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At least 199 records · Page 11

Initial Results of the MISSE-Flight Facility Polymers and Composites Experiment 1-4 (PCE 1-4)

Spacecraft in low Earth orbit (LEO) are subjected to harsh environmental conditions, including radiation (cosmic rays, ultraviolet (UV), x-ray and charged particle radiation), micrometeoroids and orbital debris, temperature extremes, thermal cycling, and atomic oxygen (AO). These environmental exposures can result in erosion, embrittlement and optical property degradation of susceptible materials threatening spacecraft performance and durability. To increase our understanding of effects such as AO erosion and radiation induced embrittlement of spacecraft materials, NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a series of experiments that are flown as part of the Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) missions on the exterior of the International Space Station (ISS). These experiments have provided critical space environmental durability data such as AO erosion data of polymers and composites, and radiation induced mechanical property degradation of spacecraft insulation materials, after long term space exposure. In continuing these studies, four Glenn experiments with 365 flight samples have been flown on ISS’s external MISSE-Flight Facility (MISSE-FF). These experiments are the Polymers and Composites Experiment-1 (PCE-1) flown as part of the inaugural MISSE-9 mission, the PCE-2 flown as part of the MISSE-10 mission, the PCE-3 flown as part of the MISSE-12 and MISSE-15 missions, and the PCE-4 flown as part of the MISSE-13 mission. The primary objective of the PCE 1-4 experiments is to determine the AO and radiation durability of spacecraft polymers and composites. In addition, each experiment has a wide variety of spacecraft materials and hence they each have numerous additional sample objectives. Each of the PCE 1-4 is designed to examine the consequences of AO interactions including AO erosion yield (Ey) and optical and thermal property characterization. Several polymers were flown in both ram and zenith flight orientations to determine the effect of varying solar to AO ratios on Ey. Common spacecraft materials including Teflon FEP, white Tedlar and Upilex-S were included on multiple MISSE missions so erosion dependence on environment exposure can be determined. The PCE-1 includes epoxy composite samples with varying ZnO levels to determine the effect of inorganic filler level on AO durability. And, a variety of samples were flown to characterize AO scattering and AO undercutting processes. All four PCE experiments include samples to provide better insight into radiation durability of polymers and composites. The MISSE-9 PCE-1 includes Teflon FEP tensile samples flown in the wake and zenith direction so variations in radiation exposure from the different flight directions can provide insight into radiation induced embrittlement of Teflon FEP. Teflon FEP tensile samples were also flown in the wake direction as part of the MISSE-13 PCE-4. In addition, shape memory alloys, shape memory composites, melanin based composites, stressed and unstressed gossamer sun shield materials, coated and uncoated docking seal samples, and new solar cell cover slides were flown for space radiation durability and/or shielding assessment. This paper provides an overview of Glenn’s PCE 1-4 MISSE-FF experiments and provides initial post-flight observations and results.

atomic oxygen↗

Towards improved characterization of high-risk releases using heterogeneous indoor sensor systems

The sudden release of toxic contaminants that reach indoor spaces can be hazardous to building occupants. For an acutely toxic contaminant, the speed of the emergency response strongly influences the consequences to occupants. The design of a real time sensor system is made challenging both by the urgency and complex nature of the event, and by the imperfect sensors and models available to describe it. In this research, we use Bayesian modeling to combine information from multiple types of sensors to improve the characterization of a release. We discuss conceptual and algorithmic considerations for selecting and fusing information from disparate sensors. To explore system performance, we use both real tracer gas data from experiments in a three story building, along with synthetic data, including information from door position sensors. The added information from door position sensors is found to be useful for many scenarios, but not always. We discuss the physical conditions and design factors that affect these results, such as the influence of the door positions on contaminant transport. We highlight potential benefits of multisensor data fusion, challenges in realizing those benefits, and opportunities for further improvement.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island a Practical Lesson in the Fundamental Importance of Effective Communications

