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At least 181 records · Page 10

SINGLE-SHELL TANKS LEAK INTEGRITY ELEMENTS/SX FARM LEAK CAUSES AND LOCATIONS - 12127

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) developed an enhanced single-shell tank (SST) integrity project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. One primary recommendation was to expand the leak assessment reports (substitute report or LD-1) to include leak causes and locations. The recommendation has been included in the M-045-9IF Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as one of four targets relating to SST leak integrity. The 241-SX Farm (SX Farm) tanks with leak losses were addressed on an individual tank basis as part of LD-1. Currently, 8 out of 23 SSTs that have been reported to having a liner leak are located in SX Farm. This percentage was the highest compared to other tank farms which is why SX Farm was analyzed first. The SX Farm is comprised of fifteen SSTs built 1953-1954. The tanks are arranged in rows of three tanks each, forming a cascade. Each of the SX Farm tanks has a nominal I-million-gal storage capacity. Of the fifteen tanks in SX Farm, an assessment reported leak losses for the following tanks: 241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX-111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114 and 241-SX-115. The method used to identify leak location consisted of reviewing in-tank and ex-tank leak detection information. This provided the basic data identifying where and when the first leaks were detected. In-tank leak detection consisted of liquid level measurement that can be augmented with photographs which can provide an indication of the vertical leak location on the sidewall. Ex-tank leak detection for the leaking tanks consisted of soil radiation data from laterals and drywells near the tank. The in-tank and ex-tank leak detection can provide an indication of the possible leak location radially around and under the tank. Potential leak causes were determined using in-tank and ex-tank information that is not directly related to leak detection. In-tank parameters can include temperature of the supernatant and sludge, types of waste, and chemical determination by either transfer or sample analysis. Ex-tank information can be assembled from many sources including design media, construction conditions, technical specifications, and other sources. Five conditions may have contributed to SX Farm tank liner failure including: tank design, thermal shock, chemistry-corrosion, liner behavior (bulging), and construction temperature. Tank design did not apparently change from tank to tank for the SX Farm tanks; however, there could be many unknown variables present in the quality of materials and quality of construction. Several significant SX Farm tank design changes occurred from previous successful tank farm designs. Tank construction occurred in winter under cold conditions which could have affected the ductile to brittle transition temperature of the tanks. The SX Farm tanks received high temperature boiling waste from REDOX which challenged the tank design with rapid heat up and high temperatures. All eight of the leaking SX Farm tanks had relatively high rate of temperature rise. Supernatant removal with subsequent nitrate leaching was conducted in all but three of the eight leaking tanks prior to leaks being detected. It is possible that no one characteristic of the SX Farm tanks could in isolation from the others have resulted in failure. However, the application of so many stressors - heat up rate, high temperature, loss of corrosion protection, and tank design - working jointly or serially resulted in their failure. Thermal shock coupled with the tank design, construction conditions, and nitrate leaching seem to be the overriding factors that can lead to tank liner failure. The distinction between leaking and sound SX Farm tanks seems to center on the waste types, thermal conditions, and nitrate leaching.

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Single-Shell Tanks Leak Integrity Elements/ SX Farm Leak Causes and Locations - 12127

