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Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The science, technology, and politics of ballistic missile defense

America's missile defense systems are deployed at home and abroad. This includes the Groundbased Missile Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California, the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe (EPAA), and regional systems in the Middle East and Asia. Unfortunately these systems lack workable architectures, and many of the required elements either don't work or are missing. Major review and reconsideration is needed of all elements of these systems. GMD performance in tests has gotten worse with time, when it ought to be getting better. A lack of political support is not to blame as the DoD spends about $10 billion per year, and proposes to add about $5 billion over the next five years. Russia objects to the EPAA as a threat to its ICBM forces, and to the extensive deployment of U.S. military forces in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, once part of the Soviet Union. Going forward the U.S. should keep working with Russia whose cooperation will be key to diplomatic gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. Meanwhile, America's missile defenses face an enduring set of issues, especially target discrimination in the face of attacks designed to overwhelm the defenses, stage separation debris, chaff, decoys, and stealth. Dealing with target discrimination while also replacing, upgrading, or adding to the many elements of U.S. missiles defenses presents daunting budget priorities. A new look at the threat is warranted, and whether the U.S. needs to consider every nation that possesses even short-range missiles a threat to America. The proliferation of missiles of all sizes around the world is a growing problem, but expecting U.S. missile defenses to deal with all those missiles everywhere is unrealistic, and U.S. missile defenses, effective or not, are justifying more and more offensive missiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Detection of Breeding Blankets Using Antineutrinos

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement between the United States and Russia makes arrangements for the disposal of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium. Under this agreement Russia plans to dispose of its excess stocks by processing the plutonium into fuel for fast breeder reactors. To meet the disposition requirements this fuel would be burned while the fast reactors are run as burners, i.e., without a natural uranium blanket that can be used to breed plutonium surrounding the core. Here, we discuss the potential application of antineutrino monitoring to the verification of the presence of a breeding blanket. We found that a 36 kg antineutrino detector, exploiting coherent elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering and made of silicon could determine the presence of a breeding blanket at a liquid sodium cooled fast reactor at the 95 percent confidence level within 90 days.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Tundra landscape heterogeneity, not interannual variability, controls the decadal regional carbon balance in the Western Russian Arctic

Across the Arctic, the net ecosystem carbon (C) balance of tundra ecosystems is highly uncertain due to substantial temporal variability of C fluxes and to landscape heterogeneity. We modeled both carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) fluxes for the dominant regional land cover types in a sub-Arctic tundra region in northeast European Russia for the period of 2006-2015 using coupled biogeochemical and permafrost models. Modeled net annual CO2 fluxes ranged from -300 g C m-2 y-1 [net uptake] in a willow fen to 3 g C m-2 y-1 [net source] in dry lichen tundra. Modeled annual CH4 emissions ranged from -0.2 to 22.3 g C m-2 y-1 at a peat plateau site and a willow fen site, respectively. Interannual variability over the decade was relatively small (20-30%) in comparison to variability among the land cover types (120-225%). Using high-resolution land cover classification, the region was a net sink of atmospheric CO2 across most land cover types but a net source of CH4 to the atmosphere due to high emissions from permafrost-free fens. Using a lower-resolution for land cover classification resulted in a 20-65% underestimation of regional CH4 flux and smaller (10%) overestimation of regional CO2 uptake, leading to an overall overestimation of the regional GHG sink by 90% due to the underestimation of wetland extent by 60%. Accurately capturing the relative fraction of uplands versus wetlands was key to determining the net regional C balance but required high (<25-30 m) spatial resolution.

Treat, Claire↗

Powerful pulsed neutron sources for research with a pulsed magnetic field

The prospects for neutron investigations into the magnetic properties of condensed matter with the use of powerful pulsed neutron sources [Japan Spallation Neutron Source (JSNS) (Tokai, Japan), TIRAN (Zababakhin All-Russia Research Institute of Technical Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center, Snezhinsk, Russia), Large Hadron Collider (LHC) (CERN)] and pulsed magnetic fields are considered. It is demonstrated that the diffraction measurements of the magnetic states induced by a magnetic field of up to 700-1000 kOe can be performed at the TIRAN reactor and the neutron source that can be developed on the basis of the LHC accelerator.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Measurement of astrophysical S factors and electron screening potentials for d(d, n){sup 3}He reaction In ZrD{sub 2}, TiD{sub 2}, D{sub 2}O, and CD{sub 2} targets in the ultralow energy region using plasma accelerators

The paper is devoted to study electron screening effect influence on the rate of d(d, n){sup 3}He reaction in the ultralow deuteron collision energy range in the deuterated polyethylene (CD{sub 2}), frozen heavy water (D{sub 2}O) and deuterated metals (ZrD{sub 2} and TiD{sub 2}). The ZrD{sub 2} and TiD{sub 2} targets were fabricated via magnetron sputtering of titanium and zirconium in gas (deuterium) environment. The experiments have been carried out using high-current plasma pulsed accelerator with forming of inverse Z pinch (HCEIRAS, Russia) and pulsed Hall plasma accelerator (NPI at TPU, Russia). The detection of neutrons with energy of 2.5MeV from dd reaction was done with plastic scintillation spectrometers. As a result of the experiments the energy dependences of astrophysical S factor for the dd reaction in the deuteron collision energy range of 2-7 keV and the values of the electron screening potential U{sub e} of interacting deuterons have been measured for the indicated above target: U{sub e}(CD{sub 2}) Less-Than-Or-Slanted-Equal-To 40 eV; U{sub e}(D{sub 2}O) Less-Than-Or-Slanted-Equal-To 26 eV; U{sub e}(ZrD{sub 2}) = 157 {+-} 43 eV; U{sub e}(TiD{sub 2}) = 125{+-}34 eV. The value of astrophysical S factor, corresponding to the deuteron collision energy equal to zero, in the experiments with D{sub 2}O target is found: S{sub b}(0) = 58.6 {+-} 3.6 keV b. The paper compares our results with other available published experimental and calculated data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear and related analytical techniques in ecology: Impact of geoecological factors on the balance of trace elements in the human organism

