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This presentation provides a high-level overview of the current U.S. shared solar landscape, the impact that a given shared solar program's structure has on requiring federal securities oversight, as well as an estimate of market potential for U.S. shared solar deployment.
The physical layer describes how communication signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical security often requires either restricting access to the channel or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we describe how the field of quantum communication offers new techniques for securing the physical layer. We describe the use of quantum seals as a unique way to test the integrity and authenticity of a communication channel and to provide security for the physical layer. We present the theoretical and physical underpinnings of quantum seals including the quantum optical encoding used at the transmitter and the test for non-locality used at the receiver. We describe how the envisioned quantum physical sublayer senses tampering and how coordination with higher protocol layers allow quantum seals to influence secure routing or tailor data management methods. We conclude by discussing challenges in the development of quantum seals, the overlap with existing quantum key distribution cryptographic services, and the relevance of a quantum physical sublayer to the future of communication security.
The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.
In order to establish and maintain sustainable nuclear security regulatory infrastructures for radioactive sources, it is important for States to develop nuclear security regulations with regulatory requirements and relevant criteria for security, which are consistent and well integrated with those for radiation safety. In establishing national regulations, experts worldwide follow the international recommendations on safety and security of radioactive sources published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the IAEA publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, some international recommendations are identical or very similar for both safety and security, for example, the requirement for the establishment of a national registry of radioactive sources. However, some other international recommendations are unique to the security area, such as the recommendation to examine the trustworthiness of employees, or to the safety area, such as the need to establish public exposure controls. Additionally, many international recommendations fall somewhere in between, such as the need for effective authorization of facilities and activities, a regulatory inspection and enforcement regime and the graded approach to establish and apply regulatory requirements. This paper examines how the IAEA international recommendations for establishing regulatory frameworks for safety and security relate to one another.
The National Spherical Tokamak Experiment (NSTX) is undergoing a wealth of upgrades (NSTX-U). These upgrades, especially including an elongated pulse length, require broad changes to the control system that has served NSTX well. A new fiber serial Front Panel Data Port input and output (I/O) stream will supersede the aging copper parallel version. Driver support for the new I/O and cyber security concerns require updating the operating system from Redhat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) v4 to RedHawk (based on RHEL) v6. While the basic control system continues to use the General Atomics Plasma Control System (GA PCS), the effort to forward port the entire software package to run under 64-bit Linux instead of 32-bit Linux included PCS modifications subsequently shared with GA and other PCS users. Software updates focused on three key areas: (1) code modernization through coding standards (C99/C11), (2) code portability and maintainability through use of the GA PCS code generator, and (3) support of 64-bit platforms. Central to the control system upgrade is the use of a complete real time (RT) Linux platform provided by Concurrent Computer Corporation, consisting of a computer (iHawk), an operating system and drivers (RedHawk), and RT tools (NightStar). Strong vendor support coupled with an extensive RT toolset influenced this decision. The new real-time Linux platform, I/O, and software engineering will foster enhanced capability and performance for NSTX-U plasma control.
Financing for decommissioning: Are the cost estimates valid? Are the financing arrangements suitable? Are the fund management systems appropriate? Cost estimates are estimated, analysed and updated on a regular basis, but cost comparisons are not straight-forward. There is an incomplete understanding of variability between estimates. Multiple internal and external factors impact estimates: Institutional, legal and policy, purpose, Strategies and plans, overall context, Facility characteristics and history Contingencies and risk, Limited actual cost data. The financing arrangements: there exists a range of systems in place for the implementation of Funding Policy and Strategy, but there are Considerable variations in: Calculating funding requirements, contributions/provisions, Allocating risks and requirements for securities Managing funds and accounting, adjusting the system, Managing disbursements, Reporting and supervision. All cost estimates for future decommissioning activities include considerable uncertainties. These uncertainties will gradually diminish with growing experience from current and planned projects. Different costing methods have different data requirements. Their reliability depends on the extent to which various data are available and applicable to the specific case being considered. Independent of the assessment method, some uncertainty is inevitable in all estimates of future costs. Analysis of the costing method may be useful in order to locate the key uncertainties in each specific estimate. NEA's Decommissioning Cost Estimation Group (DCEG) was Created in 2008 to foster the exchange of information and experience. It Aims to enhance the credibility, reliability, and auditability of the cost estimation process. It Helps define international good practices in decommissioning cost estimation. However, some major challenges remain. Weaknesses in: Understanding relations between estimates and actual costs, Lack of relevant cost data, sharing data. How might be addressed: Improved sharing of cost data, Systematic analyses of estimates and actual costs, Developing benchmarking approaches.
