Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “DISPOSAL”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

The status of LILW disposal facility construction in Korea

In this paper, we discuss the experiences during the construction of the first LILW disposal facility in South Korea. In December 2005, the South Korean Government designated Gyeongju-city as a host city of Low- and Intermediate-Level Radioactive Waste(LILW) disposal site through local referendums held in regions whose local governments had applied to host disposal facility in accordance with the site selection procedures. The LILW disposal facility is being constructed in Bongilri, Yangbuk-myeon, Gyeongju. The official name of the disposal facility is called 'Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center (LILW Disposal Center)'. It can dispose of 800,000 drums of radioactive wastes in a site of 2,100,000 square meters. At the first stage, LILW repository of underground silo type with disposal capacity of 100,000 drums is under construction expected to be completed by June of 2014. The Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center consists of surface facilities and underground facilities. The surface facilities include a reception and inspection facility, an interim storage facility, a radioactive waste treatment building, and supporting facilities such as main control center, equipment and maintenance shop. The underground facilities consist of a construction tunnel for transport of construction equipment and materials, an operation tunnel for transport of radioactive waste, an entrance shaft for workers, and six silos for final disposal of radioactive waste. As of Dec. 2012, the overall project progress rate is 93.8%. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

The status of LILW disposal facility construction in Korea - 15158

In this paper, we discuss the experiences during the construction of the first LILW disposal facility in South Korea. In December 2005, the South Korean Government designated Gyeongju-city as a host city of Low- and Intermediate-Level Radioactive Waste (LILW) disposal site through local referendums held in regions whose local governments had applied to host disposal facility in accordance with the site selection procedures. The LILW disposal facility is being constructed in Bongil-ri, Yangbuk-myeon, Gyeongju. The official name of the disposal facility is called 'Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center (LILW Disposal Center)'. It can dispose of 800,000 drums of radioactive wastes in a site of 2,100,000 square meters. At the first stage, LILW repository of underground silo type with disposal capacity of 100,000 drums was completed by the end of June 2014. The Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center consists of surface facilities and underground facilities. The surface facilities include a receipt and inspection facility, an interim storage facility, a radioactive waste treatment building, and supporting facilities such as main control center, equipment and maintenance shop. The underground facilities consist of a construction tunnel for transport of construction equipment and materials, an operation tunnel for transport of radioactive waste, an access shaft for workers, and six silos for final disposal of radioactive waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Disposal of LLW-LL, and ILW-LL at a Former Rare Earths Processing Facility in Malaysia - 19087

Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. (Geosyntec) was the design-build Contractor for a project involving the remediation and disposal of low level (LLW-LL and ILW-LL) NORM and TENORM wastes at a former rare earth processing facility in Malaysia. These sites were associated with a plant that extracted rare earth elements from local tin ores. Because of the naturally occurring radioactivity contained in the raw materials, these productions resulted in by-products and residues containing LLW-LL and ILW-LL thorium hydroxide and uranium hydroxide. The total mass of uranium (∼120 tons) and thorium (∼1,200 tons) managed in a single repository required the project design incorporate requirements related to inventory, security and safeguards around nuclear precursor materials. The requirement to consider a performance over a period of more than 10,000 years led to significant challenges in design and modeling of the disposal facility as this disposal facility was purposely designed and permitted as a final disposal for the LLW-LL and ILW-LL. The first phase of the project was the decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition of the 14- acre former rare earth processing plant and excavation of contaminated soils, construction of an engineered cell at the repository for waste disposal, and transportation and disposal of the waste materials into the cell. Final status surveys were carried out to allow the site to be successfully released by the Malaysian regulatory authorities as a clean site for re-development as common industrial use. Over 11,000 loads of material, including approximately 75,000 cubic meters of excavated soils and plant debris, were transported in specially designed steel transport boxes on public roads for disposal in the engineered cell. The second phase of the project included the design and construction of a second engineered cell, enhanced with protective barrier systems and a final cover system constructed of natural materials. Ancillary facilities such as substations, offices, processing buildings, and wastewater treatment plants were constructed to support retrieval and processing of the materials from more than 87,000 individual drums using a semi-automated process. The drums, waste packages, and other materials in the storage facility were systematically extracted, sorted, inventoried, solidified using Portland cement, transported, and disposed in the cell. All temporary facilities were decontaminated, demolished, and disposed in the cell. Radiological inventory and radiation safety programs were implemented to quantify the waste activity and to control exposure to workers and the public during the project. The total mass of radioactive contaminated waste disposed in the two projects is nearly 200,000 tons. The projects were carried out under a high level of scrutiny from Malaysian and international regulatory bodies. Between 2014 and 2017, performance monitoring and modeling activities were carried out to demonstrate that the disposal facility was performing in accordance with design requirements established by regulatory agencies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Design, Construction, and Commissioning of the RH LLW Disposal Facility at INL - 19445

