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A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

IAEA Inspections for Undeclared and Declared Activities: Is a More Robust Approach Needed?

The United States has long supported a strong international safeguards system and for many years has served as the foremost supplier of technology, equipment, and training to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it drew in many instances on DOE sponsored R&D and training that was directed towards domestic safeguards and then adapted for IAEA purposes. This was relatively straightforward because of the strong overlap between the development of nuclear material accountancy measures needed for both domestic and international purposes. Two factors have emerged that have made this strong reliance on domestic measures less and less able to be a source of support for the IAEA. One is the shift by the IAEA safeguards system towards detecting undeclared activities. The second is the shift of domestic attention away from nuclear material accountancy and towards physical protection. As a result, a gap in US sponsored R&D and training relevant to international safeguards has developed. The NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the DOE NA-22 Safeguards R&D program are intended to help fill this gap and, thereby, permit the U.S. to remain as the pre-eminent supplier of technology for international safeguards purposes. In this context, IAEA challenges have been examined from the perspective of detecting the diversion of nuclear material from declared stocks; detecting undeclared production of nuclear material and activities at locations declared under INFCIRC/153; and detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities elsewhere in a state. Of these, the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is, perhaps, the IAEA’s most significant challenge. It is a challenge that even the international community finds difficult to meet because of the scope and the geographic scale of the problem, the technical constraints, the knowledge required, and the significant resources needed to deploy effective systems world-wide (e.g., satellite surveillance systems). The IAEA’s success in carrying out this mission hinges on its capability to evaluate the declarations made by the state for completeness, correctness, and consistency in order to detect possible indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Three elements go into this evaluation: (1) evaluating the internal consistency of a State’s declaration and comparing it to information gathered by IAEA inspectors on the basis of their access to the locations, facilities, sites, personnel, and documents disclosed in the state’s declarations; (2) comparison of States’ declarations with other information available to the IAEA, including the information it gathers from its review of open sources, including scientific and technical literature and data bases, trade journals, and media reports; and (3) its ability to archive, retrieve, organize, and analyze all available information for indications of potential undeclared nuclear material and activities, and, when warranted, to request states to provide further information and access in order to investigate and clarify any questions or inconsistencies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DHS Summary Report -- Robert Weldon

This summer I worked on benchmarking the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory fission multiplicity capability used in the Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX. This work involved running simulations and then comparing the simulation results with experimental experiments. Outlined in this paper is a brief description of the work completed this summer, skills and knowledge gained, and how the internship has impacted my planning for the future. Neutron multiplicity counting is a neutron detection technique that leverages the multiplicity emissions of neutrons from fission to identify various actinides in a lump of material. The identification of individual actinides in lumps of material crossing our boarders, especially U-235 and Pu-239, is a key component for maintaining the safety of the country from nuclear threats. Several multiplicity emission options from spontaneous and induced fission already existed in MCNPX 2.4.0. These options can be accessed through use of the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed a physics model for the simulation of neutron and gamma ray emission from fission and photofission that was included in MCNPX 2.7.B as an undocumented feature and then was documented in MCNPX 2.7.C. The LLNL multiplicity capability provided a different means for MCNPX to simulate neutron and gamma-ray distributions for neutron induced, spontaneous and photonuclear fission reactions. The original testing on the model for implementation into MCNPX was conducted by Gregg McKinney and John Hendricks. The model is an encapsulation of measured data of neutron multiplicity distributions from Gwin, Spencer, and Ingle, along with the data from Zucker and Holden. One of the founding principles of MCNPX was that it would have several redundant capabilities, providing the means of testing and including various physics packages. Though several multiplicity sampling methodologies already existed within MCNPX, the LLNL fission multiplicity was included to provide a separate capability for computing multiplicity as well as including several new features not already included in MCNPX. These new features include: (1) prompt gamma emission/multiplicity from neutron-induced fission; (2) neutron multiplicity and gamma emission/multiplicity from photofission; and (3) an option to enforce energy correlation for gamma neutron multiplicity emission. These new capabilities allow correlated signal detection for identifying presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Therefore, these new capabilities help meet the missions of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which is tasked with developing nuclear detection strategies for identifying potential radiological and nuclear threats, by providing new simulation capability for detection strategies that leverage the new available physics in the LLNL multiplicity capability. Two types of tests were accomplished this summer to test the default LLNL neutron multiplicity capability: neutron-induced fission tests and spontaneous fission tests. Both cases set the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card to 5 (i.e. use LLNL multiplicity). The neutron-induced fission tests utilized a simple 0.001 cm radius sphere where 0.0253 eV neutrons were released at the sphere center. Neutrons were forced to immediately collide in the sphere and release all progeny from the sphere, without further collision, using the LCA card, LCA 7j -2 (therefore density and size of the sphere were irrelevant). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific multiplicity did not exceed 0.36%. Neutron-induced fission multiplicities were computed for U-233, U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241. The spontaneous fission tests also used the same spherical geometry, except: (1) the LCA card was removed; (2) the density of the sphere was set to 0.001 g/cm3; and (3) instead of emitting a thermal neutron, the PAR keyword was set to PAR=SF. The purpose of the small density was to ensure that the spontaneous fission neutrons would not further interact and induce fissions (i.e. the mean free path greatly exceeded the size of the sphere). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific spontaneous multiplicity did not exceed 0.23%. Spontaneous fission multiplicities were computed for U-238, Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242, Cm-242, and Cm-244. All of the computed results were compared against experimental results compiled by Holden at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al

The ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al(I{sup {pi}}=5/2{sup +},T{sub 1/2}=644(25) ms) has been measured by means of {beta}-ray-detected nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy using a spin-polarized {sup 31}Al beam produced in the projectile fragmentation reaction. The obtained Q moment, |Q{sub exp}({sup 31}Al)|=112(32) e mb, is in agreement with conventional shell model calculations within the sd valence space. Previous results on the magnetic moment also support the validity of the sd model in this isotope, and thus it is concluded that {sup 31}Al is located outside of the island of inversion.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to detect and analyze undeclared processing or production of special nuclear material. Los Alamos National Laboratory is currently investigating potential uses of LIBS for safeguards applications, including (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples in real to near-real time (typical analysis time are on the order of minutes) across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements like plutonium and uranium, (2) a LIBS system that can be deployed in harsh environments such as hot cells and glove boxes providing relative compositional analysis of process streams for example ratios like Cm/Up and Cm/U, (3) an inspector field deployable system that can be used to analyze the elemental composition of microscopic quantities of samples containing plutonium and uranium, and (4) a high resolution LIBS system that can be used to determine the isotopic composition of samples containing for example uranium, plutonium... etc. In this paper, we will describe our current development and performance testing results for LIBS instrumentation both in a fixed lab and measurements in field deployable configurations.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Tracking of Nuclear Production using Indigenous Species: Final LDRD Report

Our LDRD research project sought to develop an analytical method for detection of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Our approach is distinctly different than current research involving hardware-based sensors. By utilizing the response of indigenous species of plants and/or animals surrounding (or within) a nuclear processing facility, we propose tracking 'suspicious molecules' relevant to nuclear materials processing. As proof of concept, we have examined TBP, tributylphosphate, used in uranium enrichment as well as plutonium extraction from spent nuclear fuels. We will compare TBP to the TPP (triphenylphosphate) analog to determine the uniqueness of the metabonomic response. We show that there is a unique metabonomic response within our animal model to TBP. The TBP signature can further be delineated from that of TPP. We have also developed unique methods of instrumental transfer for metabonomic data sets.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Demonstration of the neutron tracking capability of NEXT array in time-of-flight measurements to improve energy resolution

