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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of Data Fusion Between Waveform Events and Radionuclide Detections Reported in 2021 by the International Data Centre

During this project, we assessed the percentage of events reported by the International Data Centre (IDC) that are candidates for evaluation using data fusion methods. We calculated the percentage of waveform (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, SHI) events that may be associated with radionuclide (RN) detections and vice versa. For this task, data fusion means identifying RN detections that may be associated with SHI events. The task of producing a fused SHI and RN bulletin is included in the IDC operational manual. As of 2022, the production of a fused event bulletin remains incomplete, largely because methods for producing the bulletin are under development. Nonetheless, simple methods for data fusion have been developed and preliminary software tools are available at the IDC to associate SHI events and RN detections. This report is a first look at the percentage of SHI events that may be candidates for fusion with RN detections or bulletins. One year of IDC bulletin data (2021) is considered in this report. It is important to note that there were no known nuclear explosions during this time period. Hence, we expect that events during this time period would generate SHI and RN signals. If many SHI events are candidates for fusion with RN data, greater priority should be placed on establishing screening procedures before and/or during the fusion process. By contrast, if the number of candidate events is diminishingly small, then data fusion is not a driver for further development of event or detection screening at the IDC. LLNL reviewed the events reported in the Standard Event Bulletin (SEB) and determined which events are candidates for fusion with the Reviewed Radionuclide Reports (RRR). Much of the work involves establishing a metric or metrics for determining whether a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) event is a candidate for data fusion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Adjoint Waveform Tomography for Crustal and Upper Mantle Structure the Middle East and Southwest Asia for Improved Waveform Simulations Using Openly Available Broadband Data

We present a new model of radially anisotropic seismic wavespeeds for the crust and upper mantle of a broad region of the Middle East and Southwest Asia (MESWA) derived from adjoint waveform tomography. We inverted waveforms from 192 Global Centroid Moment Tensor earthquakes (MW 5.5-7.0) recorded by over 1000 openly available broadband seismic stations from permanent and temporary networks in the region. Spatial coverage of the available data is highly uneven due to earthquakes clustered along plate boundaries and sparse coverage of open seismic networks in the region. We considered three possible starting models: the SPiRaL global model (Simmons et al., 2021); MEC-1 (Kaviani et al., 2020); and CSEM2.0 (Noe et al., 2023). Because the SPiRaL model provides good fits to the observed waveforms measured by the time-bandwidth product of selected windows in several period bands, provides all the necessary parameters and covers the entire domain we used it for the starting model with the period band 50-100 seconds. Inversion iterations proceeded using time-frequency phase misfits in six stages and 54 total iterations reducing the minimum period to 30 seconds. Our final model, MESWA, provides improved waveform fits compared to the starting model for both the data used in the inversion and an independent validation data set of 66 events. Two metrics of waveform fit (the time-frequency phase misfit used in the optimization and normalized L2 misfit) were both reduced by nearly 60% for both data sets and MESWA provides significantly larger misfit reductions relative to the SPiRaL model than the MEC-1 or CSEM models. We also find that MESWA provides a larger time-bandwidth product of selected windows indicating that more information content of the observed waveforms is explained by MESWA than the other models. Our new model reveals tectonic features imaged by other studies and methods but in a new holistic model of shear and compressional wavespeeds (v S and v P , respectively) with anisotropy covering the crust and uppermost mantle of a larger domain. MESWA has smaller scale-length features and tends to sharpen some features relative to the SPiRaL starting model. Examples include: low crustal v S in the TurkishIranian Plateau, Zagros Mountains, Afghan Central Blocks and Sulaiman Fold Belt; low mantle vSfollowing divergent (Gulf of Aden, Red Sea) and transform (Dead Sea Fault) margins of the Arabian Plate; low and high v S in the mantle beneath the Arabian Shield and Platform, respectively. Low vS is imaged below Cenozoic volcanic centers of the Arabian Peninsula, the so-called Mecca-Madina-Nafud (MMN) Line. Positive anisotropy (v SH > v SV ) is inferred for asthenospheric depths across the region except where up/downwelling may influence fabric alignment (e.g. Afar, Red Sea, Arabian Shield). Elevated vS tracks Makran subduction under southeast Iran. MESWA resembles the SPiRaL model in its long-wavelength structure, but enhances shorter wavelengths features on the order of 200 km and smaller. The resulting model could be used for as a starting model for further improvements, say using waveforms from in-country seismic networks that are not openly available or smaller-scale studies targeting shorter period waveforms. The model also could be used for source characterization and moment tensor inversion to improve earthquake hazard studies and nuclear explosion monitoring.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