The newly-commissioned Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) provides permanent disposal capability critical for continuing INL nuclear research and Naval Reactors missions at the Idaho site. The facility mission need [critical decision (CD)- 0] was approved in 2009. Alternative selection (CD-1) was finalized in 2011. The project performance baseline (CD-2/3) was approved and design was initiated in 2014 and construction began in 2015. Construction was completed and transitioned to Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Operations in 2017. The facility successfully achieved readiness with authorization to begin operations (CD-4) in 2018. The $77 M line-item capital-acquisition project was completed six months ahead of the congressional commitment date and significantly under budget. This paper presents highlights of the RH LLW Disposal Facility project delivery and a summary of facility features and critical characteristics. Highlights include: - As a hazard category II nuclear facility, the project complied with United States Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for incorporation of nuclear safety into facility design and construction as identified in DOE-STD-1189 as well as 10 CFR 835 Subpart K requirements for incorporation of ALARA principles in facility design. - From an environmental compliance perspective, the facility was subject to National Environmental Policy Act requirements resulting in a Finding of No Significant Impact as determined by an Environmental Assessment. An operating disposal authorization statement from the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG) authorizing waste disposal operations in accordance with DOE Order 435.1 was obtained. - The project was delivered using a design-build delivery method with a firm-fixed price with incentive fee contracting mechanism. The project was executed as a line-item capital-acquisition project, in full compliance with DOE Order 413.3B under INL's certified Earned Value Management System (EVMS) program. - The facility supports twenty years of waste disposal operations with five disposal vault configurations in four vault arrays supporting six different cask/canister system configurations. Three of the six cask/canister systems currently exist and three will be developed to support future operations. There are a total of 446 waste disposal vaults that will accommodate disposal of a total of 939 stainless steel radioactive waste canisters. The facility is designed to accommodate canisters with contact radiation dose rates as high as 600 Sievert/hour (60,000 Rem/hour). - The facility underwent a rigorous readiness review process in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D. Readiness activities included rigorous facility testing and shakedown activities, a management-self assessment, a contractor operational readiness review, and a DOE operational readiness review. Readiness was demonstrated for an existing cask/canister system (the MFC HFEF-5 cask). Separate readiness activities will be conducted for each cask/canister system as they are brought online for facility operations. INL's successful delivery of the project has provided waste disposal capability to ensure long-term viability of planned and current facilities and missions associated with both INL and the Naval Reactors Facility. Successful execution of the project has proven to be strategically important to future capital investments in capabilities necessary to advance INL's mission. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Special Analysis for Slit Trench Disposal of the Reactor Process Heat Exchangers

