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At least 181 records · Page 10

Information Analysis Methodology for Border Security Deployment Prioritization and Post Deployment Evaluation

Due to international commerce, cross-border conflicts, and corruption, a holistic, information driven, approach to border security is required to best understand how resources should be applied to affect sustainable improvements in border security. The ability to transport goods and people by land, sea, and air across international borders with relative ease for legitimate commercial purposes creates a challenging environment to detect illicit smuggling activities that destabilize national level border security. Smuggling activities operated for profit or smuggling operations driven by cross border conflicts where militant or terrorist organizations facilitate the transport of materials and or extremists to advance a cause add complexity to smuggling interdiction efforts. Border security efforts are further hampered when corruption thwarts interdiction efforts or reduces the effectiveness of technology deployed to enhance border security. These issues necessitate the implementation of a holistic approach to border security that leverages all available data. Large amounts of information found in hundreds of thousands of documents can be compiled to assess national or regional borders to identify variables that influence border security. Location data associated with border topics of interest may be extracted and plotted to better characterize the current border security environment for a given country or region. This baseline assessment enables further analysis, but also documents the initial state of border security that can be used to evaluate progress after border security improvements are made. Then, border security threats are prioritized via a systems analysis approach. Mitigation factors to address risks can be developed and evaluated against inhibiting factor such as corruption. This holistic approach to border security helps address the dynamic smuggling interdiction environment where illicit activities divert to a new location that provides less resistance to smuggling activities after training or technology is deployed at a given location. This paper will present an approach to holistic border security information analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Surrogate Nuclear Explosion Debris for Measurement Validation and Research

ABSTRACT There is intense interest in characterizing nuclear explosion debris following the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device. The quality of the laboratory analyses of such samples is critical if action is to be taken based on those analyses. Thus, validating methods against well characterized nuclear debris is of interest, however, actual nuclear explosion debris is difficult to obtain. PNNL has embarked on a program to develop laboratory methods to synthesize materials which mimic nuclear explosion debris with respect to selected characteristics. Which characteristics are mimicked depends on the application. For tests of laboratory radioanalytical capabilities, materials with relatively few characteristics in common with actual debris are useful. For other applications, material properties may need to match real debris to a greater extent, e.g., for fate and transport studies the chemical behavior should match real debris in detail. We will describe methods by which these materials can be produced and highlight some of the issues associated with such operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Integrated work management system.

Sandia National Laboratories develops technologies to: (1) sustain, modernize, and protect our nuclear arsenal (2) Prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction; (3) Provide new capabilities to our armed forces; (4) Protect our national infrastructure; (5) Ensure the stability of our nation's energy and water supplies; and (6) Defend our nation against terrorist threats. We identified the need for a single overarching Integrated Workplace Management System (IWMS) that would enable us to focus on customer missions and improve FMOC processes. Our team selected highly configurable commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software with out-of-the-box workflow processes that integrate strategic planning, project management, facility assessments, and space management, and can interface with existing systems, such as Oracle, PeopleSoft, Maximo, Bentley, and FileNet. We selected the Integrated Workplace Management System (IWMS) from Tririga, Inc. Facility Management System (FMS) Benefits are: (1) Create a single reliable source for facility data; (2) Improve transparency with oversight organizations; (3) Streamline FMOC business processes with a single, integrated facility-management tool; (4) Give customers simple tools and real-time information; (5) Reduce indirect costs; (6) Replace approximately 30 FMOC systems and 60 homegrown tools (such as Microsoft Access databases); and (7) Integrate with FIMS.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Facilitation of Third-party Development of Advanced Algorithms for Explosive Detection Using Workshops and Grand Challenges

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has requirements for future explosive detection scanners that include dealing with a larger number of threats, higher probability of detection, lower false alarm rates and lower operating costs. One tactic that DHS is pursuing to achieve these requirements is to augment the capabilities of the established security vendors with third-party algorithm developers. The purposes of this presentation are to review DHS's objectives for involving third parties in the development of advanced algorithms and then to discuss how these objectives are achieved using workshops and grand challenges. Terrorists are still trying and they are getting more sophisticated. There is a need to increase the number of smart people working on homeland security. Augmenting capabilities and capacities of system vendors with third-parties is one tactic. Third parties can be accessed via workshops and grand challenges. Successes have been achieved to date. There are issues that need to be resolved to further increase third party involvement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing.

Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Cambio : a file format translation and analysis application for the nuclear response emergency community.

Cambio is an application intended to automatically read and display any spectrum file of any format in the world that the nuclear emergency response community might encounter. Cambio also provides an analysis capability suitable for HPGe spectra when detector response and scattering environment are not well known. Why is Cambio needed: (1) Cambio solves the following problem - With over 50 types of formats from instruments used in the field and new format variations appearing frequently, it is impractical for every responder to have current versions of the manufacturer's software from every instrument used in the field; (2) Cambio converts field spectra to any one of several common formats that are used for analysis, saving valuable time in an emergency situation; (3) Cambio provides basic tools for comparing spectra, calibrating spectra, and isotope identification with analysis suited especially for HPGe spectra; and (4) Cambio has a batch processing capability to automatically translate a large number of archival spectral files of any format to one of several common formats, such as the IAEA SPE or the DHS N42. Currently over 540 analysts and members of the nuclear emergency response community worldwide are on the distribution list for updates to Cambio. Cambio users come from all levels of government, university, and commercial partners around the world that support efforts to counter terrorist nuclear activities. Cambio is Unclassified Unlimited Release (UUR) and distributed by internet downloads with email notifications whenever a new build of Cambio provides for new formats, bug fixes, or new or improved capabilities. Cambio is also provided as a DLL to the Karlsruhe Institute for Transuranium Elements so that Cambio's automatic file-reading capability can be included at the Nucleonica web site.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Unmanned air vehicle (UAV) ultra-persitence research

Sandia National Laboratories and Northrop Grumman Corporation Integrated Systems, Unmanned Systems (NGIS UMS) collaborated to further ultra-persistence technologies for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The greatest shortfalls in UAV capabilities have been repeatedly identified as (1) insufficient flight persistence or 'hang time,' (2) marginal electrical power for running higher power avionics and payload systems, and (3) inadequate communications bandwidth and reach. NGIS UMS requested support from Sandia to develop an ultra-persistent propulsion and power system (UP3S) for potential incorporation into next generation UAV systems. The team members tried to determine which energy storage and power generation concepts could most effectively push UAV propulsion and electrical power capabilities to increase UAV sortie duration from days to months while increasing available electrical power at least two-fold. Primary research and development areas that were pursued included these goals: perform general system engineering and integration analyses; develop initial thermal and electrical power estimates; provide mass, volume, dimensional, and balance estimates; conduct preliminary safety assessments; assess logistics support requirements; perform, preliminary assessments of any security and safeguards; evaluate options for removal, replacement, and disposition of materials; generally advance the potential of the UP3S concept. The effort contrasted and compared eight heat sources technologies, three power conversion, two dual cycle propulsion system configurations, and a single electrical power generation scheme. Overall performance, specific power parameters, technical complexities, security, safety, and other operational features were successfully investigated. Large and medium sized UAV systems were envisioned and operational flight profiles were developed for each concept. Heat source creation and support challenges for domestic and expeditionary operations were considered. Fundamental cost driver analysis was also performed. System development plans were drafted in order to determine where the technological and programmatic critical paths lay. As a result of this effort, UAVs were to be able to provide far more surveillance time and intelligence information per mission while reducing the high cost of support activities. This technology was intended to create unmatched global capabilities to observe and preempt terrorist and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) activities. Various DOE laboratory and contractor personnel and facilities could have been used to perform detailed engineering, fabrication, assembly and test operations including follow-on operational support. Unfortunately, none of the results will be used in the near-term or mid-term future. NGIS UMS and SNL felt that the technical goals for the project were accomplished. NGIS UMS was quite pleased with the results of analysis and design although it was disappointing to all that the political realities would not allow use of the results. Technology and system designs evaluated under this CRADA had previously never been applied to unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Based upon logistic support cost predictions, because the UAVs would not have had to refuel as often, forward basing support costs could have been reduced due to a decrease in the number and extent of support systems and personnel being required to operate UAVs in remote areas. Basic application of the advanced propulsion and power approach is well understood and industry now understands the technical, safety, and political issues surrounding implementation of these strategies. However, the overall economic impact was not investigated. The results will not be applied/implemented. No near-term benefit to industry or the taxpayer will be encountered as a result of these studies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Sticky bomb detection with other implications for vehicle security.

