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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory in Cybersecurity: A Review of Applications, Models, and Challenges

There are no aspects of society left unchanged by the Internet. From commerce to communication, from entertainment to engineering, every industry and sphere of influence exists in a new state thanks to the advent of the information age. This convenience, rarely controverted, comes with capricious actors, who wish to gain access to these systems for myriad reasons, be it financial, political, or mere intellectual gain. This paper presents information that can help readers to better understand the fundamentals of cybersecurity from a game theory perspective, such as coalitional games, Colonel Blotto systems, or how to find Nash Equilibrium. This paper also reviews how game theory can enhance understanding of cybersecurity through cooperative and non-cooperative methods, such as information sharing, defense modeling, and attacker analysis. The authors use the analysis to serve as a bridge for those in either field who need a way to best comprehend the methodologies of their contrasting fields.

Egan, Matthew↗
DOE OSTI2025

Open Source Intelligence for Cybersecurity Events via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes. We also examine the potential of OSINT for identifying the network protocols associated with specific events, which can aid in the mitigation procedures by informing operators if the vulnerability is exploitable given their system’s network configurations.

Dale, Dakota↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

DER-CF (Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework) and DER-CF Lite [SWR-20-29]

The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a no-cost, interactive web tool that holistically evaluates a facility’s distributed energy resource (DER) cybersecurity posture—or health—and makes customized recommendations. The newer DER-CF Lite simplifies the process and quickly provides an assessment.

Reynolds, Tamara (Tami)↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

RADIANCE Cybersecurity Plan: Generic Version

Under its Grid Modernization Initiative, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in collaboration with energy industry stakeholders developed a multi-year research plan to support modernizing the electric grid. One of the foundational projects for accelerating modernization efforts is information and communications technology interoperability. A key element of this project has been the development of a methodology for engaging ecosystems related to grid integration to create roadmaps that advance the ease of integration of related smart technology. This document is the product of activities undertaken in 2017 through 2019. It provides a Cybersecurity Plan describing the technology to be adopted in the project with details as per the GMLC Call document.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

DOE Fffice of Nuclear Energy cybersecurity research, development and demonstration program plan

This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide sciencebased methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Gap Analysis of Supply Chain Cybersecurity for Distributed Energy Resources

A supply chain is the combination of the ecosystem of resources needed to design, manufacture, and distribute a product. In the context of supply chain cybersecurity, the resources that directly influence this ecosystem include software, data, and/or other digital components. Compromised equipment or software in the supply chain may lead to attacks such as financial loss; denial of service; a breach of confidential or proprietary information from a company, its customers, or its suppliers; ransomware that denies operation of automated equipment for payment; and malicious control actions that could damage equipment and endanger personnel. Currently 60.8% of US energy comes from fossil fuels, 18.9% comes from nuclear energy, and the last 20.1% comes from renewable sources. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission order FERC 2222 and Executive Order 14017 on America's Supply Chains are important milestones for safely expanding generation from renewable energy and achieving the goal of a decarbonized U.S. energy sector by 2035. This report analyzes gaps and opportunities in the supply chain currently available to the renewable energy sector, to help stakeholders formulate a coordinated response.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Fast Charging EV Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗
DOE OSTI2021

Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation

This work provides cybersecurity analytics for a high photovoltaic (PV) penetrated distribution network, representing future power electronics dominated grid (PEDG). Firstly, the impact of active and reactive power (PQ) set-points manipulation on the network is studied. Then, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed for identifying the potentially compromised PV inverters in the network. The proposed IDS is based on defining the normal, safe, and abnormal operation regions of the PV inverters from point of view of the steady state voltage stability of the network. These three-operation regions are identified by utilizing active power, reactive power, and voltage (PQV) limits of each specific grid-following inverter in the network. Each grid-following inverter's PQV contour includes the information of network topology, inverter ratings, and inverter controller. The developed PQ limits are integrated into the centralized secondary control layer for realization of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the proposed secondary control layer is capable of providing remedial actions during an anomaly event to enhance the grid resiliency. The theoretical analyses are verified by several attack scenarios for a network of grid-following inverters.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity Enhancement for Multi-Infeed High-Voltage DC Systems

