SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The purpose of the software algorithm is to assist in the sustainability and improvement of the Cerenkov viewing devices, especially the DCVD, used by Euratom and the IAEA safeguards inspectors to verify the presence and completeness of spent nuclear fuel.
Sandia National Laboratories conducted an experiment for the National Nuclear Security Administration to determine the reliability of visual inspection of precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons. In addition visual inspection has been extensively researched since the early 20th century; however, the reliability of visual inspection for nuclear weapons parts has not been addressed. In addition, the efficacy of using inspector confidence ratings to guide multiple inspections in an effort to improve overall performance accuracy is unknown. Further, the workload associated with inspection has not been documented, and newer measures of stress have not been applied.
Abstract Eye tracking is a useful tool for studying human cognition, both in the laboratory and in real-world applications. However, there are cases in which eye tracking is not possible, such as in high-security environments where recording devices cannot be introduced. After facing this challenge in our own work, we sought to test the effectiveness of using artificial foveation as an alternative to eye tracking for studying visual search performance. Two groups of participants completed the same list comparison task, which was a computer-based task designed to mimic an inventory verification process that is commonly performed by international nuclear safeguards inspectors. We manipulated the way in which the items on the inventory list were ordered and color coded. For the eye tracking group, an eye tracker was used to assess the order in which participants viewed the items and the number of fixations per trial in each list condition. For the artificial foveation group, the items were covered with a blurry mask except when participants moused over them. We tracked the order in which participants viewed the items by moving their mouse and the number of items viewed per trial in each list condition. We observed the same overall pattern of performance for the various list display conditions, regardless of the method. However, participants were much slower to complete the task when using artificial foveation and had more variability in their accuracy. Our results indicate that the artificial foveation method can reveal the same pattern of differences across conditions as eye tracking, but it can also impact participants’ task performance.
Here, fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool are stored by suspending them in two vertically stacked layers at the Atucha Unit 1 nuclear power plant (Atucha-I). This introduces the unique problem of verifying the presence of fuel in either layer without physically moving the fuel assemblies. Given that the facility uses both natural uranium and slightly enriched uranium at 0.85 wt% 235 U and has been in operation since 1974, a wide range of burnups and cooling times can exist in any given pool. A gross defect detection tool, the spent fuel neutron counter (SFNC), has been used at the site to verify the presence of fuel up to burnups of 8000 MWd/t. At higher discharge burnups, the existing signal processing software of the tool was found to fail due to nonlinearity of the source term with burnup.
Active neutron coincidence systems are commonly used by international inspectorates to verify a material balance across the various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) is one such instrument; it is used to measure the linear density of 235 U (g 235 U/cm of active length in assembly) in fresh light water reactor fuel in nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. The UNCL and other active neutron interrogation detectors have historically relied on americium lithium ( 241 AmLi) sources to induce fission within the sample in question. Californium-252 is under consideration as a possible alternative to the traditional 241 AmLi source. Finally, this work relied upon a combination of experiments and Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate the technical basis for the replacement of 241 AmLi sources with 252 Cf sources by evaluating the statistical uncertainty in the measurements incurred by each source and assessing the penetrability of neutrons from each source for the UNCL.
Southwest Technology Development Institute (SWTDI), an independent, university-based research institute, has been the operator of the Southwest Region Photovoltaic Experiment Station (SWRES) for almost 30 years. The overarching mission of SWTDI is to position PV systems and solar technologies to become cost-effective, major sources of energy for the United States. Embedded in SWTDI's general mission has been the more-focused mission of the SWRES: to provide value added technical support to the DOE Solar Energy Technologies Program (SETP) to effectively and efficiently meet the R&D needs and targets specified in the SETP Multi-Year Technical Plan. : The DOE/SETP goals of growing U.S. PV manufacturing into giga-watt capacities and seeing tera-watt-hours of solar energy production in the U.S. require an infrastructure that is under development. The staff of the SWRES has supported DOE/SETP through a coherent, integrated program to address infrastructural needs inhibiting wide-scale PV deployment in three major technical categories: specialized engineering services, workforce development, and deployment facilitation. The SWRES contract underwent three major revisions during its five year period-of- performance, but