Asbestos Report Permit SW532 Disposal Date Range: 01/01/2020 to 03/31/2020
This is the 1st quarter Calendar Year 2020 report for disposal of asbestos at the Nevada National Security Site under Permit SW532.
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This is the 1st quarter Calendar Year 2020 report for disposal of asbestos at the Nevada National Security Site under Permit SW532.
This is the 1st quarter Calendar Year 2020 report for disposal of asbestos at the Nevada National Security Site under Permit HW0101.
The goal of this research is to develop an innovative approach to monitoring urban dynamic hydrological environment using optical-fiber-based distributed acoustic sensing (DAS). We propose to employ surface-wave dispersion inversion and coda-wave interferometry inversion based on natural and anthropogenic seismic ambient noises acquired using a DAS array to accurately invert for time-lapse changes of groundwater in urban areas. Through this work, we aim to provide the first cost-effective, city-scale, high-resolution approach to monitoring urban groundwater changes that is otherwise difficult or expensive to achieve using conventional techniques. This work will create LANL’s DAS-based near-surface and groundwater monitoring capability, which can also be leveraged in solving relevant applied energy and national security problems.
Scintillator crystals play an important role in the radiation detection field. Widespread use of scintillators as gamma-ray detectors is largely generated by their extensive availability and tunable properties, such high light output, high stopping power (Z eff ), fast decay time, and good proportionality. Additionally, the cost for manufacturing a scintillation detector like NaI:Tl is usually considerably lower than the cost for manufacturing a semiconductor detector like CdZnTe. Because there is no such thing as an ideal scintillation material, an application requiring certain detection characteristics may incorporate a scintillator tailored to its specific properties. The vast variety of applications and requirements necessitates more research into new scintillation materials and/or better methods of producing existing materials.The goal of this project was to grow low cost and environmentally stable inorganic transparent ceramic scintillators with excellent gamma ray resolution, excellent energy proportionality, excellent detection efficiency due to high density (>5 g/cm 3 ) and very high Z eff (55-80), and good light yields (>40,000 ph/MeV). In Phase I Xtallized Intelligence, Inc. (XI, Inc) developed a novel ceramic fabrication technique to produce low cost and environmentally stable highly efficient inorganic transparent ceramic scintillators of various dimensions. XI, Inc., collaborating with Fisk University (Fisk), investigated the scintillation properties of these new ceramic scintillators and compared them to in their single crystal counterparts. The results of this Phase I project show that successful production of high-quality inorganic halide ceramic scintillators Cs 2 HfCl 6 (CHC) and Tl 2 HfCl 6 (THC). Both ceramic CHC and THC scintillators have achieved good performance close to the performance of their single crystal counterparts. Fabricating these inorganic ceramic scintillators mitigate many issues encountered during conventional bulk crystal growth by melt methods. Additional benefits of the ceramic fabrication technique include high production yield, low production cost, fast production time, and no material waste Inorganic transparent ceramic scintillators produced in this project will enhance cost effectiveness at the instrument level based on low projected cost of the proposed compounds, as much smaller crystal sizes would be required to achieve similar efficiency as current radioisotope identification devices (RIID’s) used in homeland security applications as well as spectrometers in high energy physics applications.
The Site A/Plot M Decommissioned Reactor Site was inspected on June 6, 2023. Site A/Plot M is in the Palos Area Preserves, operated by the Forest Preserve District of Cook County. The site was found to be in good condition with negligible erosional concerns across the grass covered mound at Plot M. Landscaping timbers installed along the footpath of Plot M have been effective in reducing erosion down the eastern slope, thus, no additional timber steps are needed at this time. The bike trail, installed by Cook County Forest Preserve, located to the south and east of Plot M has helped to significantly reduce traffic at the site. The Site A and Plot M monuments were both replaced on May 1, 2021, and remain in good condition, despite a small amount of graffiti observed on both monuments at the time of the inspection. The 19 groundwater monitoring wells at Site A/Plot M were found to be secure and in good condition.
A suite of measurement systems were deployed as part of the Physical Experiment 1 series of experiments, which involved detonating chemical explosives along with radionuclide tracers in an underground cavity, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the United States. One of the radionuclide tracers, 127 Xe was released from the containment following the explosion and detected on a SAUNA Q B sampler situated approximately 3.5 km away. The system uses a beta-gamma coincidence detector system to measure fission product radioisotopes of xenon relevant to nuclear explosion monitoring. In this work we use the coincidence measurement data to analyse and interpret the results from the SAUNA Q B system, to calculate the measured 127 Xe activity concentration(s).
