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At least 199 records · Page 11

Blind photovoltaic modeling intercomparison: A multidimensional data analysis and lessons learned

The Photovoltaic (PV) Performance Modeling Collaborative (PVPMC) organized a blind PV performance modeling intercomparison to allow PV modelers to blindly test their models and modeling ability against real system data. Measured weather and irradiance data were provided along with detailed descriptions of PV systems from two locations (Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, and Roskilde, Denmark). Participants were asked to simulate the plane-of-array irradiance, module temperature, and DC power output from six systems and submit their results to Sandia for processing. The results showed overall median mean bias (i.e., the average error per participant) of 0.6% in annual irradiation and –3.3% in annual energy yield. While most PV performance modeling results seem to exhibit higher precision and accuracy as compared to an earlier blind PV modeling study in 2010, human errors, modeling skills, and derates were found to still cause significant errors in the estimates.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗

A rose by any other name: Certification seen as process rather than content

Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.

Wilson, John R.↗

CCD Camera Lens Interface for Real-Time Theodolite Alignment

Theodolites are a common instrument in the testing, alignment, and building of various systems ranging from a single optical component to an entire instrument. They provide a precise way to measure horizontal and vertical angles. They can be used to align multiple objects in a desired way at specific angles. They can also be used to reference a specific location or orientation of an object that has moved. Some systems may require a small margin of error in position of components. A theodolite can assist with accurately measuring and/or minimizing that error. The technology is an adapter for a CCD camera with lens to attach to a Leica Wild T3000 Theodolite eyepiece that enables viewing on a connected monitor, and thus can be utilized with multiple theodolites simultaneously. This technology removes a substantial part of human error by relying on the CCD camera and monitors. It also allows image recording of the alignment, and therefore provides a quantitative means to measure such error.

Wake, Shane↗

Aircraft automation - The problem of the pilot interface

In recent years, aviation has been experiencing a rapid growth. This growth is expected to continue, and aircraft operations in the IFR (instrument flight rules) environment, for example, are predicted to increase dramatically in the next 10 to 12 years. However, it has been found the IFR accidents are increasing at about the same rate as IFR operations, because an associated high workload can lead to human error. For this reason, NASA and others are exploring the use of aircraft systems technology as a means for reducing the pilot workload and enhancing the safety and utility of the aircraft operations. However, recent research has shown that automation, implemented with insufficient consideration to the human factors interface, can frequently create more problems than it solves. Some of this research is discussed, examples of the encountered problems are shown, and solutions regarding the arising problems are suggested.

Bergeron, H. P.↗

Safety evaluation of connected and automated vehicles in mixed traffic with conventional vehicles at intersections

Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) can potentially improve the performance of the transportation system by reducing human errors. This paper investigates the safety impact of CAVs in a mixed traffic with conventional vehicles at intersections. Analyzing real-world AV crashes in California revealed that rear-end crashes at intersections are the dominant crash type. Therefore, to enhance our understanding of the future interactions between human-driven vehicles with CAVs at intersections, a simulation framework was developed to model the mixed traffic environment of Automated Vehicles (AV), cooperative AVs, and conventional human-driven vehicles. In order to model AVs driving behavior, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and cooperative ACC (CACC) models are utilized. Particularly, this study explores system improvements due to automation and connectivity across varying CAV market penetration scenarios. ACC and CACC car following models are used to mimic the behavior of AVs and cooperative AVs. Real-world connected vehicle data are utilized to modify and tune the acceleration/deceleration regimes of the Wiedemann model. Next, the driving volatility concept capturing variability in vehicle speeds was utilized to calibrate the simulation to represent the safety performance of a real-world environment. Two surrogate safety measures are used to evaluate the safety performance of a representative intersection under different market penetration rate of CAVs: the number of longitudinal conflicts and driving volatility. At low levels of ACC market penetration, the safety improvements were found to be marginal, but safety improved substantially with more than 40% ACC penetration. Additional safety improvements can be achieved more quickly through the addition of cooperation and connectivity through CACC. Furthermore, ACC/CACC vehicles were found to improve mobility performance in terms of average speed and travel time at intersections.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

Qualitative and Quantitative Evaluation for Representative Human Reliability Analysis Methods

