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Challenges of future high power wireless power transfer for light-duty electric vehicles----technology and risk management
Wireless power transfer is a state-of-the-art technology with the advantage of convenience and flexibility, as well as the capability of enabling fully automated charging. With power transfer levels increasing beyond 100 kW, many technical and risk management challenges emerge. Here, instead of focusing on the progress review of wireless power transfer technology, this paper discusses the future challenges and risks for high power wireless charging for light-duty electric vehicles. Aiming at 200 kW or higher wireless power transfer, we discuss technology and risk management challenges in the area of electromagnetic safety, resonant frequency determination, and cybersecurity risks in detail. As potential solutions to overcome these challenges, the latest technologies with an emphasis on advanced shielding solutions and recent progress on SiC converters from both industrial and academic institutions are reviewed, and some perspectives and propositions are provided.
The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research
The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.
Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry
Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.
A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind
Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.
Trade-off Analysis of Operational Technologies to Advance Cyber Resilience through Automated and Autonomous Response to Threats
The advancement of cyber resilience requires a preliminary stage of characterizing the trade-off space of mitigation options and how these might affect the stability and determinism of an operational technology (OT). This first step will set the stage for the proper cyber-secure and cyber-resilient design and confirm the affects that can be considered and approved by the OT and the security groups. To provide a baseline for this discussion, this paper provides a consideration of the cyberphysical interactions, possible mitigation steps against certain attacks and their corresponding affects that lend to the security design planning and evaluation process. As an integral part of the proposed scheme this work introduces the concept of systemwide fuzzer, i.e., a tool that manipulates the system state in an effort to determine mitigation response sequences that minimize detriments and maximize benefit in accordance with specified operational requirements.
Distributed Optimization in Distribution Systems: Use Cases, Limitations, and Research Needs
We report electric distribution grid operations typically rely on both centralized optimization and local non-optimal control techniques. As an alternative, distribution system operational practices can consider distributed optimization techniques that leverage communications among various neighboring agents to achieve optimal operation. With the rapidly increasing integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), distributed optimization algorithms are growing in importance due to their potential advantages in scalability, flexibility, privacy, and robustness relative to centralized optimization. Implementation of distributed optimization offers multiple challenges and also opportunities. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the recent advancements in distributed optimization for electric distribution systems and classifications using key attributes. Problem formulations and distributed optimization algorithms are provided for example use cases, including volt/var control, market clearing process, loss minimization, and conservation voltage reduction. Finally, this paper also presents future research needs for the applicability of distributed optimization algorithms in the distribution system.
Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant
Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.
A Functional All-Hazard Approach to Critical Infrastructure Dependency Analysis
The critical infrastructures protection landscape is a vast and varied pattern of independent, but interconnected infrastructure systems that are essential to the function of our modern society. The U.S. policy on critical infrastructure protection has been continually evolving since the “President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection” was published in 1997. In response to these policies, federal, state, and local governments, along with research institutions, have invested a substantial amount of time and effort into identifying and analyzing critical infrastructure, their functions, and dependencies/interdependencies to better understand their vulnerabilities. To date, the ability to assess vulnerabilities, resiliency, and priorities for protecting interdependent critical infrastructure systems from an all-hazards perspective remains a difficult problem. In this paper we introduce the All-Hazards Analysis (AHA) methodology, which provides an integrated functional basis across infrastructure systems, through the implementation of a common language and a scalable level of decomposition to effectively evaluate the resilience of interconnected infrastructure systems. AHA models infrastructure systems as directed multidimensional graphs, which enable the evaluation of cross-sector interdependencies prior to, during, and after disruptive events. Finally, and by design, AHA enables the cross linking of data taxonomies to enable more effective data sharing, such as the National Critical Functions (NCF) and Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT).
The Energy Transition: Advanced Nuclear Needed but Address Climate Vulnerabilities Now
The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.
Developing Secure Power Systems Professional Competence: Alignment and Gaps in Workforce Development Programs for Phase 2 of the Secure Power Systems Professional project
This is the final report of Phase 2 of the Secure Power Systems Professional project, a 3 phase project. DOE will post to their website upon release.
Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector
With utilities in the U.S. and around the world increasingly moving toward smart grid technology and other upgrades with inherent cyber vulnerabilities, correlative threats from malicious cyber attacks on the North American electric grid continue to grow in frequency and sophistication. The potential for malicious actors to access and adversely affect physical electricity assets of U.S. electricity generation, transmission, or distribution systems via cyber means is a primary concern for utilities contributing to the bulk electric system. This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector. There have been no reported targeted cyber attacks carried out against utilities in the U.S. that have resulted in permanent or long term damage to power system operations thus far, yet electric utilities throughout the U.S. have seen a steady rise in cyber and physical security related events that continue to raise concern. Asset owners and operators understand that the effects of a coordinated cyber and physical attack on a utility’s operations would threaten electric system reliability–and potentially result in large scale power outages. Utilities are routinely faced with new challenges for dealing with these cyber threats to the grid and consequently maintain a set of best practices to keep systems secure and up to date. Among the greatest challenges is a lack of knowledge or strategy to mitigate new risks that emerge as a result of an exponential rise in complexity of modern control systems. This paper compiles an open-source analysis of cyber threats and risks to the electric grid, utility best practices for prevention and response to cyber threats, and utility suggestions about how the federal government can aid utilities in combating and mitigating risks.
Cyber-Informed Engineering
A continuing challenge for engineers who utilize digital systems is to understand the impact of cyber-attacks across the entire product and program lifecycle. This is a challenge due to the evolving nature of cyber threats that may impact the design, development, deployment, and operational phases of all systems. Cyber Informed Engineering is the process by which engineers are made aware of both how to use their engineering knowledge to positively impact the cyber security in the processes by which they architect and design components and the services and security of the components themselves.
Laboratory Directed Research and Development 2017 Annual Summary Report
The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2017.
2017 BEA Self-Assessment Report for Idaho National Laboratory
This report provides Battelle Energy Alliance’s (BEA) self-assessment of performance for the period of October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, as evaluated against the goals, performance objectives, and notable outcomes defined in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP). BEA took into consideration and consolidated all input provided from internal and external sources (e.g., Contractor Assurance System [CAS], program and customer feedback, external and independent reviews, and Department of Energy [DOE] Idaho Operations Office [ID] quarterly PEMP reports and Quarterly Evaluation Reports). After considering the information related to performance during the rating period, including feedback from the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Idaho Operations Office (ID), and other programmatic sponsors, BEA has self-assessed the Laboratory’s performance at a grade of A, an adjectival rating of “Excellent.” Table 1 documents BEA’s assessment of performance to the goals and individual performance Objectives. Table 2 documents completion of the Notable Outcomes. A more-detailed assessment of performance for each individual performance objective is documented in the closeout reports (see the PEMP reporting system). Table 3 includes an update to “Performance Challenges” as reported in the FY 2016 Self-Assessment Report.
Laboratory-Directed Research and Development 2016 Summary Annual Report
The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. INL is the lead laboratory for the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). The INL mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure with a vision to change the world’s energy future and secure our critical infrastructure. Operating since 1949, INL is the nation’s leading research, development, and demonstration center for nuclear energy, including nuclear nonproliferation and physical and cyber-based protection of energy systems and critical infrastructure, as well as integrated energy systems research, development, demonstration, and deployment. INL has been managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (a wholly owned company of Battelle) for DOE since 2005. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, is a partnership between Battelle, BWX Technologies, Inc., AECOM, the Electric Power Research Institute, the National University Consortium (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, North Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and Oregon State University), and the Idaho university collaborators (i.e., University of Idaho, Idaho State University, and Boise State University). Since its creation, INL’s research and development (R&D) portfolio has broadened with targeted programs supporting national missions to advance nuclear energy, enable clean energy deployment, and secure and modernize critical infrastructure. INL’s research, development, and demonstration capabilities, its resources, and its unique geography enable integration of scientific discovery, innovation, engineering, operations, and controls into complex large-scale testbeds for discovery, innovation, and demonstration of transformational clean energy and security concepts. These attributes strengthen INL’s leadership as a demonstration laboratory. As a national resource, INL also applies its capabilities and skills to the specific needs of other federal agencies and customers through DOE’s Strategic Partnership Program.
2016 Technology Transfer Annual Report
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) multiprogram national laboratory that conducts research and development in all DOE mission areas. Like all other national laboratories, INL has a statutory, technology transfer mission to make its capabilities and technologies available to federal agencies, state and local governments, universities and industry. To fulfill this mission, INL encourages its scientific, engineering and technical staff to disclose new inventions and creations to ensure the resulting intellectual property is captured, protected and made available to others who might benefit from it.
LDRD Strategic R&D Fund – Fiscal Year 2018 Research Priorities
Proposals are now being accepted for the Fiscal Year 2018 Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Director’s Strategic Research and Development (R&D) Fund. This call seeks high-quality proposals that address the Laboratory’s research priorities identified within the attached document LDRD Strategic R&D Fund - Fiscal Year 2018 Research Priorities.