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Y-12 is currently designing, installing, and qualifying a CAAS system in one of its nuclear facilities. The CAAS is considered a safety-significant system.
This presentation is for ASME Section III at University of Tennessee Student Event on October 18, 2023. Includes ASME Section III - Rules for construction of nuclear facility components, including an all-inclusive term that includes material, design, fabrication, installation, examination, testing, overpressure protection, inspection, stamping, and certification, and discusses Division 1-5.
A substantial effort is applied in performing radiological characterization of structures and land areas during decommissioning of a nuclear facility. This includes multiple surveys of land areas and large structures to support eventual site release under the Multi Agency Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM, Reference 1). These surveys are typically performed using manually delivered systems, which is time consuming and labor intensive. Radiological surveys intentionally follow a prescribed protocol with respect to areas covered, scan speeds, responses to elevated readings, required detector offsets, the need for repeat measurements, etc. Based on these attributes, combined with the repetitive effort of performing surveys over large areas, automation of radiological characterization techniques has a high potential to be successful and promises substantial benefit. EPRI has performed a project that resulted in the development and demonstration of an autonomous site characterization system. This EPRI project focused on building surfaces and the surfaces of large land areas as these configurations lend themselves more readily to automated survey. The project included: - Identification of the requirements for an autonomous site characterization system; - A survey of existing control systems that use automation to conduct characterization of structures and land areas. - As no fully adequate systems were identified, a complete system was developed that utilized commercially available detection and analysis systems and a self driving vehicle owned by EPRI. The system was demonstrated at the Kewaunee nuclear power plant site in the fall of 2019. The demonstration included: - Autonomous surveys of floor areas inside the Auxiliary Building at Kewaunee after manually controlled mapping of the survey areas. - For land areas, the vehicle autonomously surveyed areas using travel paths had been preprogrammed onto an internet available map of area. In this case, GPS coordinates from the preprogramming were used for navigation by the vehicles guidance system. This paper summarizes the characterization system development and system demonstration which will also be published in an EPRI report in the first half of 2020. (authors)
The timely detection of special nuclear material (SNM) transfers between nuclear facilities is an important monitoring objective in nuclear nonproliferation. Persistent monitoring enabled by successful detection and characterization of radiological material movements could greatly enhance the nuclear nonproliferation mission in a range of applications. Supervised machine learning can be used to signal detections when material is present if a model is trained on sufficient volumes of labeled measurements. However, the nuclear monitoring data needed to train robust machine learning models can be costly to label since radiation spectra may require strict scrutiny for characterization. Therefore, this work investigates the application of semi-supervised learning to utilize both labeled and unlabeled data. As a demonstration experiment, radiation measurements from sodium iodide (NaI) detectors are provided by the Multi-Informatics for Nuclear Operating Scenarios (MINOS) venture at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as sample data. Anomalous measurements are identified using a method of statistical hypothesis testing. After background estimation, an energy-dependent spectroscopic analysis is used to characterize an anomaly based on its radiation signatures. In the absence of ground-truth information, a labeling heuristic provides data necessary for training and testing machine learning models. Supervised logistic regression serves as a baseline to compare three semi-supervised machine learning models: co-training, label propagation, and a convolutional neural network (CNN). In each case, the semi-supervised models outperform logistic regression, suggesting that unlabeled data can be valuable when training and demonstrating value in semi-supervised nonproliferation implementations.
Glovebox glove pressure decay leak testing and analysis of the data can greatly improve glovebox safety, minimize Transuranic (TRU) glove waste, and minimize operational cost. It is well known, the weakest point of containment on a glovebox is the glove. Mitigating unplanned openings in gloves is critical to minimizing operational and safety costs in glovebox operations. Mitigating unplanned glove openings due to glove failures will be discussed in this paper. The lack of an engineered solution to determine a gloves operational life in nuclear operations, has lead to use of theoretical and manual subjective methods to determine the life and safety of a glovebox glove. Whether the glove is inspected visually prior to use, or gloves are changed regularly to theoretically avoid failure, both the operators PPE and the room are being exposed to contamination, or un-necessary amounts of TRU glove waste are being generated. Millions of dollars yearly in operational costs are spent on glove failures due to loss of production, incident analysis, regulatory audits, clean up, and paperwork. In a nuclear application, a glove failure could contaminate an operator and laboratory, shut down the operation for weeks, potentially create a regulatory audit, and potentially create a media frenzy; the damages to the organization can be astronomical. Elimination of glove failures is possible by tracking glove material degradation and setting limits to allow glove change when it becomes necessary, prior to glove failure. Analytical pressure decay leak testing allows the detection of material degradation, and in turn the ability to limit operational glove failures. A German based company called MK Versuchsanlagen, e.K., has developed an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System. The system, with its use of proprietary RFID and special software technology, is unique in its capabilities. The system is capable to perform highly accurate regular glove testing on any size glovebox line in minimal time. The system records and can analyze a tremendous amount of system data that in turn can determine, for example, a safe glove change time prior to a glove material failure. This paper will show how an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System can detect glove material degradation and help determine a safe change point prior to glove failure. Pressure decay curves of new gloves and recorded effects of accelerated aging on the glove over time will be shown. The use of this technology in nuclear facilities can greatly improve glovebox operational safety, minimize glovebox glove TRU waste, and save organizations tremendous costs in downtime, clean up, documentation, and potential regulatory review. (authors)
The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.