The use and acceptance of new high-performance, parallel computing platforms will be impeded by the absence of an infrastructure capable of supporting orders-of-magnitude improvement in hierarchical storage and high-speed I/O (Input/Output). The distribution of these high-performance platforms and supporting infrastructures across a wide-area network further compounds this problem. We describe an architectural design and phased implementation plan for a distributed, Cooperative Storage Environment (CSE) to achieve the necessary performance, user transparency, site autonomy, communication, and security features needed to support the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI). ASCI is a Department of Energy (DOE) program attempting to apply terascale platforms and Problem-Solving Environments (PSEs) toward real-world computational modeling and simulation problems. The ASCI mission must be carried out through a unified, multilaboratory effort, and will require highly secure, efficient access to vast amounts of data. The CSE provides a logically simple, geographically distributed, storage infrastructure of semi-autonomous cooperating sites to meet the strategic ASCI PSE goal of highperformance data storage and access at the user desktop.
We illustrate the use of modeling and simulation early in the system life-cycle to improve security and reduce costs. The models that we develop for this illustration are inspired by problems in reliability analysis and supervisory control, for which similar models are used to quantify failure probabilities and rates. In the context of security, we propose that models of this general type can be used to understand trades between risk and cost while writing system requirements and during conceptual design, and thereby significantly reduce the need for expensive security corrections after a system enters operation
This presentation discusses the pivotal role inverters play in PV generated electricity. Topics include: the inverter as the center of the system--increasingly becoming the brain, with more features and capabilities (hybrid systems, safety, islanding, monitoring, etc.); increasing inverter-based generated electricity associated with many renewable energy sources; increased dependence for grid support and forming capability; communication within the grid and security increasingly required; increasing complexity leads to more chances to fail; as in most PV segments, there is cost reduction pressure, which makes it more challenging to keep the reliability high.
The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.
The WLCG is modernizing its security infrastructure, replacing X.509 client authentication with the newer industry standard of JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) obtained through the Open ID Connect (OIDC) protocol. There is a wide variety of software available using the standards, but most of it is for Web browser-based applications and doesn’t adapt well to the command line-based software used heavily in High Throughput Computing (HTC). OIDC command line client software did exist, but it did not meet our requirements for security and convenience. This paper discusses a command line solution we have made based on the popular existing secrets management software from Hashicorp called vault. We made a package called htvault-config to easily configure a vault service and another called htgettoken to be the vault client. In addition, we have integrated use of the tools into the HTCondor workload management system, although they also work well independent of HTCondor. All of the software is open source, under active development, and ready for use.
Mixed low-level wastes (MLLW) with no available path to treatment or disposal have been longstanding challenges for DOE facilities. Today, mixed wastes with no path to treatment or disposal frequently present themselves in the form of combinations of problematic matrixes, problematic EPA Hazardous Waste Codes, and security classification requirements. In order to successfully treat and disposition these challenging wastes, waste management personnel must be more inquisitive and challenge the status quo more than ever before. All aspects of the waste from how it was generated to how the waste is currently being managed must be revisited. Each fact, the basis of each decision, and each regulatory determination must be investigated and validated. Since many of the difficult waste streams were generated several years ago, it can be quite challenging to locate knowledgeable generators from the time of generation. Significant investigation is often required to obtain the needed information to evaluate legacy waste streams. Special attention must be paid to the little things that may not seem central to the issues being investigated. Solutions are sometimes found in these details. (authors)
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).
Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.