The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident in March 1979 had a profound effect on the course of commercial nuclear generation in the United States and around the world. And while the central elements of the accident were matters of nuclear engineering, design and operations, its consequences were compounded, and in some respects superseded, by extraordinarily ineffective communications by all parties at all levels. Communications failures during the accident and its aftermath caused misunderstanding, distrust, and incorrect emergency response - and seeded or reinforced public opposition to nuclear power that persists to this day. There are communications lessons from TMI that have not yet been fully learned, and some that once were learned but are now gradually being forgotten. The more glaring TMI communications problems were in the arena of external interactions and communications among the plant owner, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the media, and the public. Confusing, fragmented, and contradictory public statements early in the accident, regardless of cause, undermined all possibility for reasonable discourse thereafter. And because the TMI accident was playing out on a world stage, the breakdown in public trust had long term and widespread implications. At the plant site, both TMI-2 cleanup and restart of the undamaged TMI-1 unit met with years of public and political criticism, and attendant regulatory pressure. Across the nation, public trust in nuclear power and those who operate it plummeted, unquestionably contributing to the 25+ year hiatus in new plant orders. There were other, less visible but equally important, consequences of ineffective communications at TMI. The unplanned 'precautionary' evacuation urged by the governor two days after the accident - a life changing, traumatic event for thousands of residents - was prompted primarily by misunderstandings and miscommunications regarding the condition of the plant. And today, nearly 30 years after the event, many in our nuclear industry have insufficient knowledge or regard for the underlying nuclear safety vulnerabilities revealed by the accident, in part because these have not been well explained. From this single, compelling experience, many lessons can be drawn. Some of these were recognized early and taken to heart by those who own and operate nuclear plants - but over time, respect for their importance has given way somewhat to the seemingly more urgent practicalities of plant cost, schedule and production goals. In other cases, the lessons have remained largely obscure. This paper will describe in greater detail the communications aspects of the TMI accident, lessons that can be drawn from them, and their implications on current and future nuclear facility operation. The paper reflects the author's personal, direct experience as part of the accident response team and subsequent cleanup operations at TMI. In summary: The Three Mile Accident was the most severe nuclear accident in U.S. history. It also is perhaps the most studied industrial accident of any kind in U.S. history. Exhaustive examinations of the public health consequences of the accident show convincingly that the effects of radioactivity releases, if any, were imperceptibly low. It is generally agreed, however, that there have been perceptible health consequences from the TMI-2 accident - those linked to stress. Stress to members of the public, particularly those living near the plant, was unquestionably high. And for some the combination of rumor, confusion, contradictory reports and uncertainty, all leading to an evacuation recommendation from the governor, took a toll. It could be argued that the ineffective internal and external communications during the course of the event were as influential to the outcome as the equipment and operational breakdowns that are now so well understood. And for that reason alone, this accident points out that communications capabilities - staffing, systems, facilities, training - can be as important to protection of the public, the plant and the environment as are the plant material and technical issues that receive constant attention. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Summary on the depressurization from supercritical pressure conditions

When a fluid discharges from a high pressure and temperature system, a 'choking' or critical condition occurs, and the flow rate becomes independent of the downstream pressure. During a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) of a water reactor the break flow will be subject to this condition. An accurate estimation of the critical flow rate is important for the evaluation of the reactor safety, because this flow rate controls the loss of coolant inventory and energy from the system, and thus has a significant effect on the accident consequences[1]. In the design of safety systems for a super critical water reactor (SCWR), postulated LOCA transients are particularly important due to the lower coolant inventory compared to a typical PWR for the same power output. This lower coolant inventory would result in a faster transient response of the SCWR, and hence accurate prediction of the critical discharge is mandatory. Under potential two-phase conditions critical flow is dominated by the vapor content or quality of the vapor, which is closely related with the onset of vaporization and the interfacial interaction between phases [2]. This presents a major challenge for the estimation of the flow rate due to the lack of the knowledge of those processes, especially under the conditions of interest for the SCWR. According to the limited data of supercritical fluids, the critical flows at conditions above the pseudo-critical point seem to be fairly stable and consistent with the subcritical homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) model predictions, while having a lower flow rate than those in the two-phase region. Thus the major difficulty in the prediction of the depressurization flow rates remains in the region where two phases co-exist at the top of the vapor dome. In this region, the flow rate is strongly affected by the nozzle geometry and tends to be unstable. Various models for this region have been developed with different assumptions, e.g. the HEM and Moody model [3], and the Henry-Fauske non-equilibrium model [4], and are currently used in subcritical pressure reactor safety design[5]. It appears that some of these models could be reasonably extended to above the thermodynamic pseudo-critical point. The more stable and lower discharge flow rates observed in conditions above the pseudo-critical point suggests that even though SCWR's have a smaller coolant inventory, the safety implications of a LOCA and the subsequent depressurization may not be as severe as expected, this however needs to be confirmed by a rigorous evaluation of the particular event and further evaluation of the critical flow rate. This paper will summarize activities on critical flow models, experimental data and numerical modeling during blowdown from supercritical pressure conditions under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on 'Heat Transfer Behaviour and Thermo-hydraulics Code testing for SCWRs'. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Explicit Dynamic Impact Analysis of the Building 3525 Packages

