments Facility (CX) operated by SNL, these facilities are not equipped with a general purpose HST. There are a number of experiment designs that require an HST, including needs for Defense Programs and Nuclear Energy. Lack of an HST constraints the national ability to perform large and heavy experiments. Large footprints are needed to successfully create mockup experiments for advanced reactors (mock-up cold critical reactor cores, which is a urgent need for new reactor designs using novel materials and longer cycle lengths), to create solution experiments in lattices, or to test nuclear data of heavy metals. A new HST is a vital piece of criticality experiment infrastructure that would allow for the conduct of integral critical experiments to address needs in the nuclear criticality safety, nuclear data, and other DOE stakeholder communities.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Canada's Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program - Ten Years of Progress and Achievements - 16456

Nuclear legacy liabilities have resulted from more than 60 years of nuclear research and development carried out on behalf of Canada. The liabilities are located at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario and Whiteshell Laboratories in Manitoba, as well as three shutdown prototype reactors in Ontario and Quebec that are being maintained in a safe storage state. Estimated at about $10.6 billion (B) (current day Canadian dollars), these liabilities consist of disused nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, a wide variety of buried and stored waste, and contaminated lands. The Government of Canada established the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP) in 2006 to implement a long-term strategy to safely and cost-effectively reduce risks and liabilities, and invested approximately $1.4 B over the 10-year duration of the Program to implement the strategy. Risks and liabilities were reduced through projects and activities that decommissioned and removed out-dated facilities, remediated lands affected by past practices, and improved the management of legacy radioactive waste. The NLLP formally ended in September 2015 when the restructuring of AECL's Nuclear Laboratories was completed, and a Government-owned Contractor-operated (GoCo) management model came into effect. The nuclear decommissioning and waste management work that was previously carried out under the NLLP was transitioned into the new GoCo contract. Over the 10-year duration of the NLLP, the Program achieved good progress in addressing health, safety and environmental priorities, reducing liabilities, and providing the studies, plans and facilities that will be needed to enable subsequent phases of the strategy. The NLLP provided a strong basis for the GoCo contractor to accelerate risk and liability reduction at AECL sites. (authors)

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