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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2017

A Targeted Attack For Enhancing Resiliency of Intelligent Intrusion Detection Modules in Energy Cyber Physical Systems

Abstract— Secure high-speed communication is required to ensure proper operation of complex power grid systems and prevent malicious tampering activities. In this paper, artificial neural networks with temporal dependency are introduced for false data identification and mitigation for broadcasted IEC 61850 SMV messages. The fast responses of such intelligent modules in intrusion detection make them suitable for time- critical applications, such as protection. However, care must be taken in selecting the appropriate intelligence model and decision criteria. As such, this paper presents a customizable malware script to sniff and manipulate SMV messages and demonstrates the ability of the malware to trigger false positives in the neural network’s response. The malware developed is intended to be as a vaccine to harden the intrusion detection system against data manipulation attacks by enhancing the neural network’s ability to learn and adapt to these attacks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2024

Motivation and Design of the OCPP Security Service

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is conducting in-depth research aimed at exploring how zero trust security principles can be effectively applied to electric vehicle charging infrastructure. This investigation seeks to enhance the resilience and reliability of these systems against cyber threats, ensuring secure and uninterrupted access to charging services for electric vehicle users and electric supply. Zero trust is a security concept centered on the belief that system operators should not automatically trust users or systems based on their location, whether inside or outside the organization, but instead must verify everything trying to connect to their systems before granting access. A key aspect of the project is to demonstrate and validate zero trust approaches targeted to electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. It has been observed that both open-source and commercial solutions often overlook the specific protocols employed in managing EV charging stations and proceeded with a general, protocol-agnostic approach. While these strategies effectively block non-authorized routes to the charging infrastructure, they do not tackle the situations where attackers may exploit legitimate access channels, such as the inattentive operator model posited by the Idaho National Laboratory. To address this gap, this paper proposes and discusses a new security service targeted to the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which is the de facto protocol for the management of charging stations and serves a critical role in the broader adoption of electric vehicles. The design and architecture of the proposed OCPP security service are discussed in detail, outlining how it aims to safeguard charging station management system (CSMS) functions. The service is particularly important in scenarios where the charging station operator (CSO), responsible for the maintenance and operation of charging stations, and the charging network provider (CNP), which manages the charging network's accessibility and billing, are separate entities. This distinction is crucial because CSOs and CNPs often have different priorities, objectives, and operational responsibilities, which may not always align perfectly. For instance, a CSO might prioritize uptime and customer satisfaction, while a CNP might focus on maximizing revenue and network utilization. Such misalignment can create security vulnerabilities, as each entity might implement different policies and standards, potentially leaving gaps in the overall security posture.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Energy Security and Resilience (ESR) Initiative

Central to achieving reduced carbon emissions and sustained economic recovery from the COVID pandemic is a national energy system based on low-carbon technologies and resistant to disruption from severe weather events and human attacks. NREL’s Energy Security and Resilience (ESR) Initiative applies NREL’s expertise in the design and operation of clean, highly distributed energy systems to the most pressing security and resilience challenges.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages

Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Direct Nonlinear Approximation for Security Region Boundary of Integrated Energy Systems: A Polynomial Chaos Expansion Solution

The strong interdependence of electricity, gas, and heating systems can facilitate fault propagation within integrated energy systems (IESs), posing significant challenges to secure operation. This paper proposes a polynomial chaos expansion (PCE)-based approximation method to accurately characterize the IES security region boundary (IES–SRB). By integrating the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions with PCE theory, the IES-SRB approximation problem is reformulated as a set of nonlinear equations concerning the approximation coefficients. Using the Galerkin projection method, these equations are further transformed into a system of projection equations that govern the polynomial approximation coefficients in the IES-SRB approximation. To reduce computational complexity while maintaining high approximation accuracy, a piecewise polynomial approximation method is proposed. Numerical studies on the E39-G20-H6 and E118-G96-H52 IES test systems demonstrate that the proposed method can accurately and effectively construct IES security regions.

Wu, Chenghao [Northeast Electric Power University]↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate System Security Engineering Approaches

System security engineering (SSE) is a set of formal engineering methods and is considered a subset of systems engineering. It is a relatively new development in systems engineering with the initial NIST (National Institute of Standards) standard published in November of 2016 with updates in 2018, and 2022. The guiding principles in our methodology are based in NIST Special Publication 800-160 Vol. 1 “Systems Security Engineering: Considerations For A Multidisciplinary Approach In The Engineering Of Trustworthy Secure Systems” and integrate methodologies from common IT (Information Technology) threat modeling approaches utilizing MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering). The presentation will discuss how our teams utilize SSE and MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering) to develop secure architectures for systems under development in our NASA aeronautics research environment. This includes the activities to develop Protection Needs (PN) that, in turn result in security requirements in the design context and policies for the future state operational context for system protection. The process of applying SSE to analyze project architectures and ConOps (Concept of Operations) is intended to ensure the transferred research is both secure and securable in a “real-world” setting.

