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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Magnetic Field Dependence of the Critical Current in S-N Bilayer Thin Films

Here we investigate the effects a non-uniform applied magnetic field has on superconducting transition-edge sensors (TESs) critical current. This has implications on TES optimization. It has been shown that TESs resistive transition can be altered by magnetic fields. We have observed critical current rectification effects and explained these effects in terms of a magnetic self-field arising from asymmetric current injection into the sensor. Our TES physical model shows that this magnetic self-field can result in significantly degraded or improved TES performance. In order for this magnetically tuned TES strategy to reach its full potential we are investigating the effect a non-uniform applied magnetic field has on the critical current.

Field Dependence↗
NASA NTRS2014

Some Challenges in the Design of Human-Automation Interaction for Safety-Critical Systems

Increasing amounts of automation are being introduced to safety-critical domains. While the introduction of automation has led to an overall increase in reliability and improved safety, it has also introduced a class of failure modes, and new challenges in risk assessment for the new systems, particularly in the assessment of rare events resulting from complex inter-related factors. Designing successful human-automation systems is challenging, and the challenges go beyond good interface development (e.g., Roth, Malin, & Schreckenghost 1997; Christoffersen & Woods, 2002). Human-automation design is particularly challenging when the underlying automation technology generates behavior that is difficult for the user to anticipate or understand. These challenges have been recognized in several safety-critical domains, and have resulted in increased efforts to develop training, procedures, regulations and guidance material (CAST, 2008, IAEA, 2001, FAA, 2013, ICAO, 2012). This paper points to the continuing need for new methods to describe and characterize the operational environment within which new automation concepts are being presented. We will describe challenges to the successful development and evaluation of human-automation systems in safety-critical domains, and describe some approaches that could be used to address these challenges. We will draw from experience with the aviation, spaceflight and nuclear power domains.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2014

Is Model-Based Development a Favorable Approach for Complex and Safety-Critical Computer Systems on Commercial Aircraft?

A system is safety-critical if its failure can endanger human life or cause significant damage to property or the environment. State-of-the-art computer systems on commercial aircraft are highly complex, software-intensive, functionally integrated, and network-centric systems of systems. Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing safety regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality. A significant degree of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems is required to ensure adequate coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety. Model-based development methodologies, methods, tools, and techniques facilitate collaboration and enable the use of common design artifacts among groups dealing with different aspects of the development of a system. This paper examines the application of model-based development to complex and safety-critical aircraft computer systems. Benefits and detriments are identified and an overall assessment of the approach is given.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2013

A Matter of Millimeters: Defining the Processes for Critical Clearances on Curiosity

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission presents an immense packaging problem in that it takes a rover the size of a car with a sky crane landing system and packs it tightly into a spacecraft. This creates many areas of close and critical clearances. Critical Clearances are defined as hardware-to-hardware or hardware-to-envelope clearances which fall below a pre-established location dependent threshold and pose a risk of hardware to hardware contact during events such as launch, entry, landing, and operations. Close Clearances, on the other hand, are defined as any clearance value that is chosen to be tracked but is larger than the critical clearance threshold for its region. Close clearances may be tracked for various reasons including uncertainty in design, large expected dynamic motion, etc.

Florow, Brandon↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Year of Progress: NASA's Space Launch System Approaches Critical Design Review

NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) made significant progress on the manufacturing floor and on the test stand in 2014 and positioned itself for a successful Critical Design Review in mid-2015. SLS, the world's only exploration-class heavy lift rocket, has the capability to dramatically increase the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique high-value national payloads. Development now is focused on configuration with 70 metric tons (t) of payload to low Earth orbit (LEO), more than double the payload of the retired Space Shuttle program or current operational vehicles. This "Block 1" design will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the Moon and back and the first crewed flight around the Moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has successfully completed its Critical Design Review and now has hardware in production or testing. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. The SLS Program is currently working toward vehicle Critical Design Review in mid-2015. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Askins, Bruce↗
NASA NTRS2015