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) developed an enhanced single-shell tank (SST) integrity project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. One primary recommendation was to expand the leak assessment reports (substitute report or LD-1) to include leak causes and locations. The recommendation has been included in the M-045-91F Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as one of four targets relating to SST leak integrity. The 241-SX Farm (SX Farm) tanks with leak losses were addressed on an individual tank basis as part of LD-1. Currently, 8 out of 23 SSTs that have been reported to having a liner leak are located in SX Farm. This percentage was the highest compared to other tank farms which is why SX Farm was analyzed first. The SX Farm is comprised of fifteen SSTs built 1953-1954. The tanks are arranged in rows of three tanks each, forming a cascade. Each of the SX Farm tanks has a nominal 1-million-gal storage capacity. Of the fifteen tanks in SX Farm, an assessment reported leak losses for the following tanks: 241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX- 111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114 and 241-SX-115. The method used to identify leak location consisted of reviewing in-tank and ex-tank leak detection information. This provided the basic data identifying where and when the first leaks were detected. In-tank leak detection consisted of liquid level measurement that can be augmented with photographs which can provide an indication of the vertical leak location on the sidewall. Ex-tank leak detection for the leaking tanks consisted of soil radiation data from laterals and dry-wells near the tank. The in-tank and ex-tank leak detection can provide an indication of the possible leak location radially around and under the tank. Potential leak causes were determined using in-tank and ex-tank information that is not directly related to leak detection. In-tank parameters can include temperature of the supernatant and sludge, types of waste, and chemical determination by either transfer or sample analysis. Ex-tank information can be assembled from many sources including design media, construction conditions, technical specifications, and other sources. Five conditions may have contributed to SX Farm tank liner failure including: tank design, thermal shock, chemistry-corrosion, liner behavior (bulging), and construction temperature. Tank design did not apparently change from tank to tank for the SX Farm tanks; however, there could be many unknown variables present in the quality of materials and quality of construction. Several significant SX Farm tank design changes occurred from previous successful tank farm designs. Tank construction occurred in winter under cold conditions which could have affected the ductile to brittle transition temperature of the tanks. The SX Farm tanks received high temperature boiling waste from REDOX which challenged the tank design with rapid heat up and high temperatures. All eight of the leaking SX Farm tanks had relatively high rate of temperature rise. Supernatant removal with subsequent nitrate leaching was conducted in all but three of the eight leaking tanks prior to leaks being detected. It is possible that no one characteristic of the SX Farm tanks could in isolation from the others have resulted in failure. However, the application of so many stressors - heat up rate, high temperature, loss of corrosion protection, and tank design working jointly or serially resulted in their failure. Thermal shock coupled with the tank design, construction conditions, and nitrate leaching seem to be the overriding factors that can lead to tank liner failure. The distinction between leaking and sound SX Farm tanks seems to center on the waste types, thermal conditions, and nitrate leaching. (authors)

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ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES FROM TANK 6F CHEMICAL CLEANING

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is preparing Tank 6F for closure. The first step in preparing the tank for closure is mechanical sludge removal. In mechanical sludge removal, personnel add liquid (e.g., inhibited water or supernate salt solution) to the tank to form a slurry. They mix the liquid and sludge with pumps, and transfer the slurry to another tank for further processing. Mechanical sludge removal effectively removes the bulk of the sludge from a tank, but is not able to remove all of the sludge. In Tank 6F, SRR estimated a sludge heel of 5,984 gallons remained after mechanical sludge removal. To remove this sludge heel, SRR performed chemical cleaning. The chemical cleaning included two oxalic acid strikes, a spray wash, and a water wash. SRR conducted the first oxalic acid strike as follows. Personnel added 110,830 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F and mixed the contents of Tank 6F with two submersible mixer pumps (SMPs) for approximately four days. Following the mixing, they transferred 115,903 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. The SMPs were operating when the transfer started and were shut down approximately five hours after the transfer started. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 2,400 gallons of solids remained in the tank. SRR conducted the second oxalic acid strike as follows. Personnel added 28,881 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F. Following the acid addition, they visually inspected the tank and transferred 32,247 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 3,248 gallons of solids remained in the tank. Following the oxalic acid strikes, SRR performed Spray Washing with oxalic acid to remove waste collected on internal structures, cooling coils, tank top internals, and tank walls. The Acid Spray Wash was followed by a Water Spray Wash to remove oxalic acid from the tank internals. SRR conducted the Spray Wash as follows. Personnel added 4,802 gallons of 8 wt % oxalic acid to Tank 6F through the spray mast installed in Riser 2, added 4,875 gallons of oxalic acid through Riser 7, added 5,000 gallons of deionized water into the tank via Riser 2, and 5,000 gallons of deionized water into the tank via Riser 7. Following the Spray Wash, they visually inspected the tank and transferred 22,430 gallons of Tank 6F material to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted it to SRNL for analysis. Following the Spray Wash and transfer, Savannah River Site (SRS) added 113,935 gallons of well water to Tank 6F. They mixed the tank contents with a single SMP and transferred 112,699 gallons from Tank 6F to Tank 7F. SRR collected a sample of the liquid from Tank 6F and submitted to SRNL for analysis. Mapping of the tank following the transfer indicated that 3,488 gallons of solids remained in the tank. Following the Water Wash, SRR personnel collected a solid sample and submitted it to SRNL for analysis to assess the effectiveness of the chemical cleaning and to provide a preliminary indication of the composition of the material remaining in the tank.