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in response to a request from Solid Waste Management (SWM), conducted a Special Analysis (SA) to evaluate the performance of nineteen heat exchangers that are to be disposed in the E-Area low level waste facility Slit Trench 9 (ST 9). Although these nineteen heat exchangers were never decontaminated, the majority of the radionuclides in the heat exchanger inventory list were determined to be acceptable for burial because they are less than the 'generic' waste form inventory limits given in the 2008 Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008). However, as generic waste, the H-3 and C-14 inventories resulted in unacceptable sum-of-fractions (SOFs). Initial scoping analyses performed by SRNL indicated that if alterations were made to certain external nozzles to mitigate various potential leak paths, acceptable SOFs could be achieved through the use of a 'Special' waste form. This SA provides the technical basis for this new 'Special' waste form and provides the inventory limits for H-3 and C-14 for these nineteen heat exchangers such that the nineteen heat exchangers can be disposed in ST 9. This 'Special' waste form is limited to these nineteen heat exchangers in ST 9 and applies for H-3 and C-14, which are designated as H-3X and C-14X, respectively. The SA follows the same methodology used in the 2008 PA and the 2008 SA except for the modeling enhancements noted below. Infiltration rates above the heat exchangers are identical to those used in the 2008 PA; however, flow through the heat exchangers is unique. Because it is unknown exactly how sealed heat exchanger openings will perform and how surface and embedded contaminants will be released, multiple base cases or scenarios were established to investigate a set of performances. Each scenario consists of flow options (based on the performance of sealed openings) and a near-field release of contaminants (based on corrosion and diffusion performance). Two disposal configurations were analyzed where heat exchangers were assumed to be disposed four across and five lengthwise (the 4x5 configuration, with one empty) and three across and seven lengthwise (the 3x7 configuration, with two empty). A large range of conditions was considered. For example, peak well concentrations at the 100-m boundary for H-3 are shown in Figure ES-1 for a wide range of configurations (i.e. release mechanism and degree of sealing options). The maximum contaminant level (MCL) and a 10% SOF goal for H-3 are also shown. The 10% goal was based on an estimated volume fraction that these nineteen heat exchangers would consume in ST 9 and was solely used for scoping purposes to assess disposal feasibility and sealing requirements. Because various line breaks and poor sealing greatly exceeded that 10% goal, the determination was made that mitigating activities were needed, such as protection from line breaks and better sealing. An initial set of scenarios was run to assess the requirements for sealing the heat exchanger openings and the need to ensure that the sealed heat exchangers stayed sealed during transit and disposal operations. After discovering that such mitigating activities were required, additional scenarios were run that included the mitigating activities. Scenarios deemed to have a very low probability of occurrence were excluded from consideration for calculating inventory limits (for example, those scenarios that assumed an instantaneous release of contaminants along with poor sealing). The SA used the most recent K d values for the C-14 analyses and the most recent Dose Conversion Factors for H-3 and C-14 which have been updated since the 2008 PA was issued. This SA took into account the location and the disposal timing of these heat exchangers. The disposal location is within a small area of the overall Slit Trench unit (about 6% of the total) and is behind a line that is 200 ft from the down-gradient edge of ST 9. The disposal timing is assumed to be after July 1, 2012 (because disposals cannot occur until this document is approved and mitigating activities are completed) which means that the disposal occurs after the first time period for the 2008 PA beta-gamma pathway (that time period is from December 1995 until December 2007), thus that pathway time period is not considered. Table ES-1 provides new 'Special' waste form groundwater pathway inventory limits for C-14X and H-3X in the heat exchangers. Inventory limits for generic C-14 and H-3 in the West Slit Trenches are included for comparison. The lowest limit for generic C-14 is 1.9E-1 Ci, while for C-14X it is 2.7E0, an increase of more than 14 times. Because time windows are employed, at later times C-14X exhibits lower limits than those for generic C-14 because with its smaller K d the C-14 moves much faster. The lowest limit for generic H-3 is 3.6E0 Ci, while for H-3X it is 1.7E3, an increase of almost 500 times.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected. Within the active burial grounds, low-level and mixed low-level waste currently may be disposed only in two lined trenches in the 218-W-5 Burial Ground (Trenches 31 and 34) until they are either filled or a decision is made to close these trenches. Some mixed low-level waste is also disposed at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility in the 200 West Area (which is covered under a separate PA). During this (fiscal year 2022) reporting period (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), waste was disposed to the 200 West Area LLBGs. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 West Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis assumptions of a postclosure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-70) estimates that the 200 West LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions and no changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained. A new PA to evaluate the long-term impacts of three disposal trenches that are currently active within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in the 200 East Area and Trenches 31 and 34 in the 200 West Area) was initiated in fiscal year 2019 and completed in fiscal year 2022. Corrective actions addressing 3 key issues and 31 secondary issues identified during the review process were developed and submitted to the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group Co-Chairs for review and approval. This PA provides additional technical basis for the continued adequacy of the existing Operating Disposal Authorization Statement.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Construction, Startup and Operation of a New LLRW Disposal Facility in Andrews County, Texas - 12151

