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At least 181 records · Page 10

Spacecraft Electrical Connector Selection and Application Processes

This assessment was initiated by the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) after a number of recent "high profile" connector problems, the most visible and publicized of these being the problem with the Space Shuttle's Engine Cut-Off System cryogenic feed-thru connector. The NESC commissioned a review of NASA's connector selection and application processes for space flight applications, including how lessons learned and past problem records are fed back into the processes to avoid recurring issues. Team members were primarily from the various NASA Centers and included connector and electrical parts specialists. The commissioned study was conducted on spacecraft connector selection and application processes at NASA Centers. The team also compared the NASA spacecraft connector selection and application process to the military process, identified recent high profile connector failures, and analyzed problem report data looking for trends and common occurrences. The team characterized NASA's connector problem experience into a list of top connector issues based on anecdotal evidence of a system's impact and commonality between Centers. These top issues are as follows, in no particular rank order: electrically shorted, bent and/or recessed contact pins, contact pin/socket contamination leading to electrically open or intermittencies, connector plating corrosion or corrosion of connector components, low or inadequate contact pin retention forces, contact crimp failures, unmated connectors and mis-wiring due to workmanship errors during installation or maintenance, loose connectors due to manufacturing defects such as wavy washer and worn bayonet retention, damaged connector elastomeric seals and cryogenic connector failure. A survey was also conducted of SAE Connector AE-8C1 committee members regarding their experience relative to the NASA concerns on connectors. The most common responses in order of occurrence were contact retention, plating issues, worn-out or damaged coupling mechanisms, bent pins, contact crimp barrel cracking and torn seals. In addition to these common themes, responses included issues with markings, dimensional errors on the build, contact/socket damage (handling), manufacturing defects and customer misapplication and mishandling. The NESC team concluded that considering the large quantity and wide variety of connectors successfully flown on human and robotic space applications, the number of failures is quite low. However, "high profile" failures with significant cost, schedule, safety, and/or mission success impacts continue to occur. It was also concluded that connector failures occur throughout a system's life-cycle with the majority of connector issues application related. A number of recommendations were identified for improving NASA connector selection processes and overall space connector reliability and performance.

Iannello, Chris↗

AST Critical Propulsion and Noise Reduction Technologies for Future Commercial Subsonic Engines Area of Interest 1.0: Reliable and Affordable Control Systems

The General Electric Reliable and Affordable Controls effort under the NASA Advanced Subsonic Technology (AST) Program has designed, fabricated, and tested advanced controls hardware and software to reduce emissions and improve engine safety and reliability. The original effort consisted of four elements: 1) a Hydraulic Multiplexer; 2) Active Combustor Control; 3) a Variable Displacement Vane Pump (VDVP); and 4) Intelligent Engine Control. The VDVP and Intelligent Engine Control elements were cancelled due to funding constraints and are reported here only to the state they progressed. The Hydraulic Multiplexing element developed and tested a prototype which improves reliability by combining the functionality of up to 16 solenoids and servo-valves into one component with a single electrically powered force motor. The Active Combustor Control element developed intelligent staging and control strategies for low emission combustors. This included development and tests of a Controlled Pressure Fuel Nozzle for fuel sequencing, a Fuel Multiplexer for individual fuel cup metering, and model-based control logic. Both the Hydraulic Multiplexer and Controlled Pressure Fuel Nozzle system were cleared for engine test. The Fuel Multiplexer was cleared for combustor rig test which must be followed by an engine test to achieve full maturation.

Myers, William↗

Lessons Learned From Ventilation and Glovebox Flooding Via Overfilling of the Wet Vacuum System in a Plutonium Facility

In the summer of 2021, operations personnel requested maintenance personnel to fill a wet vacuum (Wetvac) seal water tank in a plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). After the filling was finished, the fill valve of the Wetvac seal water tank was left open and a ‘dead-man’ valve on an isolation line failed to close properly. After a series of other failures, the water exited the glovebox and contaminated three rooms of the first floor of the facility and an underlying area in the basement. A retrospective analysis of this event determined that there was no risk of a criticality due to the inherent design features of the ventilation system. This paper will explain the driving factors behind how this event was able to happen, as well as some of the major lessons learned that can be universally applied to other nuclear facilities. One of the main causes of the event was the delegation of work to maintenance personnel that were not qualified for the work being asked of them. Additionally, there was a lack of coordination between criticality safety engineers and facility operations equipment owners regarding equipment and connections present on the seal water tanks for the Wetvac, specifically the presence of overflow drain lines. The respective criticality safety evaluation credited an overflow drain line being present on the seal water tanks that was later found to have not been present. Lastly, there are lessons to be learned regarding equipment configuration and designing systems with safety in mind.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

