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At least 199 records · Page 11

An Architectural Survey of the REECo Maintenance Compound, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to install a 26.45-mile-long 138-kilovolt (kV) transmission line on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. This new transmission line will upgrade the electrical transmission system and provide reliable power between Mercury Switching Station in Area 23 and the U1a Facility in Area 1. The proposed upgrade to the power transmission system constitutes an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. A portion of this new transmission line will cross the western perimeter of the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo) Maintenance Compound located in Area 6 of the NNSS. This compound with its trade shops, storage sheds, and yards served as a general construction facility that supported nuclear testing activities on the NNSS from 1967 to 1992. Although three architectural resources in the compound have previously been recorded and evaluated for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), other resources within it have not, nor has the compound been recorded and evaluated as a potential district. The State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) concurred with NNSA/NFO’s determination that the unevaluated REECo Maintenance Compound will be adversely affected by the proposed undertaking (Reed 2021). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25553 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Installation of a 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility and the Removal of the Historic 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility in Areas 1, 3, 5, 6, and 23 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. This architectural survey report was prepared in accordance with MOA Stipulation III.B. It describes the origins, history, layout, and functions of the REECo Maintenance Compound during the Cold War and identifies contributing and noncontributing resources. The report defines a district boundary based on archival research and the field survey and concludes with an appendix that presents digital color images of the compound with descriptions and a map key showing image viewpoints and directions. Although none of the architectural resources are recommended individually eligible, the district evaluation concludes the REECo Maintenance Compound is eligible as a historic district for listing in the NRHP under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criteria A and C at the local level. The historic district retains all seven aspects of integrity and conveys its significance under the abovementioned criteria.

138 kV↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-113, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-113 in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15236), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition of Building 23-113 is part of the long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury on the NNSS for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (the Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-113 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. Therefore, the purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-113 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that although Building 23-113 is significant at the local level for its important role as a recreational facility on the NNSS, the building lacks sufficient integrity to convey its significance. It is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP at any level. The building remains eligible as a contributing element to the MHD.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Report Series: Finding of Effect and Mitigation Documentation for Building 23-W10, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

Finding of Effect: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-W10 in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15228), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The purpose of the undertaking is related to the modernization of Mercury for future mission needs. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-W10, a supply warehouse, was installed in Mercury in 1962 (NNSS GIS Database) and served as a support facility for nuclear testing throughout much of the Cold War. It was likely produced during World War II (WWII) and previously installed at Camp Desert Rock. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource #D230) under Criteria A and C for their importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-W10 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al. 2018) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). Building 23-W10 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category II contributing element. Category II properties are those that have several representatives in the MHD, such as warehouses, but may possess different engineering or architectural characteristics that distinguish them from other classes of similar elements. Building 23-W10 is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Mitigation: The purpose of this letter report is to support the mitigation of the demolition of Building 23-W10 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15228) in the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource #D230) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The warehouse is considered contributing to the significance of the district both for its historic importance in relation to nuclear testing under Criterion A and as a part of the distinctive design and construction of the district under Criterion C. This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Using Project Complexity Determinations to Establish Required Levels of Project Rigor

This presentation discusses the project complexity determination process that was developed by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for implementation at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The complexity determination process was developed to address the diversity of NNSS project types, size, and complexity; to fill the need for one procedure but with provision for tailoring the level of rigor to the project type, size, and complexity; and to provide consistent, repeatable, effective application of project management processes across the enterprise; and to achieve higher levels of efficiency in project delivery. These needs are illustrated by the wide diversity of NNSS projects: Defense Experimentation, Global Security, weapons tests, military training areas, sensor development and testing, training in realistic environments, intelligence community support, sensor development, environmental restoration/waste management, and disposal of radioactive waste, among others.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2021 with 2021 Environmental Report Attachment A: Site Description

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2021 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The accompanying Attachment A expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2021. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2022 w/Attachment A Site Description

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2022 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The accompanying Attachment A expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2022. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023, with Attachment A Site Description and Summary Report

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2023 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The accompanying Attachment A expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The supplemental Summary report provides an abbreviated version of the full report.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023; Attachment A Site Description

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2023 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The accompanying Attachment A expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The supplemental Summary report provides an abbreviated version of the full report.

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023: Summary Report

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2023 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The accompanying Attachment A expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2023. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The supplemental Summary report provides an abbreviated version of the full report.