Abstract Recently collected naturally occurring geochemical and isotopic groundwater tracers were combined with historic data from the Pahute Mesa area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada, USA, to provide insights into long-term regional groundwater flow patterns, mixing and recharge. Pahute Mesa was the site of 85 nuclear detonations between 1965 and 1992, many of them deeply buried devices that introduced radionuclides directly into groundwater. The dataset examined included major ions and field measurements, stable isotopes of hydrogen (δ 2 H), oxygen (δ 18 O), carbon (δ 13 C) and sulfur (δ 34 S), and radioisotopes of carbon ( 14 C) and chloride ( 36 Cl). Analysis of the patterns of groundwater 14 C data and the δ 2 H and δ 18 O signatures indicates that groundwater recharge is predominantly of Pleistocene age, except for a few localized areas near major ephemeral drainages. Steep gradients in sulfate (SO 4 ) and chloride (Cl) define a region near the western edge of the NNSS where high-concentration groundwater flowing south from north of the NNSS merges with dilute groundwater flowing west from eastern Pahute Mesa in a mixing zone that coincides with a groundwater trough associated with major faults. The 36 Cl/Cl and δ 34 S data suggest that the source of the high Cl and SO 4 in the groundwater was a now-dry, pluvial-age playa lake north of the NNSS. Patterns of groundwater flow indicated by the combined data sets show that groundwater is flowing around the northwest margin of the now extinct Timber Mountain Caldera Complex toward regional discharge areas in Oasis Valley.
Michael Bernardin’s retirement actually looks a little more like a second career. This one, though, as an author of books. Bernardin retired last year after 35 years as a nuclear physicist that culminated with his role as the Associate Lab Director for Weapons Physics. Since then, he’s continued accessing the collections of the National Security Research Center, which is the Lab’s classified library.
Light Water Reactor Sustainability Issue 31 Newsletter.
In FY16, Pu targets were fabricated in support of the Nuclear Physics: Cumulative Fission Product Yields (Fission R-values) task of the F2016 venture project; these targets are suitable for irradiation in the Flattop critical assembly at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report documents an overview of the target design, preparation of the Pu metal materials by removing the oxide layer and appropriate sizing for the target holders, target fabrication including filling an inner aluminum cup with the Pu material and the sealing of an outer stainless steel capsule, target assay using gamma spectroscopy, and the He leak testing of the final targets. Four targets were fabricated with two containing 99% 239 Pu metal and two containing 93% 239 Pu metal. Additional samples of each material were set aside for mass spectrometric analysis at PNNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory.
During the week of August 22, 2022, Integral Experiment Request (IER) 538, an international blind intercomparison for nuclear accident dosimetry (NAD) exercise, was completed using the Godiva-IV critical assembly at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located in the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This exercise builds upon a series of experiments that include the characterization the radiation fields around Godiva (IER-147) and Flattop (IER-252) and follow up intercomparisons of dosimetry around both Godiva IV and Flattop (IER-148 and IER-253, respectively). The participants consisted of seven Department of Energy laboratories and one laboratory each from the US Navy, United Kingdom, and France. The participants of the exercise were Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Sandia National Laboratory (SNL); Savannah River Site (SRS); Hanford Site, Missions Support and Test Services (MSTS); Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12); Naval Dosimetry Center (NDC); Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE); and Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN). MSTS dosimeters were included in the irradiations but not reported for evaluation. This report primarily discusses the performance of the 24 hour results submitted by participants, though available final results are briefly discussed. Information for each irradiation performed is provided for participating laboratories to produce their own final report which will be incorporated into the CED-4a report.
The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors a crosscutting technology development (CTD) program addressing common instrumentation & controls (I&C) needs in all DOE-NE sponsored programs. In 2012, DOE-NE initiated the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technology (NEET) Program to conduct research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) in crosscutting technologies that directly support and enable the development of existing, new and advanced reactor designs, and fuel cycle technologies. These technologies will advance the state of nuclear technology, improve its competitiveness, and promote continued contribution to meeting our Nation’s energy and environmental challenges. The NEET Program has spurred innovation in the field of sensors and instrumentation, advanced methods for manufacturing, and cyber security. The Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program is one element of the NEET CTD that has spurred innovation in the measurement science field by funding research on sensors, instrumentation and controls, communication, and advanced analytics that measure system parameters, gauge component control input, and provide power plant owners and operators critical awareness so they can plan and safely manage operational evolutions. The NEET ASI Program has carried out research and development (R&D) required to develop and deploy innovative and advanced sensors, and instrumentation and control capabilities for current and future nuclear energy systems, and to enable the advanced technologies essential to NE’s R&D efforts needed to realize mission goals. The concept of technology readiness assessment is helpful for the classification of instrumentation technology as part of the program strategy. A technology readiness assessment evaluates technology maturity using the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale and was pioneered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the 1980s for space technology. It has recently been adopted to advance fuels and materials. The NEET ASI program objective is to mature instruments technology to TRL 6, which is “demonstration of the technology in relevant environment.” While there may be instances in which a different strategy is justified, the aim of the program is to respond to DOE program and stakeholder needs for nuclear instrumentation then hand off the technology after demonstration for integration in a more complex system, for example an irradiation test, experimental loop or a plant component such as the core, primary system or heat exchanger. A mechanism to continue some level of support from NEET ASI during and after the adoption (for example, to maintain fabrication and calibration capabilities) will be defined as the first example of technology hand off comes to fruition. In addition, several paths exist within DOE to complement NEET ASI activities to extend the maturity beyond TRL, for example through GAIN, technology commercialization funding, and small-business programs. Role of NEET ASI CINR projects in the TRL space, and integration with direct funded demonstration.
