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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

A Robust Method to Secure Multi-Inverter Grid Tied PV and Battery Energy Storage Systems Against Cyber Intrusions

This paper details a robust method to secure a multi-inverter grid tied system that interfaces photovoltaic (PV) and battery energy storage against potential cyber-attacks. The method can be applied to any third-party inverter systems without a need to modify their internal controls. A small random private excitation signal termed "watermark" is injected into the DC input voltage terminals (via a series transformer) connected to the PV/battery inverter system. An external robust cyber intrusion detector (CID) hardware consisting of a digital signal processor (DSP) generates the "watermark" and also receives the sensor signals that control the setpoints of the PV/battery grid tied system. The CID algorithm is shown to detect all possible cyber intrusions (such as false data injection(FDI)) on external sensor signals such as P and Q measured by a smart meter that control the overall system operation. The proposed CID computes online system ID and two variance tests in real time on each sensor signal and is able pinpoint intrusion location in a multi-inverter system. Results on a hardware in the loop (HIL) of a two-inverter grid connected system demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed CID system for FDI and unobservable FDI. Test results on a laboratory prototype will be discussed in the conference presentation.

Ibrahim, Hasan↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-Physical Smart Light Control System Integration with Smart Grid using Zigbee

This paper presents a hardware-in-the-loop cyber-physical system architecture design to monitor and control smart lights connected to the active distribution grid. The architecture uses Zigbee-based (IEEE 802.15.4) wireless sensor networks and publish-subscribe architecture to exchange monitoring and control signals between smart-light actuators (SLAs) and a smart-light central controller (SLCC). Each SLA integrated into a smart light consists of a Zigbee-based endpoint module to send and receive signals to and from the SLCC. The SLCC consists of a Zigbee-based coordinator module, which further exchanges the monitoring and control signals with the active distribution management system over the TCP/IP communication network. The monitoring signals from the SLAs include light status, brightness level, voltage, current, and power data, whereas, the control signals to the SLAs include light intensity, turn ON, turn OFF, standby, and default settings. We have used our existing hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) cyber-physical system (CPS) security SCADA testbed to process signals received from the SLCC and respond suitable control signals based on the smart light schedule requirements, system operation, and active distribution grid dynamic characteristics. We have integrated the proposed cyber-physical smart light control system (CPSLCS) testbed to our existing HIL CPS SCADA testbed. We use the integrated testbed to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm by real-time performance and latency between the SLCC and SLAs. The experiments demonstrated significant results by 100% realtime performance and low latency while exchanging data between the SLCC and SLAs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Machine Learning-based Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection in Wide Area Voltage Control Systems

Wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) are widely deployed in power grid to improve the voltage stability in transmission system using Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices. The WAVCS relies on wide-area measurement and control signals for closed-loop control of FACTS devices to improve the transient voltage stability in power grid in real-time. Since the WAVCS utilizes a cyber-layer communication during its normal operation, they are susceptible to cyber attacks from adversaries which can lead to a voltage collapse if the attacks go undetected and unmitigated. This paper proposes a supervised machine learning (ML)-based anomaly detection algorithm for detecting various stealthy cyber attacks in the context of WAVCS cybersecurity. In particular, a fuzzy logic-based wide-area controller, as proposed by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), is implemented on the Kundur’s four machine two-area system that is integrated with a static var compensator (SVC) to improve voltage profile on sensitive buses. Later, different types of data integrity attacks, including pulse and ramp attacks, are considered on the wide-area measurement and control signals to analyze the performance of the proposed anomaly detector. Our experimental evaluation shows a promising performance with a high true-positive rate (more than 99%) and low false-negative rate (less than 1%) while exhibiting a small prediction time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cryptographic Method for Defense Against MiTM Cyber Attack in the Electricity Grid Supply Chain

Critical infrastructures such as the electricity grid can be severely impacted by cyber-attacks on its supply chain. Hence, having a robust cybersecurity infrastructure and management system for the electricity grid is a high priority. This paper proposes a cyber-security protocol for defense against man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks to the supply chain, which uses encryption and cryptographic multi-party authentication. A cyber-physical simulator is utilized to simulate the power system, control system, and security layers. The correctness of the attack modeling and the cryptographic security protocol against this MiTM attack is demonstrated in four different attack scenarios.