Software Innovation in a Mission Critical Environment

Operating in mission-critical environments requires trusted solutions, and the preference for "tried and true" approaches presents a potential barrier to infusing innovation into mission-critical systems. This presentation explores opportunities to overcome this barrier in the software domain. It outlines specific areas of innovation in software development achieved by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Engineering Directorate in support of NASA's major human spaceflight programs, including International Space Station, Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), and Commercial Crew Programs. Software engineering teams at JSC work with hardware developers, mission planners, and system operators to integrate flight vehicles, habitats, robotics, and other spacecraft elements for genuinely mission critical applications. The innovations described, including the use of NASA Core Flight Software and its associated software tool chain, can lead to software that is more affordable, more reliable, better modelled, more flexible, more easily maintained, better tested, and enabling of automation.

Fredrickson, Steven↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2015

Planning the Unplanned Experiment: Towards Assessing the Efficacy of Standards for Safety-Critical Software

Safe use of software in safety-critical applications requires well-founded means of determining whether software is fit for such use. While software in industries such as aviation has a good safety record, little is known about whether standards for software in safety-critical applications 'work' (or even what that means). It is often (implicitly) argued that software is fit for safety-critical use because it conforms to an appropriate standard. Without knowing whether a standard works, such reliance is an experiment; without carefully collecting assessment data, that experiment is unplanned. To help plan the experiment, we organized a workshop to develop practical ideas for assessing software safety standards. In this paper, we relate and elaborate on the workshop discussion, which revealed subtle but important study design considerations and practical barriers to collecting appropriate historical data and recruiting appropriate experimental subjects. We discuss assessing standards as written and as applied, several candidate definitions for what it means for a standard to 'work,' and key assessment strategies and study techniques and the pros and cons of each. Finally, we conclude with thoughts about the kinds of research that will be required and how academia, industry, and regulators might collaborate to overcome the noted barriers.

Graydon, Patrick J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Design, Fabrication, and Critical Current Testing of No-Insulation Superconducting Rotor Coils for NASA's 1.4 MW High-Efficiency Megawatt Motor

NASA Glenn Research Center is developing a 1.4 MW high-efficiency electric machine for future electrified aircraft to reduce energy consumption, emissions, and noise. This wound-field, synchronous machine employs a self-cooled, superconducting rotor to achieve excellent specific power and efficiency. This paper discusses the design and fabrication of the no-insulation high temperature superconducting (HTS) rotor coils and compares them to conventionally insulated HTS coils. Two sub-scale test coils with epoxy on only one axial face were fabricated. Critical current testing of the coils at 77 K and self field was conducted to study the influence of thermal cycling on their critical current and n-value. After two or four aggressive thermal cycles between 77 K and about 278 K (5 degree C), the critical current and n-value were nearly unchanged, indicating very little to no degradation.

electric aircraft propulsion↗
NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tracking Critical Thermal Metrics throughout the Life Cycle of a Large Observatory Thermal Model

Observatory thermal models for large, complex missions, such as the Wide Field InfraRed Survey Telescope (WFIRST) mission, produce an immense amount of data to be processed. Configuration management of the model throughout the project life cycle has mainly focused on which versions of the subsystem models form the current observatory level configuration. However, the results produced by the model are not nearly as well tracked and traceable. Given the various states of design maturity for each of the components in the WFIRST design, an updated component model is nearly ready to be integrated at the next higher level of assembly about every month or two. With each subsystem model delivery, the observatory model needs to remove the old component, integrate the new one, execute the model, and inspect the results. Usually, this inspection focuses primarily on the newly integrated component. Recently, a Metric Tracking Spreadsheet was developed to help provide a “big picture” view of the entire observatory highlighting key parameters critical to mission performance. This spreadsheet helps track impacts on subsystems by updates of other subsystems that were not intuitively obvious. Metrics tracked include: absorbed environmental loading (to determine effectiveness of sunshield), temperatures of critical avionics, electrical dissipations, heater power predictions, stability of critical optics, parasitic heat leaks in cryogenic region, high level heat flows between elements, and model run time. Producing this data for the same operational configuration with each model update has helped produce a trail of data to evaluate the impact of model updates. While the metrics selected are specific for WFIRST, other large, complex observatories could be well served to establish their own metrics early in the project life cycle to track to quickly assess the impact of any subsystem on other subsystems or the overall system itself.