Systems Security Engineering↗

DOE OSTI2022

Wavelet and Deep-Learning-Based Approach for Generation System Problematic Parameters Identification and Calibration

Accurate models of generation systems are critical for maintaining reliable and secure grid operations. In this paper, a novel and systematic approach is proposed to identify and calibrate the generation system problematic parameters using continuous wavelet transform (CWT) and advanced deep-learning technology. The phasor measurement unit (PMU) data are used through “event playback” to check whether the parameter calibration is required, and if yes, a group of suspicious parameters will be identified as the primary problematic parameter candidates (PPCs). These primary PPCs are randomly perturbed to generate the event playback simulation data, which are used by the CWT and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to further narrow down the primary PPCs into a smaller set of candidates. Then, the identified candidates are perturbed again to generate massive event playback simulation data for training a parameter calibration neural network. Here, we designed a multi-output neural network structure to find the mappings between the perturbed parameters and the simulation data using both CNN and long short-term memory (LSTM) models. Finally, the well-trained and tested CNN-LSTM model is used to estimate the accurate value of the suspicious parameters with actual PMU measurements. The proposed CNN-LSTM network can accurately and reliably estimate the generation-system problematic parameters, and has better performance when compared to other machine-learning methods, such as the multilayer perceptron network and the conditional variational autoencoder method. The accuracy and effectiveness of the proposed approach have been validated through simulation and real-world data.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS1989

UNIX security in a supercomputing environment

The author critiques some security mechanisms in most versions of the Unix operating system and suggests more effective tools that either have working prototypes or have been implemented, for example in secure Unix systems. Although no computer (not even a secure one) is impenetrable, breaking into systems with these alternate mechanisms will cost more, require more skill, and be more easily detected than penetrations of systems without these mechanisms. The mechanisms described fall into four classes (with considerable overlap). User authentication at the local host affirms the identity of the person using the computer. The principle of least privilege dictates that properly authenticated users should have rights precisely sufficient to perform their tasks, and system administration functions should be compartmentalized; to this end, access control lists or capabilities should either replace or augment the default Unix protection system, and mandatory access controls implementing multilevel security models and integrity mechanisms should be available. Since most users access supercomputing environments using networks, the third class of mechanisms augments authentication (where feasible). As no security is perfect, the fourth class of mechanism logs events that may indicate possible security violations; this will allow the reconstruction of a successful penetration (if discovered), or possibly the detection of an attempted penetration.

Bishop, Matt↗

NASA NTRS1995

Monte Carlo simulations of precise timekeeping in the Milstar communication satellite system

The Milstar communications satellite system will provide secure antijam communication capabilities for DOD operations into the next century. In order to accomplish this task, the Milstar system will employ precise timekeeping on its satellites and at its ground control stations. The constellation will consist of four satellites in geosynchronous orbit, each carrying a set of four rubidium (Rb) atomic clocks. Several times a day, during normal operation, the Mission Control Element (MCE) will collect timing information from the constellation, and after several days use this information to update the time and frequency of the satellite clocks. The MCE will maintain precise time with a cesium (Cs) atomic clock, synchronized to UTC(USNO) via a GPS receiver. We have developed a Monte Carlo simulation of Milstar's space segment timekeeping. The simulation includes the effects of: uplink/downlink time transfer noise; satellite crosslink time transfer noise; satellite diurnal temperature variations; satellite and ground station atomic clock noise; and also quantization limits regarding satellite time and frequency corrections. The Monte Carlo simulation capability has proven to be an invaluable tool in assessing the performance characteristics of various timekeeping algorithms proposed for Milstar, and also in highlighting the timekeeping capabilities of the system. Here, we provide a brief overview of the basic Milstar timekeeping architecture as it is presently envisioned. We then describe the Monte Carlo simulation of space segment timekeeping, and provide examples of the simulation's efficacy in resolving timekeeping issues.

