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At least 181 records · Page 10

Cyber-Resilient Design Methodology for Microgrids

Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.

CCE↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLCSite 300: Toxic Emissions Inventory Plan for ABA 2588 California Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987 (Revision 3.0)

The Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act (AB 2588 or the “Act”) was enacted in September 1987. Under the Act, stationary sources are required to report the types and quantities of certain toxic substances their facilities routinely release into the air. AB 2588 is designed to provide information to state and local agencies and to the general public on the extent of airborne emissions from stationary sources and the potential public health impacts of those emissions. The San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District (the District) is mandated by the State to implement AB 2588. On March 6, 2015, The State Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) adopted changes to the Air Toxics Hot Spots Program Guidance Manual for the Preparation of Health Risk Assessments. These revisions were designed to incorporate three technical support documents and to provide enhanced protection of children as required under state law (SB 25, Escutia, 1999). Due to these recent changes, and the corresponding potential increases in calculated health risk, the District notified LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC that we must be re-evaluated under AB 2588. Pursuant to the Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987, we have prepared a comprehensive, site-specific Toxics Emissions Inventory Plan. The plan specifies in detail how LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC will inventory our facility's emissions of all toxic substances on the list of substances subject to the Act. The plan provides a comprehensive and detailed description of the methods that will be used to quantify air releases or potential air releases of listed substances from all points of release. The plan also includes quantification methods which result in accurate and comprehensive characterization of releases and comply with all applicable requirements of the “Hot Spots” regulation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

PEAR Objective 3.2

NTESS and its aviation security industry partners developed the Open Threat Assessment Platform (OTAP), an open-architecture platform project that provides a common set of software interfaces and data standards, for Transportation Security Administration airport screening.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Technology for Thorium Fuel Cycles: Research and Development Needs Assessment and Recommendations

This report presents Safeguards Technology for Thorium Fuel Cycles: Research and Development Needs Assessment and Recommendations prepared for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) Safeguards Program by a multilaboratory team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Y-12 National Security Complex. It documents key findings of a 2-year scoping study on “Safeguards Technology Needs Assessment for Leading Thorium Fuel Cycles” (project OR18-V-SG Tec Needs Th Fuel Cycles-PD1Lb).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Carbon Capture, Transport, & Storage: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment (Final Report)

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. This report was completed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to examine carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture, transport, and storage technologies and associated supply chains that will be required to support the United States (U.S.) decarbonization goals by 2050. Specifically, the analysis sought to understand supply chain bottlenecks to achievingan upper-bound 2.0 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO 2 capture and storage (CCS) per year in the United States. A literature review shows that in aggressive infrastructure deployment scenarios, the United States’ likely upper bound of CCS capacity is 1.7 Gigatons per annum (Gtpa) by 2050. This suggests the study design of 2.0 Gtpa capacity by 2050 is more aggressive yet and represents a conservative upper bound for supply chain analyses.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGITAL I&C SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Food security under high bioenergy demand toward long-term climate goals

Bioenergy is expected to play an important role in the achievement of stringent climate-change mitigation targets requiring the application of negative emissions technology. Using a multi-model framework, we assess the effects of high bioenergy demand on global food production, food security, and competition for agricultural land. Various scenarios simulate global bioenergy demands of 100, 200, 300, and 400 exajoules (EJ) by 2100, with and without a carbon price. Six global energy-economy-agriculture models contribute to this study, with different methodologies and technologies used for bioenergy supply and greenhouse-gas mitigation options for agriculture. We find that the large-scale use of bioenergy, if not implemented properly, would raise food prices and increase the number of people at risk of hunger in many areas of the world. For example, an increase in global bioenergy demand from 200 to 300 EJ causes a -11% to +40% change in food crop prices and decreases food consumption from -45 to -2 kcal person -1 day -1 , leading to an additional 0 to 25 million people at risk of hunger compared with the case of no bioenergy demand (90th percentile range across models). This risk does not rule out the intensive use of bioenergy but shows the importance of its careful implementation, potentially including regulations that protect cropland for food production or for the use of bioenergy feedstock on land that is not competitive with food production.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Geographic Information System Based Emergency Response Training Assessments for DOE Radioactive Materials Transport - 20027