During this last year, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) completed construction and achieved start of operations of a new low level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility in Andrews County Texas. Disposal operations are underway for commercial LLRW, and start up evolutions are in progress for disposal of Department of Energy (DOE) LLRW. The overall approach to construction and start up are presented as well as some of the more significant challenges and how they were addressed to achieve initial operations of the first new commercial low level radioactive waste disposal facility in more than 30 years. The WCS disposal facility consists of two LLRW disposal cells, one for Texas Compact waste, and a separate disposal cell for DOE waste. Both disposal cells have very robust and unique designs. The cells themselves are constructed entirely in very low permeability red bed clay. The cell liners include a 0.91 meter thick clay liner meeting unprecedented permeability limits, 0.3 meter thick reinforced concrete barriers, as well as the standard geo-synthetic liners. Actions taken to meet performance criteria and install these liners will be discussed. Consistent with this highly protective landfill design, WCS chose to install a zero discharge site water management system. The considerations behind the design and construction of this system will be presented. Other activities essential to successful start of LLRW disposal operations included process and procedure development and refinement, staffing and staff development, and training. Mock ups were built and used for important evolutions and functions. Consistent with the extensive regulation of LLRW operations, engagement with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was continuous and highly interactive. This included daily activity conference calls, weekly coordination calls and numerous topical conference calls and meetings. TCEQ staff and consultants frequently observed specific construction evolutions, such as geological feature mapping of designated excavation faces, disposal cell clay liner installation, disposal cell concrete barrier construction, etc. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Deep Borehole Disposal Research in the United States - 17427

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) manages a research and development (R and D) program for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. Deep boreholes are being evaluated for disposal of some smaller DOE-managed waste as an alternative to disposal in a mined geologic repository. The deep borehole disposal concept consists of drilling borehole(s) to a total depth of about 5,000 m (16,400 ft - or greater than three miles) into crystalline basement rock, placing waste packages in the lower emplacement zone portion of the borehole, and sealing and plugging the upper portion of the borehole. The required bottom-hole diameter of the borehole(s) depends on the waste package configuration for the reference concept, but ranges from 22 to 43 cm (8.5 to 17 inches). Additional research and development is desired in several important areas for further consideration of deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste. A Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT) will be conducted by DOE to further assess the viability of deep borehole disposal as an alternative for the disposal of smaller DOE-managed waste forms. The DBFT will be used to evaluate three main areas: 1) evaluation of the capability for drilling and construction of deep, large-diameter boreholes; 2) downhole scientific analyses to assess hydrogeochemical conditions that control waste stability and containment; and 3) engineering activities to assess the viability and safety of waste package emplacement and retrieval in deep boreholes. The DBFT will include first drilling a characterization borehole, followed by an optional field test borehole, to a total depth of about 5,000 m (16,400 feet) into crystalline basement rock in a geologically stable continental location. The initial smaller diameter characterization borehole will be drilled and completed to facilitate downhole scientific testing and analysis. If site conditions are found to be suitable, DOE intends to drill a larger-diameter field test borehole to evaluate emplacement activities using surrogate waste packages. The surrogate waste packages will not contain any radioactive waste, nor will any radioactive waste be used in these tests. One of the advantages of deep borehole disposal is that it would give DOE the flexibility to consider options for disposal of smaller waste forms. Deep borehole disposal also potentially offers earlier disposal of some wastes than might be possible in a mined repository, and could reduce costs associated with projected treatments of some wastes. In order to accomplish the DBFT, DOE will require the support of multiple national laboratories, along with a site contractor to acquire a suitable test site and to manage the site and the required testing activities. DOE issued a competitive solicitation via a request for proposal (RFP) in July, 2015, which requested proposals to provide a test site and site management services. The contract was awarded in January, 2016, to a team led by Battelle Memorial Institute which included a proposed test site in Pierce County, North Dakota. After efforts to acquire both the initial test site in North Dakota and an alternative proposed site in Spink County, South Dakota were unsuccessful, activities were suspended. The experiences in Pierce County, ND and Spink County, SD highlighted the importance of public engagement and support for the DBFT, and that relevant levels of government and other public stakeholders should be involved from the beginning. Using the lessons learned in North and South Dakota, DOE issued a new RFP on August 22, 2016 which emphasized local, state, and tribal (if applicable) government engagement, as well as public and other stakeholder involvement ahead of proposal submittals and throughout the contract execution phases. The new RFP allowed for multiple initial awards and multiple phases of contract execution. In December, 2016, DOE announced the selection of four companies - AECOM, ENERCON, RE/SPEC, and TerranearPMC - to begin exploring the possibility of conducting a DBFT under the terms of the new RFP. Ultimately, only one site will be chosen for the field test. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Disposal of Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste in Andrews County, Texas - 16408

