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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1989

Optimum control forces for multibody systems with intermittent motion

The objective is to address the continuity of motion when a dynamical system is suddenly subjected to constraint conditions. Motion discontinuity due to the initial constraint violation is avoided by prior control forces that adjust the motion and yield velocity and acceleration consistent at the point of application of the constraint. The optimum control forces are determined for a specified control interval. The method proposed provides an optimum adjustment of the system's motion and assures that the stresses developed at the system components are kept within acceptable limits. The procedures developed will be illustrated making use of inequality constraints applied to obstacle avoidance problems in robotics.

Ider, Sitki Kemal↗
NASA NTRS1983

Inventory Management

Known as MRO for Maintenance, Repair and Operating supplies, Tropicana Products, Inc.'s automated inventory management system is an adaptation of the Shuttle Inventory Management System (SIMS) developed by NASA to assure adequate supply of every item used in support of the Space Shuttle. The Tropicana version monitors inventory control, purchasing receiving and departmental costs for eight major areas of the company's operation.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

Data Mining Methods Applied to Flight Operations Quality Assurance Data: A Comparison to Standard Statistical Methods

In a previous study, multiple regression techniques were applied to Flight Operations Quality Assurance-derived data to develop parsimonious model(s) for fuel consumption on the Boeing 757 airplane. The present study examined several data mining algorithms, including neural networks, on the fuel consumption problem and compared them to the multiple regression results obtained earlier. Using regression methods, parsimonious models were obtained that explained approximately 85% of the variation in fuel flow. In general data mining methods were more effective in predicting fuel consumption. Classification and Regression Tree methods reported correlation coefficients of .91 to .92, and General Linear Models and Multilayer Perceptron neural networks reported correlation coefficients of about .99. These data mining models show great promise for use in further examining large FOQA databases for operational and safety improvements.

Stolzer, Alan J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Marshall Space Flight Center Materials and Processes Laboratory

Marshall?s Materials and Processes Laboratory has been a core capability for NASA for over fifty years. MSFC has a proven heritage and recognized expertise in materials and manufacturing that are essential to enable and sustain space exploration. Marshall provides a "systems-wise" capability for applied research, flight hardware development, and sustaining engineering. Our history of leadership and achievements in materials, manufacturing, and flight experiments includes Apollo, Skylab, Mir, Spacelab, Shuttle (Space Shuttle Main Engine, External Tank, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor, and Solid Rocket Booster), Hubble, Chandra, and the International Space Station. MSFC?s National Center for Advanced Manufacturing, NCAM, facilitates major M&P advanced manufacturing partnership activities with academia, industry and other local, state and federal government agencies. The Materials and Processes Laborato ry has principal competencies in metals, composites, ceramics, additive manufacturing, materials and process modeling and simulation, space environmental effects, non-destructive evaluation, and fracture and failure analysis provide products ranging from materials research in space to fully integrated solutions for large complex systems challenges. Marshall?s materials research, development and manufacturing capabilities assure that NASA and National missions have access to cutting-edge, cost-effective engineering design and production options that are frugal in using design margins and are verified as safe and reliable. These are all critical factors in both future mission success and affordability.

Tramel, Terri L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Distribution and Validation of CERES Irradiance Global Data Products Via Web Based Tools

The CERES SYN1deg product provides climate quality 3-hourly globally gridded and temporally complete maps of top of atmosphere, in atmosphere, and surface fluxes. This product requires efficient release to the public and validation to maintain quality assurance. The CERES team developed web-tools for the distribution of both the global gridded products and grid boxes that contain long term validation sites that maintain high quality flux observations at the Earth's surface. These are found at: http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php. In this poster we explore the various tools available to users to sub-set, download, and validate using surface observations the SYN1Deg and Surface-EBAF products. We also analyze differences found in long-term records from well-maintained land surface sites such as the ARM central facility and high quality buoy radiometers, which due to their isolated nature cannot be maintained in a similar manner to their land based counterparts.

Rutan, David↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Meet Changing Needs

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Infuse Risk Leadership and Assurance Framework Concepts

In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

Matthew J. Forsbacka↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Hybrid Method of Assurance Cases and Testing for Improved Confidence in Autonomous Space Systems

Autonomous systems react intelligently to their environments, making them capable of handling many possible conditions, but challenging to test. We are investigating a new test development method that aims to maximize the confidence to be achieved by combining Assurance Cases with High Throughput Testing (HTT). Assurance Cases, developed for safety-critical systems, are a rigorous argument that the system satisfies a property (e.g., the Mars rover will not tip over during a traverse). They integrate testing, analysis, and environmental and operational assumptions, from which the set of conditions that testing must cover is determined. In our method, information from the Assurance Case is used to determine the test coverage needed, and then input to HTT to generate the minimal test suites needed to provide that coverage.

