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DOE OSTI2016

Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

APSN↗

DOE OSTI2014

Attaining and Maintaining a Continuity of Knowledge to Draw Safeguards Conclusions with Confidence.

As the 21st century progresses, new nuclear facilities and the expansion of nuclear activities into new countries will require the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to place a higher reliance on attaining and maintaining a Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of its safeguards information than is currently practiced. Additionally, a conceptual view of where and how CoK can be applied will need to evolve to support improved efficiency and efficacy of drawing a safeguards conclusion for each Member State. The ability to draw a safeguards conclusion for a Member State will be predicated on the confidence that CoK has been attained and subsequently maintained with respect to the data and information streams used by the IAEA. This confidence can be described as a function of factors such as elapsed time since the measurement, surveillance of attributes, authentication of information, historic knowledge of potential system failures, and the number and type of data collections. A set of general scenarios are further described for determining what is required to attain CoK and whether CoK has been maintained. A high-level analysis of example scenarios is presented to identify failures or gaps that could cause a loss of CoK. Potential areas for technological research and development are discussed for the next generation of CoK tools.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2015

Lessons Learned from U.S. Industry Engagement on Safeguards by Design

Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration, through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), has supported development of the safeguards by design (SBD) concept. In more recent years, NGSI has made efforts to move the concept of SBD from paper to standard industry practice through engagement with commercial nuclear industry. These partnerships between NGSI and domestic facility designers have represented a unique opportunity to assess and explore the safeguards implementation challenges that emerging reactor designs have the potential to pose. Thus far, partners have included NuScale Power, Babcock & Wilcox mPower, Westinghouse, and TerraPower. This paper reviews engagements with partners to-date, with an emphasis on approaches to engaging commercial industry on SBD and identifying lessons learned from these engagements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2013

3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2013

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Bubbler Design Updates for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

The accurate monitoring of molten salt is crucial for nuclear safeguards, particularly in the context of mixtures used in molten salt reactors and pyropocessing. To attain material accountancy in actinide bearing molten salts, fluid volume and density are needed. Previous work utilized a triple bubbler sensor to measure the fluid level and density in processing tanks. This triple bubbler system utilized three gas dip-tubes strategically positioned at different heights within the molten salt such that the molten salt level, density, and surface tension were determined simultaneously. This investigation explores the effectiveness of an updated bubbler design with larger internal diameters for the dip-tubes to reduce plugging. The findings of this study will provide valuable insights into a bubbler design and configuration for applications in nuclear safeguards. This will contribute to enhanced accountability and transparency in the monitoring of actinide bearing molten salts, promoting objectives in nuclear safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Bubbler Design Updates for Nuclear Safeguards Application

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Bubbler Design Updates for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

The accurate monitoring of molten salt compositions is crucial for nuclear safeguards, particularly in the context of mixtures used in molten salt reactors as well as pyroprocessing. However, for nuclear material accountancy in actinide bearing molten salts, the solution volume is also needed to determine the total mass of material in the salt. This study explores the effectiveness of two bubbler configurations, triple and single, for density and level measurements within these molten salts for salt volume determinations. The triple bubbler system utilizes three gas dip-tubes strategically positioned at different heights within the molten salt. With this design, the molten salt level, density, and surface tension can be determined simultaneously. The single bubbler configuration, on the other hand, relies on a dynamic single dip-tube to determine the density and level. Both configurations will be tested in aqueous solutions as well as in LiCl-KCl and NaCl-MgCl2 molten salts between 450°C and 750°C. Dip-tube diameters and bubbler inferences will also be explored. A new bubbler is being designed based on results. The findings of this study will provide valuable insights into the optimal bubbler design and configuration for ensuring representative sampling of molten salt compositions in nuclear safeguards applications. This will contribute to enhanced accountability and transparency in the monitoring of actinide bearing molten salts, promoting nuclear safeguards objectives.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2018

A comparison of Monte Carlo fission models for safeguards neutron coincidence counters

Monte Carlo simulation is a powerful tool used to model neutron coincidence detectors for international safeguards. The simulation has typically sampled properties such as the fission neutron multiplicity, energy, and direction, from independent probability density functions. However, multiplicity counters detect event-based neutron correlations and thus more accurate fission event modeling is needed. To respond to this need, the Fission Reaction Event Yield Algorithm (FREYA) and the Cascading Gamma-ray Multiplicity with Fission (CGMF) models were added in the newest version of MCNP, MCNP6.2. The models simulate individual fission events conserving momentum, energy, and angular momentum such that correlated particles are emitted. The effects of the new models on simulations of safeguards neutron coincidence counters were studied and compared to standard MCNP simulations. The MCNPX-PoliMi model was also included in the comparison. The properties of fission neutrons from safeguards relevant isotopes were compared to literature references. Then a hypothetical simplified detector was modeled to isolate the effects of specific differences between models. Experimental measurements from previous work were modeled and agreements were compared. Lastly, the probabilities of correlated events occurring in the experimental measurements were calculated with the different models. For example, the probability was calculated of detecting neutrons from both induced fission in uranium and spontaneous fission of Cf-252 in the same fission chain.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2014

