Results for “Cybersecurity Requirements” — Page 11

DOE OSTI2022

Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

EyeON

EyeON: Eye on Operational technology Software Supply Chain attacks have risen drastically over the past few years, none more well-known and impactful than the SolarWinds compromise. Criminal organizations inserted an attack vector into a specific version of the source code, giving themselves an air of credibility. Once news broke on SolarWinds, identifying compromised sites was very difficult, even knowing the culprit update. Software Bills of Materials (SBOM) have been touted as the solution to reclaiming control of your software supply chain. Deployment of SBOMs has been slow, however, due to conflicting standards, opaque storage requirements, and vendor adoption. Additionally, the path from obtaining an SBOM and securing your supply chain is unclear; how can an SBOM library be leveraged to provide insight to your attack surface? The EyeON tool, sponsored by Department of Energy Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DoE CESER), aims to address these gaps by providing an encapsulated solution to tracking which updates have been installed in an enterprise, and alerting system administrators to vulnerabilities as they become known. Similar to a virus scanner, EyeON is a command line tool to parse either a single file, nested directory structure, or filesystem. It collects data such as signature (hashes), version information, VirusTotal tags, compiler, compilation date, and code signing information. Users will anonymously submit scan data periodically to DoE CESER, who will then compile a database of known software products employed by Critical Infrastructure and broadcast alerts based on discovered flaws as they arise.

Tenzing, Wangmo↗

DOE OSTI2019

Optimization of SiV Defect Yield in Diamond Substrates

Color centers (defect complexes such as SiV) in diamond have shown potential in fields ranging from metrology, cybersecurity to quantum computation. Demonstrations in these fields have pushed the envelope of state-of-the-art operations – for example, single photon sources (SPS) making use of SiV centers in diamond for quantum key distribution have demonstrated all the requirements for SPS operation including: (1) stable operation with second correlation function <<1, (2) electrically driven single photon emission and (3) compatibility with frequenc y conversion to telecommunication frequencies. To-date, however, all these demonstrations have been on lab-scale one-off devices. The key question behind how to deterministically fabricate these devices, namely activation yield has been overlooked. For context, Si based semiconductor devices are hugely successful because we have a high activation yield for implanted dopants. This is not yet true for diamond color centers. As currently understood, the color center yield is dominated by a lack of vacancies in the immediate area of the implantation. We propose to optimize the activation yield of color center using a combination of (1) focused single ion implantation with in-situ detection to count the number of implanted Si ions and (2) localized point defect (vacancy) creation using a focused Li ion beam to improve the yield. These experiments build on the unique capabilities of the SNL nanoImplanter (nI) to produce focused ion beam with spatial resolution of < 10 nm of both Si and Li ions. This work will also leverage our world-leading single ion implantation and detection capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report

The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado - brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including VPP owner/operators, aggregators, OEMs, utilities, testing & certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for aggregated Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). The workshop was catalyzed by recognition that traditional, rearward-looking regulatory frameworks are insufficient to keep pace with technological change. There is a "missing understanding" of risk, an "absent security basis" for managing it, and an "untenable responsibility" due to unclear ownership and requirements. The workshop aimed to shift the mindset from reacting to past crises to proactively preparing for emerging threats, fostering forward resilience through risk simulation and collaborative action. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking it a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2019

Assessment of CReST-VCT Deployment in Real-Time Environments: Communication System Examination

Incorporation of decentralized generation or distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar and wind, is transforming the electricity grid. These resources have the potential to provide greater overall value when they are grid connected and coordinated between transmission and distribution systems. The Coordinated Real-Time Sub-Transmission Volt-VAr Control Tool (CReST-VCT) has been proposed to provide co-optimization between transmission and distribution systems maximizing DER utilization while maintaining overall grid stability. In this paper, we examine the communication systems that are necessary to support the integration of the CReST-VCT optimization mechanism in a real-time operational environment. The required communication interfaces will be identified based on the operation model of CReST-VCT. The characteristics of the communication systems at these interfaces will be described to establish the context within which CReST-VCT will operate. The related protocols and cybersecurity domain will be reviewed. Potential issues and concerns will then be identified to guide subsequent integration efforts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

Digital risk analysis in nuclear engineering projects: Designing for safety, performance, reliability, and security

Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are important in promoting the need to identify cybersecurity concerns early in the systems engineering lifecycle so risks from adversarial cyber-attacks can be eliminated or reduced through engineering design practices. In addition to adversarial risk, risk in operational technology systems also includes non-adversarial and unintentional risk from other factors such as human performance errors, environmental conditions, design flaws, and device degradation or failure. This paper introduces a new concept for characterizing digital risk, both adversarial and non-adversarial, and provides the basis for initial research into a novel digital risk analysis approach focused on incorporating attack difficulty into a multi-attribute analysis technique using robust decision-making. This digital risk characterization is also used to frame a discussion on the challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements in an integrated energy system project that incorporates a small modular reactor and industrial facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

EVs-at-RISC: A Secure and Resilient Interoperable SCM Control System Architecture for Electric Vehicle’s-at-Scale (Final Technical Report)

The EVs-at-RISC project was a five-year research, development, and demonstration initiative to create foundational tools for utility-scale fleet aggregation and Smart Charge Management (SCM) of Electric Vehicles (EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), and related Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Rather than seeking to develop and demonstrate highly perfected SCM algorithms and control strategies, this project instead focused on creating foundational software solutions that enable unprecedented digital interoperability across the communications technologies and vendor platforms used to manage EV , EVCI, and DER, as well as existing energy management infrastructure operated by utilities, grid operators, and aggregators. This project then extends these novel interoperability capabilities to develop and deploy powerful middleware abstractions across grid edge networks and EVCI/DER fleet aggregations incorporating modern software tools and best practices, such as CI/CD, to bring the immense capabilities of infrastructure-as-code and policy-as-code to modern grid edge network environments. This addresses the foremost systemic issues preventing realization of any net operational benefits from scaled deployment of behind-the-meter EV, EVCI, and DER assets in electric power grids and markets today. The results of this approach and project unlock massive potential for new SCM capabilities to be easily prototyped, evaluated, and deployed at-scale within the existing grid edge network infrastructure and EVCI/DER technology ecosystem. The EVs-at-RISC project achieves this by extending Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB), a conceptual model for digital interoperability and distributed intelligence in traditional front-of-meter utility SCADA networks, validating our hypothesis that OpenFMB could be similarly used to solve systemic digital interoperability issues in behind-the-meter environments and unlock real-world utility-scale SCM capabilities without requiring any new proprietary vendor solutions or significant infrastructure reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Enabling the Write-Once Read-Many (WORM) Dashboard and Web Interface for HPC Data Storage

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), supported by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) through the Nuclear Science User Facilities, provides access to supercomputer systems and data storage along with support staff for system management, software installation, cybersecurity, and user support to the broader DOE-NE user community. A key component of this is providing long-term or perpetual data storage as part of efforts to improve reproducibility in modeling and simulation in addition to supporting simulations with regulatory compliance requirements. This milestone details the deployment of a new type of storage option for users requiring tamper resistant perpetual storage of data and the associated support for data control and release via the data storage web interface. The perpetual data storage system is integrated within the Open OnDemand framework deployed at INL and is called the ?WORM? in recognition of its write-once read-many characteristics.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2019

Cyber Threat Screening Using a Queuing-Based Game-Theoretic Approach

Dynamic and uncertain security environments, such as cyber systems, often involve strategic interactions among multiple decision-making agents. In this paper, we consider a cybersecurity setting where a system administrator (defender) has to screen malicious service requests of an attacker who seeks to exhaust available cyber resources and inconvenience users with normal requests. We propose a novel cyber-threat inspection model, based on Stackelberg games, that unies aspects of Threat Security Games with the Erlang-B queuing framework to provide equilibrium strategies for both the attacker and defender. In our proposed model, the defender seeks to determine the optimal number of inspection nodes required to maximize detection probability of malicious requests, while the attacker maximizes the probability of legitimate requests dropping out of the system. We derive analytical expressions of the equilibrium solutions of the proposed Stackelberg game under realistic assumptions on system observability and payoff structure of the players. A numerical case study is presented, and steps for further research are identified.

Cybersecurity, Stackelberg game, Erlang-B loss sys↗

DOE OSTI2022

The Role of Timing in Industrial Control Systems: A Primer

Accurate and synchronized time is an important dependency within an industrial control system. Manipulation or degradation of timing can result in varying impacts based on the critical infrastructure sector. As control systems continue to be digitized and automated, they require more precise timing elements which increases the potential impact of a cyber-attack on timing elements.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

DOE OSTI2019

Secure, Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2019

Secure Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV (Final Technical Report)

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services. This was conducted in two parts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