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At least 199 records · Page 11

The Integrated Hazard Analysis Integrator

Hazard analysis addresses hazards that arise in the design, development, manufacturing, construction, facilities, transportation, operations and disposal activities associated with hardware, software, maintenance, operations and environments. An integrated hazard is an event or condition that is caused by or controlled by multiple systems, elements, or subsystems. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is especially daunting and ambitious for large, complex systems such as NASA s Constellation program which incorporates program, systems and element components that impact others (International Space Station, public, International Partners, etc.). An appropriate IHA should identify all hazards, causes, controls and verifications used to mitigate the risk of catastrophic loss of crew, vehicle and/or mission. Unfortunately, in the current age of increased technology dependence, there is the tendency to sometimes overlook the necessary and sufficient qualifications of the integrator, that is, the person/team that identifies the parts, analyzes the architectural structure, aligns the analysis with the program plan and then communicates/coordinates with large and small components, each contributing necessary hardware, software and/or information to prevent catastrophic loss. As viewed from both Challenger and Columbia accidents, lack of appropriate communication, management errors and lack of resources dedicated to safety were cited as major contributors to these fatalities. From the accident reports, it would appear that the organizational impact of managers, integrators and safety personnel contributes more significantly to mission success and mission failure than purely technological components. If this is so, then organizations who sincerely desire mission success must put as much effort in selecting managers and integrators as they do when designing the hardware, writing the software code and analyzing competitive proposals. This paper will discuss the necessary and sufficient requirements of one of the significant contributors to mission success, the IHA integrator. Discussions will be provided to describe both the mindset required as well as deleterious assumptions/behaviors to avoid when integrating within a large scale system.

Morris, A. Terry↗

Hazard Detection Analysis for a Forward-Looking Interferometer

The Forward-Looking Interferometer (FLI) is a new instrument concept for obtaining the measurements required to alert flight crews to potential weather hazards to safe flight. To meet the needs of the commercial fleet, such a sensor should address multiple hazards to warrant the costs of development, certification, installation, training, and maintenance. The FLI concept is based on high-resolution Infrared Fourier Transform Spectrometry (FTS) technologies that have been developed for satellite remote sensing. These technologies have also been applied to the detection of aerosols and gases for other purposes. The FLI concept is being evaluated for its potential to address multiple hazards including clear air turbulence (CAT), volcanic ash, wake vortices, low slant range visibility, dry wind shear, and icing during all phases of flight (takeoff, cruise, and landing). The research accomplished in this second phase of the FLI project was in three major areas: further sensitivity studies to better understand the potential capabilities and requirements for an airborne FLI instrument, field measurements that were conducted in an effort to provide empirical demonstrations of radiometric hazard detection, and theoretical work to support the development of algorithms to determine the severity of detected hazards

West, Leanne↗

Free-Flight Terrestrial Rocket Lander Demonstration for NASA's Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) System

The Autonomous Landing Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is chartered to develop and mature to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of six an autonomous system combining guidance, navigation and control with terrain sensing and recognition functions for crewed, cargo, and robotic planetary landing vehicles. The ALHAT System must be capable of identifying and avoiding surface hazards to enable a safe and accurate landing to within tens of meters of designated and certified landing sites anywhere on a planetary surface under any lighting conditions. Since its inception in 2006, the ALHAT Project has executed four field test campaigns to characterize and mature sensors and algorithms that support real-time hazard detection and global/local precision navigation for planetary landings. The driving objective for Government Fiscal Year 2012 (GFY2012) is to successfully demonstrate autonomous, real-time, closed loop operation of the ALHAT system in a realistic free flight scenario on Earth using the Morpheus lander developed at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). This goal represents an aggressive target consistent with a lean engineering culture of rapid prototyping and development. This culture is characterized by prioritizing early implementation to gain practical lessons learned and then building on this knowledge with subsequent prototyping design cycles of increasing complexity culminating in the implementation of the baseline design. This paper provides an overview of the ALHAT/Morpheus flight demonstration activities in GFY2012, including accomplishments, current status, results, and lessons learned. The ALHAT/Morpheus effort is also described in the context of a technology path in support of future crewed and robotic planetary exploration missions based upon the core sensing functions of the ALHAT system: Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN), Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA), and Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN).