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has recommended approval of an initiative to permit the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to license the disposal of commercial and co-mingled Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Waste (GTCC LLW) in Andrews County, Texas. Such a framework is clearly articulated in the Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The NRC staff also recommended approval to proceed with a rulemaking to align the Waste Classification Tables in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61.55 with the paragraph 61.2 definition of 'waste' to provide a disposal pathway for waste containing certain alpha-emitting transuranic elements with concentrations exceeding 100 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g). A pathway for the disposal of commercial and co-mingled GTCC LLW, including waste with certain alpha emitting transuranic elements exceeding 100 nCi/g (TRU waste), might emerge if the initiative described in the Commissions' July 22, 2015 document, SECY-15-0094, Historical and Current Issues Related to Disposal of GTCC LLW, is approved. The NRC staff recommendations envisioned the NRC and TCEQ working together to review a site-specific performance assessment that would be submitted by Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) as part of an amendment to its existing Radioactive Materials License No. R04100. The TCEQ's recommendations were prompted by a petition for rulemaking filed by WCS to allow the disposal of GTCC waste in Texas. On September 10, 2014, the TCEQ Commissioners directed their staff to engage stakeholders and request input from the NRC and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regarding actions needed to proceed with any future rulemaking. On January 30, 2015, the TCEQ requested clarification from the NRC regarding their legal authority and jurisdiction to regulate GTCC, GTCC-like, and TRU waste. The deliberations that have transpired over the past year have raised important legal, policy, and technical matters. This initiative could provide a safe disposal pathway for certain waste streams that have been orphaned over the past 30 years. One important realization that has emerged is the conservative assumptions used to establish the upper limits for Class C LLW when Part 61 was promulgated in 1981 would be much too restrictive when applied to a modern, highly engineered disposal facility located in arid west Texas. Waste that was not suitable for near surface disposal in 1981 could certainly be demonstrated to be safely disposed at the WCS Federal Waste Disposal Facility in Andrews County, Texas. This paper will address the legal, policy, and technical matters supporting this important topic currently under consideration both nationally and within the State of Texas. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

NRC Monitoring of Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site - 13147

As part of monitoring required under Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA), the NRC staff reviewed an updated DOE performance assessment (PA) for salt waste disposal at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). The NRC staff concluded that it has reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF meets the 10 CFR 61 performance objectives for protection of individuals against intrusion (chap.61.42), protection of individuals during operations (chap.61.43), and site stability (chap.61.44). However, based on its evaluation of DOE's results and independent sensitivity analyses conducted with DOE's models, the NRC staff concluded that it did not have reasonable assurance that DOE's disposal activities at the SDF meet the performance objective for protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity (chap.61.41) evaluated at a dose limit of 0.25 mSv/yr (25 mrem/yr) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). NRC staff also concluded that the potential dose to a member of the public is expected to be limited (i.e., is expected to be similar to or less than the public dose limit in chap.20.1301 of 1 mSv/yr [100 mrem/yr] TEDE) and is expected to occur many years after site closure. The NRC staff used risk insights gained from review of the SDF PA, its experience monitoring DOE disposal actions at the SDF over the last 5 years, as well as independent analysis and modeling to identify factors that are important to assessing whether DOE's disposal actions meet the performance objectives. Many of these factors are similar to factors identified in the NRC staff's 2005 review of salt waste disposal at the SDF. Key areas of interest continue to be waste form and disposal unit degradation, the effectiveness of infiltration and erosion controls, and estimation of the radiological inventory. Based on these factors, NRC is revising its plan for monitoring salt waste disposal at the SDF in coordination with South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). DOE has completed or begun additional work related to salt waste disposal to address these factors. NRC staff continues to evaluate information related to the performance of the SDF and has been working with DOE and SCDHEC to resolve NRC staff's technical concerns. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

NRC Consultation and Monitoring at the Savannah River Site: Focusing Reviews of Two Different Disposal Actions - 12181

Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certain non-high level waste determinations. The NDAA also requires NRC to monitor DOE's disposal actions related to those determinations. In Fiscal Year 2011, the NRC staff reviewed DOE performance assessments for tank closure at the F-Tank Farm (FTF) Facility and salt waste disposal at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part of consultation and monitoring, respectively. Differences in inventories, waste forms, and key barriers led to different areas of focus in the NRC reviews of these two activities at the SRS. Because of the key role of chemically reducing grouts in both applications, the evaluation of chemical barriers was significant to both reviews. However, radionuclide solubility in precipitated metal oxides is expected to play a significant role in FTF performance whereas release of several key radionuclides from the SDF is controlled by sorption or precipitation within the cementitious wasteform itself. Similarly, both reviews included an evaluation of physical barriers to flow, but differences in the physical configurations of the waste led to differences in the reviews. For example, NRC's review of the FTF focused on the modeled degradation of carbon steel tank liners while the staff's review of the SDF performance included a detailed evaluation of the physical degradation of the saltstone wasteform and infiltration-limiting closure cap. Because of the long time periods considered (i.e., tens of thousands of years), the NRC reviews of both facilities included detailed evaluation of the engineered chemical and physical barriers. The NRC staff reviews of residual waste disposal in the FTF and salt waste disposal in the SDF focused on physical barriers to flow and chemical barriers to radionuclide release from the waste. Because the waste inventory and concentration at both sites is sufficient to generate unacceptable doses to an off-site member of the public or inadvertent intruder in the absence of engineered barriers, the NRC staff review focused on the engineering features DOE plans to put in place to limit radionuclide release. At the FTF, DOE expects that peak doses are delayed beyond a 10,000 year performance period by a combination of (1) the flow-limiting effect of the steel tank liner and (2) chemical conditions created by the stabilizing grout overlying the waste that limit the solubility of key radionuclides for tens of thousands of years. At the SDF, DOE expects that flow will be significantly limited by water shedding along the closure cap lower drainage layer and that radionuclide release will be further limited by radionuclide precipitation or sorption within the high pH, chemically reducing conditions created within the saltstone waste form. Because the performance of both facilities depends on the performance of engineered barriers for thousands of years, the reviews included a detailed evaluation of the expected long-term behavior of these barriers. As previously discussed, NRC staff reviews of DOE waste determinations during consultation are designed to evaluate the three NDAA criteria, whereas the review of an updated PA during monitoring only addresses whether the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the planned disposal action will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61. The NRC staff review of the Waste Determination for the FTF did not include conclusions about whether the planned disposal of residual waste at the FTF would meet the NDAA criteria because of the substantial uncertainties in the degree of waste removal DOE would achieve and other technical uncertainties. The main product of the NRC staff review of the planned FTF disposal action is the recommendation that DOE should conduct waste release experiments to increase support for key modeling assumptions related to: (1) the evolution of pH and Eh in the grouted tank system over time; (2) identification of HRR association with solid phases comprising the residual wastes; and (3) expected solubility of HRRs under a range of environmental or service conditions that the residual wastes in the contaminated zone are expected to be exposed to over time. Implementation of this recommendation is deemed crucial for NRC staff to have reasonable assurance that the performance objectives in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C can be met. Given the risk-significance of Tank 18 to the overall PA and the short timeline for closure of this tank, the NRC staff recommended that DOE should initiate discussions with NRC staff regarding implementation of this recommendation for Tank 18 as soon as practical. The NRC staff also recommended that experiments to address this recommendation should be conducted prior to final closure of Tank 18. Results of the Tank 18 residual waste experiments, if conducted, will be evaluated by NRC staff to determine the need for additional data collection, experiments, and modeling for Tank 18, as well as other FTF tanks. Additional information regarding the NRC staff's recommendations in this area, including details on the suggested implementation of other recommendations will be provided in the NRC staff's plan for monitoring the FTF later in FY 2012, after DOE makes a final decision on the waste determination. The NRC staff's review of waste disposal at the SDF is ongoing. When complete, the SDF TER will indicate whether the NRC staff continues to have reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61 (NDAA Criterion 3). The TER also will include risk insights that will form the basis of the NRC staff's revised monitoring plan for the SDF. The NRC staff will publish an updated monitoring plan for the SDF later in FY 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Planning large-scale excavation and construction activities within an aerially constrained site for construction of a repository for low and short-lived intermediate level radioactive waste at the Bulgarian national disposal facility - 15372