HFIR Dissolution Nuclear Criticality Analysis Information

H-Canyon Nuclear and Criticality Safety Engineering has completed development of the documentation necessary to complete the September 30, 2014, H-Canyon PBI milestone that states: Complete the analytical work to develop proposed HFIR Criticality Safety Limits associated with receipt and dissolving of HFIR material. Attached to this memorandum are the following: (1) Attachment 1- HFIR Dissolution Nuclear Criticality Analysis; (2) Attachment 2 - SCALE 5/KENO VI sample input As documented in Attachment 1, the safety of HFIR dissolution in H-Canyon has been evaluated. Due to the composition and geometry of the HFIR elements and the chemistry of the dissolution process, there are no credible criticality events associated with HFIR dissolution, with the exception of potential Pu polymerization. There are no mass, concentration, or soluble poison CSLs required for HFIR dissolution in H-Canyon. If SRNL, in the development of the HFIR flow sheet, determines that Pu polymerization is a credible event, a minimum nitric acid PPL and controls will be developed. However, there is no analysis or CSLs needed for this event. The boron in the borated stainless steel posts is not required, and, therefore, blackness testing is not required for criticality safety.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study. Emergency Diesel Generators 1998–2013

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This report evaluates component performance over time using Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES) data from 1998 through 2013 and maintenance unavailability (UA) performance data using Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Basis Document data from 2002 through 2013. The objective is to present an analysis of factors that could influence the system and component trends in addition to annual performance trends of failure rates and probabilities. The factors analyzed for the EDG component are the differences in failures between all demands and actual unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) demands, differences among manufacturers, and differences among EDG ratings. Statistical analyses of these differences are performed and results showing whether pooling is acceptable across these factors. In addition, engineering analyses were performed with respect to time period and failure mode. The factors analyzed are: sub-component, failure cause, detection method, recovery, manufacturer, and EDG rating.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Unsteady Analyses and Risk Assessment - Part 2

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Design Support of the feasibility of operating conditions and procedures is critical in such cases due to the possibility of startup/shutdown transients, moving shock structures, unsteady shock-boundary layer interactions and engine and diffuser unstart modes that can result in catastrophic failure. Analyses of such systems is difficult due to resolution requirements needed to accurately capture moving shock structures, shock-boundary layer interactions, two-phase flow regimes and engine unstart modes. In a companion paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD, steady analyses advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in the sub-scale A-3 facility. In this paper we will address transient issues with the operation of the facility especially at startup and shutdown, and assess risks related to afterburning due to the interaction of a fuel rich plume with oxygen that is a by-product of the steam ejectors. The primary areas that will be addressed in this paper are: (1) analyses of unstart modes due to flow transients especially during startup/ignition, (2) engine safety during the shutdown process (3) interaction of steam ejectors with the primary plume i.e. flow transients as well as probability of afterburning. In this abstract we discuss unsteady analyses of the engine shutdown process. However, the final paper will include analyses of a staged startup, drawdown of the engine test cell pressure, and risk assessment of potential afterburning in the facility. Unsteady simulations have been carried out to study the engine shutdown process in the facility and understand the physics behind the interactions between the steam ejectors, the test cell and the supersonic diffuser. As a first approximation, to understand the dominant unsteady mechanisms in the engine test cell and the supersonic diffuser, the turning duct in the facility was removed. As the engine loses power a rarefaction wave travels downstream that disrupts the shock cell structure in the supersonic diffuser. Flow from the test cell is seen to expand into the supersonic diffuser section and re-pressurizes the area around the nozzle along with a upstream traveling compression wave that emanates from near the first stage ejectors. Flow from the first stage ejector expands to the center of the duct and a new shock train is formed between the first and second stage ejectors. Both stage ejectors keep the facility pressurized and prevent any large amplitude pressure fluctuations from affecting the engine nozzle. The resultant pressure loads the nozzle experiences in the shutdown process are small.