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SLUDGE BATCH 7B QUALIFICATION ACTIVITIES WITH SRS TANK FARM SLUDGE

Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) has requested that characterization and a radioactive demonstration of the next batch of sludge slurry - Sludge Batch 7b (SB7b) - be completed in the Shielded Cells Facility of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) via a Technical Task Request (TTR). This characterization and demonstration, or sludge batch qualification process, is required prior to transfer of the sludge from Tank 51 to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) feed tank (Tank 40). The current WSE practice is to prepare sludge batches in Tank 51 by transferring sludge from other tanks. Discharges of nuclear materials from H Canyon are often added to Tank 51 during sludge batch preparation. The sludge is washed and transferred to Tank 40, the current DWPF feed tank. Prior to transfer of Tank 51 to Tank 40, SRNL typically simulates the Tank Farm and DWPF processes with a Tank 51 sample (referred to as the qualification sample). With the tight schedule constraints for SB7b and the potential need for caustic addition to allow for an acceptable glass processing window, the qualification for SB7b was approached differently than past batches. For SB7b, SRNL prepared a Tank 51 and a Tank 40 sample for qualification. SRNL did not receive the qualification sample from Tank 51 nor did it simulate all of the Tank Farm washing and decanting operations. Instead, SRNL prepared a Tank 51 SB7b sample from samples of Tank 7 and Tank 51, along with a wash solution to adjust the supernatant composition to the final SB7b Tank 51 Tank Farm projections. SRNL then prepared a sample to represent SB7b in Tank 40 by combining portions of the SRNL-prepared Tank 51 SB7b sample and a Tank 40 Sludge Batch 7a (SB7a) sample. The blended sample was 71% Tank 40 (SB7a) and 29% Tank 7/Tank 51 on an insoluble solids basis. This sample is referred to as the SB7b Qualification Sample. The blend represented the highest projected Tank 40 heel (as of May 25, 2011), and thus, the highest projected noble metals content for SB7b. Characterization was performed on the Tank 51 SB7b samples and SRNL performed DWPF simulations using the Tank 40 SB7b material. This report documents: (1) The preparation and characterization of the Tank 51 SB7b and Tank 40 SB7b samples. (2) The performance of a DWPF Chemical Process Cell (CPC) simulation using the SB7b Tank 40 sample. The simulation included a Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) cycle, where acid was added to the sludge to destroy nitrite and reduce mercury, and a Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) cycle, where glass frit was added to the sludge in preparation for vitrification. The SME cycle also included replication of five canister decontamination additions and concentrations. Processing parameters were based on work with a nonradioactive simulant. (3) Vitrification of a portion of the SME product and characterization and durability testing (as measured by the Product Consistency Test (PCT)) of the resulting glass. (4) Rheology measurements of the SRAT receipt, SRAT product, and SME product. This program was controlled by a Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP), and analyses were guided by an Analytical Study Plan. This work is Technical Baseline Research and Development (R&D) for the DWPF. It should be noted that much of the data in this document has been published in interoffice memoranda. The intent of this technical report is bring all of the SB7b related data together in a single permanent record and to discuss the overall aspects of SB7b processing.