Paul, Shuva↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Physical Power Systems Protection: The Byzantine Cybersecurity Framework

Cybersecurity of smart grids have been topic of much interest in recent years. As this critical infrastructure operation increases dependency on automated processes and controls, exposure to cyber-physical threats become inevitable. Considering cyber-physical security of the grid, much focus of attention has been made towards smart grids real-time monitoring solutions, including the state estimation process. Analyzing the relevant literature, one can note though that seldom research has been done on cyber-physical security of smart grids protection systems. Protection systems have intangible value towards grid reliability. This paper presents a cybersecurity framework for smart grids protection systems. A physics-based inspired machine learning solution is at the core process of the framework. Processed relay inputs and outputs are used by a deep predictive coding network. Formal models, a quasi-static state estimator, provides an oracle when low confidence decision is reached. Evolving knowledge is derived through reinforcement learning. Implementation aspects considering the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Electricity Infrastructure Operations Center are presented. Built as an extra control layer to protection systems, without hard-to-derive parameters, highlights potential aspects towards real-life applications.

Bretas, Arturo Suman↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Attack Sequences Generation for Electric Power Grid

Security assessment of cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) such as the electric power grid is a critical operation to maintain availability, reliability, and quality of service in the presence of persistent threats from malicious cyber actors. Existing security assessment approaches such as penetration testing and red teaming rely on subject matter expert experience and forensic cyber analysis of historical events to perform realistic, threat-informed assessments of CPES defense. CPESs have a large attack surface because of the heterogeneity and complexity of underlying topology, devices, measurements, and vulnerabilities. The aforementioned approaches lead to partial coverage of the attack surface with a large set of unknown but possible exploits. There is a need to automate the CPES attack surface discovery and contextualize it for relevant, highly probable, real-world attack scenarios. We propose a methodology and framework to facilitate the discovery of the CPES attack surface. We present a multilayer attack graph with ranked attack sequences to describe CPES failure scenarios. We present a work-in-progress framework that lists key components to automate the attack modeling and sequence generation. We demonstrate the published National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource CPES failure scenario to highlight the trustworthiness of generated attack sequences.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗
DOE OSTI2024

Online Dynamic Cyber-Attack Diagnosis in Power Electronics Systems Based on Few-Shot Learning

With increasing exposure to software-based sensing and control, power electronics systems are facing higher risks of cyber-physical attacks. To ensure system stability and minimize potential economic losses, it is critical to monitor the operating states and detect those attacks at the early stage. However, anomaly detection and diagnosis of attacks are still challenging, especially when labeled anomaly data is difficult or even infeasible to obtain. To overcome this problem, we propose a Few-Shot Learning (FSL) based approach for cyber-attack diagnosis leveraging the waveform data. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt at leveraging FSL for cyber-attack diagnosis in power electronics systems. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach can achieve comparable diagnosis accuracy with the state-of-the-art data-driven methods using less than 0.04% of the training samples.

Li, Qi↗
DOE OSTI2024

Guest Editorial: Special section on Resilient Control of Cyber-Physical Power and Energy Systems

Our power and energy systems are becoming more and more integrated and interconnected. The increasing integration of edge devices and dependence on cyber infrastructure provides both the potential for benefits and risks. The integration enables more dynamic and flexible control paradigms while at the same time increasing the cyberattack surface and uncertainty of behavior. Control methodology in this new world must be designed for resilience and must have the ability to withstand, react, and respond to both physical faults and cyber-induced threats. Finally, understanding system resilience under adverse conditions requires studying control performance and how cyber infrastructure can integrate with and support the overall resilience of the system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Automated Adversary-in-the-Loop Cyber-Physical Defense Planning