all tasks and deliverables fell within the following task areas: Task 1: PV Systems Assistance Center 1. Develop a Comprehensive multi-year plan 2. Provide technical workforce development materials and workshops for PV stakeholder groups including university, professional installers, inspectors, state energy offices, Federal agencies 3. Serve on the NABCEP exam committee 4. Provide on-demand technical PV system design reviews for U.S. PV stakeholders 5. Provide PV system field testing and instrumentation, technical outreach (including extensive support for the DOE Market Transformation program) Task 2: Design-for-Manufacture PV Systems 1. Develop and install 18 kW parking carport (cost share) and PV-thermal carport (Albuquerque) deriving and publishing lessons learned Task 3: PV Codes and Standards 1. Serve as the national lead for development and preparation of all proposals (related to PV) to the National Electrical Code 2. Participate in the Standards Technical Panels for modules (UL1703) and inverters (UL1741) Task 4: Assess Inverter Long Term Reliability 1. Install and monitor identical inverters at SWRES and SERES 2. Operate and monitor all inverters for 5 years, characterizing all failures and performance trends Task 5: Test and Evaluation Support for Solar America Initiative 1. Provide test and evaluation services to the National Laboratories for stage gate and progress measurements of SAI TPP winners
This report summarizes the environmental status of Ames Laboratory for calendar year 2010. It includes descriptions of the Laboratory site, its mission, the status of its compliance with applicable environmental regulations, its planning and activities to maintain compliance, and a comprehensive review of its environmental protection, surveillance and monitoring activities. In 2010, the Laboratory accumulated and disposed of waste under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued generator numbers. All waste is handled according to all applicable EPA, State, Local regulations and DOE Orders. In 2006 the Laboratory reduced its generator status from a Large Quantity Generator (LQG) to a Small Quantity Generator (SQG). EPA Region VII was notified of this change. The Laboratory's RCRA hazardous waste management program was inspected by EPA Region VII in April 2006. There were no notices of violations. The inspector was impressed with the improvements of the Laboratory's waste management program over the past ten years. The Laboratory was in compliance with all applicable federal, state, local and DOE regulations and orders in 2010. There were no radiological air emissions or exposures to the general public due to Laboratory activities in 2010. See U.S. Department of Energy Air Emissions Annual Report in Appendix B. As indicated in prior SERs, pollution awareness, waste minimization and recycling programs have been in practice since 1990, with improvements implemented most recently in 2010. Included in these efforts were battery and CRT recycling, miscellaneous electronic office equipment, waste white paper and green computer paper-recycling and corrugated cardboard recycling. Ames Laboratory also recycles/reuses salvageable metal, used oil, foamed polystyrene peanuts, batteries, fluorescent lamps and telephone books. Ames Laboratory reported to DOE-Ames Site Office (AMSO), through the Laboratory's Performance Evaluation Measurement Plan, on its Affirmative Procurement Performance Measure. A performance level of 'A-' was achieved in 2010 for Integrated Safety, Health and Environmental Protection. As reported in Site Environmental Reports for prior years, the Laboratory's Environmental Management System (EMS) has been integrated into the Laboratory's Integrated Safety Management System since 2005. The integration of EMS into the way the Laboratory does business allows the Laboratory to systematically review, address and respond to the Laboratory's environmental impacts. The Laboratory's EMS was audited in April 2009 by DOE-CH. There were four 'Sufficiently in Conformity' findings as a result of the audit. All four findings were tracked in the Laboratory's corrective action database for completion. Beryllium was used routinely at Ames Laboratory in the 1940's and 1950's in processes developed for the production of highly pure uranium and thorium in support of the historic Manhattan Project. Laboratory metallurgists also worked on a process to produce pure beryllium metal from beryllium fluoride. In the early 1950's, beryllium oxide powder was used to produce shaped beryllium and crucibles. As a result of that work, beryllium contamination now exists in many interstitial spaces (e.g., utility chases) and ventilation systems in Wilhelm, Spedding and Metals Development buildings. Extensive characterization and remediation efforts have occurred in 2009 and 2010 in order to better understand the extent of the contamination. Analysis of extensive sampling data suggests that a fairly wide dispersion of beryllium occurred (most likely in the 1950's and 60's) in Wilhelm Hall and in certain areas of Spedding Hall and Metals Development. Area air-sampling results and work-area surface characterizations indicate the exposure potential to current workers, building visitors and the public remains extremely low. This information is now used to guide cleaning efforts and to provide worker protection during remodeling and maintenance activities. Results were shared with the DOE's Former Worker Program to support former worker medical testing and compensation programs. A complete discussion of the Laboratory's beryllium characterization and remediation efforts can be found at: http://www.ameslab.gov/operations/esha/beryllium-information.
