Eliminating Grid-Initiated Wildfires and Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Fire
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
This presentation provides an overview of the CESER Battery Energy Storage Systems supply chain considerations report and related research. It highlights this challenge for the National Association of Regulatory Energy Commissioners and discusses policy and technical solutions for addressing near term risks.
This paper is a collaboration between SNL and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) - sponsored by NA211, Office of International Nuclear Security. The paper was accepted for publication by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024).
Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime sidechannel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. We propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzAR in terms of execution time overhead (up to −46%), code size overhead (up to −10%), and correctness (no failures) on five different embedded/edge devices.
No abstract prepared.
No abstract prepared.
Critical infrastructure (CI) collectively refers to those assets, systems, and networks that, if incapacitated, would have a substantial negative impact on national or regional security, economic operations, or public health and safety. Combined heat and power (CHP) offers the opportunity to improve CI resiliency, mitigating the impacts of an emergency by keeping critical facilities running without any interruption in electric or thermal service. If the electricity grid is impaired, a specially configured CHP system can continue to operate, ensuring an uninterrupted supply of power and heating or cooling to the host facility.
Quantum Technologies for Critical Infrastructure Security Summit, January 14-15, 2021
A key component in protecting a nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources is the security of control systems. The term industrial control system refers to supervisory control and data acquisition, process control, distributed control, and any other systems that control, monitor, and manage the nation’s critical infrastructure. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) consists of electric power generators, transmission systems, transportation systems, dam and water systems, communication systems, chemical and petroleum systems, and other critical systems that cannot tolerate sudden interruptions in service. Simply stated, a control system gathers information and then performs a function based on its established parameters and the information it receives. The patch management of industrial control systems software used in CIKR is inconsistent at best and nonexistent at worst. Patches are important to resolve security vulnerabilities and functional issues. This report recommends patch management practices for consideration and deployment by industrial control systems owners.
Establish operational critical infrastructure research environment with focus on control systems security Continue enhancement of critical infrastructure cyber-physical interdependency analysis and knowledge management capabilities
Critical Infrastructure systems(CIs) such as energy, water, transportation and communication are highly interconnected and mutually dependent in complex ways. Robust modeling of CIs interconnections is crucial to identify vulnerabilities in the CIs. We present here a national-scale Infrastructure Vulnerability Analysis System (IVAS) vision leveraging Se- mantic Big Data (SBD) tools, Big Data, and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) tools. We survey existing ap- proaches on vulnerability analysis of critical infrastructures and discuss relevant systems and tools aligned with our vi- sion. Next, we present a generic system architecture and discuss challenges including: (1) Constructing and manag- ing a CI network-of-networks graph, (2) Performing analytic operations at scale, and (3) Interactive visualization of ana- lytic output to generate meaningful insights. We argue that this architecture acts as a baseline to realize a national-scale network based vulnerability analysis system.
Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.
Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.
The importance of Internet and communication networks in our daily life and in any organization’s daily operations is well known and cannot be overstressed. A nation’s economy is fully reliant on its critical infrastructure. Energy sector is one of the 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors identified by the Department of Homeland Security. Securing these critical infrastructure sectors is challenging but is also of utmost priority in this day of constant and persistent cyber threats. Threat is any circumstance or event that has the potential to adversely impact an agency's assets and operations. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is the process of collection, analysis, and identification of potential cyber threats to the organization. This goal of current research performed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Aiken, SC, is to develop a Cyber Threat Intelligence framework for gathering Threat Intelligence passively from the network traffic from and to a real or simulated Critical Control Systems.
The Nation’s electrical power depends on one bulk power grid to support security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Threat Assessment of 2020, the largest cyber threat to homeland security is potential disruption to critical infrastructure, including power grids. Critical infrastructure includes the physical and cyber systems which generate, transmit, and distribute electricity with an impact on economic security, public health, or safety. The surety of the Nation’s power grid is vital for providing essential services and would put the population at risk if disrupted. Power outages can have catastrophic consequences for critical organizations such as hospitals and military installations. Additionally, the current fossil-fuel dependent power grid is extremely fragile and vulnerable to overloads, storms that destroy power lines, and cyber-attacks.