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SRS Strategy for Tank 3 Salt Dissolution - Performance and Lessons Learned - 20441

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank Farms have 51 underground waste tanks used to store and process liquid nuclear waste materials. There are 4 different tank types, ranging in capacity from 2,840,000 to 4,920,000 L (750,000 to 1,300,000 Gal). Twenty-four of the tanks are older style and do not meet full secondary containment standards. The older style tanks are the initial focus of waste removal efforts for tank closure at SRS. Eight of these twenty-four tanks have completed waste removal and are filled with grout. Prior to salt dissolution, Tank 3 was a dry salt tank that contained 5.06 m (199.3 in) of salt and sludge waste. Additional salt waste was present on cooling coils above the salt layer up to approximately 5.59 m (220 in). Three mixing eductors were installed in Tank 3 to aid in dissolving salt waste in three tank riser access ports. A transfer pump was installed, and the transfer pump suction was located 25.4 cm (10 in) from the tank bottom. Well water was added to the tank through a downcomer until the dry bulk salt was covered with liquid. During the initial fill of Tank 3, approximately 242,000 L (64,000 Gal) of rain water were added from periodic F-Tank Farm (FTF) Catch Tank additions and approximately 17,000 L (4,500 Gal) of well water were added. Following liquid additions to cover the dry bulk salt, well water was added through the three mixing eductors in batches during each stage. Additionally, during the salt dissolution campaigns, the FTF Catch Tank was utilized to add rain water through a downcomer in the center tank riser access port as needed for volume relief in the FTF Catch Tank. Following liquid additions, the water was recirculated (internal to the tank) using the transfer pump, and a sample was pulled to confirm the target specific gravity (SpG) of the dissolved salt solution was achieved. The dissolved salt solution was then transferred to the receipt tank (Tank 7), and the mixing eductors were lowered as close to the new bulk salt layer as possible, to support subsequent dissolution campaigns. While the mixing jets were able to dissolve salt successfully in Tank 3, they did not do so in a completely uniform manner. Throughout dissolution, mounds were discovered under Riser 1, Riser 2, and the Center Riser. The mixing jets dissolved the salt around the edges of the tank well but were not as effective toward the center of the tank. FTF Catch Tank additions through the center tank riser access port downcomer were required to impact the mound under the center tank riser. FTF Catch Tank additions were sporadic as they were dependent on rainfall in the area. Additionally, all mixing jets were rarely able to be lowered to the same elevation, indicating some mounding in the bulk salt layer. Indexing of the mixing jets was also utilized to impact the salt mounds. Overall, Tank 3 salt dissolution was successful as approximately 1,476,000 L (390,000 Gal) of dissolved salt solution was transferred to Tank 7 over six stages. Slightly less than 852,000 L (225,000 Gal) of water were added to Tank 3. The original material balance prediction estimated that the bulk salt level in Tank 3 would be 3.88 m (152.8 in) after six salt dissolution stages. After six stages the actual bulk salt level was 3.38 m (133 in). This paper will discuss the salt removal strategy, each salt dissolution stage, and lessons learned for future salt dissolution. (authors)

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METHODOLOGY AND CALCULATIONS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF WASTE GROUPS FOR THE LARGE UNDERGROUND WASTE STORAGE TANKS AT THE HANFORD SITE