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The Observed Inefficiency of Explosions to Produce Large Aftershocks: Båth’s Law for Explosions is 2.5

Underground explosions are observed to produce fewer and smaller aftershocks than similar size earthquakes. The seismic magnitude difference $Δm_x$ between an explosion and its largest aftershock is an expression of Båth’s law for explosions. Based on an analysis of a compilation of aftershock studies from Soviet testing at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan and observations from American testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), here we find that the average magnitude difference for explosions $\overline{Δm_x}$ is about 2.5. Based on the NNSS data, two standard deviations of $Δm_x$ is about 1.5. In all the cases studied, from ton to megaton yield, from shallow to overburied depth, and chemical or nuclear source, no explosion aftershock has been larger than the explosion that preceded it. In fact, the two events at the NNSS with the largest aftershock magnitudes relative to the explosion are associated with the collapse of the cavity created by the explosion. This is similar to observations from North Korean testing at the Punggye-ri Test Site, where the largest seismic event following the test is attributed to the collapse after the 2017 explosion and is from 0.8 to 2 magnitude units less than the mainshock.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan, Revision 0

The purpose of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Integrated Sampling Plan (referred to herein as the Plan) is to provide a comprehensive, integrated approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the needs and objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. Implementation of this Plan will provide high-quality data required by the UGTA Activity for ensuring public protection in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements relevant to assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. This Plan identifies locations to be sampled by corrective action unit (CAU) and location type, sampling frequencies, sample collection methodologies, and the constituents to be analyzed. In addition, the Plan defines data collection criteria such as well-purging requirements, detection levels, and accuracy requirements; identifies reporting and data management requirements; and provides a process to ensure coordination between NNSS groundwater sampling programs for sampling of interest to UGTA. This Plan does not address compliance with requirements for wells that supply the NNSS public water system or wells involved in a permitted activity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

AMS/NRCan Joint Survey Report: Aerial Campaign

In January 2014 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) and the Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) Nuclear Emergency Response project conducted a series of joint surveys at a number of locations in Nevada including the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The goal of this project was to compare the responses of the two agencies’ aerial radiation detection systems and data analysis techniques. This test included varied radioactive surface contamination levels and isotopic composition experienced at the NNSS and the differing data processing techniques utilized by the respective teams. Because both teams used the commercial aerial radiation detection systems from Radiation Solutions, Inc., the main focus of the campaign was to investigate the data acquisition techniques, data analysis, and ground-truth verification. The NRCan system consisted of four 4" × 4" × 16" NaI(Tl) scintillator crystals of which two were externally mounted in a modified commercial cargo basket certified for the Eurocopter AS350; the NNSA AMS system consisted of twelve 2" × 4" × 16" NaI(Tl) crystals in externally mounted dedicated pods. For NRCan, the joint survey provided an opportunity to characterize their system’s response to extended sources of various fission products at the NNSS. Since both systems play an important role in their respective countries’ national framework of radiological emergency response and are subject to multiple mutual cooperation agreements, it was important for each country to obtain more thorough knowledge of how they would employ these important assets and define the roles that they would each play in an actual response.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radiochemically-Supported Microbial Communities: A Potential Mechanism for Biocolloid Production of Importance to Actinide Transport

Due to the legacy of Cold War nuclear weapons testing, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site (NTS)) contains millions of Curies of radioactive contamination. Presented here is a summary of the results of the first comprehensive study of subsurface microbial communities of radioactive and nonradioactive aquifers at this site. To achieve the objectives of this project, cooperative actions between the Desert Research Institute (DRI), the Nevada Field Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Underground Test Area Activity (UGTA), and contractors such as Navarro-Interra (NI), were required. Ultimately, fluids from 17 boreholes and two water-filled tunnels were sampled (sometimes on multiple occasions and from multiple depths) from the NNSS, the adjacent Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and a reference hole in the Amargosa Valley near Death Valley. The sites sampled ranged from highly-radioactive nuclear device test cavities to uncontaminated perched and regional aquifers. Specific areas sampled included recharge, intermediate, and discharge zones of a 100,000-km2 internally-draining province, known as the Death Valley Regional Flow System (DVRFS), which encompasses the entirety of the NNSS/NTTR and surrounding areas. Specific geological features sampled included: West Pahute and Ranier Mesas (recharge zone), Yucca and Frenchman Flats (transitional zone), and the Western edge of the Amargosa Valley near Death Valley (discharge zone). The original overarching question underlying the proposal supporting this work was stated as: Can radiochemically-produced substrates support indigenous microbial communities and subsequently stimulate biocolloid formation that can affect radionuclides in NNSS subsurface nuclear test/detonation sites? Radioactive and non-radioactive groundwater samples were thus characterized for physical parameters, aqueous geochemistry, and microbial communities using both DNA- and cultivation-based tools in an effort to understand the drivers of microbial community structure (including radioactivity) and microbial interactions with select radionuclides and other factors across the range of habitats surveyed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FY18 1st Quarter Transportation Report