Rutishauser, David K.↗

Lidar and Electro-Optics for Atmospheric Hazard Sensing and Mitigation

This paper provides an overview of the research and development efforts of the Lidar and Electro-Optics element of NASA's Aviation Safety Program. This element is seeking to improve the understanding of the atmospheric environments encountered by aviation and to provide enhanced situation awareness for atmospheric hazards. The improved understanding of atmospheric conditions is specifically to develop sensor signatures for atmospheric hazards. The current emphasis is on kinetic air hazards such as turbulence, aircraft wake vortices, mountain rotors, and windshear. Additional efforts are underway to identify and quantify the hazards arising from multi-phase atmospheric conditions including liquid and solid hydrometeors and volcanic ash. When the multi-phase conditions act as obscurants that result in reduced visual awareness, the element seeks to mitigate the hazards associated with these diminished visual environments. The overall purpose of these efforts is to enable safety improvements for air transport class and business jet class aircraft as the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System occurs.

Clark, Ivan O.↗

Helicopter Field Testing of NASA's Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) System fully integrated with the Morpheus Vertical Test Bed Avionics

The Autonomous Landing Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project was chartered to develop and mature to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of six an autonomous system combining guidance, navigation and control with real-time terrain sensing and recognition functions for crewed, cargo, and robotic planetary landing vehicles. The ALHAT System must be capable of identifying and avoiding surface hazards to enable a safe and accurate landing to within tens of meters of designated and certified landing sites anywhere on a planetary surface under any lighting conditions. This is accomplished with the core sensing functions of the ALHAT system: Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN), Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA), and Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN). The NASA plan for the ALHAT technology is to perform the TRL6 closed loop demonstration on the Morpheus Vertical Test Bed (VTB). The first Morpheus vehicle was lost in August of 2012 during free-flight testing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), so the decision was made to perform a helicopter test of the integrated ALHAT System with the Morpheus avionics over the ALHAT planetary hazard field at KSC. The KSC helicopter tests included flight profiles approximating planetary approaches, with the entire ALHAT system interfaced with all appropriate Morpheus subsystems and operated in real-time. During these helicopter flights, the ALHAT system imaged the simulated lunar terrain constructed in FY2012 to support ALHAT/Morpheus testing at KSC. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the highest fidelity testing of a system of this kind to date. During this helicopter testing, two new Morpheus landers were under construction at the Johnson Space Center to support the objective of an integrated ALHAT/Morpheus free-flight demonstration. This paper provides an overview of this helicopter flight test activity, including results and lessons learned, and also provides an overview of recent integrated testing of ALHAT on the second Morpheus vehicle.

Rutishauser, David↗

Helicopter Field Testing of NASA's Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) System fully Integrated with the Morpheus Vertical Test Bed Avionics

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project was chartered to develop and mature to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of six an autonomous system combining guidance, navigation and control with real-time terrain sensing and recognition functions for crewed, cargo, and robotic planetary landing vehicles. The ALHAT System must be capable of identifying and avoiding surface hazards to enable a safe and accurate landing to within tens of meters of designated and certified landing sites anywhere on a planetary surface under any lighting conditions. This is accomplished with the core sensing functions of the ALHAT system: Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN), Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA), and Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN). The NASA plan for the ALHAT technology is to perform the TRL6 closed loop demonstration on the Morpheus Vertical Test Bed (VTB). The first Morpheus vehicle was lost in August of 2012 during free-flight testing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), so the decision was made to perform a helicopter test of the integrated ALHAT System with the Morpheus avionics over the ALHAT planetary hazard field at KSC. The KSC helicopter tests included flight profiles approximating planetary approaches, with the entire ALHAT system interfaced with all appropriate Morpheus subsystems and operated in real-time. During these helicopter flights, the ALHAT system imaged the simulated lunar terrain constructed in FY2012 to support ALHAT/Morpheus testing at KSC. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the highest fidelity testing of a system of this kind to date. During this helicopter testing, two new Morpheus landers were under construction at the Johnson Space Center to support the objective of an integrated ALHAT/Morpheus free-flight demonstration. This paper provides an overview of this helicopter flight test activity, including results and lessons learned, and also provides an overview of recent integrated testing of ALHAT on the second Morpheus vehicle.

Epp, Chirold D.↗

Real-Time Hazard Detection and Avoidance Demonstration for a Planetary Lander

The Autonomous Landing Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is chartered to develop and mature to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of six an autonomous system combining guidance, navigation and control with terrain sensing and recognition functions for crewed, cargo, and robotic planetary landing vehicles. In addition to precision landing close to a pre-mission defined landing location, the ALHAT System must be capable of autonomously identifying and avoiding surface hazards in real-time to enable a safe landing under any lighting conditions. This paper provides an overview of the recent results of the ALHAT closed loop hazard detection and avoidance flight demonstrations on the Morpheus Vertical Testbed (VTB) at the Kennedy Space Center, including results and lessons learned. This effort is also described in the context of a technology path in support of future crewed and robotic planetary exploration missions based upon the core sensing functions of the ALHAT system: Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN), Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA), and Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN).