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is the regulatory expert organization established by the Korean government to strengthen the nation’s technical capabilities relating to nuclear safety regulation. KINS oversees the technical aspects of nuclear safety regulation, including safety reviews, inspections, education, and safety research—all conducted based on technical knowledge and accumulated regulatory experience. In 2023, KINS requested that Idaho National Laboratory (INL) validates representative human reliability analysis (HRA) methods used throughout the world, thus affording KINS with a basis for determining an HRA method adequate for its domestic regulatory purposes. The present paper mainly examines INL’s efforts in this regard. The resulting INL study covered four representative HRA methods widely used by nuclear utilities and regulatory institutes. These methods were qualitatively evaluated by applying specific evaluation criteria and determining how well each method reflected critical HRA issues. For this assessment, INL benchmarked the Halden International HRA Empirical Study. Using the Halden empirical data, along with information on human failure events (HFEs), the present study employed the selected HRA methods to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) for the HFEs. It also performed statistical analyses to compare the HEPs predicted via the HRA methods against those from the Halden empirical data.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safety in the operating theatre--part 1: interpersonal relationships and team performance

The authors examine the application of interpersonal human factors training on operating room (OR) personnel. Mortality studies of OR deaths and critical incident studies of anesthesia are examined to determine the role of human error in OR incidents. Theoretical models of system vulnerability to accidents are presented with emphasis on a systems approach to OR performance. Input, process, and outcome factors are discussed in detail.

Non-NASA Center↗

Human factors of the high technology cockpit

The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

Space Flight Resource Management for ISS Operations

Although the astronaut training flow for the International Space Station (ISS) spans 2 years, each astronaut or cosmonaut often spends most of their training alone. Rarely is it operationally feasible for all six ISS crewmembers to train together, even more unlikely that crewmembers can practice living together before launch. Likewise, ISS Flight Controller training spans 18 months of learning to manage incredibly complex systems remotely in plug-and-play ground teams that have little to no exposure to crewmembers before a mission. How then do all of these people quickly become a team - a team that must respond flexibly yet decisively to a variety of situations? The answer implemented at NASA is Space Flight Resource Management (SFRM), the so-called "soft skills" or team performance skills. Based on Crew Resource Management, SFRM was developed first for shuttle astronauts and focused on managing human errors during time-critical events (Rogers, et al. 2002). Given the nature of life on ISS, the scope of SFRM for ISS broadened to include teamwork during prolonged and routine operations (O'Keefe, 2008). The ISS SFRM model resembles a star with one competency for each point: Communication, Cross-Culture, Teamwork, Decision Making, Team Care, Leadership/Followership, Conflict Management, and Situation Awareness. These eight competencies were developed with international participation by the Human Behavior and Performance Training Working Group. Over the last two years, these competencies have been used to build a multi-modal SFRM training flow for astronaut candidates and flight controllers that integrates team performance skills into the practice of technical skills. Preliminary results show trainee skill increases as the flow progresses; and participants find the training invaluable to performing well and staying healthy during ISS operations. Future development of SFRM training will aim to help support indirect handovers as ISS operations evolve further with the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program.

Schmidt, Lacey L.↗

Ecological Adaptive Cruise Control of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle With Connected Infrastructure and On-Road Experiments

Abstract This paper examines both mathematical formulation and practical implementation of an ecological adaptive cruise controller (ECO-ACC) with connected infrastructure. Human errors are typical sources of accidents in urban driving, which can be remedied by rigorous control theories. Designing an ECO-ACC is, therefore, a classical research problem to improve safety and energy efficiency. We add two main contributions to the literature. First, we propose a mathematical framework of an online ECO-ACC for plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV). Second, we demonstrate ECO-ACC in a real world, which includes other human drivers and uncertain traffic signals on a 2.6 (km) length of the corridor with eight signalized intersections in Southern California. The demonstration results show, on average, 30.98% of energy efficiency improvement and 8.51% additional travel time.

Automation & Control Systems↗

EXTRACTING HUMAN RELIABILITY FINDINGS FROM HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES IN THE HUMAN SYSTEMS SIMULATION LABORATORY

Modernization of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) is widespread, with most plants currently replacing and transitioning equipment, control systems, and human system interfaces (HSI)s from analog to digital displays. This conversion remedies the obsolescence of analog parts along with needs for increased intuitiveness of design, safety, and capabilities. The Human Factors and Reliability team at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) carried out twelve control room modernization studies in the newly designed Human Systems Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) over nine years. The HSSL was constructed as a testbed for evaluating human factors techniques and performance measures, HSI frameworks, and cutting-edge operational concepts in NPPs. Installing a full-scope training simulator enabled direct design and evaluation work on the same instrumentation and control (I&C) and HSIs located at U.S. plants. The subsequent addition of glass top bays afforded crews opportunities to implement operations via the simulator using full-scale representations of their home NPP. Additionally, functional HSI prototypes were created, providing an environment for operator-in-the-loop benchmark studies. The HSSL has assisted in upgrades of six commercial NPP control rooms and served as an invaluable proving ground for new NPP operations technology. Human reliability analysis (HRA) was not originally the focus of the studies; however, data relating to HRA such as type and frequency of human errors can be extracted from the studies. INL is currently extracting data from the HSSL study reports to apprise how information gathered from simulation, HSI, and other related studies can create a broad look across different data sources to help inform HRA methods.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sketch-to-Solution: A Case Study in RCS Aerodynamic Interaction