Security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) continues to pose new challenges due to the tight integration and operational complexity of the cyber and physical components. To address these challenges, this article presents a domain-aware, optimization-based approach to determine an effective defense strategy for CPS in an automated fashion—by emulating a strategic adversary in the loop that exploits system vulnerabilities, interconnection of the CPS, and the dynamics of the physical components. Our approach builds on an adversarial decision-making model based on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that determines the optimal cyber (discrete) and physical (continuous) attack actions over a CPS attack graph. The defense planning problem is modeled as a non-zero-sum game between the adversary and defender. We use a model-free reinforcement learning method to solve the adversary’s problem as a function of the defense strategy. We then employ Bayesian optimization (BO) to find an approximate best-response for the defender to harden the network against the resulting adversary policy. This process is iterated multiple times to improve the strategy for both players. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a ransomware-inspired graph with a smart building system as the physical process. Numerical studies show that our method converges to a Nash equilibrium for various defender-specific costs of network hardening.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Computational Techniques for Improving Resilience of Critical Energy Infrastructure under Cyber-Physical Attacks

In this chapter, we present recent advances in improving the resilience of cyber-physical systems, especially with regards to energy systems. We provide discussions around various types of cyber-physical events that can cause disruptions and new advances in optimization, control, and reinforcement learning (RL) to deal with the challenges posed by such cyber-physical events. The presented methods range from distributed robust optimization, autonomous and coordinated control, reinforcement learning based resilient control and topology reconfiguration in Inter-System resilient control.

Nazir, Mohammad Nawaf [BATTELLE (PACIFIC NW LAB)]↗
DOE OSTI2020

NREL’s Cyber-Energy Emulation Platform for Research and System Visualization

This paper presents NREL’s Cyber Energy Emulation (CEE) Platform. This is a novel emulation platform for achieving real-time visualization of large-scale environments involving cyber-physical devices. It allows for the environment to include real, physical hardware, along with emulated devices communicating with each other as part of the same system. The CEE Platform is also capable of streaming, collecting, storing, transporting, and visualizing all data within the emulated environment. By providing this capability, it enables high-fidelity visual analysis of events to be performed in real time as well as the use of historical data for forensic analysis. This paper presents the design of the CEE Platform as well as several potential use cases and applications. It also aims to highlight why this type of visualization tool has potential for research and education about cyber-physical systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (Workshop Summary)

On March 30, 31, and April 1, 2021, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled "U.S. and allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific". This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and private sector in the United States and among allied countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The workshop evaluated threat perceptions, assessed cyber power in a regional context, and explored opportunities for building capacity and trust with allies, partners, and the private sector. The region's cyber threat landscape is marked by increasing malicious activity, with threats persistent and ever-growing. Grounded by this strategic reality, the workshop advocated for 1) a concerted push into the arena of norm setting from the bottom up, 2) an agreed metric by which to assess progress, and 3) the creation of future lines of collaborative effort for the United States and its allies to ensure an open, interoperable, and secure internet.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design and Development of a High Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed

In order to ensure that future critical infrastructure systems are resilient to various types of such advanced and persistent threats, it is important to develop and integrate tailored solutions that holistically address cyber-attack detection and mitigation in a timely manner such that adverse system impacts that impact a large population are avoided. Further, it is essential to create environments that allow control, protection and communication to exist within a realistic environment to analyze the effects of adverse conditions and system operating modes. This project aims to establish a high-fidelity testbed environment for modeling and simulating a single microgrid all the way up to a network of microgrids along with baseline controls, protection, and associated cyber communication. This is an important activity because accurately modeling and simulating the various power-electronics-based DERs and loads in a microgrid is critical to adequately capturing their behaviors over a wide range of off-normal conditions, as well as to evaluate the resilience of the system using the developed controls. The work presented in this report focuses on the process of building this high-fidelity testbed and the associated experimentation it enables. The model enables the creation of high-fidelity use cases and associated datasets that have been used extensively within the initiative to study resilience and support novel control development and prototyping. The work heavily leverages existing capability that is part of the high-fidelity cyber-physical system experimentation lab to create a power hardware-in-the-loop setup. The report also details the creation of an automated model building platform that can enable high-fidelity real-time models to be built without much effort allowing existing low-fidelity models to be analyzed in higher fidelity. Lastly, the report also discusses efforts center around scaling to large complex power system models to make the experimentation more effective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Modeling Communication Infrastructures of Cyber Physical Systems