The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is planning the construction of a near-surface repository for low and short-lived intermediate level radioactive waste, the National Disposal Facility (NDF), at the Radiana Site adjacent to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The Site, a rectangular area approximately 1.2 km east-west by 0.4 north-south, is located on a slopping area between the second and sixth loess terraces above the River Danube with elevations ranging from approximately +40 m to elevation +95 m. Construction of the NDF will be divided into three phases separated by approximately 20 years each. The first phase will see the construction of the primary support facilities, referred to as the Auxiliary Buildings and including the Waste Reception and Buffer Storage (WRBS) Building, and the first set of 22 reinforced concrete disposal cells and supporting infrastructure, including a network of subsurface observation galleries, the Infiltration Network Control (ICN) Galleries. Each disposal cell will be 20.15 m long by 17.05 m wide by 9.45 m in height. The disposal cells will be arranged in two parallel rows. Disposal activities will be conducted using overhead cranes installed inside of track mounted mobile roofs. Each row of disposal cells will be serviced by one mobile roof. The mobile roofs will be supported by massive concrete foundations. Construction at the site will present several logistical challenges that will need to be overcome to fully realize the NDF. First in order to begin construction of these facilities nearly 1 million 3 of soil will require excavation and handling. Consistent with requirements to minimize potential environmental impacts identified in the site Environmental Safety Assessment (EIA) excavated soil will, to the extent possible, remain onsite. Approximately three quarters of the soil can be accommodated within the site boundaries. Another challenge results from requirements imposed by the ground conditions. The sub-grade at the site, which consists primarily of loess, will require considerable improvement. To this end a 5 m thick loess-cement cushion will be constructed across much of the site. Specifically, the cushion will be required beneath the disposal cells and the WRBS Building. Construction of the loess-cement cushion in the disposal area will require detailed planning and coordination, particularly as the cushion beneath the disposal cells also contains embedded structures, including the ICN Galleries as well as massive concrete foundation beams required for the two mobile roofs. Construction of these structures will require planned interruptions in the construction of the loess-cement cushion. Specific cement types and strict quality requirements will be required for completion of the loess-cement cushion as well as for completion of the ICN Galleries. The construction planning will need to account for the large volumes of soil to be excavated as well as ensuring sufficient material supplies in terms of both quality as well as quantity. Large quantities of materials including both dry cement for mixing with the loess, and wet concrete for pouring of the mobile roof foundations are accounted for by the plan. However, even after completion of these activities additional challenges are addressed by the plan related to the contemporaneous construction management of the auxiliary buildings and the disposal cells. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Discussion on the merits of deep borehole disposal, especially with recycling - 15389

With the continued global expansion of the nuclear industry, disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level waste (HLW) continues to be a largely unimplemented (but extensively studied) activity throughout the world and can continue to do so due to the safe practices of 'interim' SNF/used nuclear fuel (UNF) and HLW storage. However as the industry continues to operate and expand in both existing and new countries, the accumulated SNF/UNF and HLW will continue to grow in both quantity and locations across the globe; hence, requiring more effort to control and monitor. Countries with nuclear power programs, or are considering starting nuclear power programs, must consider the potential financial and the engineering burden associated with both the interim storage and the disposal of SNF/UNF and HLW produced by these programs: can the cost of disposal be reasonably captured in the cost of electricity produced from nuclear programs and are there suitable sites for disposal in their country, such as a mined-geologic site, for the expected accumulated quantity of SNF and HLW? Answering these questions may be particularly vexing for countries with small nuclear programs where establishing viable disposal sites for SNF and HLW and funding of the development of these sites may be a challenge. In an effort to establish an alternative to traditional, expensive, mined-geologic disposal sites, the deep borehole option has been (re-)considered by multiple countries and entities to be a relatively simple solution to disposal of SNF and HLW. However, disposal of SNF in deep boreholes must overcome several issues including: (1) limiting-sized borehole diameters; (2) limited ability for retrieval; and (3) potential hang-up issues associated with lowering longer (e.g., > 180 inches) canisters down into a deep borehole. Since most SNF is a resource when recycled (i.e., UNF) and to dispose of it in an irretrievable manner would be wasteful, a more optimal alternative that could overcome these issues and maximize the benefits of the UNF is to recycle the UNF and dispose of the resulting HLW into deep boreholes. The multiple and mutual benefits of this approach are elucidated in this paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Development of Waste Disposal Strategy for RH LLW Stored in the ATR Canal - 19453