Camparo, James C.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Virtualized Multi-Mission Operations Center (vMMOC) and its Cloud Services

His presentation will cover, the current and future, technical and organizational opportunities and challenges with virtualizing a multi-mission operations center. The full deployment of Goddard Space Flight Centers (GSFC) Virtualized Multi-Mission Operations Center (vMMOC) is nearly complete. The Space Science Mission Operations (SSMO) organizations spacecraft ACE, Fermi, LRO, MMS(4), OSIRIS-REx, SDO, SOHO, Swift, and Wind are in the process of being fully migrated to the vMMOC. The benefits of the vMMOC will be the normalization and the standardization of IT services, mission operations, maintenance, and development as well as ancillary services and policies such as collaboration tools, change management systems, and IT Security. The vMMOC will also provide operational efficiencies regarding hardware, IT domain expertise, training, maintenance and support.The presentation will also cover SSMO's secure Situational Awareness Dashboard in an integrated, fleet centric, cloud based web services fashion. Additionally the SSMO Telemetry as a Service (TaaS) will be covered, which allows authorized users and processes to access telemetry for the entire SSMO fleet, and for the entirety of each spacecrafts history. Both services leverage cloud services in a secure FISMA High and FedRamp environment, and also leverage distributed object stores in order to house and provide the telemetry. The services are also in the process of leveraging the cloud computing services elasticity and horizontal scalability. In the design phase is the Navigation as a Service (NaaS) which will provide a standardized, efficient, and normalized service for the fleet's space flight dynamics operations. Additional future services that may be considered are Ground Segment as a Service (GSaaS), Telemetry and Command as a Service (TCaaS), Flight Software Simulation as a Service, etc.

Ido, Haisam Kassim↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, thus, improving the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2025

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2022

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗

DOE OSTI2019

Widespread Loss of Communications in Grid Systems: Impacts and Response Strategies

This report explores the reliance on communication systems for bulk grid operations and considers selected options as a supplement to cyber security. The extreme scenario of a complete loss of communications for power grid operation is assessed, presenting a bounded, worst-case perspective. The paper explores grid communications failures and how a system modifications can, at an increased cost, retain a moderate level of preparedness for a loss of communications and control when used in partnership with cyber security protocols. Doing so allows the increased economic and secure operation that communication based controls affords, but also ensures a level of resilient operation if they are lost. The motivation of this paper is due to the proliferation of photovoltaic (PV) resources, and more generally, smart-grid resources within the US grid, which are requiring more and more active and wide-area controls. Though the loss of communication and control can affect nearly any grid control system, the risk of losing load at large scales requires a broad view of system interconnectivity, so it has been evaluated from a transmission perspective in this report.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Enhancing Security and Resiliency in Operational Technology Environments Through Network Slicing and Federated Learning

The growing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) within Industry 4.0 environments has introduced new demands on industrial network infrastructure. As cyber-physical systems become increasingly interconnected, ensuring the secure, timely, and efficient exchange of critical data is essential. This thesis explores how network slicing, a method of creating isolated virtual network segments, can be applied within OT environments to address challenges such as latency, security, and resource allocation. The first research question addressed in this thesis is: How can OT networks take advantage of NFV and SDN technology to become cyber resilient? This study examines the operational, security, and architectural implications of introducing network slicing into traditionally static OT infrastructures such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA. Through simulated deployments and case studies, the research demonstrates how slicing enables better isolation between critical and non-critical services, thereby improving response time, throughput, and security in sensitive environments. The second question considers: How to dynamically implement network slicing and take advantage of network resources towards integrating decentralized machine learning? In response, this thesis proposes a framework that combines Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Federated Learning (FL) to enable real-time analytics while maintaining data locality. The proposed approach reduces the burden on centralized infrastructure and minimizes privacy risks by supporting on-site training of models across distributed OT nodes, coordinated through dynamically allocated network slices. The third focus explores: How slicing helps to increase the resiliency of OT networks through the orchestration of a dynamic DMZ? To answer this, the thesis presents a method for creating and managing Dynamic Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) using network slicing. This enables flexible and automated isolation of sensitive subsystems during threat scenarios or high-risk operations. Coupled with intelligent orchestration and containerized security services, the dynamic DMZ significantly enhances the system's ability to respond to cyber incidents without halting production. Ultimately, this thesis contributes a comprehensive architecture that blends network slicing with machine learning, secure segmentation, and automation, paving the way for resilient, adaptive, and intelligent OT environments. Performance evaluations across multiple scenarios show improvements in system reliability, threat response time, model accuracy, and resource utilization, providing a strong foundation for future industrial automation systems.

