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Qualification of the First ICS-3000 ION Chromatograph for use at the Defense Waste Processing Facility

The ICS-3000 Ion Chromatography (IC) system installed in 221-S M-13 has been qualified for use. The qualification was a head to head comparison of the ICS-3000 with the currently used DX-500 IC system. The crosscheck work included standards for instrument calibration and calibration verifications and standards for individual anion analysis, where the standards were traceable back to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In addition the crosscheck work included the analysis of simulated Sludge Receipt Adjustment Tank (SRAT) Receipt, SRAT Product, and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) samples, along with radioactive Sludge Batch 5 material from the SRAT and SME tanks. Based upon the successful qualification of the ICS-3000 in M-13, it is recommended that this task proceed in developing the data to qualify, by a head to head comparison of the two ICS-3000 instruments, a second ICS-3000 to be installed in M-14. The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) requires the analysis of specific anions at various stages of its processing of high level waste (HLW). The anions of interest to the DWPF are fluoride, formate, chloride, nitrite, nitrate, sulfate, oxalate, and phosphate. The anion analysis is used to evaluate process chemistry including formic acid/nitric acid additions to establish optimum conditions for mercury stripping, reduction-oxidation (REDOX) chemistry for the melter, nitrite destruction, organic acid constituents, etc. The DWPF Laboratory (Lab) has been using Dionex DX-500 ion chromatography (IC) systems since 1998. The vendor informed DWPF in 2006 that the instruments would no longer be supported by service contracts after 2008. DWPF purchased three new ICS-3000 systems in September of 2006. The ICS-3000 instruments are (a) designed to be more stable using an eluent generator to make eluent, (b) require virtually no daily chemical handling by the analysts, (c) require less line breaks in the hood, and (d) generally require less maintenance due to the pump configuration only using water versus the current system where the pump uses various hydroxide concentrations. The ICS-3000 instruments also allow the DWPF to maintain current service contracts, which support routine preventive maintenance and emergency support for larger problems such as component failure. One of the three new systems was set up in the DWPF Lab trailers in January of 2007 to be used for the development of methods and procedures. This system will continue to be used for training, new method development and potential improvements to current methods. The qualification of the other two ICS-3000 instruments is to be a phased effort. This effort is to be supported by the Applied Computational Engineering and Statistical (ACES) group of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) as authorized by the Technical Task Request (TTR) and as directed by the corresponding Task Technical and Quality Assurance (TT&QA) plan. The installation of the first 'rad' system into the M-13 Lab module required modifications to both the Lab module and to the radiohood. The installation was completed in July 2008. The testing of this system was conducted as directed by the TT&QA plan. The purpose of this technical report is to provide a review of the data generated by these tests that will lead to the recommendation for the qualification of the M-13 ICS-3000 instrument. With the successful qualification of this first ICS-3000, plans will be developed for the installation of the second 'rad' system in the M-14 Lab module later in fiscal year 2009. When the second 'rad' ICS-3000 system is installed, the DX-500 systems will be removed and retired from service.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Analysis Approach and Data Package for Mayak Public Doses: Data Supporting the Calculation of Representative Doses to Members of the Public from Airborne Releases of 131 I at the Mayak Production Association from 1948 through 1972