Boron-10 Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Safeguards

The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security applications, including international nuclear safeguards. Any alternative neutron detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. For nuclear safeguards, a system must perform measurements in the field with a prescribed precision in a specified time. This paper describes an effort to design, model and test an alternatives-based neutron coincidence counter for nuclear safeguards applications. The technology chosen for use in an alternatives-based uranium neutron coincidence collar was boron-lined proportional counters. Extensive modeling was performed of various system configurations and comparisons were made to measurements on a commercial prototype boron-10 based uranium neutron coincidence collar.

alternative neutron detectors↗

DOE OSTI2012

Systems Analysis of hiRX for Improved Reprocessing Safeguards

The goal of this work was to examine the potential safeguards improvement of the High Resolution X-ray (hiRX) technology for aqueous reprocessing plants. Existing plants utilize KEdge and Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry for routine accountancy measurements for the key input and output accountability tanks. The IAEA also use these technologies for verification measurements. The hiRX technology has the potential to significantly reduce the measurement uncertainty with an equally simple but less costly instrument that uses a much smaller sample size. Such a technology could be highly desirable for both the operator and inspector. This work utilizes a Separations and Safeguards Performance Model of a PUREX reprocessing plant to determine the safeguards improvement offered by the reduced measurement uncertainty of hiRX. Results show that a significant improvement in the ability to detect a protracted diversion may be possible.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2012

Modeling and Design of Integrated Safeguards and Security for an Electrochemical Reprocessing Facility

Electrochemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel may be an alternative to aqueous processing and is considered more attractive for fast reactor fuel cycles. Molten salt processing of the fuel may simplify the number of processing steps, but the nuclear industry worldwide has much less operational experience with this technology, including safeguards and security. As interest in electrochemical processing grows in the U.S. and other countries, it is important to understand how to address materials accountancy and security in this unique environment. For this work, a model of a commercial-scale electrochemical plant was developed in Matlab Simulink for design and analysis of integrated safeguards and security systems. The model tracks the mass flow rates of the fuel and salt through the various unit operations and simulates materials accountancy, process monitoring measurements, and physical protection. These measurements are then used to calculate inventory balances during normal operation and diversion scenarios. The model analysis enables one to identify various strategies and options for safeguarding nuclear material, contingent upon the feasibility of the measurement technology. This paper describes the model development, measurement options and strategies, and performance under diversion scenarios.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2012

Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2013

Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.

black box↗

DOE OSTI2013

Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS requirements can be incorporated into the pre-conceptual through early facility design stages, seeking a cost-effective design that meets both operational efficiencies and the regulatory environment. The larger scope of the project, i.e., in future stages, includes the identification of potentially conflicting requirements identified by the ISOSS framework, including an analysis of how regulatory requirements may be changed to account for the intrinsic features of SMRs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2015

Select Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Plant Design for Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) per Used Fuel Campaign

As preparation to the year-end deliverable (Provide SSBD Best Practices for Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant) for the Work Package (FT-15LA040501–Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage), the initial step was to select a generic dry-storage pilot plant design for SSBD. To be consistent with other DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) activities, the Used Fuel Campaign was engaged for the selection of a design for this deliverable. For the work Package FT-15LA040501–“Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage”, SSBD will be initiated for the Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant described by the layout of Reference 2. SSBD will consider aspects of the design that are impacted by domestic material control and accounting (MC&A), domestic security, and international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2017

FY2017 Final Report: Power of the People: A technical ethical and experimental examination of the use of crowdsourcing to support international nuclear safeguards verification.

Recent advances in information technology have led to an expansion of crowdsourcing activities that utilize the “power of the people” harnessed via online games, communities of interest, and other platforms to collect, analyze, verify, and provide technological solutions for challenges from a multitude of domains. To related this surge in popularity, the research team developed a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities as they relate to international nuclear safeguards, evaluated the potential legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of crowdsourcing to support safeguards, and proposed experimental designs to test the capabilities and prospect for the use of crowdsourcing to support nuclear safeguards verification.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