New Tables for Infrasound Event Catalogs with a Focus on Machine Learning

Natural and anthropogenic sources such as volcanoes, earthquakes, auroral processes, chemical and nuclear explosions, rocket launches, and aircraft can generate infrasound, sound with frequencies less than 20 Hz. Both the availability of infrasound data and interest in machine learning (ML) applications have grown in recent years. Large, open-source datasets are essential to solving complex ML problems, but the field of infrasound is lacking in this arena. To increase the utility of ML for infrasound, here we present new tables for infrasound event catalogs. It is the aim that these tables be incorporated into both existing and future infrasound processing pipelines to generate large datasets ripe for use with ML/DL methods.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Predicting seismic amplitudes with machine learning

The accurate estimation of seismic wave amplitude is vital to precisely determine the yield, magnitude, and event discrimination possible for a given network – a critical element in nuclear explosion monitoring. This task is complicated by several factors, including but not limited to radiation pattern, scattering effects, and crustal variations, which can lead to the attenuation or amplification of amplitude along a given raypath. In this report, we explore the novel application of machine learning to the task of seismic amplitude estimation by training a simple Artificial Neural Network (ANN) on an S-wave amplitude dataset from Lai et al. (2019). Attributes from this dataset used as input to the ANN included event-station distances, station locations (latitude, longitude), event locations (latitude, longitude), event depths, event magnitudes, radiation patterns, signal-to noise ratio (SNR) measurements (average-amplitude, peak-to-trough, maximum peak), and signal periods. We find that the trained ANN predicts S-wave amplitudes with a modest tendency toward underestimating the actual values, as indicated by a linear regression between predicted and actual data (slope: 0.892, intercept: -0.651). These results suggest that an ANN can perform this task, with potential for significant improvements through improved datasets, architectures, and parameter tuning.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Scaling Containment on a Large Centrifuge

Containment science concerns the trapping or leakage of radioactive cavity gases from underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). The most physically relevant data for validation of containment science comes from legacy UNE testing or large field-scale chemical explosions. Field-scale tests can inform on the degree of residual stress imparted to host geology and possible formation of an accompanying gas-containing “stress cage”, for example, as a function of chemical explosion yield. However, field testing can be expensive, difficult to conduct, and challenging to instrument with limitations on data coverage (i.e., the number of boreholes; difficult coring through damage zones). Small-scale laboratory tests are typically simpler to conduct and more thoroughly characterize, but may not include the right scale of containment processes for stress-cage or chimney formation. This report presents the theory and fundamentals of large centrifuge physical modeling, including a history of explosive or similar testing relevant to containment science investigations on centrifuges. Subscale models with embedded chemical explosives in the enhanced gravity of a large centrifuge can represent hundreds of meters of depth and large explosions not otherwise attainable in the laboratory as based on scaling of length, energy, and other processes by the g-factor of the centrifuge (i.e., the number of times larger the centrifugal force is than the gravitational force on the Earth’s surface). The centrifuge uniquely joins the simplicity and exhaustiveness of laboratory-scale characterization with the physics of field-scale processes. This report is part of Sandia National Laboratories’ (SNL’s) effort to prepare for physical modeling with approximately one-meter tall geologic models of stress cage and/or chimney formation on its 29-foot [8.84 m] radius centrifuge with a load capacity of 1.6 million 𝑔-pounds [726 𝑔-ton]. The scaling relationships herein will inform model design decisions and performance requirements for in-flight sensors.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Production of Xenon-135 from isotopically enriched Xenon-134 and Xenon-136 Targets