Thermal Desktop↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adaptive Stress Testing: Using Reinforcement Learning to Find Failures in Safety-Critical Systems

Emerging applications in artificial intelligence, such as driverless cars and autonomous aircraft promise to be more efficient, cheaper to operate, and always available. However, ensuring the safety of these systems remains a major challenge to their certification and adoption. These autonomous systems are expected to routinely make safety-critical decisions where failures can have serious consequences including loss of life and property. Testing and validation techniques aim to identify and diagnose potential failures before the system is deployed. However, finding failure scenarios in autonomous systems can be very challenging due to high-dimensional and continuous state spaces, interaction with large environments over many time steps, and the rarity of failures. This talk presents Adaptive Stress Testing (AST), a simulation-based testing framework for finding the most likely path to a failure event of a safety-critical system. The key idea of AST is that stress testing can be formulated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which enables reinforcement learning techniques to be used for finding failure events. Reinforcement learning algorithms can efficiently explore the search space and have been shown to scale to very large systems. We present applications of AST to find failures in various safety-critical systems including the aircraft collision avoidance systems, autonomous cars, and small unmanned aerial vehicles.

autonomous vehicles↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Critical Ablative TPS Capabilities Sustainment - An Approach to Playing the Long Game

Historically, we have been pound foolish and penny wise for decades, and it is time to reverse this. We present an approach that will maintain critical NASA ablative TPS capabilities through small, sustained, smart and targeted investment. NASA’s ablative TPS history is one of developing new capabilities and letting them atrophy. When needed, there are two options: (1) revive the capability at considerable cost impact or (2) develop an alternate capability with considerable schedule impact. Either of these options have had considerable mission impact. The third alternate is to maintain proven capabilities in a cost effective manner to allow the science community to propose missions with confidence. NASA and DoD have had a working group to periodically assess and make recommendations on at-risk items. This working group typically focuses on raw materials availability. While we agree that at-risk raw materials are an important and necessary part of the overall capability, focus solely on them is not sufficient. Instead, we advocate for a broader focus on the critical “technology capability” that includes not only raw material but also industrial manufacturing and processing capabilities and in-house expertise in design, testing and flight hardware certification. In this proposed presentation, we will highlight a case study related to PICA capability. We will present the rationale for sustaining PICA and HEEET as two minimum essential ablative TPS capabilities for future NASA missions. We will present an approach for how small investment could lead to maintaining mission critical capabilities over a longer period. While HEEET and PICA are NASA unique, the raw material and some of the vendor capabilities involved also support DoD TPS. Hence a partnership between NASA and DoD is recommended for broader benefit.

Ethiraj Venkatapathy↗
NASA NTRS2020

Detecting Juno’s ‘Heartbeat’: Communications Support during Critical Events of the Juno Mission

The first section of this paper summarizes the radio systems of the spacecraft, the antennas of the DSN, and signal processing performed in real-time on the ground to support the critical activities. The second section goes into detail on each of the critical events with details of the radio science support and results of each event. Finally, the paper is concluded with a discussion of future planned supports and capabilities of radio science support during critical events.

Jongeling, Andre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Critical Ablative TPS Capabilities Sustainment for Future NASA Missions