The safe transport and handling of radioactive material containers is critical to ensure the protection of personnel, facilities, and the environment. Accidental drops during handling pose a significant hazard, necessitating robust design and analysis to mitigate potential consequences. This study presents an explicit dynamic impact analysis of two container designs, the Baby Sugarman and the Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) Tall Boy, used in Building 3525 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The analysis employed nonlinear finite element modeling in LS-DYNA to simulate free-fall impacts from a height of 16.5 ft across eight critical orientations. The study evaluated deformation, strain failure, and shielding integrity under these extreme conditions. Results demonstrated that both designs maintain structural integrity, with no breaches or loss of shielding under specified administrative controls. Notably, a maximum shielding loss of 10 lbs was observed during a top-corner drop, highlighting the need to limit drop heights to less than 1 ft for certain orientations. These findings underscore the effectiveness of engineering controls and design measures in preventing containment breaches and ensuring compliance with safety requirements. This work provides a comprehensive methodology for impact analysis, contributing valuable insights to the field of radioactive materials packaging and transportation safety.

Martinez, Oscar [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000181814046)↗

Tale of Two Domains: Cyber - Physical

As devices and systems continue to modernize and adopt integrated circuits, the use of cyber technology to deploy an application is the expectation. This deployment through cyber assets brings new cyber risk and cybersecurity is the practice of managing this risk. Cyber-risk is constantly changing due to the speed of technology advancement and the changing quality of the adversary. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) mitigates cyber-risk through engineering controls where as the traditional practice of cybersecurity mitigates cyber-risk through cybersecurity controls. By clearly defining the cyber-physical boundary, engineering controls and cybersecurity controls can clearly demonstrate their complementary nature to provide layered defenses and successfully mitigate cyber-risk through independent controls. In this paper, a layered model of device decomposition of the the cyber-physical boundary is presented to provide clarity where engineering controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the physics, functional materials, electronic, or integrated circuit layers and where cybersecurity controls are used to reduce cyber-risk within the machine code and application layers. By implementing both traditional cybersecurity controls and engineering controls, a more holistic approach to cybersecurity is achieved in protecting modern devices and systems, as well as a clear awareness in identifying, documenting, and authorizing the system’s cybersecurity protection scheme is achieved.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

SAFETY AT FLUOR HANFORD (A) CASE STUDY - PREPARED BY THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

By November of 1997, Fluor Hanford (Fluor) had been the site manager of the Hanford nuclear reservation for a year. The Hanford site had been established as part of the Manhattan Project in the 1940s that gave birth to the atomic bomb. Hanford produced two thirds of U.S. plutonium during the Cold War period. The Hanford site was half the size of Rhode Island and occupied 586 square miles in southeastern Washington State. The production of plutonium for more than 40 years left a huge legacy of chemical and radiological contamination: 80 square miles of contaminated groundwater; 2,300 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in underwater basins; 20 tons of plutonium-laced contaminated materials; and 500 contaminated facilities. The cleanup involved a challenging combination of radioactive material handling within an infrastructure constructed in the 1940s and 1950s. The cleanup that began in 1988 was expected to take 30 years or more. Improving safety at Hanford had already proven to be a significant challenge. As the new site manager at Hanford, Fluor Hanford inherited lower- and mid-level managers and thousands of unionized employees, many of whom were second or third generation Hanford employees. These employees had seen many contractors come and go over the years. Some of the managers who had worked with the previous contractor saw Fluor's emphasis on safety as getting in the way of operations. Union-management relations were fractious. Hanford's culture was described as 'production driven-management told everyone what to do, and, if you didn't do it, there were consequences'. Worker involvement in designing and implementing safety programs was negligible. Fluor Hanford also was having trouble satisfying its client, the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE did not see a clear path forward for performance improvements at Hanford. Clearly, major change was necessary, but how and where should it be implemented?