Precise neutron-energy measurements are required to probe the nuclear structure effects of neutron-rich nuclei, where β-delayed neutron emission becomes a dominant decay mode. The Neutron dEtector with Xn Tracking (NEXT) array has been designed and constructed to measure β-delayed neutrons with better energy resolution. The new design localizes the neutron interaction position by optically segmenting the detector along the direction of the neutron flight path, reducing the associated uncertainties in the neutron time-of-flight measurements. This significantly improves the energy resolution without losing the necessary detection efficiency. The proof-of-principle and efficiency measurements showed promising results. Herein, this article details the implementation of the neutron tracking capability of NEXT array in time-of-flight measurements.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Discussion - Next Step for Fukushima Daiichi Muon Tomography

Specification of Fukushima Daiichi Muon Tomography (FMT): (1) 18-feet (5.5-m) drift tube, 2-inch (5-cm) diameter; (2) 108 tubes per layer; (3) Unit layer = 2 layer (detection efficiency: 0.96 x 0.96 = 92%); (4) 12 or 16 layer per module; (5) 16 layers allows momentum analysis at 30% level; (6) 2 module per super module (5.5 x 11 m{sup 2}); and (7) FMT = 2 super module. By deploying MMT next to a research reactor, we will be able to measure the impact of low level radiation fields on muon tomography and reconstruction processes. Radiation level during reactor operation is {approx}50 {micro}Sv/h which provides similar radiation environment of inside the FMT radiation shield at Fukushima Daiichi. We will implement coincidence algorithm on the FPGA board.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Summary Report for the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School 2012

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosted students from across the United States at the inaugural Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School from June 11 – 22, 2012. The summer school provided students with a unique understanding of nuclear security challenges faced in the field and exposed them to the technical foundations, analyses, and insight that will be required by future leaders in technology development and implementation. The course heavily emphasized laboratory and field demonstrations including direct measurements of special nuclear material. The first week of the summer school focused on the foundational knowledge required by technology practitioners; the second week focused on contemporary applications. Student evaluations and feedback from student advisors indicates that the summer school achieved its objectives of 1) exposing students to the range of nuclear security applications for which radiation detection is necessary, 2) articulating the relevance of student research into the broader context, and 3) exciting students about the possibility of future careers in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Optimized {gamma}-Multiplicity Based Spin Assignments of s-Wave Neutron Resonances

The multiplicity of -ray emission following neutron capture at isolated resonances carries valuable information on the resonance spin. Several methods utilizing this information have been developed. The latest method was recently introduced for analyzing the data from time-of-flight measurements with 4 -calorimetric detection systems. The present paper describes a generalization of this method. The goal is the separation of the -emission yields belonging to the two neutron capturing state spins of isolated (or even unresolved) s-wave neutron resonances on targets with non-zero spin. The formalism for performing this separation is described and then tested on artificially generated data. This new method was applied to the -multiplicity data obtained for the 147Sm(n, )148Sm reaction using the DANCE detector system at the LANSCE facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The analyzing power of the upgraded method is supported by combined dicebox and geant4 simulations of the fluctuation properties of the multiplicity distributions.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Symmetric Pin Diversion Detection using a Partial Defect Detector (PDET)

Since the signature from the Partial Defect Detector (PDET) is principally dependent on the geometric layout of the guide tube locations, the capability of the technique in detecting symmetric diversion of pins needs to be determined. The Monte Carlo simulation study consisted of cases where pins were removed in a symmetric manner and the resulting signatures were examined. In addition to the normalized gamma-to-neutron ratios, the neutron and gamma signatures normalized to their maximum values, were also examined. Examination of the shape of the three curves as well as of the peak-to-valley differences in excess of the maximum expected in intact assemblies, indicated pin diversion. A set of simulations with various symmetric patterns of diversion were examined. The results from these studies indicated that symmetric diversions as low as twelve percent could be detected by this methodology.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Modelling populations of kilonovae