There is strong agreement among policymakers, practitioners, and academic researchers that the concept of resilience must play a major role in assessing the extent to which various entities - critical infrastructure owners and operators, communities, regions, and the Nation - are prepared to respond to and recover from the full range of threats they face. Despite this agreement, consensus regarding important issues, such as how resilience should be defined, assessed, and measured, is lacking. The analysis presented here is part of a broader research effort to develop and implement assessments of resilience at the asset/facility and community/regional levels. The literature contains various definitions of resilience. Some studies have defined resilience as the ability of an entity to recover, or 'bounce back,' from the adverse effects of a natural or manmade threat. Such a definition assumes that actions taken prior to the occurrence of an adverse event - actions typically associated with resistance and anticipation - are not properly included as determinants of resilience. Other analyses, in contrast, include one or more of these actions in their definitions. To accommodate these different definitions, we recognize a subset of resistance- and anticipation-related actions that are taken based on the assumption that an adverse event is going to occur. Such actions are in the domain of resilience because they reduce both the immediate and longer-term adverse consequences that result from an adverse event. Recognizing resistance- and anticipation-related actions that take the adverse event as a given accommodates the set of resilience-related actions in a clear-cut manner. With these considerations in mind, resilience can be defined as: 'the ability of an entity - e.g., asset, organization, community, region - to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from a disturbance.' Because critical infrastructure resilience is important both in its own right and because of its implications for community/regional resilience, it is especially important to develop a sound methodology for assessing resilience at the asset/facility level. This objective will be accomplished by collecting data on four broadly defined groups of resilience-enhancing measures: preparedness, mitigation measures, response capabilities, and recovery mechanisms. Table ES-1 illustrates how the six components that define resilience are connected to the actions that enhance the capacity of an entity to be resilient. The relationships illustrated in Table ES-1 provide the framework for developing a survey instrument that will be used to elicit the information required to assess resilience at the asset/facility level. The resilience of a community/region is a function of the resilience of its subsystems, including its critical infrastructures, economy, civil society, governance (including emergency services), and supply chains/dependencies. The number and complexity of these subsystems will make the measurement of resilience more challenging as we move from individual assets/facilities to the community/regional level (where critical infrastructure resilience is only one component). Specific challenges include uncertainty about relationships (e.g., the composition of specific supply chains), data gaps, and time and budget constraints that prevent collection of all of the information needed to construct a comprehensive assessment of the resilience of a specific community or region. These challenges can be addressed, at least partially, by adopting a 'systems approach' to the assessment of resilience. In a systems approach, the extent to which the analysis addresses the resilience of the individual subsystems can vary. Specifically, high-level systems analysis can be used to identify the most important lower-level systems. In turn, within the most important lower-level systems, site assessment data should be collected only on the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known. Implementation of the strategies outlined here to assess resilience will facilitate the following four objectives: (1) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the asset/facility level, (2) Develop a methodology and supporting products to assess resilience at the critical infrastructure sector level, (3) Provide resilience-related information to critical infrastructure owners/operators to facilitate risk-based resource decision making, and (4) Provide resilience-related information to State and local mission partners to support their risk-based resource decision making.
The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. INL is the lead laboratory for the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). The INL mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure with a vision to change the world’s energy future and secure our critical infrastructure. Operating since 1949, INL is the nation’s leading research, development, and demonstration center for nuclear energy, including nuclear nonproliferation and physical and cyber-based protection of energy systems and critical infrastructure, as well as integrated energy systems research, development, demonstration, and deployment. INL has been managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (a wholly owned company of Battelle) for DOE since 2005. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, is a partnership between Battelle, BWX Technologies, Inc., AECOM, the Electric Power Research Institute, the National University Consortium (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, North Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and Oregon State University), and the Idaho university collaborators (i.e., University of Idaho, Idaho State University, and Boise State University). Since its creation, INL’s research and development (R&D) portfolio has broadened with targeted programs supporting national missions to advance nuclear energy, enable clean energy deployment, and secure and modernize critical infrastructure. INL’s research, development, and demonstration capabilities, its resources, and its unique geography enable integration of scientific discovery, innovation, engineering, operations, and controls into complex large-scale testbeds for discovery, innovation, and demonstration of transformational clean energy and security concepts. These attributes strengthen INL’s leadership as a demonstration laboratory. As a national resource, INL also applies its capabilities and skills to the specific needs of other federal agencies and customers through DOE’s Strategic Partnership Program.
From 2007 until 2011, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) engaged in a partnership with the National Energy Technology Lab (NETL) to improve State-Federal coordination on electricity policy and energy assurance issues. This project allowed State Public Utility Commissioners and their staffs to engage on the most cutting-edge level in the arenas of energy assurance and electricity policy. Four tasks were outlined in the Statement of Performance Objectives: Task 1 - Training for Commissions on Critical Infrastructure Topics; Task 2 - Analyze and Implement Recommendations on Energy Assurance Issues; Task 3 - Ongoing liaison activities & outreach to build stronger networks between federal agencies and state regulators; and Task 4 - Additional Activities. Although four tasks were prescribed, in practice these tasks were carried out under two major activity areas: the critical infrastructure and energy assurance partnership with the US Department of Energy's Infrastructure Security and Emergency Response office, and the National Council on Electricity Policy, a collaborative which since 1994 has brought together State and Federal policymakers to address the most pressing issues facing the grid from restructuring to smart grid implementation. On Critical Infrastructure protection, this cooperative agreement helped State officials yield several important advances. The lead role on NARUC's side was played by our Committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Key lessons learned in this arena include the following: (1) Tabletops and exercises work - They improve the capacity of policymakers and their industry counterparts to face the most challenging energy emergencies, and thereby equip these actors with the capacity to face everything up to that point as well. (2) Information sharing is critical - Connecting people who need information with people who have information is a key success factor. However, exposure of critical infrastructure information to bad actors also creates new vulnerabilities. (3) Tensions exist between the transparency-driven basis of regulatory activity and the information-protection requirements of asset protection. (4) Coordination between states is a key success factor - Because comparatively little federal authority exists over electricity and other energy infrastructure, the interstate nature of these energy grids defy centralized command and control governance. Patchwork responses are a risk when addressed at a state-by-state level. Coordination is the key to ensuring consistent response to shared threats. In Electricity Policy, the National Council on Electricity Policy continued to make important strides forward. Coordinated electricity policy among States remains the best surrogate for an absent national electricity policy. In every area from energy efficiency to clean coal, State policies are driving the country's electricity policy, and regional responses to climate change, infrastructure planning, market operation, and new technology deployment depend on a forum for bringing the States together.