We plan to present an approach for NASA to maintain critical ablative TPS capabilities through small, sus-tained, smart and targeted investment. Historically, we have been pound foolish and penny wise for decades and paid very little attention to sustainability of abla-tive TPS and as a result, spent couple of decades in learning what we lost and inventing newer technology solutions. NASA’s ablative TPS history has been one of in-vesting in new and unique capabilities in anticipation of needs, and once flight proven, letting the capability atrophy due to lack of subsequent near-term mission needs [1]. When the need arises, NASA has resorted to two options: (1) revive the capability at considerable cost impact, or (2) develop an alternate capability with considerable schedule impact. Both these options have had considerable mission impact. The third alternate is to maintain proven capabilities in a cost effective manner. A risk informed decision process in terms of maintaining ablative TPS capabilities is feasible with planning and sustained support. Assured TPS availa-bility will allow the science community to propose competed missions with confidence and at a lower risk for selection. We submitted a white paper to the cur-rent Decadal Survey [2] on the need for and im-portance of sustainability. Since then, we have been formulating an executable cost effective strategy. The intent of this presentation is to outline the develop-ments since the submission of the white paper. NASA and DoD have had a working group related to critical technologies to periodically assess and make recommendations on at-risk items from a national need perspective. This inter-agency working group typically focuses on raw materials availability. While we agree that at-risk raw materials are important, fo-cus solely on them is not sufficient. Instead, we advo-cate for a broader focus that includes not only raw material but also industrial manufacturing and processing, and NASA expertise in design, testing and flight hardware certification. In this proposed presentation, we will give a brief overview of NASA’s ablative TPS history along with recent examples of atrophy to highlight case studies related to the PICA and Carbon-Phenolic TPS. We will present the rationale for sustaining PICA, HEEET and 3MDCP for future NASA missions. We will present an approach for how targeted small investments could lead to maintaining mission critical capabilities over long periods.

E Venkatapathy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing Approaches for Certification of Uninspectable Fracture Critical AM Components

Introduction - Human-rated spaceflight hardware is subject to the Fracture Control requirements in NASA-STD5019, which are intended to control the risk of component failure due to undetected cracks or defects. - All hardware in this mission class is classified for Fracture Control – Exempt, Non-fracture Critical, or Fracture Critical - Fracture Critical: A classification that identifies a part where failure due to the presence of a crack is a catastrophic hazard ➔ Pressure vessels, engine components, primary structure, etc. - Axiom 1: Material and manufacturing process produce structures and components with cracks or defects. - Axiom 2: The presence of a crack or defect of sufficient size reduces the strength and life of the structure. - Damage Tolerance: demonstration that a component can survive the service life (with a safety factor) in the presence of an undetected flaw or damage. - Components are manufactured from aerospace quality materials using controlled processes. - Components are inspected for damage (cracks, flaws, defects, etc.). - Components are shown by test or analysis to be tolerant to undetected flaws.

Will Tilson↗
NASA NTRS2024

ECI Final Report: Closing of Critical Technology Gaps for Rotating Detonation Rocket Engines

NASA has successfully fired several configurations of a dual regenerative 10K lbf class Rotating Detonation Rocket Engines using cryogenic liquid methane, liquid hydrogen, and RP-1 as fuel and liquid or gaseous oxygen as the oxidizer. In addition, 3 hot fire test phases were conducted to evaluate parametrically varying combustor geometries using a subscale 500-1K lbf class thruster RDRE. Several studies were successfully completed to evaluate the impacts of contraction ratio, annulus L’, heat transfer through calorimetry, and varying injector designs. Laser powder bed fusion GRCop-42, GRX-810, and C-103 alloys were used for the outer bodies, inner bodies, nozzles, and injector variations. The development of RDRE technology is only now possible with additive manufacturing techniques and these specialized alloys. Critical design parameters, design rules of thumb, and operability limitations have been identified. Major lessons learned in the development of critical components have also been documented. All critical technology gaps have been demonstrated at one scale or another and closed. A major finding of this work is that the combustion efficiency of the RDRE is far superior to that of the traditional liquid rocket engine requiring an order of magnitude lower chamber volume and residence time to react. Because of this, the design trade space opens up significantly. More compact chamber geometries are now possible with potential mass savings and significant length savings possible to flight geometries. In addition, the ceiling for the technology, in terms of Isp, has not yet been reached. It is likely that an additional ~10% better Isp over equivalent state-of-the-art combustion devices may be achieved over the next decade should the technology continue to be developed. This technology has been shown to be viable for near term infusion (2-5 years) into space missions and enable cost effective space access for US industry. This final report documents all major findings from this early career initiative (ECI) project and lays out what is needed post ECI.

Thomas Teasley↗