The Hanford Site contains 177 large underground radioactive waste storage tanks (28 double-shell tanks and 149 single-shell tanks). These tanks are categorized into one of three waste groups (A, B, and C) based on their waste and tank characteristics. These waste group assignments reflect a tank's propensity to retain a significant volume of flammable gases and the potential of the waste to release retained gas by a buoyant displacement gas release event. Assignments of waste groups to the 177 double-shell tanks and single-shell tanks, as reported in this document, are based on a Monte Carlo analysis of three criteria. The first criterion is the headspace flammable gas concentration following release of retained gas. This criterion determines whether the tank contains sufficient retained gas such that the well-mixed headspace flammable gas concentration would reach 100% of the lower flammability limit if the entire tank's retained gas were released. If the volume of retained gas is not sufficient to reach 100% of the lower flammability limit, then flammable conditions cannot be reached and the tank is classified as a waste group C tank independent of the method the gas is released. The second criterion is the energy ratio and considers whether there is sufficient supernatant on top of the saturated solids such that gas-bearing solids have the potential energy required to break up the material and release gas. Tanks that are not waste group C tanks and that have an energy ratio < 3.0 do not have sufficient potential energy to break up material and release gas and are assigned to waste group B. These tanks are considered to represent a potential induced flammable gas release hazard, but no spontaneous buoyant displacement flammable gas release hazard. Tanks that are not waste group C tanks and have an energy ratio {ge} 3.0, but that pass the third criterion (buoyancy ratio < 1.0, see below) are also assigned to waste group B. Even though the designation as a waste group B (or A) tank identifies the potential for an induced flammable gas release hazard, the hazard only exists for specific operations that can release the retained gas in the tank at a rate and quantity that results in reaching 100% of the lower flammability limit in the tank headspace. The identification and evaluation of tank farm operations that could cause an induced flammable gas release hazard in a waste group B (or A) tank are included in other documents. The third criterion is the buoyancy ratio. This criterion addresses tanks that are not waste group C double-shell tanks and have an energy ratio {ge} 3.0. For these double-shell tanks, the buoyancy ratio considers whether the saturated solids can retain sufficient gas to exceed neutral buoyancy relative to the supernatant layer and therefore have buoyant displacement gas release events. If the buoyancy ratio is {ge} 1.0, that double-shell tank is assigned to waste group A. These tanks are considered to have a potential spontaneous buoyant displacement flammable gas release hazard in addition to a potential induced flammable gas release hazard. This document categorizes each of the large waste storage tanks into one of several categories based on each tank's waste characteristics. These waste group assignments reflect a tank's propensity to retain a significant volume of flammable gases and the potential of the waste to release retained gas by a buoyant displacement event. Revision 8 is the annual update of the calculations of the flammable gas Waste Groups for DSTs and SSTs.

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Annual Radioactive Waste Tank Inspection Program - 2018

The Department of Energy (DOE) requires that Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the Liquid Waste contractor, maintain a robust and timely Structural Integrity Program for waste tanks that are leak-tight and for waste tanks that have leaked or are suspect. These requirements are promulgated in DOE Manual 435.1-1, Section II.Q.(2). A key aspect of SRR's implementation of these requirements is its annual tank inspection program. In 2018, the SRR Visual and In-Service Inspection Program used two visual imagery techniques to ascertain the integrity of the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks: high resolution digital photography and closed-circuit television. The primary inspection method made use of direct photograph techniques, e.g., making a series of photographs providing detailed views of the tank and wide-angle photography for obtaining overviews of large areas. Closed-circuit television was then typically used to further investigate conditions found during the initial inspection. During 2018, a total of 4,853 photographs were taken and 47 video inspections were performed as part of this inspection program. Of the 51 waste tank systems at SRS that were designed, constructed, and placed into active service storing radioactive liquid waste, 43 remain in active service. Eight tanks have been cleaned, stabilized by filling with engineered grout, and removed from service (also known as operationally closed) -Tanks 5, 6, and 12 (Type I tanks); Tank 16 (Type II tank); and Tanks 17, 18, 19, and 20 (Type IV tanks). For the 43 waste tanks, inspections were successfully conducted in 2018 through all accessible annulus risers and inspection ports for nine Type I tanks, three Type II tanks, and 27 Type III/IIIA tanks; at least one inspection was made in the interior of four Type IV tanks (i.e., the tanks without annular spaces) above the liquid level in the tank. Rainwater continues periodically to be observed migrating into the annuli of some tanks. Evidence of this infiltration was primarily noted by observation of surface stains, and occasionally by calciferous deposits, changed configuration of salt deposits in the associated annulus, and mild surface corrosion. The conditions of the 43 tanks remained essentially unchanged from the conditions reported in 2017. The one key exception was the identification of eight new cracks in the Tank 15 primary tank wall. These newly identified cracks are located at 65, 67, 70, 76, 150, 152, 176 inches and 200 inches above the tank bottom. The identified cracks in Tank 15 do not constitute an impact on the structural integrity of the tank, as evaluated and confirmed in the referenced report, SRNS-STI-2008-00028, A Structural Impact Assessment of Flaws Detected During Ultrasonic Examination of Tank 15, and calculation, T-CLC-H-00890, Calculation of Critical Crack Lengths in HLW Tank 15. The 2018 inspection program confirmed the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of all 43 waste tanks.

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