Thanks to recent advances in the fields of anisotropic grid adaptation, error estimation, and geometry modeling, a sketch-to-solution work flow is now possible for viscous computational fluid dynamic (CFD) simulations. With this workflow, a CFD application engineer provides geometry, boundary conditions, and flow parameters; and the sketch-to-solution process yields a CFD simulation through automatic, error-based, grid adaptation. To explore the benefits of this nascent capability, a conventional manual grid generation work flow is compared to this new automatic grid generation work flow for a given engineering question: What are the aerodynamic interactions caused by the reaction control system (RCS) on an entry vehicle? This case study indicates that while the automatic grid generation sketch-to- solution process is not yet mature, it is preferred over a manual grid generation work flow because it greatly reduces manual labor, eliminates many opportunities for human error, and provides grid sensitivity information.

Bill Kleb↗

Manual Crew Override of Vehicle Landings Following G-Transitions

BACKGROUND Manual control during exploration spaceflight consists of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. This crew override capability is critical to enable overall mission success during landing contingencies. However, the introduction of manual override capabilities must be implemented to enable crews to mitigate risks introduced by human error. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. While training and landing aids enable successful landing through disorientation, these adaptive changes may increase cognitive demand that needs to be accounted for in the manual control strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition to develop appropriate countermeasures. METHODS The following study seeks to inform the risk associated with altered sensorimotor and vestibular function impacting critical mission tasks. We aim to characterize the effects of short and long-duration weightlessness on manual control following G-transitions using simulated lunar landing on a six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) motion base, a fixed base simulation, and a supervisory control tablet task. The primary goal is to understand the impact of spaceflight on crew ability to perform manual crew override and supervisory control. This aim will be assessed by comparing pre- versus postflight simulation performance in crewmembers assigned to either short duration (< 30 day) or long duration (~6- month) missions to the International Space Station (ISS). We hypothesize there will be postflight increases in the percent time that pilots are outside of the acceptable range for recommended vehicle state parameters and the reaction time for secondary cognitive tasks. Ground-based control subjects, who are demographically matched to the crew considering age (± 5 years) and gender, will undergo the same testing schedule as the crew to examine the effects of flight phase independent of microgravity exposure. The second aim is to examine how adaptive changes in vestibular and cognitive function relate to changes in manual crew override proficiency. Crew performance for a sensorimotor perceptual test battery will evaluate motion perception tracking, roll nulling, and/or vection sensitivity using the 6DOF motion base. We hypothesize that a higher severity of vestibular alterations will be associated with increased percent time outside of guidance limits. Motion sickness severity and sleepiness will also be evaluated. To determine the impact of “just-in-time” training, the third aim seeks to compare performance during on-board lunar landing tasks conducted late in-flight to early postflight. We hypothesize that proficiency on the “just-in-time” laptop trainer late in mission will be positively correlated with early postflight proficiency on the same task. The final aim will establish assessments of performance, training protocols, and the learning progression in a ground-control cohort of first-time users. RESULTS The assessment of the learning progression associated with the piloting task on the motion base system with thirty ground subjects will be reported. Learning curves will be established across four distinct sessions and within session considering trial difficulty. The difficulty of the landing task can be modulated with the landing divert distance and cross or downrange difficulty. Results may include changes in performance across multiple trials of a multi-attribute lunar tablet supervisory control task. Preliminary investigations of eighteen subjects who completed vestibular threshold and motion perception tasks offer expected performance ranges for upcoming preflight crew evaluations. The results yielded an average roll threshold of 0.46 ± 0.30 deg/s and an average roll nulling root mean square error performance of 2.52 ± 0.52 deg/s. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew monitoring capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew performance will help better characterize the manual control risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. Ground testing will evaluate learning progression, refine training protocols, and serve as a control cohort for comparisons to crew performance. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The authors acknowledge contributions from Draper, the Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) Lab, and the Software, Robotics, and Simulation Division toward the development of the lunar landing simulation platforms. This project is funded by the Human Health Countermeasures Element.

Hannah M. Weiss↗