Composed of multiple two-terminal high-voltage DC (HVDC) transmission systems, a multi-infeed HVDC (MIDC) system exchanges massive power among multiple asynchronous AC systems. However, as an intrinsically cyber-physical system, an MIDC system could suffer from cyber-attacks, leading to massive power mismatches in multiple AC systems, and resulting in catastrophic consequences. Since the sequential responses of an MIDC system and interconnected AC systems are in different timescales, this paper first establishes a two-timescale model to evaluate the sequential impacts caused by cyber-attacks. Then, an event-triggered cyber-defense strategy is proposed to enhance the cybersecurity of an MIDC system by mitigating multiple non-simultaneous cyber-attacks. Whenever new cyber-attack events occur, the proposed cyber-defense strategy, which is mathematically modeled as a mixed-integer quadratic programming problem, is executed on-line and updated in an event-triggered manner. Here, simulation results on an MIDC system demonstrate that the low-cost and almost blind cyber-attacks can cause severe frequency deviations, and the proposed strategy can mitigate multi-cyber-attacks effectively.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Identification and Testing of Electric Vehicle Fast Charger Cybersecurity Mitigations

Fast-charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is needed to enable and achieve the national goals of transitioning the vehicle fleet toward more electrification. Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have jointly worked to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential cyber-related consequences associated with fast charger systems. NREL contributed by considering cyberattack scenarios and consequences associated with integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) at fast-charging stations. The dynamic nature of fast-charger load profiles would encourage site operators to incorporate solar for energy cost reduction and energy storage for peak demand cost management at future charging facilities with multiple fast chargers at a site. These energy resources would be monitored and coordinated via a site energy management controller with data exchange between devices and local power metering infrastructure; thus, networking between devices and the design of the system becomes important in the overall cybersecurity posture. In addition, component vendors and system operators might have remote interfaces to any of these systems. It is therefore important to understand the breadth of the cyberattack surface and potential strategies to mitigate impacts. This project has focused on components and protocols expected to be found within a local charging site that includes multiple chargers and DER resources. Our methods and results are summarized in this final report.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Center for Secure Evolvable Energy Delivery Systems (SEEDS)

The SEEDS Center has successfully completed its mission to research and develop a plethora of technologies during its six-year timeframe. The Center institutions of the University of Arkansas, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Carnegie-Mellon University, Florida International University, Lehigh University, and MIT all worked together with industry partners to define relevant energy sector cybersecurity issues, create projects to address those issues, and execute those projects in roughly two and three-year increments. The short project descriptions below indicate some really keystone areas of research. The teams generally met all of their objectives with only a few exceptions, which is tremendous in an R&D center. In fact, the success of one project led to the creation of a startup company, Bastazo, Inc. that is commercializing the SPARTAN project. In addition to creating new technologies, the Center helped to educate a desperately needed workforce. Lastly, a big success is that the UA seriously followed the mandate of the original program manager to try to become self-sustaining. This effort has resulted in a combined NSF center with the CREDC Center at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. To summarize the SEEDS effort, great research was funded, students were educated and put into the workforce, technology is being commercialized and offered to the electric sector, and the research efforts are being sustained through additional funding. The effort was an unqualified success.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Digital Twin and Cybersecurity Requirements for Beartooth

This report summarizes the requirements for the Cybersecurity and the Digital Twin for Beartooth. The Beartooth digital twin will ultimately allow for both comprehensive offline data analysis and transformational autonomy. This document places limits on the IPL-funded work scope to end at a predictive digital twin stage but allow for future expansion to support full autonomy. It is expected that this work will support both currently funded LDRD and future direct-funded digital twin research.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Zero Trust Cybersecurity: Concepts and Models for Application

Zero Trust is a cybersecurity paradigm centered on the idea that a network breach is inevitable and so no user or asset should be implicitly trusted. Entities on the network are continuously monitored and access-granting decisions are based on dynamic risk assessment using multiple inputs. To limit the damage from an attack, privileges and lateral access are constrained by default. This report provides an overview of current models and constructs employed in building out these concepts into a zero trust architecture.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity at the Grid Edge: Protecting LA's Energy Systems in a Connected World

Join SoCalGas and the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) for an insightful webinar on securing operational technology and energy systems. Los Angeles has the second-largest metro by population in the nation, making it vital to protect the energy infrastructure that powers day-to-day life. However, cybersecurity for energy systems is an immense challenge due to an increasing number of interconnected devices and stakeholders. While there was traditionally a limited need to secure energy infrastructure, the grid is only becoming smarter and more software-defined. Amid aging infrastructure and evolving cyber threats, the need to ensure the security of energy is at an all-time high. Together, SoCalGas and NLR are assessing the current state-of-the-art of the energy ecosystem to understand gaps in current best practices and technologies relevant to powering the city of Los Angeles.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

VPP Cybersecurity: Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities

This presentation was presented at the Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, at NREL in Golden, Colorado. The goal of the two-day workshop was to address the critical cybersecurity challenges for the future electric grid. This presentation outlines a framework for assessing the roles and responsibilities of virtual power plant stakeholders in mitigating cyber risk to virtual power plant projects and the overall power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