The U.S. Department of Energy vitrification facilities currently employ glass property-composition models to ensure processability of waste streams and acceptability of the final glass products. The efficiency (e.g., process flexibility, reduced down time, and reduced cost) of waste vitrification is directly tied to the size of the waste processing envelope. To increase the size of the processing envelope, a larger database was developed. The database will improve the prediction accuracy of glass properties, leading to higher waste loadings, higher waste throughput, broader process flexibility, and reduced mission life. Some of the data in this expanded database has insufficient quality assurance (QA) rigor for use in nuclear facility operation and glass qualification. A plan was developed to qualify high-value data under the appropriate QA rigor for use at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant’s High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility. This qualification plan first compares the data coverage over the composition region of interest to Hanford HLW by property. Those studies that significantly improve the data coverage in the Hanford HLW glass composition region were prioritized for qualification activities. Qualification methods including QA equivalence, peer review, data corroboration, and confirmatory testing have been assigned to each high-priority study.
Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)
The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is tasked with closing cleanup sites throughout the DOE-EM complex. A major component of successfully closing the sites is the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of radioactively contaminated buildings in nuclear facilities. Deactivation consists of the process of placing a contaminated facility in stable condition in order to minimize any risks that could affect workers, the public, and the environment. Successful deactivation and decommissioning consists of leaving the buildings in an agreed upon end state to provide future protection against hazards. Hazards include radiation but can also include asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other environmental and physical hazards.
The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) has experienced substantial growth in terms of staff, research, and production in recent years. MFC operational performance has effectively kept pace with this growth. However, to capture the continuous improvement actions needed to improve effectiveness and increase the efficiency of our management systems, a broad operations management strategy is necessary. The MFC Operations Management Improvement (OMI) Strategy is complementary to the MFC Five-Year Mission and Investment Strategies and the MFC Management Plan. The OMI strategy is structured to address the management systems outlined in the Nuclear Facility Management Standard Operations Model. Selected management systems are evaluated independently in chapters that describe the prior 5 years of performance improvement, a description of improvement actions for the MFC staff that directly perform within or contribute to the management system, process improvements, and any needed equipment improvements. Chapter selection is based on a management system’s need for improvement. In some cases, management systems may be combined in a single chapter. Additional chapters are added to address subject areas not formally described in the standard operations model.
Nuclear sites across the Unites States and other nations in the world, are prone to extreme radiation effects. To understand the radiation hazards, plan the cleanup efforts; and to meet the quality standards and guidelines, it is important to accurately characterize any nuclear facility. One of the current methods in characterizing facilities is the use of advanced autonomous systems. These are safe, efficient, and cost-effective tools, which can safely deploy state-of-the-art instrumentation without exposing workers to radiation risks. Conventional methods of taking radiation measurements by hand within or around the containment areas, and analyzing the collected data to obtain the result are: Ineffective, Puts scientists at risk of Radiation, Not cost-effective. The platform uses the Robotic Operating Systems (ROS) to integrate multiple sensors seamlessly. It can operate near real time by using a distributed processing system to handle large amounts of data: Surrounding cameras, A multi-channel 3D Lidar, Manipulator arm, High-performance gamma-ray spectrometer.