Historical activities at facilities producing nuclear materials for weapons released radioactivity into the air and water. Past studies in the United States have evaluated the release, atmospheric transport and environmental accumulation of 131 I from the nuclear facilities at Hanford in Washington State and the resulting dose to members of the public (Farris et al. 1994). A multi-year dose reconstruction effort (Mokrov et al. 2004) is also being conducted to produce representative dose estimates for members of the public living near Mayak, Russia, from atmospheric releases of 131 I at the facilities of the Mayak Production Association. The approach to calculating individual doses to members of the public from historical releases of airborne 131 I has the following general steps: • Construct estimates of releases 131 I to the air from production facilities. • Model the transport of 131 I in the air and subsequent deposition on the ground and vegetation. • Model the accumulation of 131 I in soil, water and food products (environmental media). • Calculate the dose for an individual by matching the appropriate lifestyle and consumption data for the individual to the concentrations of 131 I in environmental media at their residence location. A number of computer codes were developed to facilitate the study of airborne 131 I emissions at Hanford. Of particular interest is DESCARTES code that modeled accumulation of 131 I in environmental media (Miley et al. 1994). In addition, the CIDER computer code estimated annual doses to individuals (Eslinger et al. 1994) using the equations and parameters specific to Hanford (Snyder et al. 1994). Several of the computer codes developed to model 131 I releases from Hanford are general enough to be used for other facilities. Additional codes have been developed, including the new individual dose code CiderF (Eslinger and Napier 2013), and applied to historical releases of 131 I from Mayak. This document provides a data package that identifies computer code runs and associated input and output files prepared for the purpose of calculating doses to members of the public from atmospheric releases of 131 I at the Mayak Production Association for the time period 1948 through 1972.

Mayak↗

User Instructions for the CiderF Individual Dose Code and Associated Utility Codes

Historical activities at facilities producing nuclear materials for weapons released radioactivity into the air and water. Past studies in the United States have evaluated the release, atmospheric transport and environmental accumulation of 131I from the nuclear facilities at Hanford in Washington State and the resulting dose to members of the public (Farris et al. 1994). A multi-year dose reconstruction effort (Mokrov et al. 2004) is also being conducted to produce representative dose estimates for members of the public living near Mayak, Russia, from atmospheric releases of 131I at the facilities of the Mayak Production Association.

CiderF↗

Chemical composition analysis and product consistency tests to support enhanced Hanford waste glass models. Results for the third set of high alumina outer layer matrix glasses

In this report, the Savannah River National Laboratory provides chemical analyses and Product Consistency Test (PCT) results for 14 simulated high level waste glasses fabricated by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The results of these analyses will be used as part of efforts to revise or extend the validation regions of the current Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant glass property models to cover a broader span of waste compositions. The measured chemical composition data are reported and compared with the targeted values for each component for each glass. All of the measured sums of oxides for the study glasses fell within the interval of 96.9 to 100.8 wt %, indicating recovery of all components. Comparisons of the targeted and measured chemical compositions showed that the measured values for the glasses met the targeted concentrations within 10% for those components present at more than 5 wt %. The PCT results were normalized to both the targeted and measured compositions of the study glasses. Several of the glasses exhibited increases in normalized concentrations (NCi) after the canister centerline cooled (CCC) heat treatment. Five of the glasses, after the CCC heat treatment, had NC B values that exceeded that of the Environmental Assessment (EA) benchmark glass. These results can be combined with additional characterization, including X-ray diffraction, to determine the cause of the higher release rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Chemical Analyses in the LLNLSuperblock

This document describes the methodology used to analyze plutonium (Pu) materials for isotopic composition, radioactive daughters, and stable impurities by Inductively-Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICPMS). Analysts need extensive skill in traditional analytical wet chemistry techniques, experience in ICPMS measurements, and an understanding of its limitations.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

User Instructions for the CiderF Individual Dose Code and Associated Utility Codes

This is a major update to PNNL-22699 published back in 2013. Historical activities at facilities producing nuclear materials for weapons released radioactivity into the air and water. Past studies in the United States have evaluated the release, atmospheric transport and environmental accumulation of 131I from the nuclear facilities at Hanford in Washington State and the resulting dose to members of the public (Farris et al. 1994). A multi-year dose reconstruction effort (Degteva et al. 2019; Eslinger et al. 2014; Mokrov et al. 2004; Napier 2014; Napier et al. 2017; Tolstykh et al. 2018) is also being conducted to produce representative dose estimates for members of the public living near Mayak, Russia, from atmospheric releases of 131I at the facilities of the Mayak Production Association.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Enhancing Nuclear and Radiological Security in Polarized Times: Safeguarding Against Extremist Insider Threats

Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of misinformation online. This concerning trend raises an important question: has this increase in extremist violence manifested in more incidents involving radioactive or nuclear (RN) materials and a corresponding security concern? To explore this question, we analyzed existing data on events involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials over time. Specifically, we examined the rate of RN-related incidents, the targets of these events, and the ideologies motivating the perpetrators by using the Violent Non-State Actor Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Event Database from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Our analysis aimed to determine whether the broader rise of violent extremism has translated to an elevated risk of attacks involving RN materials. Results of the analysis revealed that there was no clear increase in events involving RN material in the dataset. However, given the rarity of these events, this conclusion does not indicate that such a trend might not appear in coming years if violent extremism continues to rise. To address the potential risk presented by violent extremism, in addition to quantifying the frequency of RN events, we also reviewed traits that could make organizations more susceptible to insider threats from radicalized employees. Focusing on the literature around counterproductive workplace behavior, we identified organizational characteristics that might increase the risk of malicious acts committed by radicalized insiders. These risk factors include abusive leadership, situational constraints, and organizational injustice. Finally, using these organizational risk characteristics, we discuss interventions that organizations with RN material can take to reduce their risk of attacks stemming from violent extremism while still protecting individual rights to privacy and civil liberties. Overall, this article provides an overview of the intersections between rising domestic extremism, insider threats, and risks posed by RN materials. We present current data on trends and patterns in this space as well as practical guidance for organizational resilience.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An evaluation of some special techniques for nuclear waste disposal in space

A preliminary examination is reported of several special ways for space disposal of nuclear waste material which utilize the radioactive heat in the waste to assist in the propulsion for deep space trajectories. These include use of the wastes in a thermoelectric generator (RTG) which operates an electric propulsion device and a radioisotope - thermal thruster which uses hydrogen or ammonia as the propellant. These propulsive devices are compared to the space tug and the space tug/solar electric propulsion combination for disposal of waste on a solar system escape trajectory. Such comparisons indicate that the waste-RTG approach has considerable potential provided the combined specific mass of the waste container - RTG system does not exceed approximately 150 kg/kw sub e. Several exploratory numerical calculations have been made for high earth orbit and Earth escape destinations.

Mackay, J. S.↗

Comparison Between Predictions & Observations of Induced Radioactive Background in Interplanetary Missions

Radioactivity induced in detector materials and their immediate surroundings is the major source of discrete-line, gamma-ray background and an important source of continuum background in the performance of remote-sensing, gamma-ray spectroscopy of planetary bodies. In interplanetary space the dominant sources of particles are cosmic rays and their secondaries arising from interactions with the spacecraft and the surface of the target body. In addition, certain future gamma-ray astronomy missions, such as INTEGRAL, are to be located so as to perform their observations in interplanetary space rather than in the traditional low earth orbits. Such location removes contributions from the earth's atmosphere and inner radiation belt at the expense of increased exposure to cosmic rays and solar particle events. Accurate prediction of the activation of key materials by cosmic rays is of the utmost importance for detector design and data interpretation.

Dyer, Clivea↗

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Calculating Residual Dose in Mu2e DS Hall

The Mu2e experiment at Fermilab is a project designed to measure the neutrinoless conversion of muons into electrons. In this experiment there will be particle beams accelerated to relativistic energies impinging upon targets, producing fluxes of secondary particles. It’s among these fluxes where there are substantial fractions of high-energy stable particles arising in spallation and fragmentation reactions, leading to nuclear transmutations in the structural materials surrounding those targets. As a result of neutron activation of the walls and other materials, the structures become radioactive even after the beam has been turned off. This leads to the desire of quantifying the severity of this radiation hazard in order to comply with Fermilab radiological standards.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Background Model for the Majorana Demonstrator

The Majorana Collaboration is constructing a system containing 40 kg of HPGe detectors to demonstrate the feasibility and potential of a future tonne-scale experiment capable of probing the neutrino mass scale in the inverted-hierarchy region. To realize this, a major goal of the Majorana Demonstrator is to demonstrate a path forward to achieving a background rate at or below 1 cnt/(ROI-t-y) in the 4 keV region of interest around the Q-value at 2039 keV. This goal is pursued through a combination of a significant reduction of radioactive impurities in construction materials with analytical methods for background rejection, for example using powerful pulse shape analysis techniques profiting from the p-type point contact HPGe detectors technology. The effectiveness of these methods is assessed using simulations of the different background components whose purity levels are constrained from radioassay measurements.