The complexity of assuring cyber resilience for physical process interactions in connected systems such as energy grids increases dramatically as the coupling between processes becomes more direct and responsive. An example of this growing complexity is provided by Integrated Energy Systems (IES), in which various processes such as nuclear heat generation and commodity production are being directly coupled for increased responsiveness to highly variable signals such as market pricing or electricity demand. As such, the potential attack surface of the coupled processes is larger than the two processes independently. Securing these complex systems requires two-fold monitoring: cybersecure monitoring for potential malicious incursion, and physics monitoring for system tampering. Physics monitoring includes analyzing the behavior of the signals within the system for anomalous behavior. This analysis has been shown to be insufficient if approached by only data-driven machine learning and artificial intelligence (MLAI) techniques or only low-level model comparison. Previous efforts at Purdue University suggested combining high-fidelity models with MLAI algorithms as a basis for a software tool for detecting anomalies in physical processes. This work built on that suggestion, developing an advanced library for signal decomposition and analysis using both MLAI and high-fidelity physics algorithms for greatly improved anomaly detection, especially false data injection. This software can be used as part of a secure imbedded intelligence (SEI) system designed under Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) for complex coupled systems. This library established a foundation for online and posteriori analysis of digital signals for the purpose of detecting potential malicious tampering in digital signals representing physical processes. Demonstrations carried out throughout the development highlight the effective use of characterization algorithms to detect signal perturbations, particularly triangle attack-style perturbations, in three wide-ranging applications: seismic monitoring, nuclear thermal hydraulics system simulation, and custom manufacturing.
The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is home to four critical assemblies which are used to support of range of missions, including nuclear criticality safety and nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, subcritical systems can also be assembled at NCERC. NCERC is providing critical and subcritical experiments valuable to the nuclear data community and experiments performed at NCERC are often published as benchmarks in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. This manuscript will give a broad overview of recent experiments performed at NCERC, upcoming experiments, and why integral measurements are important and useful to the nuclear data community. The four critical assemblies are GODIVA IV, FLATTOP, COMET, and PLANET. GODIVA IV is a cylindrical metal fast burst reactor, the fourth in the GODIVA series that dates back to the 1950’s. FLATTOP is an highly enriched uranium (HEU) or Pu core reflected by natural uranium. COMET and PLANET are vertical lift assemblies, where one half of the reactor can be lifted to the upper half of the reactor to create a critical system. Some recent experiments include various critical intermediate energy assemblies with lead, and subcritical measurements of plutonium reflected by copper, tungsten, and nickel. Work is also underway to make a better measurement of the critical mass of neptunium, using a neptunium sphere surrounded by nickel shells. Additionally, measurements will be performed next year with HEU shells from Rocky Flats. These HEU shells will be stacked together to make larger systems, allowing for a large range of criticality (from subcritical to delayed critical). Other upcoming measurements include an HEU critical assembly sensitive to intermediate energy neutrons.
Presentation to be given at the FY 2020 SDRD Annual Meeting, to be held Sept. 23-24, on WebEx. Cognitive Hybrid Radio Waveforms for High-Reliability Secure Wireless Communications, STL-013-19, Year 2
The Trinity test of July 16, 1945, marked the scientific apex of the Manhattan Project. Often recognized as the symbolic birth of the nuclear age, Trinity’s multifaceted legacy remains just as captivating and complex today as it did 75 years ago. This paper examines why the test was necessary from a technical standpoint, shows how Los Alamos scientists planned the event, and explores the physical and emotional aftermaths of Trinity. The author also uses rarely accessed original records to reconstruct the story of Trinity’s health hazards, as seen through the eyes of radiation technicians and medical doctors as events unfolded. Trinity was conducted as the Potsdam Conference began, weeks after the collapse of Nazi Germany. It was considered necessary to let President Harry S. Truman know whether the United States possessed a nuclear capability ahead of his negotiations with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet premier. The author examines the competing priorities that drove the timetable for the test: international politics, security, and safety. Three weeks after Trinity, a gun-assembled enriched-uranium bomb called Little Boy was used against the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, Fat Man, a weaponized version of the imploding Trinity device, was dropped on Nagasaki. The author briefly examines these strikes and what impact they may have had on the Japanese surrender. The paper concludes by examining the legacy of the Trinity test 75 years into the age it helped usher in.
The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general-purpose critical assembly facility located within the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. The NCERC is operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.
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