Abstract The 2017 detection of a kilonova coincident with gravitational-wave emission has identified neutron star mergers as the major source of the heaviest elements and dramatically constrained alternative theories of gravity. Observing a population of such sources has the potential to transform cosmology, nuclear physics, and astrophysics. However, with only one confident multi-messenger detection currently available, modelling the diversity of signals expected from such a population requires improved theoretical understanding. In particular, models that are quick to evaluate and are calibrated with more detailed multi-physics simulations are needed to design observational strategies for kilonovae detection and to obtain rapid-response interpretations of new observations. We use grey-opacity models to construct populations of kilonovae, spanning ejecta parameters predicted by numerical simulations. Our modelling focuses on wavelengths relevant for upcoming optical surveys, such as the Rubin Observatory Legacy Survey of Space and Time (LSST). In these simulations, we implement heating rates that are based on nuclear reaction network calculations. We create a Gaussian-process emulator for kilonova grey opacities, calibrated with detailed radiative transfer simulations. Using recent fits to numerical relativity simulations, we predict how the ejecta parameters from binary neutron star (BNS) mergers shape the population of kilonovae, accounting for the viewing-angle dependence. Our simulated population of BNS mergers produce peak i-band absolute magnitudes of −20 ≤ Mi ≤ −11. A comparison with detailed radiative transfer calculations indicates that further improvements are needed to accurately reproduce spectral shapes over the full light curve evolution.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Improved scintillation detector performance via a method of enhanced layered coatings

Increasing demand for better detection performance with a simultaneous reduction in size, weight and power consumption has motivated the use of compact semiconductors as photo-converters for many gamma-ray and neutron scintillators. The spectral response of devices such as silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) is poorly matched to many common high-performance scintillators. We have developed a generalized analytical method that utilizes an optical reference database to match scintillator luminescence to the excitation spectrum of high quantum efficiency semiconductor detectors. This is accomplished by the fabrication and application of a series of high quantum yield, short fluorescence lifetime, wavelengthshifting coatings. Furthermore, we show here a 22% increase in photoelectron collection and a 10% improvement in energy resolution when applying a layered coating to an APD-coupled, cerium-doped, yttrium oxyorthosilicate (YSO:Ce) scintillator. Wavelength-shifted radioluminescence emission and rise time analysis are also discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of a Time-tagged Neutron Source for SNM Detection

Associated particle imaging (API) is a powerful technique for special nuclear material (SNM) detection and characterization of fissile material configurations. A sealed-tube neutron generator has been under development by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory to reduce the beam spot size on the neutron production target to 1 mm in diameter for a several-fold increase in directional resolution and simultaneously increases the maximum attainable neutron flux. A permanent magnet 2.45 GHz microwave-driven ion source has been adopted in this time-tagged neutron source. This type of ion source provides a high plasma density that allows the use of a sub-millimeter aperture for the extraction of a sufficient ion beam current and lets us achieve a much reduced beam spot size on target without employing active focusing. The design of this API generator uses a custom-made radial high voltage insulator to minimize source to neutron production target distance and to provide for a simple ion source cooling arrangement. Preliminary experimental results showed that more than 100 µA of deuterium ions have been extracted, and the beam diameter on the neutron production target is around 1 mm.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A CZT-based radioxenon detection system in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Here in this work, a prototype radioxenon detection system was designed, developed and tested at Oregon State University to study the response of CdZnTe (CZT) detectors to xenon radioisotopes for monitoring nuclear explosions. The detector utilizes two coplanar CZT detectors and measures xenon radioisotopes through beta-gamma coincidence detection between the two detection elements. The CZT-based detection system offers excellent energy resolution and background count rate compared with scintillator-based beta-gamma coincidence detectors currently in operation at the IMS stations. In this paper, we briefly discuss the detector design and report our recent measurement results with 131mXe, 133mXe, and 133Xe produced in the TRIGA reactor at OSU.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