The current legal framework in Belgium foresees the progressive phase out of nuclear power between October 2022 (Doel 3) and December 2025 (Doel 2). Upon its definitive shutdown, each unit of the Tihange and Doel sites will enter a Post-Operational Phase (POP) and be prepared for its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D). Prior to obtaining the D and D license, the Operator Electrabel is legally required to remove any non-fissile irradiated core items stored in the deactivation pools. The non-fissile irradiated core items consist essentially of control rods, poison rods and source thimbles as well as thimble plugs and foreign materials irradiated during operation: - Their significant content in highly radiant radionuclides (up to 6 TBq of Co-60 per kg of irradiated material) renders all existing operational waste management processes inadequate due to insufficient biological shielding; - Their high concentrations in long-lived radionuclides call for their disposal in a geological repository for which no final design nor waste acceptance criteria are expected prior to 2050. Uncertainties in the Belgian energy supply and security, however, require the Operator to be prepared for a partial nuclear phase out, where one or more units would benefit from lifetime extension while the remaining units would undergo decommissioning. The present paper aims at presenting how Electrabel, in partnership with Tractebel, addressed this challenge by maximizing the use of synergies within the respective sites as well as between both sites themselves, all the while accounting for site specificities. The most recent results and state of progress of the project will be detailed and the first lessons learned will be shared. The project has been split in multiple tasks and phased as follows: - An inventory phase aimed at mapping the contents, origin, composition and history of the non-fissile irradiated core items; - A pre-characterization phase based on neutron activation models; - A waste sorting phase aimed at separating waste forms for which an evacuation route exists from those for which such route does not exist; - A feasibility phase aimed at exploring all possible scenarios for the management of non-fissile irradiated core items and identifying the optimal feasible solution for each site; - A preparation phase (currently ongoing), developing further the optimal solution and ensuring that back-up solutions are available for any foreseeable change of context (licensing issue, modification in the nuclear phase-out program, etc.) and initiating early contacts with potential subcontractors for segmentation works and cask manufacturers, as well as the Belgian regulatory body and waste management agency. This phase also foresees the investigation of destructive and non-destructive radiological measurements to support the detailed characterization of the waste forms; - A realization phase (future work). (authors)
This paper introduces a novel Distributed Extensible Grid Control (DEGC) software and communication platform to facilitate the control of distributed energy resources on electric grids. The DEGC software platform leverages state-of-the-art advances in secure, distributed communication and decentralized authorization and authentication. We discuss how these advances enable the kind of robust and secure communication required for a distributed grid control platform, and show how DEGC applies these technologies to the agile development and deployment of grid software through an extensible and flexible API. Here, we describe how DEGC can implement both Volt-VAR voltage magnitude control and Phasor-Based Control as sample applications and demonstrate the DEGC platform in hardware with the demanding Phasor-Based Control test case, and provide performance metrics.
National security applications require artificial neural networks (ANNs) that consume less power, are fast and dynamic online learners, are fault tolerant, and can learn from unlabeled and imbalanced data. We explore whether two fundamentally different, traditional learning algorithms from artificial intelligence and the biological brain can be merged. We tackle this problem from two directions. First, we start from a theoretical point of view and show that the spike time dependent plasticity (STDP) learning curve observed in biological networks can be derived using the mathematical framework of backpropagation through time. Second, we show that transmission delays, as observed in biological networks, improve the ability of spiking networks to perform classification when trained using a backpropagation of error (BP) method. These results provide evidence that STDP could be compatible with a BP learning rule. Combining these learning algorithms will likely lead to networks more capable of meeting our national security missions.
The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) is considering investing in new tools that would allow the program to support its partner states from a distance. At the same time, the program is considering approaches that would allow several organizations, including NNSA, IAEA, national laboratories and contractor staff, to collaborate in the development and maintenance of instructional content. Software systems known as Learning Management Systems (LMSs) might represent a mechanism through which INSEP could accomplish these goals (collaborative development and remote support). To assess the usefulness of an LMS, INSEP has specified its needs for delivering online training and compared those needs to the capability of a range of LMSs. This comparison will allow INSEP to determine whether an LMS would be a useful tool and may set the stage for a "make-buy" decision in the future. The study team concluded that INSEP's content development and delivery needs align well with the capabilities of the leading LMSs on the market today and that that INSEP performance requirements allow for a customized approach using existing training portals that are already available to NNSA. Additional work would be required to specify the desired processes for developing online training and outreach materials, structuring the databases, specifying the data that should be collected, and detailing the desired system reports and documentation.