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Structural Optimization of a Force Balance Using a Computational Experiment Design

This paper proposes a new approach to force balance structural optimization featuring a computational experiment design. Currently, this multi-dimensional design process requires the designer to perform a simplification by executing parameter studies on a small subset of design variables. This one-factor-at-a-time approach varies a single variable while holding all others at a constant level. Consequently, subtle interactions among the design variables, which can be exploited to achieve the design objectives, are undetected. The proposed method combines Modern Design of Experiments techniques to direct the exploration of the multi-dimensional design space, and a finite element analysis code to generate the experimental data. To efficiently search for an optimum combination of design variables and minimize the computational resources, a sequential design strategy was employed. Experimental results from the optimization of a non-traditional force balance measurement section are presented. An approach to overcome the unique problems associated with the simultaneous optimization of multiple response criteria is described. A quantitative single-point design procedure that reflects the designer's subjective impression of the relative importance of various design objectives, and a graphical multi-response optimization procedure that provides further insights into available tradeoffs among competing design objectives are illustrated. The proposed method enhances the intuition and experience of the designer by providing new perspectives on the relationships between the design variables and the competing design objectives providing a systematic foundation for advancements in structural design.

Parker, P. A.↗

Reactor design for nuclear electric propulsion

The paper analyzes the consequences of heat pipe failures, that resulted in modifications to the basic design of a heat-pipe cooled, fast spectrum nuclear reactor and led to consideration of an entirely different core design. The new design features an integral laminated core configuration consisting of alternating layers of UO2 and molybdenum sheets that span the diameter of the core. Design characteristics are presented and compared for two reactors. A conceptual design for a heat exchanger between the core and the thermionic converter assembly is described. This heat exchanger would provide design and fabrication decoupling of these two assemblies.

Koenig, D. R.↗

Mitigation of Severe Accident Consequences Using Inherent Safety Principles

Sodium-cooled fast reactors are designed to have a high level of safety. Events of high probability of occurrence are typically handled without consequence through reliable engineering systems and good design practices. For accidents of lower probability, the initiating events are characterized by larger and more numerous challenges to the reactor system, such as failure of one or more major engineered systems and can also include a failure to scram the reactor in response. As the initiating conditions become more severe, they have the potential for creating serious consequences of potential safety significance, including fuel melting, fuel pin disruption and recriticality. If the progression of such accidents is not mitigated by design features of the reactor, energetic events and dispersal of radioactive materials may result. For severe accidents, there are several approaches that can be used to mitigate the consequences of such severe accident initiators, which typically include fuel pin failures and core disruption. One approach is to increase the reliability of the reactor protection system so that the probability of an ATWS event is reduced to less than 1 x 10-6 per reactor year, where larger accident consequences are allowed, meeting the U.S. NRC goal of relegating such accident consequences as core disruption to these extremely low probabilities. The main difficulty with this approach is to convincingly test and guarantee such increased reliability. Another approach is to increase the redundancy of the reactor scram system, which can also reduce the probability of an ATWS event to a frequency of less than 1 x 10-6 per reactor year or lower. The issues with this approach are more related to reactor core design, with the need for a greater number of control rod positions in the reactor core and the associated increase in complexity of the reactor protection system. A third approach is to use the inherent reactivity feedback that occurs in a fast reactor to automatically respond to the change in reactor conditions and to result in a benign response to these events. This approach has the advantage of being relatively simple to implement, and does not face the issue of reliability since only fundamental physical phenomena are used in a passive manner, not active engineered systems. However, the challenge is to present a convincing case that such passive means can be implemented and used. The purpose of this paper is to describe this third approach in detail, the technical basis and experimental validation for the approach, and the resulting reactor performance that can be achieved for ATWS events.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Full core LOCA safety analysis for a PWR containing high burnup fuel