Cuesta, C↗

Global recycling services for short and long term risk reduction

New schemes are being developed by AREVA in order to provide global solutions for safe and non-proliferating management of used fuels, thereby significantly contributing to overall risks reduction and sustainable nuclear development. Utilities are thereby provided with a service through which they will be able to send their used fuels and only get returned vitrified and compacted waste, the only waste remaining after reprocessing. This waste is stable, standard and has demonstrated capability for very long term interim storage. They are provided as well with associated facilities and all necessary services for storage in a demonstrated safely manner. Recycled fuels, in particular MOX, would be used either in existing LWRs or in a very limited number of full MOX reactors (like the EPR reactor), located in selected countries, that will recycle MOX so as to downgrade the isotopic quality of the Pu inventories in a significant manner. Reprocessed uranium also can be recycled. These schemes, on top of offering demonstrated operational advantages and a responsible approach, result into optimized economics for all shareholders of the scheme, as part of reactor financing (under Opex or Capex form) will be secured thanks to the value of the recycled flows. It also increases fuel cost predictability as recycled fuel is not subject to market fluctuations as much and allows, in a limited span of time, for clear risk mitigation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Computational Studies of Gas Phase Reactions of Zirconium Tetrachloride (ZrCl{sub 4}) and Metal Chloride Impurities

Zirconium-based cladding materials that surround used nuclear fuel (UNF) rods represent a significant fraction of the total amount of high level waste that must be disposed of in long term geological repositories. The decontamination, recovery and reuse of these materials would significantly reduce the high level waste associated with light water reactors and could provide a new source of hafnium free zirconium for the fabrication of new nuclear components. One part in the strategy to recycle zirconium from used cladding materials involves developing a computational modeling (DFT) protocol to understand the reactions between ZrCl{sub 4} and metal chloride impurities that may occur in the gas phase during sublimation. Several of the metal chloride species present are known to form Lewis acid/base adducts in the gas phase and development of purification protocols require investigation into the properties of these ZrCl{sub 4} contaminates.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Removal of Tritium from the Gaseous Effluents Produced by the Recovery of Zirconium from Used Fuel Cladding

U.S. regulations will require the removal of tritium ({sup 3}H) from gaseous effluents associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycling. One process that may generate {sup 3}H-containing gaseous effluents is the recovery of zirconium from used fuel cladding. A chlorination process developed by Collins et al. is designed to convert the zirconium present in Zircaloy{sup R} cladding to recoverable ZrCl{sub 4}. The greatest economic benefit from including zirconium recycle as part of a larger used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle effort would be a decrease in the disposal cost of used fuel cladding. Used fuel cladding is considered high-level waste (HLW). As zirconium is the second largest element by mass (25%) contained in most UNF assemblies (with uranium being the largest), recovery of the zirconium could result in a substantial decrease in the amount of HLW intended for geologic disposition. The reclaimed ZrCl{sub 4} product, if sufficiently free from radioactive impurities, could then be disposed of as low-level waste or reused in nuclear applications. The chlorination process uses chlorine gas (Cl{sub 2}) and an inert carrier such as argon (Ar) to convert the zirconium present in cladding to ZrCl{sub 4}. ZrCl{sub 4} is more volatile than other components in the cladding, causing evaporation of a relatively pure gaseous ZrCl{sub 4} stream. The product ZrCl{sub 4} is recovered as a solid salt by condensation when cooled to less than about 300 deg. C. A fraction of the {sup 3}H (0-96%) produced in nuclear fuel during irradiation is found in zirconium-based cladding, possibly as zirconium hydride (the wide range is a remnant of various researchers' analyses of cladding of various irradiations and cooling times). Heating the cladding to high temperatures, such as would be done during the chlorination process, will release the {sup 3}H. At the temperatures of the zirconium recycle process, the {sup 3}H is likely to react with excess Cl{sub 2} to produce tritiated HCl ({sup 3}HCl), although this could be avoided if the cladding and fuel were treated to remove {sup 3}H prior to chlorination. A previous analysis showed that the concentration of {sup 3}HCl in the off-gas of the zirconium recycle process will be in the range of parts per billion to a few parts per million. Should {sup 3}H mitigation be required for the zirconium recycle process, it will be completed through the abatement of {sup 3}HCl from this off-gas stream. The intent of the testing described in this summary was to conduct proof-of-principle demonstrations for two {sup 3}HCl removal methods. The zirconium recycle off-gas stream differs from many industrial HCl-containing streams in that the concentration of HCl requiring removal is extremely low. Demonstrations of HCl removal at ppm concentrations were not found in the literature, making the proof-of-principle approach attractive as a way to identify the most promising method for continued development. An important consideration throughout these experiments was that current research efforts on the zirconium recycle process are conducted in a hot cell and any {sup 3}HCl removal methods should be easily deployed in a hot-cell environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Solidification Tests for LLW Sludges