Recent structural failures such as the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minnesota have underscored the urgent need for improved methods and procedures for evaluating our aging transportation infrastructure. This research seeks to develop a basis for a Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) system to provide quantitative information related to the structural integrity of metallic structures to make appropriate management decisions and ensuring public safety. This research employs advanced structural analysis and nondestructive testing (NDT) methods for an accurate fatigue analysis. Metal railroad bridges in New Mexico will be the focus since many of these structures are over 100 years old and classified as fracture-critical. The term fracture-critical indicates that failure of a single component may result in complete collapse of the structure such as the one experienced by the I-35W Bridge. Failure may originate from sources such as loss of section due to corrosion or cracking caused by fatigue loading. Because standard inspection practice is primarily visual, these types of defects can go undetected due to oversight, lack of access to critical areas, or, in riveted members, hidden defects that are beneath fasteners or connection angles. Another issue is that it is difficult to determine the fatigue damage that a structure has experienced and the rate at which damage is accumulating due to uncertain history and load distribution in supporting members. A SHM system has several advantages that can overcome these limitations. SHM allows critical areas of the structure to be monitored more quantitatively under actual loading. The research needed to apply SHM to metallic structures was performed and a case study was carried out to show the potential of SHM-driven fatigue evaluation to assess the condition of critical transportation infrastructure and to guide inspectors to potential problem areas. This project combines the expertise in transportation infrastructure at New Mexico State University with the expertise at Sandia National Laboratories in the emerging field of SHM.
Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.
Under the SmartRegs ordinance in the city of Boulder, Colorado, all rental properties in the city must achieve an energy efficiency level comparable to a HERS Index of approximately 120 points or lower by the year 2019. The City of Boulder received a $\$$12 million grant from the DOE's Better Buildings initiative to create and incentivize their EnergySmart Program. In this report, the Consortium forAdvanced Residential Buildings (CARB) describes its work with the program, including energy audits of rental properties, developing training programs for insulators and inspectors, and conducting interviews with property owners.
The Smart InfraRed Inspection System (SIRIS) is a tool designed to assist inspectors in determining which vehicles passing through the SIRIS system are in need of further inspection by measuring the thermal data from the wheel components. As a vehicle enters the system, infrared cameras on the road measure temperatures of the brakes, tires, and wheel bearings on both wheel ends of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) in motion. This thermal data is then presented to enforcement personal inside of the inspection station on a user friendly interface. Vehicles that are suspected to have a violation are automatically alerted to the enforcement staff. The main goal of the SIRIS field operational test (FOT) was to collect data to evaluate the performance of the prototype system and determine the viability of such a system being used for commercial motor vehicle enforcement. From March 2010 to September 2010, ORNL facilitated the SIRIS FOT at the Greene County Inspection Station (IS) in Greeneville, Tennessee. During the course of the FOT, 413 CMVs were given a North American Standard (NAS) Level-1 inspection. Of those 413 CMVs, 384 were subjected to a SIRIS screening. A total of 36 (9.38%) of the vehicles were flagged by SIRIS as having one or more thermal issues; with brakes issues making up 33 (91.67%) of those. Of the 36 vehicles flagged as having thermal issues, 31 (86.11%) were found to have a violation and 30 (83.33%) of those vehicles were placed out-of-service (OOS). Overall the enforcement personnel who have used SIRIS for screening purposes have had positive feedback on the potential of SIRIS. With improvements in detection algorithms and stability, the system will be beneficial to the CMV enforcement community and increase overall trooper productivity by accurately identifying a higher percentage of CMVs to be placed OOS with minimal error. No future evaluation of SIRIS has been deemed necessary and specifications for a production system will soon be drafted.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) intends to automate the UF 6 cylinder nondestructive assay (NDA) verification currently performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at enrichment plants. PNNL is proposing the installation of a portal monitor at a key measurement point to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until inspector arrival. This report summarizes the status of the research and development of an enrichment assay methodology supporting the cylinder verification concept. The enrichment assay approach exploits a hybrid of two passively-detected ionizing-radiation signatures: the traditional enrichment meter signature (186-keV photon peak area) and a non-traditional signature, manifested in the high-energy (3 to 8 MeV) gamma-ray continuum, generated by neutron emission from UF 6 . PNNL has designed, fabricated, and field-tested several prototype assay sensor packages in an effort to demonstrate proof-of-principle for the hybrid assay approach, quantify the expected assay precision for various categories of cylinder contents, and assess the potential for unsupervised deployment of the technology in a portal-monitor form factor. We refer to recent sensor-package prototypes as the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA). The report provides an overview of the assay signatures and summarizes the results of several HEVA field measurement campaigns on populations of Type 30B UF 6 cylinders containing low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). Approaches to performance optimization of the assay technique via radiation transport modeling are briefly described, as are spectroscopic and data-analysis algorithms.