Ahuja, Vineet↗

A new critical experiment in support of the nuclear criticality safety class - 14488

A new critical experiment has been performed on the Planet vertical assembly machine at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). The purpose of the experiment was to compare the moderator properties of polyethylene versus Lucite and to use the experiment as an instructional tool for criticality safety engineers. The Lucite version of this experiment has been performed many times since the mid-1970's. Similar to the Lucite critical experiment, the polyethylene experiment was designed to emphasize the factors that affect criticality; namely, enrichment, reflection, interaction, moderation, mass, shape, volume, density, concentration, and poisons. The critical mass obtained with the moderating high density polyethylene plates was 997.0 ± 0.65 grams of highly enriched uranium, which is approximately 34% lower than the critical mass obtained using the Lucite moderating plates. This 34% decrease is mostly attributable to the higher hydrogen and carbon atom densities of polyethylene versus Lucite. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Functional Hazard Assessment for the eVTOL Aircraft Supporting Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Applications: Exploratory Demonstrations

The active development community surrounding electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft has demonstrated potential to bring new technological capabilities to market, encouraging visions of widespread and diverse Urban Air Mobility (UAM) applications. New capabilities always come with safety considerations, some familiar and others less so. OEMs who intend to obtain FAA type certification for their eVTOL designs must plan for and execute sufficient safety engineering processes to demonstrate that credible hazards associated with these eVTOL designs are adequately mitigated. This work provides an orientation for eVTOL stakeholders, especially new entrants and those in hybrid roles, to the safety and regulatory context for assuring eVTOL aircraft for UAM applications. We further present selections of functional hazard assessment (FHA) performed on a reference eVTOL concept, with process and decision narration. The exercise allows exploration of several safety considerations specific to eVTOL systems and demonstrates the FHA process together with negotiation of some of its options and variations.

Hazard Analysis↗

Vocabulary of aerospace safety terms pertaining to cryogenic safety, fires, explosions, and structure failure

This vocabulary listing characterizes the contents of over 10,000 documents of the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute's (ASRDI) safety engineering collection. The ASRDI collection is now one of the series accessible on the NASA RECON data base. There are approximately 6,300 postable terms that describe literature in the areas of cryogenic fluid safety, specifically hydrogen, oxygen, liquified natural gas; fire and explosion technology; and the mechanics of structural failure. To facilitate the proper selection of information nonpostable, related and array terms have been included in this listing.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗

A Predictive Safety Management System Software Package Based on the Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology

The goal of this research was to integrate a previously validated and reliable safety model, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM), into a software application. This led to the development of a safety management information system (PSMIS). This means that the theory or principles of the CHTFPM were incorporated in a software package; hence, the PSMIS is referred to as CHTFPM management information system (CHTFPM MIS). The purpose of the PSMIS is to reduce the time and manpower required to perform predictive studies as well as to facilitate the handling of enormous quantities of information in this type of studies. The CHTFPM theory encompasses the philosophy of looking at the concept of safety engineering from a new perspective: from a proactive, than a reactive, viewpoint. That is, corrective measures are taken before a problem instead of after it happened. That is why the CHTFPM is a predictive safety because it foresees or anticipates accidents, system failures and unacceptable risks; therefore, corrective action can be taken in order to prevent all these unwanted issues. Consequently, safety and reliability of systems or processes can be further improved by taking proactive and timely corrective actions.

Quintana, Rolando↗

Current Status of the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Course at Sandia

A hands-on critical-experiment training class has been developed by the US DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program using the water-moderated pin-fueled critical experiments at Sandia National Laboratories. The class is offered as part of the NCSP training program for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers in a facility that allows attendance by both cleared and uncleared personnel. Laboratory exercises have been developed that demonstrate the effects of varying a number of the parameters that are considered important to criticality safety. Accompanying the experiments is a series of classroom presentations that emphasize the concepts that are demonstrated in the experiments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Space shuttle main engine controller

A technical description of the space shuttle main engine controller, which provides engine checkout prior to launch, engine control and monitoring during launch, and engine safety and monitoring in orbit, is presented. Each of the major controller subassemblies, the central processing unit, the computer interface electronics, the input electronics, the output electronics, and the power supplies are described and discussed in detail along with engine and orbiter interfaces and operational requirements. The controller represents a unique application of digital concepts, techniques, and technology in monitoring, managing, and controlling a high performance rocket engine propulsion system. The operational requirements placed on the controller, the extremely harsh operating environment to which it is exposed, and the reliability demanded, result in the most complex and rugged digital system ever designed, fabricated, and flown.