A 'sticky bomb' is a type of improvised explosive device (IED) placed on a motor vehicle by (for example) a terrorist. The bomb is typically attached with adhesive ('duct') tape, or with magnets. This paper reports some preliminary results for a very rudimentary demonstration of two techniques for detecting the placement of a sticky bomb on a motor vehicle. The two techniques are tire pressure and magnetic measurements. There are other possible security applications for these techniques as well.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Safer Nuclear Enterprise - Application to Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)(U)

Activities and infrastructure that support nuclear weapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

ACCIDENTS↗

Managing Critical Infrastructures C.I.M. Suite

See how a new software package developed by INL researchers could help protect infrastructure during natural disasters, terrorist attacks and electrical outages. For more information about INL research, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Transmission Line Security Monitor

The Transmission Line Security Monitor is a multi-sensor monitor that mounts directly on high-voltage transmission lines to detect, characterize and communicate terrorist activity, human tampering and threatening conditions around support towers. For more information about INL';s critical infrastructure protection research, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory

The purpose of the briefing is to describe general laboratory technical capabilities to be used for various groups such as military cadets or university faculty/students and post docs to recruit into a variety of Los Alamos programs. Discussed are: (1) development and application of high leverage science to enable effeictive, predictable and reliability outcomes; (2) deter, detect, characterize, reverse and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use by adversaries and terrorists; (3) modeling and simulation to define complex processes, predict outcomes, and develop effective prevention, response, and remediation strategies; (4) energetic materials and hydrodynamic testing to develop materials for precise delivery of focused energy; (5) materials cience focused on fundamental understanding of materials behaviors, their quantum-molecular properties, and their dynamic responses, and (6) bio-science to rapidly detect and characterize pathogens, to develop vaccines and prophylactic remedies, and to develop attribution forensics.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear EMP simulation for large-scale urban environments. FDTD for electrically large problems.

In case of a terrorist nuclear attack in a metropolitan area, EMP measurement could provide: (1) a prompt confirmation of the nature of the explosion (chemical or nuclear) for emergency response; and (2) and characterization parameters of the device (reaction history, yield) for technical forensics. However, urban environment could affect the fidelity of the prompt EMP measurement (as well as all other types of prompt measurement): (1) Nuclear EMP wavefront would no longer be coherent, due to incoherent production, attenuation, and propagation of gamma and electrons; and (2) EMP propagation from source region outward would undergo complicated transmission, reflection, and diffraction processes. EMP simulation for electrically-large urban environment: (1) Coupled MCNP/FDTD (Finite-difference time domain Maxwell solver) approach; and (2) FDTD tends to be limited to problems that are not 'too' large compared to the wavelengths of interest because of numerical dispersion and anisotropy. We use a higher-order low-dispersion, isotropic FDTD algorithm for EMP propagation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Economic Impacts of Potential Foot and Mouth Disease Agro-terrorism in the United States: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis

The foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus has high agro-terrorism potential because it is contagious, can be easily transmitted via inanimate objects and can be spread by wind. An outbreak of FMD in developed countries results in massive slaughtering of animals (for disease control) and disruptions in meat supply chains and trade, with potentially large economic losses. Although the United States has been FMD-free since 1929, the potential of FMD as a deliberate terrorist weapon calls for estimates of the physical and economic damage that could result from an outbreak. This paper estimates the economic impacts of three alternative scenarios of potential FMD attacks using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the US economy. The three scenarios range from a small outbreak successfully contained within a state to a large multi-state attack resulting in slaughtering of 30 percent of the national livestock. Overall, the value of total output losses in our simulations range between $37 billion (0.15% of 2006 baseline economic output) and $228 billion (0.92%). Major impacts stem from the supply constraint on livestock due to massive animal slaughtering. As expected, the economic losses are heavily concentrated in agriculture and food manufacturing sectors, with losses ranging from $23 billion to $61 billion in the two industries.

Oladosu, Gbadebo A↗