For economic reasons, the US nuclear industry is renewing efforts to build a technical basis to extend peak rod average burnup limits above the current regulatory burnup limit of 62 GWd/MTU. The primary driver of these efforts is to economically increase pressurized water reactor (PWR) cycle lengths to 24 months, reduce the number of fresh fuel assemblies, increase time online, thereby reducing number of outages and their associated cost, higher fuel utilization, and possibly reduce core design constraints. In order for US nuclear utilities to leverage these economic efficiencies, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require nuclear power plants (NPPs) to analyze a number of potential operational occurrences and their potential consequences with each new core design prior to resuming normal operation. Potential operational occurrences can be divided into three primary regimes: (1) normal operation, (2) anticipated operation occurrences (AOOs), and (3) design basis accidents (DBAs). Normal plant operation is an operating regime in which the plant operates within specified operational limits until the end of the cycle, whereas AOOs are events that result in the NPP deviating outside the normal operating regime. A key attribute of an AOO is that the occurrence should be expected. However, by definition, the occurrence of an AOO does not result in significant impact to critical safety functions. The last potential operational occurrence is a DBA. From the fuel performance point-of-view, DBAs can be subdivided into two bounding categories: (1) loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs), and (2) reactivity insertion accidents (RIAs). Unlike AOOs, DBAs may result in fuel rod failure. The NRC imposes fundamental acceptance criteria to minimize radiological consequences to the public and onsite staff. Furthermore, safety criteria are typically linked to the fulfillment of other acceptance criteria related to reactor safety equipment designed to mitigate DBAs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A system approach to aircraft optimization

Mutual couplings among the mathematical models of physical phenomenon and parts of a system such as an aircraft complicate the design process because each contemplated design change may have far reaching consequences throughout the system. This paper outlines techniques for computing these influences as system design derivatives useful in both judgmental and formal optimization purposes. The techniques facilitate decomposition of the design process into smaller, more manageable tasks and they form a methodology that can easily fit into existing engineering optimizations and incorporate their design tools.

Sobieszczanski-Sobieski, Jaroslaw↗

System Safety and the Unintended Consequence

The analysis and identification of risks often result in design changes or modification of operational steps. This paper identifies the potential of unintended consequences as an over-looked result of these changes. Examples of societal changes such as prohibition, regulatory changes including mandating lifeboats on passenger ships, and engineering proposals or design changes to automobiles and spaceflight hardware are used to demonstrate that the System Safety Engineer must be cognizant of the potential for unintended consequences as a result of an analysis. Conclusions of the report indicate the need for additional foresight and consideration of the potential effects of analysis-driven design, processing changes, and/or operational modifications.

Watson, Clifford↗

WIPP Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System Design - 18490

A large exhaust ventilation system has been designed to provide continuous HEPA filtration of the exhaust from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground while meeting the demand for expanded waste emplacement and mining operations over the next 40 years. The WIPP Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) design provides secondary confinement to mitigate the consequences of a postulated radiological release in the underground. The SSCVS design specifically addresses the radiological incident that occurred in 2014 by providing Safety Significant secondary confinement and continuous HEPA filtration over a wide range of operating and environmental conditions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance

Fast Reactor Fuel Type and Reactor Safety Performance R. Wigeland , Idaho National Laboratory J. Cahalan, Argonne National Laboratory The sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor is currently being evaluated for the efficient transmutation of the highly-hazardous, long-lived, transuranic elements that are present in spent nuclear fuel. One of the fundamental choices that will be made is the selection of the fuel type for the fast reactor, whether oxide, metal, carbide, nitride, etc. It is likely that a decision on the fuel type will need to be made before many of the related technologies and facilities can be selected, from fuel fabrication to spent fuel reprocessing. A decision on fuel type should consider all impacts on the fast reactor system, including safety. Past work has demonstrated that the choice of fuel type may have a significant impact on the severity of consequences arising from accidents, especially for severe accidents of low probability. In this paper, the response of sodium-cooled fast reactors is discussed for both oxide and metal fuel types, highlighting the similarities and differences in reactor response and accident consequences. Any fast reactor facility must be designed to be able to successfully prevent, mitigate, or accommodate all consequences of potential events, including accidents. This is typically accomplished by using multiple barriers to the release of radiation, including the cladding on the fuel, the intact primary cooling system, and most visibly the reactor containment building. More recently, this has also included the use of ‘inherent safety’ concepts to reduce or eliminate the potential for serious damage in some cases. Past experience with oxide and metal fuel has demonstrated that both fuel types are suitable for use as fuel in a sodium-cooled fast reactor. However, safety analyses for these two fuel types have also shown that there can be substantial differences in accident consequences due to the neutronic and thermophysical properties of the fuel and their compatibility with the reactor coolant, with corresponding differences in the challenges presented to the reactor developers. Accident phenomena are discussed for the sodium-cooled fast reactor based on the mechanistic progression of conditions from accident initiation to accident termination, whether a benign state is achieved or more severe consequences are expected. General principles connecting accident phenomena and fuel properties are developed from the oxide and metal fuel safety analyses, providing guidelines that can be used as part of the evaluation for selection of fuel type for the sodium-cooled fast reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Designing a tokamak fusion reactor—How does plasma physics fit in?