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is 250 megawatt research reactor designed and operated for the United States Department of Energy for irradiation testing of advanced nuclear fuels and material samples. The pressurized light-water moderated and cooled reactor achieved criticality in 1967. It is designed to allow high neutron flux irradiation of structural materials and nuclear fuels to replicate long-term exposure of materials in traditional lower-flux reactor cores. The ATR also produces rare isotopes for the use in the medical and other industries. The ATR is one of only four reactors in the world with this high-flux irradiation capability. Adjacent to the ATR is a water-filled canal which is used to handle casks, prepare experiments, perform irradiation experiments, and store irradiated components generated from reactor operations. The canal is used to store irradiated (activated) metals that are subsequently determined to be waste. In many instances, these items are too radioactive to remove from the canal and remain in temporary storage until a sufficient decay period has elapsed to where they can be safely removed. The more highly-radioactive remote-handled (RH) waste items requiring hundreds of years to decay have been in storage in the canal since the first ATR core internal changeout (CIC) which was conducted in the 1970's. The INL has recently completed construction and startup of a new Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility, which will serve as the final disposal capability for legacy RH (greater than 200 mR/hr on contact) metal waste currently stored in the canal. The ATR will need to develop a method for packaging, characterizing, removing, and shipping this material to the new disposal facility. Based on the configuration of the new disposal cells at the RH LLW Disposal Facility, the ATR must produce an entire new process for handing and packaging the legacy RH waste and preparing it for transport and final disposal. The ATR Canal RH LLW Cleanup Project scope is to develop the processes, tools, and equipment for safely sizing, packaging, and removing RH LLW from the canal. This paper presents highlights and challenges the project faces to develop and implement this capability: - Designing new tools, fabricating new equipment, and implementing new processes at an active Hazard Category-I nuclear facility. - Ensuring new equipment and tools are compatible with the existing equipment and processes at both the generator and the disposal facilities. - Sizing legacy waste under water using remote tools and equipment to minimize void space in waste disposal canisters while ensuring as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) goals are met. - Loading waste containers underwater and preparing them to meet the liquid-free criteria of the disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC). - Providing a new shielded transport container to transfer waste from ATR to the new on-site RH LLW Disposal Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Borehole Disposal: Update on the Science, Technology, and Potentially Suitable Radioactive Wastes - 20170

A recent Special Issue of the Energies Journal on Deep Borehole Disposal of Nuclear Waste has delivered a timely update on the science and technology of borehole disposal and the types of radioactive wastes it could potentially accommodate. The Special Issue papers discuss (i) circumstances under which a national waste management programme might wish to consider deep borehole disposal [1], (ii) a status report of deep borehole disposal options in Germany [2], (iii) the use of deep horizontal drill-holes in sedimentary, metamorphic or igneous rocks for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste [3], (iv) the analysis of corrosion performance of engineered barrier systems [4], (v) a review of the potential cementing systems suitable for deep borehole disposal [5], (vi) the thermal evolution around heat-generating waste for a wide range of material properties and disposal configurations [6], (vii) a geochemical analysis of deep brines focussed on fluid-rock interactions [7], (viii) post-closure performance assessment calculations for deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules [8], and (ix) an example safety case for deep borehole disposal of nuclear wastes [9]. This paper provides an overview of the main findings from these publications and highlights some of the technological and scientific challenges that need to be overcome when developing a deep borehole disposal concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Annual Status Report (FY 2024): Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements. The IDF is a near-surface disposal facility designed to receive and permanently dispose of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste (MLLW) generated from Hanford Site operations. The facility consists of two double-lined disposal cells equipped with leak detection and leachates recovery systems to ensure environmental protection. Waste planned for disposal includes vitrified low-activity waste (LAW) and solid secondary waste (SSW) from the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). At the end of FY 2024, the IDF had not yet received any waste, as it remains in a pre-operational state. Disposal activities will begin with the hot commissioning of the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility using the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) approach in Calendar Year (CY) 2025. This ASR justifies the continued adequacy of the PA and DAS by reviewing key documents and data sources. these sources are listed in Table A-2 in Appendix A.4): The Operating Disposal Authorization Statement (ODAS) for the IDF (DOE-EM, 2021) remains in effect, with no outstanding conditions or key issues affecting its implementation. Based on the comprehensive review of PA analyses, monitoring data, and regulatory compliance activities, this ASR concludes that the IDF remains in compliance with DOE O 435.1, and there is reasonable assurance that the PA performance objectives will be met once disposal operations commence in CY 2025.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