Epp, Chirold D.↗

Evaluation of the Simple Safe Site Selection (S4) Hazard Detection Algorithm Using Helicopter Field Test Data

Small scale terrain hazards, such as rocks, slopes, and craters, can pose significant risk to landing spacecraft and rover or payload deployment. Onboard Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) systems scan and analyze the landing area for these hazards in real time during descent, and divert the spacecraft to the safest touchdown site. The computationally efficient Simple Safe Site Selection (S4) algorithm combined with a flash LIDAR is an HDA system geared towards small robotic spacecraft. Rather than creating and analyzing a digital elevation map (DEM) from potentially many overlapping range images, S4 operates directly on a single flash LIDAR image. Extending prior work that has analyzed S4 performance for Mars landing using extensive simulations, this paper evaluates S4 performance using actual flash LIDAR images of an artificial hazard field acquired during a 2014 helicopter field test in Death Valley, CA. In particular, we describe LIDAR characterization and calibration, creation of ground truth elevation and safety maps, creation of ground truth sensor poses, actual S4 algorithm processing, and performance analysis. The results show that the safety cost images produced by S4 are remarkably close to the ground truth safety map (computed offline by an HDA algorithm developed under the Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance (ALHAT) project) at significantly reduced computational cost, confirming S4 as a viable candidate algorithm for onboard spacecraft HDA.

Luna, Michael E.↗

The Flux of Impact Ejecta on the Lunar Surface from Scaling Considerations: Implications for Operational Hazards and Geomorphic Forcing

The impact cratering process has been critical to the evolution of the Moon’s surface over its geologic history and remains an important ongoing process today. Impact events have a major local effect, but also excavate ejecta particles that re-impact the lunar surface over a wide area. Quantifying the flux of ejecta to a given point on the Moon is the subject of this work. We also estimate how this flux is partitioned into different particle sizes and different ejecta velocities. Motivation: There are two main factors motivating this work. First, and most critically, is the assessment of the hazard posed by impact ejecta for future surface exploration (i.e., to infrastructure, spacesuits, etc.). LROC observations of new craters have led to the reemphasized need to consider this hazard. In fact, a hazard assessment of this type was made prior to Apollo, although some of the underlying assumptions of that work are now clearly obsolete (see [4]). We also now know much more about the impactor flux, scaling of impact events, and scaling of ejecta than was known in the 1960's, so revisiting this hazard assessment is appropriate.We note that also have recently revisited the earlier hazard estimates and independently revised them downward using an entirely different analytical approach. The second motivation is that several recent papers have argued that the flux of distal ejecta is the controlling factor in how fast the lunar surface evolves. For this reason, improving understanding of the ejecta mass flux and how the flux translates into geomorphic work is of interest. To be clear, it is obvious that the ejecta mass flux is much larger than the primary impactor mass flux – indeed, this is self-evident because the craters excavated by hypervelocity impacts are much larger than their impactors. On the other hand, the energy delivered by a given primary to the surface is larger than the sum of the energy delivered by all its associated ejecta, as required by conservation, aggravated by the fact that not all of an impactor’s kinetic energy is partitioned into ejecta excavation. If distal ejecta and secondaries control lunar geomorphic evolution, this suggests that re-impacting ejecta must more efficiently translate their energy into geomorphic work than primaries. It is also easy to imagine the relative efficiency of primary and secondary impacts to do geomorphic work varying with the size of the primary. Considering the details of this process is thus of significant interest for lunar geomorphology.

Fassett, C. I.↗

Guidance for Designing Safety into Urban Air Mobility: Hazard Analysis Techniques

The national airspace system is exceptionally safe, specifically in terms of commercial air traffic operations. The introduction of innovative aircraft (such as electric vertical takeoff and landing vehicles) undergoing novel operations (such as for an urban air passenger carrying mission) is a potential disruptor to the current means of regulating and ensuring the safety of air travel. The aviation industry and associated regulatory bodies are adapting their approaches to assuring system safety to enable these new paradigms. However, any system safety analysis requires that a hazard assessment be performed. In this work, we consider the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) techniques for hazard assessment and evaluate whether they can be used in a complementary fashion for regulatory approval purposes. We perform an FHA and an STPA on an electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) vehicle undergoing an urban air mobility (UAM) passenger carrying reference scenario and present excerpts of this analysis. We then draw parallels between the techniques and highlight elements where they naturally reinforce to each other’s results, specifically in the consideration of hazard severity with respect to flight phases, the design of hazard mitigations, and the applicability of the results to all types of regulatory approvals (e.g., type certification, operational approval, and crew training).