Our work attempts to bridge the gap between tokamak reactor design and plasma physics. The analysis demonstrates that the overall design of a tokamak fusion reactor is determined almost entirely by the constraints imposed by nuclear physics and fusion engineering. Virtually, no plasma physics is required to determine the main design parameters of a reactor: a , R 0 , B 0 , T i , T e , p , n , τ E , I . The one exception is the value of the toroidal current I, which depends upon a combination of engineering and plasma physics. This exception, however, ultimately has a major impact on the feasibility of an attractive tokamak reactor. The analysis shows that the engineering/nuclear physics design makes demands on the plasma physics that must be satisfied in order to generate power. These demands are substituted into the well-known operational constraints arising in tokamak physics: the Troyon limit, Greenwald limit, kink stability limit, and bootstrap fraction limit. However, a tokamak reactor designed on the basis of standard engineering and nuclear physics constraints does not scale to a reactor. Too much current is required to achieve the necessary confinement time for ignition. The combination of achievable bootstrap current plus current drive is not sufficient to generate the current demanded by the engineering design. Several possible solutions are discussed in detail involving advances in plasma physics or engineering. The main contribution of this report is to demonstrate that the basic reactor design and its plasma physics consequences can be determined simply and analytically. The analysis thus provides a crisp, compact, logical framework that will hopefully lead to improved physical intuition for connecting plasma physic to tokamak reactor design.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

SAM Co-Development to Support Fluoride-salt-cooled High-temperature Reactor Design and Licensing (CRADA 2018-18177 Final Report)

This project aims to raise the SAM code's technical and commercial maturity level to enable the Kairos Power ("Kairos") to use SAM to support its KP-FHR design analysis and licensing application. Argonne National Laboratory ("Argonne") has actively developed and maintained SAM, a modern system-level analysis tool for advanced nonlight water reactors safety analysis. Kairos is currently actively pursuing development of an FHR design and associated technology, and consequently requires a pedigreed safety analysis tool. The purpose of this project is to increase the maturity of the SAM code for the modeling and simulation of the KP-FHR design, thus enabling its use in safety analyses that support licensing application. Argonne will primarily be responsible for software design, development, and testing; while Kairos will be responsible for software requirements, assessment of software capabilities, needs, gaps, and priorities, and development of proprietary models. The research and development activities for the joint SAM development project include: a series of identification and prioritization studies on design characteristics, event sequences, relevant phenomena, and software capabilities; SAM capability enhancements for specific KP-FHR systems and components; performing code verification and validations; integrating uncertainty quantification (UQ), model calibration, and sensitivity analysis (SA) techniques in safety analyses; and raising the software quality rigor level for commercial-grade applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Effects of radiobiological uncertainty on shield design for a 60-day lunar mission

Some consequences of uncertainties in radiobiological risk due to galactic cosmic ray exposure are analyzed to determine their effect on engineering designs for a first lunar outpost - a 60-day mission. Quantitative estimates of shield mass requirements as a function of a radiobiological uncertainty factor are given for a simplified vehicle structure. The additional shield mass required for compensation is calculated as a function of the uncertainty in galactic cosmic ray exposure, and this mass is found to be as large as a factor of 3 for a lunar transfer vehicle. The additional cost resulting from this mass is also calculated. These cost estimates are then used to exemplify the cost-effectiveness of research.

Wilson, John W.↗