U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the 324 Building and is preparing to remotely excavate and disposition the radioactive soil beneath the building to allow further deactivation of the building. The 324 Building is a non-reactor Category 2 Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 liters of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) and strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) spilled onto the floor of a hot cell, B-Cell, in the 324 Building. The spill contained an estimated 1.3 million curies (Ci) of radioactivity. A breach in the sump of B-Cell was discovered in November 2009 during characterization of the soil under the building. Exposure rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr were detected through a system of access pipes installed under the hot cell, and an estimated 1.557 E+05 Ci of {sup 137}Cs and 6.842 E+04 Ci of {sup 90}Sr are in the soil beneath B-Cell. The magnitude of the soil contamination below B-Cell represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. The objective of CHPRC's 324 Project is to remotely excavate and disposition the highly contaminated soil under the hot cell so building deactivation and stabilization activities can resume. Depending on the volume and radioactivity of contaminated soil under B-Cell, the material will be dispositioned either at the Hanford Site's Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) or in grout monoliths that will be created in the hot cells (A, C and D) next to B-Cell during future building demolition activities. The current project scope includes installing structural supports under the walls of B-Cell and using remotely operated equipment to remove debris from the hot cell, remove debris mixed with grout on the floor, saw through and remove the cell floor and liner, and excavate contaminated soil under B-Cell to a depth of up to 3.66 meters (12 feet). Addition or removal of debris in A-Cell may be required to support B-Cell cleanout and excavation activities. The base approach is to disposition debris and soil bins in the Radiochemical Engineering Cell (REC) monoliths, and subsequently disposition the monoliths during building demolition. (authors)
The selection of Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs) in nuclear facilities decommissioning is important because they serve as criteria for site characterization and final status surveys. DCGLs should be derived for KAERI TRIGA Mark II and III research reactor site clearance and prior to the work, a radionuclides list for DCGLs consideration was created. Radionuclides selection for DCGLs was performed according to the procedure proposed by the US NRC based on the characterization survey related to the decommission site. By evaluating the dose contribution of each radionuclide using D and D computer code, radionuclides with a dose contribution fraction of 0.1% or more for the entire radionuclide were selected. As a result, the selected radionuclides were beta radionuclides H-3, C-14 and Sr-90 and gamma radionuclides Co-60, Cs-137, Eu-152 and Eu-154. The selected radionuclides can be presented for consultation with domestic regulatory agencies in the future and will be used as the technical base of DCGLs for the final status survey. (authors)
For routine radiological operations, lost radioactive sources, decommissioning and cleanup of nuclear facilities, and radiological terrorist events such as Radioactive Dispersive Devices (RDDs) or Radiological Exposure Devices (REDs), individuals are tasked with accurately locating both point and distributed sources of radiation. Radiation workers must often practice these tasks, whether part of initial training or periodically as part of formal or informal exercises or drills. In such circumstances, it is desirable to have an accurate recreation of a radioactive source, including a method of detecting it, which does not include dangerous amounts of radiation. The goal of this research was to develop a radiation simulation technology that uses IEEE 802.11x W-LAN protocol, i.e. Wi-Fi sources and detectors for these, as an inexpensive, precise and accurate method of replicating sources of gamma radiation. For this work, existing 802.11x sources were used. Software was developed for use with an Android smartphone to detect the presence of these sources. The measurements followed the expected behavior as a function of distance from the sources, mimicking that of gamma radiation, thus demonstrating the fundamental principle of operation. The ultimate system will be used in an outreach program to interest students in the radiation protection field.
There is an increasing need to create predictive models for defect classification in concrete using the output of non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques. Recent advancement of machine-learning algorithms has offered several techniques for developing classification models for different types of data sets. However, the performance of these algorithms is very uncertain, mainly when applied to small and noisy datasets. For example, when human access is limited (e.g., nuclear facility), robot-based NDT is preferred. But compared to manual tests with humans present on site, the data sets are small, and more noise can exist. Therefore, it is imperative to develop new approaches to ensure a consistently high classification accuracy for inadequate data sets. This study explores the classification performance on NDT dataset using classifiers from different machine-learning algorithms, namely k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Decision Tree, Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The authors further integrated the predictions from these classifiers using proposed methods. The integration strategy combines the output of the classifiers based on two different measures, accuracy, and performance (ACC and PERF), using equations such as sum, average, and square-root-of-sums-of-squares (SRSS). Our results reveal varying classification accuracies across individual classifiers with different misclassifications across the test data set. The integration strategy provided significant improvement in the classification accuracy compared to the individual classifiers. Furthermore, the results indicate minimal variation across the integration methods as compared to the variation across the individual classifiers. To conclude, prediction integration offers a unique approach for combining the output of multiple classifiers to create redundancies with the potential of achieving high classification performance and improved reliability in predictive models for defect detection in concrete. (authors)