Oak Ridge National laboratory has about 350,000 gallons of remote-handled (RH) sludge in ten liquid low-level waste (LLLW) tanks that must be solidified and stabilized for disposal at the Nevada Test Site. Samples of the waste sludge were collected from four tanks, and a total of 36 small-scale grouting tests were performed. The presence of free water during curing was evaluated, and the cured grouts were analyzed using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) to determine if any of the hazardous metals in the sludge (Cd, Cr, Hg, Pb, etc.) would leach above the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) limits/ The grouting formulation used for these tests, with ratios of grout-forming additives weight to waste slurry weight ranging from 0.75:1 to 1.2:1, produced wet grout mixtures that were easy to stir and were self leveling. The grout mixtures cured with no free water visible at any time. The cured grout matrix was very effective at retaining the hazardous metals in the sludge, with TCLP leachate concentrations well below the RCRA limits. The addition of ferrous sulfide (FeS) to some of the sludge samples resulted in, at most, a minimal reduction in the amount of mercury that leached from the grout samples, and had no detectable impact on the other heavy metals present in the sludge (Cd, Cr, and Pb). The TCLP extraction was performed on three samples after 1 day and 7 days of curing, compared to the >28 days for the remaining samples. The metal concentrations for the short cure time samples were similar to the remaining samples, and were all well below the RCRA limits.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leaching Characteristics of Hanford Ferrocyanide Wastes

A series of leach tests were performed on actual Hanford Site tank wastes in support of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The samples were targeted composite slurries of high-level tank waste materials representing major complex, radioactive, tank waste mixtures at the Hanford Site. Using a filtration/leaching apparatus, sample solids were concentrated, caustic leached, and washed under conditions representative of those planned for the Pretreatment Facility in the WTP. Caustic leaching was performed to assess the mobilization of aluminum (as gibbsite, Al[OH]3, and boehmite AlO[OH]), phosphates [PO43-], chromium [Cr3+] and, to a lesser extent, oxalates [C2O42-]). Ferrocyanide waste released the solid phase 137Cs during caustic leaching; this was antithetical to the other Hanford waste types studied. Previous testing on ferrocyanide tank waste focused on the aging of the ferrocyanide salt complex and its thermal compatibilities with nitrites and nitrates. Few studies, however, examined cesium mobilization in the waste. Careful consideration should be given to the pretreatment of ferrocyanide wastes in light of this new observed behavior, given the fact that previous testing on simulants indicates a vastly different cesium mobility in this waste form. The discourse of this work will address the overall ferrocyanide leaching characteristics as well as the behavior of the 137Cs during leaching.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

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