Mallory S Graydon↗

Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials

This document describes the criteria and procedural guidelines used by the NASA/JSC Toxicology Office (JSCSTO), to perform toxicological evaluations. The JSCSTO is responsible for conducting toxicological assessments and assigning toxic hazard levels (THLs) for essentially all chemicals and test materials to be used in or transported to the habitable areas of U.S. spacecraft, non‐U.S. spacecraft inhabitaed by U.S. crew members or habitable areas of off‐Earth habitats where U.S. crew members would be present, including chemicals carried by visiting spacecraft(visiting vehicles) to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Biohazard assessments for biological materials used in payload experiments are performed by the NASA Biosafety Review Board. Radioactive materials are assessed by the Space Radiation Analysis Group for radiation hazards; the flammability rating on flammable materials is assessed by the JSC Materials and Processes Branch, ES4. This document will focus on the assessment of chemically‐induced toxicity hazards. The toxicological assessments, together with assessments on radioactive, biological, physical, and flammability hazards, are incorporated into a mission‐specific Hazardous Materials Summary Table (HMST).

Valerie Elizabeth Ryder↗

Evaluating and Exploring Extreme Precipitation in CHIRPS3, CHIMES, and the Climate Hazards Station Database

Between 2015 and 2019, the impacts and losses associated with droughts, floods, and hurricanes surged through the interaction of increasing exposure and more extreme weather and climate (Funk 2021). In 2020, the Aon-Benfield Reinsurance Company reported that cyclones, floods, and droughts resulted in $165 billion (USD) in losses. For 2020, EM-DAT lists 363 flood, landslide, storm, and drought events impacting some 98 million people. As hazards mount, models indicate more variable precipitation, and observations indicate increasing extremes in humid regions, yet the small number of available gauge observations is declining. In this talk we briefly introduce two new resources: version 3 of the 1981-near present Climate Hazards center Infrared Precipitation with Stations (CHIRPS3) archive, and the 2000-near present Climate Hazards IMErg with Stations archive (CHIMES). The satellite-only CHIRP3 and CHIME components are based, respectively, on geostationary thermal infrared Cold Cloud Duration (CCD) values and the NASA GPM IMERGlate product. These archives benefit from thousands of station observations. In addition to standard global sources, the Climate Hazards station database includes about 5,000 additional stations in humid tropical and sub-tropical areas associated with likely increases in extreme rainfall. While effectively monitoring extreme precipitation is important to humanitarian agencies like FEWS NET, and to hydrologic modeling applications (a, b), evaluations of the widely used CHIRPS2 product indicate a propensity to underestimate extremes. Here, we explain the source of this problem. Then, focusing on pentad totals in 12 well-gauged regions, we use the high-quality gauge-based REGEN dataset to show that CHIRP3 and CHIME perform substantially better than CHIRP2. We examine trends in extremes in these validation regions, comparing REGEN results with values from the satellite-only CHIRP2, CHIRP3, CHIME and the gauge-enhanced CHIRP2, CHIRP3, CHIME. Trends in dry and humid regions are contrasted and compared. We conclude with global evaluations of the pentad CHIRP3, CHIRPS3, CHIME, CHIMES, and Climate Hazards station database products. How does the performance of the shorter period of record CHIME compare with CHIRP3? We anticipate that the sophisticated microwave-based IMERGlate inputs into CHIME will perform better. Where do we see the largest increases in extremes in these products? How well might CHIRPS3 and CHIMES perform in the context of humanitarian assistance efforts?

C Funk↗

Global Landslide Forecasting System for Hazard Assessment and Situational Awareness

Landslides triggered by extreme rainfall can be devastating, resulting in loss of life, property, and infrastructure. Landslide forecasting systems provide an opportunity to build awareness of potential hazards and ultimately take preemptive measures. There is currently a dearth of forecasting systems that provide regional or global coverage, but these systems can offer important situational awareness in data-sparse, ungauged, or large-scale catchments. A near global, primarily satellite-based system calledthe Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness (LHASA) provides near real-time estimates of potential landslide hazard and exposure around the world. In this work, a precipitation forecast module is introduced into LHASA to complement the existing LHASA framework and provide an estimate of landslide hazard up to three days in advanceat 1km resolution. The model-based Goddard Earth Observing System-Forward Processing (GEOS-FP) precipitation forecast product is used as the forcing input for the model in place of the satellite-based Integrated Multi-satellitE Retrievals for Global Precipitation Mission product. Soil moisture and snow depth from the GEOS-FP assimilated product are also incorporated. The study period January 2020–January 2021 is usedto test the model performance against the LHASA near real-time estimates at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Validation of the model is carried out using a collection of rainfall-triggered landslide inventories from around the world as case studies to demonstrate the potential utility and limitations of this system.The rescaling of the GEOS-FP precipitation product is a critical step in incorporating the forecasted precipitation data within LHASA-Forecast (LHASA-F). Combining different streams of forecasted data within the LHASA-F framework shows promise, particularly for larger events at the 1-and 2-day lead time for events. Results indicate that for the case studies evaluated, the LHASA-F is generally able to resolve major landslide events triggered by extreme rainfall, such as from tropical cyclones. The analysis shows that landslide forecast outputs may be represented differently depending on the user’s needs. This framework serves as a first milestone in providing a global predictive view of landslide hazard.