This effort explores modeling cyber infrastructure, including communication devices like switches, routers, sensors, and controllers, and physical media attributes like propagation of radio signals, in coordination with power distribution system model layouts. To do this, the project studies real-world configurations to define axioms of how different communication media is deployed with control equipment. These axioms will be used to develop tools to generate realistic cyber infrastructure models from starting power system models. This effort leverages and builds on the co-simulation platform developed by the other RD2C projects. The axioms and tools will be validated and demonstrated with the NS3 simulation tool as part of a co-simulation to show the behavior/impacts of cyber infrastructure on control operations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Compendium of Cyber Incident Notification Requirements for Critical Infrastructure Utilities by State

Cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the United States are on the rise and pose serious risks to the economy and health and safety of its citizens. Experts suggest a sound cyber risk mitigation strategy includes constant monitoring for signs of cyber intrusions and rapid reporting of incidents so that other critical infrastructure operators may benefit from early warnings. Reporting incidents to Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) and other state agencies who have roles in energy emergency planning and incident response and recovery is essential for them to maintain situational awareness and provide necessary support to ensure rapid restoration of utility services, should disruptions occur.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

SCEPTRE: A Cyber-Physical Emulation Capability

Cyber-physical systems form a critical but vulnerable backbone to US critical infrastructure. Recent high-profile cyber-attacks have shown the need for increased assessment and hardening of these systems. However, such assessments and investigations into advanced technologies to harden these systems is difficult due to their operational nature. Instead, modeling of these systems is heavily leveraged. Investigation into these complex systems and their potential cascading failures requires comprehensive modeling of both the cyber and physical components of the system. This paper introduces SCEPTRE, an emulation capability to address this need.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trust-Based Detection and Mitigation of Cyber Attacks in Distributed Cooperative Control of Islanded AC Microgrids

In this study, we address the challenge of detecting and mitigating cyber attacks in the distributed cooperative control of islanded AC microgrids, with a particular focus on detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), a significant threat to the Smart Grid (SG). The SG integrates traditional power systems with communication networks, creating a complex system with numerous vulnerable links, making it a prime target for cyber attacks. These attacks can lead to the disclosure of private data, control network failures, and even blackouts. Unlike machine learning-based approaches that require extensive datasets and mathematical models dependent on accurate system modeling, our method is free from such dependencies. To enhance the microgrid’s resilience against these threats, we propose a resilient control algorithm by introducing a novel trustworthiness parameter into the traditional cooperative control algorithm. Our method evaluates the trustworthiness of distributed energy resources (DERs) based on their voltage measurements and exchanged information, using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to dynamically adjust control actions. We validated our approach through simulations on both the IEEE-34 bus feeder system with eight DERs and a larger microgrid with twenty-two DERs. The results demonstrated a detection accuracy of around 100%, with millisecond range mitigation time, ensuring rapid system recovery. Additionally, our method improved system stability by up to almost 100% under attack scenarios, showcasing its effectiveness in promptly detecting attacks and maintaining system resilience. These findings highlight the potential of our approach to enhance the security and stability of microgrid systems in the face of cyber threats.

Computer Science↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure State Estimation with Asynchronous Measurements for Coordinated Cyber Attack Detection in Active Distribution Systems

Coordinated cyber attacks tamper with measurement data to disrupt the situational awareness of active distribution systems. Various sensors report measurements asynchronously at different rates, which introduces challenges during state estimation. In addition, this forces cyber intruders to exert greater effort to compromise multiple communication channels and launch coordinated attacks. Therefore, multi-channel and asynchronous measurements could be harnessed to develop more secure cyber defense strategies. In this paper, a prediction-correction-based multi-rate observer is designed to exploit the value of asynchronous measurements for the detection of coordinated false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, a time-function-dependent prediction-correction strategy is proposed to adjust the sampling interval for each sensor’s measurement. Then, an observer is designed based on the trade-off between estimation error and the optimal period of the most recent sampling instant, with the convergence of estimation error with the maximum permitted sampling interval. Moreover, the conditions for exponential stability are developed using the Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional technique. Next, a coordinated FDI attack detection strategy is developed based on the dual nonlinear minimization problem. The proposed attack detection and secure state estimation strategies are tested on the IEEE 13-node system. Simulation results show that these schemes are effective in enhancing attack detection based on asynchronous measurements or compromised data.

asynchronous measurements↗