The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) manages DoE's post-closure responsibilities and ensures the future protection of human health and the environment with respect to sites that have no continuing DOE mission after undergoing remediation. LM's beneficial reuse program promotes the LM strategic goal to sustainably manage and optimize use of public lands. The beneficial reuse program aims to repurpose former contaminated sites to restore the environment, protect the public health, revitalize communities, and spur economic growth. Benefits from the reuse of a site may increase the local tax base, facilitate job growth, utilize existing infrastructure, and enhance or protect natural resources. Beneficial reuse also promotes protectiveness by ensuring activities are compatible with long-term maintenance and protection of public health and the environment, as well as by retaining good stewardship of natural resources. LM actively participates in promoting the economic development vision of the surrounding communities by collaborating with local communities to promote regional or municipal initiatives. The Borough of Middlesex, New Jersey, has prepared the Lincoln Boulevard Redevelopment Plan, which will reinvent a once-viable downtown and enhance the quality of life for the community. The Middlesex South, New Jersey, Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site lies within the boundaries of this redevelopment area. In support of this development plan, the Borough is interested in acquiring the site for its Department of Public Works and to increase street access in the future commercial district to be built near adjacent properties. The opportunity to put the FUSRAP site into productive use aligns with LM's mission and strategic goals. In support of beneficial reuse activities, DOE can dispose of excess real property using several mechanisms. The two disposal options applicable to the Middlesex south site include (1) utilizing the US General Services Administration (GSA) or (2) using the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Section 770, 'Transfer of Real Property at Defense Nuclear Facilities for Economic Development' (known as a '770 transfer') process. Using the 770 transfer requires economic development as the primary driver, and a specific redevelopment proposal must be submitted. If there is no interest in specific economic development, the GSA option becomes the default mechanism for disposal of the property. In the case of the Middlesex south site, the 770 transfer process is being utilized and the Borough has submitted its economic development proposal to LM. Although LM is encouraged by the opportunity to put the site into productive use, the Middlesex south site is currently on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Priorities List and remediation is being performed by the US Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Consequently, any property transfer must meet the requirements under CERCLA Section 120(h), 'Property Transferred by Federal Agencies.' As the groundwater remedy will not be in place for several years, approval would be required from the US EPA administrator and the governor of the state of New Jersey to perform an early transfer of the site (before all response actions have been completed). The time frame for these approvals to occur under the normal process conflicts with the proposed redevelopment schedule; therefore, various options for expedited sale, transfer, or lease of portions of the site to the Borough were evaluated. The subsequent decision on a mutually beneficial path forward was the result of a collaborative effort between LM, USACE, the Borough and its redevelopment team, EPA, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. (authors)
A new method for predicting the pressure drop across High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter media is proposed based upon mass deposited onto the filter and known physical characteristics of the filter media. Detailed are the methods used in conjunction with current filter loading models to predict the pressure drop, as well as tests conducted to validate the methods. The benefit of a prediction model for practical use lies in the manufacturing and service life of nuclear grade HEPA filters. HEPA filters for use in nuclear facilities have a prescribed expiration date and a maximum allowable operating pressure drop. Therefore, the ability to predict the pressure drop across a filter and relate it to an expected length of service time can enable a reduction in wasted filters. This will allow for more informed decisions to be made based upon the dictated life cycle of the filters. Also, understanding and predicting how the pressure drop of HEPA filter media behaves as a function of physical characteristics and loaded mass can assist in future design and manufacturing of filter media. Currently, most existing pressure drop models are either computationally based or analytical methods relying on data gathered during tests. Neither are practical for prediction; the computational methods are difficult to implement, and the current analytical methods are more useful as tools for analysis. The current analytical model developed by Bergman et al. is based upon the pressure drop from each media fiber and modeling the deposited particles as newly formed fibers. Using Bergman's model and the media properties, air properties, and known aerosol particle size distribution, a pressure drop curve as a function of loaded mass can be created. This curve implies initial loading in the depth of the filter media with a transition to pure surface loading on the filter face, and a sensitivity to an evolving particle size distribution as mass continues to load onto the filter. To implement the predictive model, knowledge of the mean filter fiber diameter and porosity of the filter media is required. Traditionally, the mean fiber diameter is calculated as an effective diameter from prior media testing, however, in this study a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) technique is used to acquire this variable. Validation of the predictive model is provided by flat sheet media tests under a controlled environment with a measured particle size distribution of the challenge aerosol and shows reasonable preliminary agreement.
The Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility located in Technical Area 16 (TA-16) of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Tritium related research, development, and processing in support of stockpile stewardship program activities is conducted at WETF. Within WETF, various devices can be used to contain tritium and certain devices are designated as Tritium Containment Vessels (TCVs). Several different device types are identified as TCVs within WETF such as LP-50s and AL-M1s. Historically, a threshold tritium mass value has been used as the mechanism for designating a device as a TCV. When the tritium content of the device was below the tritium mass threshold it was not considered to be a TCV in the formal context. When the tritium content was above the administrative threshold, the device was considered to be a TCV. An upper tritium mass limit was also established for TCVs.