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 1st quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2018.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Need to Consider Colloid-Facilitated Plutonium Transport in Contaminant Boundary Calculations for Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium (Pu) into the environment. While tritium ( 3 H) is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface from an activity standpoint (4.7×10 6 TBq decay corrected to September 23, 1992), Pu is the most abundant anthropogenic element by mass. Between 1951 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were performed and approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu remains in the NNSS subsurface (Smith et al., 2003). The vast majority of this Pu is sequestered in nuclear melt glass that pools at the bottom of cavities formed by nuclear explosions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Geologic Investigation of Alternative Flight Testing Sites

Sandia National Laboratories is evaluating alternative gravity bomb flight test (GBFT) options that might be more cost effective in the 2025 timeframe than the current Tonopah Test Range (TTR) facility. The alternate ranges being considered are White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). One of the factors considered in the decision process is if the geology of the alternative sites is suitable for gravity bomb flight testing. The study looked at seven specific sites within the three test ranges, including the TTR. Those seven sites are Main Lake and Antelope Lake at TTR, Trinity Lake at WSMR, and Yucca Lake, an area west of Frenchman Flat, Pahute Mesa, and the Pahute Airstrip all at NNSS. The four lakes studied are playas. In general the findings indicate that the playa lakes (Main, Antelope, Trinity, and Yucca) consist of fine-grained lacustrine sediments with inter-bedded stringers of coarse grains and gravels towards the shorelines. Frenchman Flat and Pahute Airstrip are both located within basins filled with poorly sorted gravel alluviums. Pahute Mesa consists of volcanic tuff. The seven sites are listed in order from the most favorable location to least favorable based on the suitability of the geology for GBFT. An ideal test site would consist of a succession of soft sediments devoid of hard layers. WSMR Lake Trinity is the most suitable site, exhibiting solely find-grained sediments across the study region. The lakes at TTR follow next with Antelope Lake and Main Lake, Antelope lake being finer grained and more homogeneous than Main Lake. The four NNSS sites are considered the least favorable due the heterogenetic character of Yucca Lake, Pahute Airstrip, and Frenchman Flat. The geology of Pahute Mesa is considered the least favorable consisting of volcanic tuff too hard for current test operations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

2nd Quarter FY18 Transportation Report

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018 low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW), which includes classified LLW and MLLW, classified non-radioactive (CNR) and classified non-radioactive hazardous (CNRH) shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2018.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Recovery and calibration of legacy analog data from the Leo Brady Seismic Network for the Source Physics Experiment

The Leo Brady Seismic Network (LBSN) was established in 1960 by Sandia National Laboratories for monitoring underground nuclear tests (UGTs) at the Nevada Test Site— renamed in 2010 to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The LBSN has been in various configurations throughout its existence, but it has been generally comprised of four to six stations at regional distances from the NNSS with evenly spaced azimuthal coverage. Between 1962 and the early 1980s, the LBSN—and a sister network operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—were the most comprehensive U.S. source of regional seismic data of UGTs. During the pre-digital era, LBSN data were transmitted as frequency-modulated (FM) audio over telephone lines to the NTS and recorded in analog on hi-fi 8-track AMPEX tapes. These tapes have been stored in temperature-stable buildings or bunkers on the NNSS and Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM for decades and contain the sole record of this irreplaceable data from the analog era; full waveforms of UGTs during this time were never routinely converted to digital form. We have been developing a process over the past few years to recover and calibrate data from these tapes, converting them from FM audio to digital waveforms in ground motion units. The calibration of legacy data from the LBSN is still ongoing. To date, we have digitized tapes from 592 separate UGTs. As a proof-of-concept, we calibrated data from the BOXCAR event.

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