Landslide forecasting system↗

Towards Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

Towards Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

Addressing Control of Hazardous Energy (COHE) Requirements in a Laser Safety Program

OSHA regulation 29CFR1910.147 specifies control of hazardous energy requirements for 'the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to employees.' Class 3B and Class 4 laser beams must be considered hazardous energy sources because of the potential for serious eye injury; careful consideration is therefore needed to safely de-energize these lasers. This paper discusses and evaluates control of hazardous energy principles in this OSHA regulation, in ANSI Z136.1 ''Safe Use of Lasers,'' and in ANSI Z244.1 ''Control of Hazardous Energy, Lockout/Tagout and Alternative Methods.'' Recommendations are made for updating and improving CoHE (control of hazardous energy) requirements in these standards for their applicability to safe laser operations.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Facilities Condition and Hazards Assessment for Materials and Fuel Complex Facilities MFC-799, 799A, and 770C

The Materials & Fuel Complex (MFC) facilities 799 Sodium Processing Facility (a single building consisting of two areas: the Sodium Process Area (SPA) and the Carbonate Process Area (CPA), 799A Caustic Storage Area, and 770C Nuclear Calibration Laboratory have been declared excess to future Department of Energy mission requirements. Transfer of these facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management, and an associated schedule for doing so, have been agreed upon by the two offices. The prerequisites for this transfer to occur are the removal of nonexcess materials and chemical inventory, deinventory of the calibration source in MFC-770C, and the rerouting and/or isolation of utility and service systems. This report provides a description of the current physical condition and any hazards (material, chemical, nuclear or occupational) that may be associated with past operations of these facilities. This information will document conditions at time of transfer of the facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management and serve as the basis for disposition planning. The process used in obtaining this information included document searches, interviews and facility walk-downs. A copy of the facility walk-down checklist is included in this report as Appendix A. MFC-799/799A/770C are all structurally sound and associated hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions are well defined and well understood. All installed equipment items (tanks, filters, etc.) used to process hazardous materials remain in place and appear to have maintained their integrity. There is no evidence of leakage and all openings are properly sealed or closed off and connections are sound. The pits appear clean with no evidence of cracking or deterioration that could lead to migration of contamination. Based upon the available information/documentation reviewed and the overall conditions observed during the facilities walk-down, it is concluded that these facilities may be disposed of at minimal risk to human health, safety or the environment.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SSHAC Level 1 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis for the Idaho National Laboratory

A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) was completed for the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), and the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) (Figure 1-1). The PSHA followed the approaches and procedures appropriate for a Study Level 1 provided in the guidance advanced by the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) NUREG/CR-6372 and NUREG-2117 (NRC, 1997; 2012a). The SSHAC Level 1 PSHAs for MFC and ATR were conducted as part of the Seismic Risk Assessment (SRA) project (INL Project number 31287) to develop and apply a new-risk informed methodology, respectively. The SSHAC Level 1 PSHA was conducted for NRF to provide guidance on the potential use of a design margin above rock hazard levels. The SRA project is developing a new risk-informed methodology that will provide a systematic approach for evaluating the need for an update of an existing PSHA. The new methodology proposes criteria to be employed at specific analysis, decision, or comparison points in its evaluation process. The first four of seven criteria address changes in inputs and results of the PSHA and are given in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard, DOE-STD-1020-2012 (DOE, 2012a) and American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) 2.29 (ANS, 2008a). The last three criteria address evaluation of quantitative hazard and risk-focused information of an existing nuclear facility. The seven criteria and decision points are applied to Seismic Design Category (SDC) 3, 4, and 5, which are defined in American Society of Civil Engineers/Structural Engineers Institute (ASCE/SEI) 43-05 (ASCE, 2005). The application of the criteria and decision points could lead to an update or could determine that such update is not necessary.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