Mattox, R. M.↗

Process and environmental safety of thermochemical conversion of biomass

Biomass presents a promising opportunity for converting waste into valuable energy, fuels, and chemicals through various thermochemical processes, including hydrothermal carbonization, hydrothermal liquefaction, pyrolysis, gasification, and combustion. However, these processes operate under extreme conditions, introducing significant safety hazards that necessitate meticulous management to prevent accidents. This review discusses potential hazards, risk mitigation strategies, and safety management practices, emphasizing the importance of integrated safety measures into the design and operation of these processes. It also highlights the critical need for robust safety engineering and environmental management strategies tailored to each thermo-chemical process. As these processes transition from laboratory to industrial scale, there is an imperative to develop a clear and concise pathway for emerging industries to achieve regulatory compliance, achieve safety certification, and enable effective stewardship of potential fugitive emissions. By addressing safety and environmental concerns, stakeholders can optimize economic benefits, rural development, and achieve sustained domestic energy generation benefits offered by biomass conversion technologies. Further research on plant design optimization, operational safety, environmental evaluation standardization, and innovative waste management solutions will support the safe and effective scaling of these technologies, ultimately contributing to sustainable management and resource recovery.

09 - BIOMASS FUELS↗

Phase modulation failsafe system for multi-kJ lasers based on optical heterodyne detection

Amplification of the transverse scattered component of stimulated Brillouin scattering (SBS) can contribute to optical damage in the large aperture optics of multi-kJ lasers. Because increased laser bandwidth from optical phase modulation (PM) can suppress SBS, high energy laser amplifiers are injected with PM light. Phase modulation distributes the single-frequency spectrum of a master oscillator laser among individual PM sidebands, so a sufficiently high modulation index β can maintain the fluence for all spectral components below the SBS threshold. To avoid injection of single frequency light in the event of a PM failure, a high-speed PM failsafe system (PMFS) must be employed. Because PM is easily converted to AM, essentially all PM failsafes detect AM, with the one described here employing a novel configuration where optical heterodyne detection converts PM to AM, followed by passive AM power detection. Although the PMFS is currently configured for continuous monitoring, it can also detect PM for pulse durations ≥2 ns and could be modified to accommodate shorter pulses. This PMFS was deployed on the Z-Beamlet Laser (ZBL) at Sandia National Laboratories, as required by an energy upgrade to support programs at Sandia’s Z Facility such as magnetized liner inertial fusion. Depending on the origin of a PM failure, the PMFS responds in as little as 7 ns. In the event of an instantaneous failure during initiation of a laser shot, this response time translates to a 30–50 ns margin of safety by blocking a pulse from leaving ZBL’s regenerative amplifier, which prevents injection of single frequency light into the main amplification chain. In conclusion, the performance of the PMFS, without the need for operator interaction, conforms to the principles of engineered safety.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Vulnerability of manned spacecraft to crew loss from orbital debris penetration

Orbital debris growth threatens the survival of spacecraft systems from impact-induced failures. Whereas the probability of debris impact and spacecraft penetration may currently be calculated, another parameter of great interest to safety engineers is the probability that debris penetration will cause actual spacecraft or crew loss. Quantifying the likelihood of crew loss following a penetration allows spacecraft designers to identify those design features and crew operational protocols that offer the highest improvement in crew safety for available resources. Within this study, a manned spacecraft crew survivability (MSCSurv) computer model is developed that quantifies the conditional probability of losing one or more crew members, P(sub loss/pen), following the remote likelihood of an orbital debris penetration into an eight module space station. Contributions to P(sub loss/pen) are quantified from three significant penetration-induced hazards: pressure wall rupture (explosive decompression), fragment-induced injury, and 'slow' depressurization. Sensitivity analyses are performed using alternate assumptions for hazard-generating functions, crew vulnerability thresholds, and selected spacecraft design and crew operations parameters. These results are then used to recommend modifications to the spacecraft design and expected crew operations that quantitatively increase crew safety from orbital debris impacts.

Williamsen, J. E.↗

Mechanistic Fission Gas Release Uncertainty Induced by Microstructure Data

Fission Gas Release (FGR) is an important engineering safety parameter for nuclear fuel. While fuel performance modeling with BISON currently relies on mechanistic models to predict it, comparison with experimental data shows both under or over prediction depending on operation mode (steady or transient).Predicting microstructure data is essential to accurately predicts the engineering scale parameters. An important source of uncertainty in mechanistic models arises from the missing captured physics. Continuous validation and refinement of these models against experimental data are also necessary to ensure their reliability and accuracy in predicting engineering parameters.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