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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Analysis of CSIRT/SOC Incidents and Continuous Monitoring of Threats

Security Operations Centers (SOC) contain a wealth of data which, if properly classified and tagged upfront, can yield a wealth of real-time information about your organizations IT Security posture, risks, and threats. These include answers to relevant and actionable questions such as: What are our biggest threats? Who is attacking us and what do they want? What controls are working or not working? How effective was the new technology we just implemented? What is our ROI?

Wang, John↗
NASA NTRS2011

Contribution of Near Real Time MODIS-Based Forest Disturbance Detection Products to a National Forest Threat Early Warning System

U.S. forests occupy approx. 751 million acres (approx. 1/3 of total land). These forests are exposed to multiple biotic and abiotic threats that collectively damage extensive acreages each year. Hazardous forest disturbances can threaten human life and property, bio-diversity and water supplies. Timely regional forest monitoring products are needed to aid forest management and decision making by the US Forest Service and its state and private partners. Daily MODIS data products provide a means to monitor regional forest disturbances on a weekly basis. In response, we began work in 2006 to develop a Near Real Time (NRT) forest monitoring capability, based on MODIS NDVI data, as part of a national forest threat early warning system (EWS)

Spruce, Joseph↗
NASA NTRS2015

Overview of Threats and Failure Models for Safety-Relevant Computer-Based Systems

This document presents a high-level overview of the threats to safety-relevant computer-based systems, including (1) a description of the introduction and activation of physical and logical faults; (2) the propagation of their effects; and (3) function-level and component-level error and failure mode models. These models can be used in the definition of fault hypotheses (i.e., assumptions) for threat-risk mitigation strategies. This document is a contribution to a guide currently under development that is intended to provide a general technical foundation for designers and evaluators of safety-relevant systems.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2014

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗
NASA NTRS2019

Advancing Asteroid Threat Assessment

Asteroid Threat Assessment for Planetary Defense [Asteroid Threat Assessment Project (TAP) at NASA Ames Research Center]. Objectives: Develop models and data to characterize the potential damage and risks due to asteroid strikes on Earth. Provide results that can help guide decisions and planning: Asteroid surveys; Mitigation systems; Disaster response.

Wheeler, Lorien↗
NASA NTRS2021

Interactions Between Two Existential Threats: COVID-19 and Climate Change

The COVID-19 pandemic and climate change are complex existential threats, unpredictable in many ways and unprecedented in modern times. There are parallels between the scale and scope of their impacts and responses. Understanding shared drivers, coupled vulnerabilities, and criteria for effective responses will help societies worldwide prepare for the simultaneous threats of climate change and future pandemics. We summarize some shared characteristics of COVID-19 and climate change impacts and interventions and discuss key policy implications and recommendations.

Climate change adaptation↗
DOE OSTI2010

A Risk Management Approach to the "Insider Threat"

Abstract Recent surveys indicate that the financial impact and operating losses due to insider intrusions are increasing. But these studies often disagree on what constitutes an insider; indeed, many define it only implicitly. In theory, appropriate selection of, and enforcement of, properly specified security policies should prevent legitimate users from abusing their access to computer systems, information, and other resources. However, even if policies could be expressed precisely, the natural mapping between the natural language expression of a security policy, and the expression of that policy in a form that can be implemented on a computer system or network, creates gaps in enforcement. This paper defines insider precisely, in terms of these gaps, and explores an access-based model for analyzing threats that include those usually termed insider threats. This model enables an organization to order its resources based on the business value for that resource and of the information it contains. By identifying those users with access to high-value resources, we obtain an ordered list of users who can cause the greatest amount of damage. Concurrently with this, we examine psychological indicators in order to determine which users are at the greatest risk of acting inappropriately.We conclude by examining how to merge this model with one of forensic logging and auditing.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Bio-threat microparticle simulants

A bio-threat simulant that includes a carrier and DNA encapsulated in the carrier. Also a method of making a simulant including the steps of providing a carrier and encapsulating DNA in the carrier to produce the bio-threat simulant.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Bio-threat microparticle simulants

A bio-threat simulant that includes a carrier and DNA encapsulated in the carrier. Also a method of making a simulant including the steps of providing a carrier and encapsulating DNA in the carrier to produce the bio-threat simulant.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

Schanfein, Mark J.↗
DOE OSTI2018

DETECTION OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL AS CRIMINAL/UNAUTHORIZED THREATS TO MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS

Major Public Events (MPEs), by their nature, draw great public interest and receive intense media attention. They can be anything from sporting events (e.g., Olympics, World Cups) to political summits to large festivals. The threat of nuclear or other radiological materials out of regulatory control during these events is of particular concern. A terrorist could use this material as a dirty bomb to disperse radioactive material in a stadium, or hide dangerous radioactive sources in a garbage can to expose people to harmful radiation, leading to fear and uncertainty. The requirements for nuclear security, preparedness, and operational capabilities for nuclear/radiological detection at MPEs have steadily increased in recent years. Many countries have gained considerable experience in recent years in nuclear security operations at MPEs when hosting these events. Dozens of MPEs hosted around the world each year now provide some level of nuclear security as part of their overall security plan. Several training workshops and courses, co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and conducted through bilateral agreements, are offered each year. These workshops and courses provide the opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned and aid countries to build capacity for nuclear security at their MPEs. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides guidance for the detection of radiological threat materials out of regulatory control through the Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for Advanced Reactors (Conference Presentation)

The next generation of Advanced Reactors include planned capabilities for both Autonomous (operating without human interaction for a set period-of-time) and Remote (operating with human interaction from a separate physical location) Operations. Existing Nuclear Reactor architectures include a set of safety and security constraints tightly coupled with personnel policies and procedures. As Advanced Reactors are fielded with these new Autonomous and Remote operational capabilities, the architectures and associated infrastructure services and components will perceivably expand the overall attack surface and risk calculations with regards to safe and secure operations. This paper is part of an FY21 work program focused on ensuring Advanced Reactor designs are informed with threat-based guidance on design and operation of Secure Architectures with a specific focus on the deployment of Autonomous Systems in support of Advanced Reactor Operations. The next phase of this research program is to complement produce a methodology for assessment of the cyber threat against these architectures as well as a catalogue of Use Cases to support the Advanced Reactor community in their implementation of Autonomous and Remote Operations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Insider Risk Threat to the Internet of Things (IoT)

Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2012

Status of Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Activities Underway to Address Major Domestic Radiological Security Challenges - 12105

During their service lives, radioactive sealed sources are used for a wide variety of essential purposes. However, each year, thousands of radioactive sealed sources that pose a potential risk to national security, health, and safety become disused and unwanted in the United States. Due to their concentrated activity and portability, these sources could be used in radiological dispersal devices ('dirty bombs'). For more than a decade, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. Department of Energy, through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Offsite Source Recovery Project (GTRI/OSRP), have facilitated the removal and disposition of thousands of disused/unwanted sources worldwide. However, the ability of GTRI/OSRP to continue its work is critically dependent on the ability to transport and appropriately dispose of these sources. On that front, GTRI/OSRP progress includes development of two prototype Type B transport containers and significant efforts toward certification, increased commercial disposal access for risk-significant sealed sources at commercial sites, and cooperation through the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase source repatriation. Disused sealed sources continue to pose a national security concern. The impact of a dirty bomb detonation could be costly both financially and to those exposed to the resulting radiation. However, significant progress has been made since 2008 on each of the challenges identified in the DHS Sealed Source Security Workshop. Not only will there be increased opportunity for commercial disposal of many sizes and types of sealed sources, but also stakeholders are studying front-end solutions to the problem of disused sealed sources, such as financial assurance and recycle. The lack of sealed source transport containers is also likely to be mitigated with the development and certification by NNSA of two new Type B models. Internationally, increased efforts at source repatriation will mitigate the threat posed by disused sealed sources abroad. Sealed sources provide irreplaceable benefits to those who use them or who benefit from their use; now stakeholders are rising to the challenge of ensuring that those benefits are safely and securely realized. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Feasibility of Applying a Human Bio-signals Monitoring to Minimize Insider Threats

With the on-going global war on terror, a potential terrorist attack on a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is getting a lot of attention. In particular, the potential threat of an insider is a major concern as it could lead to the loss of a nationally critical asset and thus deserves serious consideration. The current approach to preventing an insider threat is the Insider Mitigation Program (IMP) based on periodic self-assessment or peer and manager review of specific employees. These are potentially biased and subjective assessments and are unreliable. Also, as the approach is reactive-based, identifying a problem employee could be too late to protect NPP assets (i.e., confidential information and nuclear materials). Thus, a new approach for detecting and predicting an insider is necessary. We propose a proactive approach based on using bio-signals as an alternative. To address the vulnerability of current insider detection systems, our studies investigated the possibility of insider detection and prediction by using biosignals (electroencephalogram (EEG), electrocardiogram (ECG), and galvanic skin response (GSR)). But one main question remained in the previous studies was: Is the method using key EEG indicators specific enough to discern the difference between a normal worker's motivation level change and being ready to commit a crime? This study examined the answer to the question.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Threat Landscape and Engineering Mitigations for Grid Forming Inverters

This talk will cover the cyber threat landscape and engineering mitigations for grid forming (GFM) inverters. It will discuss the penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) in the United States and expected growth. It will then discuss the threat landscape for IBRs based on current and expected penetration. Real-world examples of cyber incidents affecting IBRs will be presented, concluding with an introduction to Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and a guide on applying it to GFM inverters.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