Rodiles Delgado, Brian G↗

DOE OSTI2024

Nuclear Computational Resource Center Progress and Status Report

The Nuclear Computational Resource Center (NCRC) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), supported by the United States Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), provides access to supercomputer systems and protected software in support of nuclear energy research and development. The NCRC vision recognizes the central role modeling and simulation plays in nuclear energy innovation as well as ensuring the safe, secure, and efficient operations of existing nuclear energy systems. To accomplish this vision, the NCRC supports processes and systems which provide access to computational tools, supercomputing systems, and training in support of nuclear energy innovation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2014

Review of Enabling Technologies to Facilitate Secure Compute Customization

High performance computing environments are often used for a wide variety of workloads ranging from simulation, data transformation and analysis, and complex workflows to name just a few. These systems may process data for a variety of users, often requiring strong separation between job allocations. There are many challenges to establishing these secure enclaves within the shared infrastructure of high-performance computing (HPC) environments. The isolation mechanisms in the system software are the basic building blocks for enabling secure compute enclaves. There are a variety of approaches and the focus of this report is to review the different virtualization technologies that facilitate the creation of secure compute enclaves. The report reviews current operating system (OS) protection mechanisms and modern virtualization technologies to better understand the performance/isolation properties. We also examine the feasibility of running ``virtualized'' computing resources as non-privileged users, and providing controlled administrative permissions for standard users running within a virtualized context. Our examination includes technologies such as Linux containers (LXC [32], Docker [15]) and full virtualization (KVM [26], Xen [5]). We categorize these different approaches to virtualization into two broad groups: OS-level virtualization and system-level virtualization. The OS-level virtualization uses containers to allow a single OS kernel to be partitioned to create Virtual Environments (VE), e.g., LXC. The resources within the host's kernel are only virtualized in the sense of separate namespaces. In contrast, system-level virtualization uses hypervisors to manage multiple OS kernels and virtualize the physical resources (hardware) to create Virtual Machines (VM), e.g., Xen, KVM. This terminology of VE and VM, detailed in Section 2, is used throughout the report to distinguish between the two different approaches to providing virtualized execution environments. As part of our technology review we analyzed several current virtualization solutions to assess their vulnerabilities. This included a review of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) for Xen, KVM, LXC and Docker to gauge their susceptibility to different attacks. The complete details are provided in Section 5 on page 33. Based on this review we concluded that system-level virtualization solutions have many more vulnerabilities than OS level virtualization solutions. As such, security mechanisms like sVirt (Section 3.3) should be considered when using system-level virtualization solutions in order to protect the host against exploits. The majority of vulnerabilities related to KVM, LXC, and Docker are in specific regions of the system. Therefore, future "zero day attacks" are likely to be in the same regions, which suggests that protecting these areas can simplify the protection of the host and maintain the isolation between users. The evaluations of virtualization technologies done thus far are discussed in Section 4. This includes experiments with 'user' namespaces in VEs, which provides the ability to isolate user privileges and allow a user to run with different UIDs within the container while mapping them to non-privileged UIDs in the host. We have identified Linux namespaces as a promising mechanism to isolate shared resources, while maintaining good performance. In Section 4.1 we describe our tests with LXC as a non-root user and leveraging namespaces to control UID/GID mappings and support controlled sharing of parallel file-systems. We highlight several of these namespace capabilities in Section 6.2.3. The other evaluations that were performed during this initial phase of work provide baseline performance data for comparing VEs and VMs to purely native execution. In Section 4.2 we performed tests using the High-Performance Computing Conjugate Gradient (HPCCG) benchmark to establish baseline performance for a scientific application when run on the Native (host) machine in contrast with execution under Docker and KVM. Our tests verified prior studies showing roughly 2-4% overheads in application execution time & MFlops when running in hypervisor-base environments (VMs) as compared to near native performance with VEs. For more details, see Figures 4.5 (page 28), 4.6 (page 28), and 4.7 (page 29). Additionally, in Section 4.3 we include network measurements for TCP bandwidth performance over the 10GigE interface in our testbed. The Native and Docker based tests achieved >= ~9Gbits/sec, while the KVM configuration only achieved 2.5Gbits/sec (Table 4.6 on page 32). This may be a configuration issue with our KVM installation, and is a point for further testing as we refine the network settings in the testbed. The initial network tests were done using a bridged networking configuration. The report outline is as follows: - Section 1 introduces the report and clarifies the scope of the proj...

Aderholdt, Ferrol↗