The goal of this work was to examine the potential safeguards improvement of the High Resolution X-ray (hiRX) technology for aqueous reprocessing plants. Existing plants utilize KEdge and Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry for routine accountancy measurements for the key input and output accountability tanks. The IAEA also use these technologies for verification measurements. The hiRX technology has the potential to significantly reduce the measurement uncertainty with an equally simple but less costly instrument that uses a much smaller sample size. Such a technology could be highly desirable for both the operator and inspector. This work utilizes a Separations and Safeguards Performance Model of a PUREX reprocessing plant to determine the safeguards improvement offered by the reduced measurement uncertainty of hiRX. Results show that a significant improvement in the ability to detect a protracted diversion may be possible.
As the weatherization and home energy upgrade industries expand and gain recognition, the need for a qualified workforce becomes more apparent. The certification component of the Guidelines project was designed to create meaningful and lasting careers for weatherization workers. Intended for experienced home energy professionals, the four new certifications focus on the most common jobs in the industry: energy auditor, retrofit installer technician, crew leader, and quality control inspector.
Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.
This report summarizes the activities undertaken by EWI while under contract from the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) for the management and operation of the Nuclear Fabrication Consortium (NFC). The NFC was established by EWI to independently develop, evaluate, and deploy fabrication approaches and data that support the re-establishment of the U.S. nuclear industry: ensuring that the supply chain will be competitive on a global stage, enabling more cost-effective and reliable nuclear power in a carbon constrained environment. The NFC provided a forum for member original equipment manufactures (OEM), fabricators, manufacturers, and materials suppliers to effectively engage with each other and rebuild the capacity of this supply chain by : Identifying and removing impediments to the implementation of new construction and fabrication techniques and approaches for nuclear equipment, including system components and nuclear plants. Providing and facilitating detailed scientific-based studies on new approaches and technologies that will have positive impacts on the cost of building of nuclear plants. Analyzing and disseminating information about future nuclear fabrication technologies and how they could impact the North American and the International Nuclear Marketplace. Facilitating dialog and initiate alignment among fabricators, owners, trade associations, and government agencies. Supporting industry in helping to create a larger qualified nuclear supplier network. Acting as an unbiased technology resource to evaluate, develop, and demonstrate new manufacturing technologies. Creating welder and inspector training programs to help enable the necessary workforce for the upcoming construction work. Serving as a focal point for technology, policy, and politically interested parties to share ideas and concepts associated with fabrication across the nuclear industry. The report the objectives and summaries of the Nuclear Fabrication Consortium projects. Full technical reports for each of the projects have been submitted as well.
The City of Houston is committed to achieving a sustainable solar infrastructure. In 2008, Houston was named a United States Department of Energy (DOE) Solar America City. As a Solar America City, Houston teamed with the Houston Advanced Research Center (HARC), Sandia National Laboratory (Sandia), industry, and academia, to implement the Solar Houston Initiative and prepare the Solar Houston Plan. The Solar Houston initiative was focused on identifying and overcoming barriers associated with establishing a solar infrastructure that is incorporated into the City of Houston’s overall energy plan. A broad group of Houston area stakeholders, facilitated by HARC, came together to develop a comprehensive solar plan that went beyond technology to address barriers and establish demonstrations, public outreach, education programs and other activities. The plan included proposed scopes of work in four program areas: policies, solar integration, public outreach, and education. Through the support of the DOE SunShot Rooftop Solar Challenge (RSC) grant to the Texas Collaboration (San Antonio, Austin, and Hosuton), Houston has been able to implement several of the recommendations of the Solar Houston Plan. Specific recommendations that this project was able to support include; Working with the other Texas Solar America Cities (San Antonio and Austin), to harmonize permitting and inspection processes to simplify for installers and lower soft costs of installation; Participating in state level solar policy groups such as the Texas Renewable Energy Industries Association (TRIEA); Continued coordination with the local transmission and distribution utility (CenterPoint) and retail electric providers (REP); Identification of opportunities to improve permitting and interconnection; Providing training on PV systems to City inspectors; Educating the public by continuing outreach, training, and workshops, particularly using the the Green Building Resources Center; Evaluating methods of addressing financial barriers to residential solar; Maintaining www.solarhoustontx.org; and Continuing meetings with stakeholders to get ongoing feedback from the solar community on their needs. The following sections provide a brief summary of the activities completed under each of the nine tasks specifically related to the RSC grant. Reports and other backup information are included in the appendices.
A central pillar of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. From the inception of the IAEA, the United States has supported the development and evolution of both the safeguards system itself and devices and systems approaches used by inspectors. The IAEA safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. From Iran to Syria, to the more than 190 other countries that accept IAEA safeguards, the IAEA safeguards system enhances international security, seeking to assure compliance with international nuclear agreements. The cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA safeguards largely have evolved to ensure non-nuclear weapon state compliance with the NPT.