Atmospheric radioxenon analyses conducted under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) necessitates the collection and analysis of air samples to quantify 135Xe, an indicator for nuclear explosions and reactor operations. Analytical instrument calibration for these analyses requires high quality, monoisotopic reference standards that are typically short lived, and therefore must be produced and shipped promptly to monitoring stations worldwide. This work describes the preparation of 135Xe by neutron capture (n, ?) on monoisotopic 134Xe, neutron irradiation (n,2n) on monoisotopic 136Xe, and high energy photon irradiation (?, n) on monoisotopic 136Xe. The targets are prepared by electromagnetic isotope separation of natural xenon. Results from each process are compared for 135Xe yield and purity.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Characterizing IHE Response to Multiple Shock Loading

The response of high explosives to shock loading is traditionally measured with a steady loading pressure. In many accident scenarios involving fragment impact, however, a loading duration that is shorter than the build up to detonation may occur. Fragments passing through multiple materials before reaching a high explosive charge may produce loading that is comprised of more than one shock wave. Additionally, the build up to detonation in high explosive corner turning loads the explosive a short duration pressure pulse, since rarefactions can often rapidly overtake the reactive wave. For these reasons, we have studied the response of the insensitive high explosive (IHE) materials PBX 9502 and LX-17 to complex loadings of varied intensity and duration. We refer to a single loading of limited duration as a “thin pulse”, whereas more complex scenarios were studied with an impactor that produces a double shock in the explosive. The following report presents experimental data and analyses of thin pulse shock initiation and double shock experiments designed to guide development of models of Insensitive High Explosives (IHEs) under controlled one-dimensional conditions relevant to accident scenarios and corner turning. Thin pulse shock initiation data on PBX 9502 and LX-17 were obtained under varied pulse duration, pressed density, and temperature conditions in order to probe various parameters essential for the development of a physics-based Cheetah reactive flow hotspot model. In situ pressure gauges provide insight into the degree of reaction in the explosive that are not obtainable with optical PDV measurements or distance measurements such as run to detonation. Double shock data was obtained to inform a Composition Aware Cheetah model which can be applied to any TATB-based IHEs. This model supports efforts to find a new IHE formulation and potentially incorporate new binders into IHE formulations. Simulations of each experiment are included to demonstrate the utility of these focused experiments to developing models of HE behavior. One-dimensional gas gun experiments are essential for characterizing shocked HE behavior and informing HE models.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2024

Temporal Explosion Source Processes of Declared Nuclear Tests in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

In this work we highlight a preliminary temporal source analysis of the six declared Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear tests. We use regional seismic data to estimate relative source time functions (RSTFs) via iterative time-domain deconvolution (Ammon, 2006; Pippin, 2022) of vertical-component ground motions recorded within 2000 km of the source region. Since RSTFs are ideally independent of site and propagation effects, their amplitude spectrum is equivalent to the source spectral ratio, but they also retain phase information. We compare observed RSTFs (in the time and frequency domains) with synthetic RSTFs derived from the Mueller & Murphy (1971) explosion source model. The resolution of these time functions varies, however, we generally obtain high-quality results within the limitations of the recording broadband instrumentation. The results indicate that this method effectively preserves source time-history information that can be used for temporal analysis of remote nuclear explosions. This preliminary analysis is intended to assess the viability of using time-domain deconvolution methods for extracting temporal source information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Method for Assessing Effectiveness and Technical Capabilities Required for Integrated Deterrence (NSLP-Final Report-Draft2022)

The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Report on the recovery of legacy 1997-1998 Depth-of-Burial / Tunnel-and-Hole-Closure explosion data from the Kazakhstan former Soviet nuclear test site, Semipalatinsk.

In 1996, negotiations between the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC), the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Administration (DSWA) and the U.S. Department of Energy led to an agreement for a joint series of experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site Semipalatinsk (STS). These experiments had a dual purpose: to close holes and tunnels originally created for the purpose of testing nuclear weapons, and to characterize explosive sources at a former nuclear test site. This report covers the recovery of legacy data from the experiments conduct in 1997 and 1998. Two teams collected data. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in collaboration with the NNC, collected the near-source (local) data out to approximately 20 km. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO), with funding from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), also in collaboration with NNC, collected regional data, 200 – 1000 km distant, leveraging the KZ regional seismic network that LDEO had recently installed in collaboration with NNC. The two teams also worked together to some extent, regarding instrumentation and planning. This report primarily addresses the near-source data collected by the LANL/NNC team.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