Safety and security are priorities of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive materials shipping campaigns. In the more than 70-year history of domestic transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), there has never been a transportation-related radiological injury. To support transportation planning, among the tools that DOE uses is the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START contains geospatial data and transportation route analyses capabilities designed to support a range of DOE transportation planning initiatives. One of those functions is the capability to support emergency response planning and training for State and Tribal jurisdictions located on routes used for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. As part of the Department's commitment to public safety, DOE provides federally-funded radiological response training to emergency responders along DOE radioactive materials transportation corridors through its Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). START contains spatial data representing the locations and emergency-response capabilities of fire departments, police, hospitals, State emergency response centers, and where TEPP-trained personnel are based. The START tool supports State and Tribal users' ability to evaluate emergency-response coverage on active and potential DOE radioactive materials transport routes through their jurisdictions, provide expected response times to reach the scene of an incident, identify equipment available to support a response, and identify the number of response personnel and their respective training levels. In addition, START can be used to identify gaps in coverage along a transportation corridor where additional radiological emergency response training may be needed. This paper describes the data, features, and functionality DOE uses to provide a resource for emergency response training needs assessments for States and Tribes along active and potential routes for transporting radioactive materials, and illustrates its use. It also discusses future plans to integrate TEPP and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) radiological training data to provide a more comprehensive source of geospatial information on personnel who have received equivalent radiological response training. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Physical Security of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize the security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD is leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions, including dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios are modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures are modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Optimization of Physical Security Posture of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes an ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD was leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions including the dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios were modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Routinely Generated Remote Handled Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory Routinely Generated Remote Handled Low-Level Waste (NEID09MFCRLLW, Revision 7) is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the INL Routinely Generated Remote Handled LLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P. The INL Routinely Generated Remote Handled LLW is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Historic Significance and Current Condition Assessment of Building 06-CP-170, the Yucca Flat Weather Station, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report was produced in partial fulfillment of the mitigation of adverse effects to Building 06-CP-170, the Yucca Flat Weather Station on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and is intended to comply with the 2021 Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-21NA25543 Between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Demolition of Fourteen Buildings and Structures in Area 6 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the MOA). This MOA was executed to resolve adverse effects from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) plan to demolish 14 architectural resources at the Control Point and in the vicinity in Area 6 of the NNSS. The management and operations contractor for the NNSS identified these 14 architectural resources as environmental hazards unsafe for human occupation due to deterioration and rodent infestation. Building 06-CP-170 is scheduled for demolition as part of this undertaking. Building 06-CP-170 was originally recorded in 2018 during a Section 106 cultural resources inventory for a proposed installation of a 138-kilovolt transmission line on the NNSS. The building was determined individually eligible by the DOE, in consultation with the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office, for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criterion A because of its association with nuclear testing. Pursuant to Stipulation III.D.3 of the MOA, this report provides a summary of the historic significance of Building 06-CP-170 and a description of its current condition and accessory resources. In addition, an updated Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form with new information and photographs is included in the appendix in fulfillment of Stipulation III.D.2.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Behavioral Health/Employee Assistance. Interim Program Report FY 2020

The Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL) Corporate Behavioral Health Program is a workplace- based program that: 1) provides Employee Assistance Program (EAP) services including early identification and resolution of personal concerns which may impact job performance, 2) assists managers and the organization in addressing productivity issues, and 3) supports the SNL commitment to provide a safe and healthful work environment. The program is offered to approximately 13,500 employees in New Mexico. The Behavioral Health Program is a corporate program combining services in NM and CA. It is integrated with other occupational health and clinical services including disability, disease management and preventive health programs. In addition, Sandia's Behavioral Health Program provides critical management consultation and psychological assessment services for external organizations including Human Resources, the Department of Energy and Security through the Clinical Evaluation (CE) process, Human Reliability Program (HRP), Protective Force Program, Workplace Violence/Threat Assessment Team (TAT), and Insider Threat Working Group programs. The program supports Sandia National Laboratories' mission to safeguard national security, the environment, and the public; it is a proactive approach to early identification, intervention and assessment. Importantly, it reduces barriers to accessing mental health services and assists with reducing health care costs attributed to illness or injuries related to unhealthy lifestyles and behaviors. The team is comprised of a professional staff including a licensed Clinical Psychologist, a licensed professional clinical counselor (LPCC) and a licensed Marriage and Family counselor (MFT) who is also a Certified Employee Assistance Professional and who holds a doctorate in counseling psychology.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