Huntsberger, Terry↗
NASA NTRS1977

Design and Development of the Space Shuttle Tail Service Masts

The successful launch of a space shuttle vehicle depends on the proper operation of two tail service masts (TSMs). Reliable TSM operation is assured through a comprehensive design, development, and testing program. The results of the concept verification test (CVT) and the resulting impact on prototype TSM design are presented. The design criteria are outlined, and the proposed prototype TSM tests are described.

Dandage, S. R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Considerations for Medical Transport from the Space Station via an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV)

In developing a permanently crewed space station, the importance of medical care has been continually reaffirmed; and the health maintenance facility (HMF) is an integral component. It has diagnostic, therapeutic, monitoring, and information management capability. It is designed to allow supportive care for: (1) non-life-threatening illnesses; e.g., headache, lacerations; (2) moderate to severe, possibly life-threatening illnesses; e.g., appendicitis, kidney stones; and (3) severe, incapacitating, life-threatening illnesses; e.g., major trauma, toxic exposure. Since the HMF will not have a general surgical capability, the need for emergency escape and recovery methods has been studied. Medical risk assessments have determined that it is impossible to accurately predict the incidence of crewmember illness/injury. A best estimate is 1:3 per work-year, with 1% of these needing an ACRV. For an eight-person crew, this means that one assured crew return vehicle (ACRV) will be used every 4 to 12 years. The ACRV would serve at least three basic objectives as: (1) a crew return if the space shuttle is unavailable; (2) an escape vehicle from a major time-critical space station emergency; and (3) a full or partial crew return vehicle for a medical emergency. The focus of this paper is the third objective for the ACRV.

Stepaniak, Philip↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRS1988

Environmental control medical support team

The activities conducted in support of the Environmental Control and Life Support Team during December 7, 1987 through September 30, 1988 are summarized. The majority of the ongoing support has focused on the ECLSS area. Through a series of initial meetings with the ECLSS team and technical literature review, an initial list of critical topics was developed. Subtasks were then identified or additional related tasks received as action items from the ECLSS group meetings. Although most of the efforts focused on providing MSFC personnel with information regarding specific questions and problems related to ECLSS issues, other efforts regarding identifying an ECLSS Medical Support Team and constructing data bases of technical information were also initiated and completed. The specific tasks are as follows: (1) Provide support to the mechanical design and integration of test systems as related to microbiological concerns; (2) Assist with design of Human Subjects Test Protocols; (3) Interpretation and recommendations pertaining to air/water quality requirements; (4) Assist in determining the design specifications required as related to the Technical Demonstration Program; (5) Develop a data base of all microorganisms recovered from previous subsystem testing; (6) Estimates of health risk of individual microbes to test subjects; (7) Assist with setting limits for safety of test subjects; (8) Health monitoring of test subjects; (9) Assist in the preparation of test plans; (10) Assist in the development of a QA/QC program to assure the validity, accuracy and precision of the analyses; and (11) Assist in developing test plans required for future man in the loop testing.

Crump, William J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Software assurance standard

This standard specifies the software assurance program for the provider of software. It also delineates the assurance activities for the provider and the assurance data that are to be furnished by the provider to the acquirer. In any software development effort, the provider is the entity or individual that actually designs, develops, and implements the software product, while the acquirer is the entity or individual who specifies the requirements and accepts the resulting products. This standard specifies at a high level an overall software assurance program for software developed for and by NASA. Assurance includes the disciplines of quality assurance, quality engineering, verification and validation, nonconformance reporting and corrective action, safety assurance, and security assurance. The application of these disciplines during a software development life cycle is called software assurance. Subsequent lower-level standards will specify the specific processes within these disciplines.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2020

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks of effective development are realized with implementation of model-based approaches to systems and assurance. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core. These benefits in the context of spaceflight system challenges can include [1]: • Improved management of complex development • Reduced risk in the development process • Improved cost management • Improved design decisions With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance community also can improve early oversight and insight into project development. NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative [2, 3]. These include the following: • Model viewpoints that promote rapid and systematic assessment of requirements coverage, hazard tagging and risk management • Embedded safety assessments for launch vehicles • Deployment of model assisted development of reliability products - Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) and Fault Trees • Test Planning • Validation and Verification of complex functions • Support of Assurance Case development for complex systems In addition, while there are benefits to be harvested, there is a realization that these do not come without effort and cost. Enabling model-based approaches requires structure, not only in an organizational context, but in a modeling context as well. There can be a steep learning curve and costs associated to train skilled modelers. But, on the other hand, not all of the assurance community need to be modelers. Models themselves must conform to ontologies that enable assurance. This places constraints upon the models and modelers. Optimums have yet to be developed where resources and constraints on modeling must be traded off in the organization and modeling efforts for projects. A number of barriers need to be overcome, as well, which pose challenges to the developers of the software that supports MBSE/MBMA. Information and data must be made to flow seamlessly through the life cycle. Because there is a wide variety of tools used in the community, to avoid the problems of the past of silos, delays, and diverging interests, information should flow among these tools to support the “single source of truth” paradigm of MBSE. This will greatly facilitate MBMA and advancement of assurance functions.

Evans, John W.↗