Current capabilities of the nuclear and related analytical techniques: neutron activation analysis, X-ray fluorescent analysis, and atomic adsorption spectrometry—are used to carry out multielement analysis of a wide range of foodstuffs and drinking water in various regions of Russia. The results of a more than 20-year-long collaboration of the Geological Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Neutron Activation Analysis and Applied Research Sector, Frank Laboratory of Neutron Physics, Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, in this field are presented. It is shown that the trace element content of agricultural products depends on the ecological and geochemical conditions in a particular region. A possibility of lettuce and spinach variety determination with respect to Cd and Pb contamination of the soil is demonstrated in the experiment with artificially produced soil contamination. Principles that may underlie accumulation of heavy metals and toxic elements by basidiomycetes are determined. Out of a great deal of human diets in use, the six most typical ones are selected and the intake of macro- and micronutrients from these diets by a human is evaluated. The effect produced on the human organism by the basic elements intake with the food and possible risks are discussed. Dependence of the trace element content of the drinking water on the ecological and geochemical conditions is investigated in three regions of Russia. It is shown that the quality of drinking water critically depends on the condition of the water supply system.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Erratum to: Search for phenomena beyond the Standard Model in events with large b -jet multiplicity using the ATLAS detector at the LHC

In the original HTML version of this article, one affiliation of the author V. O. Tikhomirov was missing. He is affiliated to the following two affiliations: P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia and National Research Nuclear University MEPhI, Moscow, Russia. The original article has been corrected.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

GEFSv12 High- and Low-Skill Day-10 Tornado Forecasts

Abstract On average, modern numerical weather prediction forecasts for daily tornado frequency exhibit no skill beyond day 10. However, in this extended-range lead window, there are particular model cycles that have exceptionally high forecast skill for tornadoes because of their ability to correctly simulate the future synoptic pattern. Here, model initial conditions that produced a more skillful forecast for tornadoes over the United States were exploited while also highlighting potential causes for low-skill cycles within the Global Ensemble Forecasting System, version 12 (GEFSv12). There were 88 high-skill and 91 low-skill forecasts in which the verifying day-10 synoptic pattern for tornado conditions revealed a western U.S. thermal trough and an eastern U.S. thermal ridge, a favorable configuration for tornadic storm occurrence. Initial conditions for high skill forecasts tended to exhibit warmer sea surface temperatures throughout the tropical Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, an active Madden–Julian oscillation, and significant modulation of Earth-relative atmospheric angular momentum. Low-skill forecasts were often initialized during La Niña and negative Pacific decadal oscillation conditions. Significant atmospheric blocking over eastern Russia—in which the GEFSv12 overforecast the duration and characteristics of the downstream flow—was a common physical process associated with low-skill forecasts. This work helps to increase our understanding of the common causes of high- or low-skill extended-range tornado forecasts and could serve as a helpful tool for operational forecasters. Significance Statement This research provides a framework for the anticipation of a more (or less) skillful 10-day tornado forecast in an operational numerical weather prediction system. High-skill forecasts were associated with substantial tropical convection and warm sea surface temperature throughout the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico, whereas the underlying cause of low-skill forecasts were typically associated with a blocking anticyclone over eastern Russia. These findings are important because they permit increased or decreased confidence in a long-range forecast of tornado occurrence based on a dynamical prediction system.

Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences↗

2010 Neutron Review: ORNL Neutron Sciences Progress Report

During 2010, the Neutron Sciences Directorate focused on producing world-class science, while supporting the needs of the scientific community. As the instrument, sample environment, and data analysis tools at High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR ) and Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) have grown over the last year, so has promising neutron scattering research. This was an exciting year in science, technology, and operations. Some topics discussed are: (1) HFIR and SNS Experiments Take Gordon Battelle Awards for Scientific Discovery - Battelle Memorial Institute presented the inaugural Gordon Battelle Prizes for scientific discovery and technology impact in 2010. Battelle awards the prizes to recognize the most significant advancements at national laboratories that it manages or co-manages. (2) Discovery of Element 117 - As part of an international team of scientists from Russia and the United States, HFIR staff played a pivotal role in the discovery by generating the berkelium used to produce the new element. A total of six atoms of ''ununseptium'' were detected in a two-year campaign employing HFIR and the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the heavy-ion accelerator capabilities at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, Russia. The discovery of the new element expands the understanding of the properties of nuclei at extreme numbers of protons and neutrons. The production of a new element and observation of 11 new heaviest isotopes demonstrate the increased stability of super-heavy elements with increasing neutron numbers and provide the strongest evidence to date for the existence of an island of enhanced stability for super-heavy elements. (3) Studies of Iron-Based High-Temperature Superconductors - ORNL applied its distinctive capabilities in neutron scattering, chemistry, physics, and computation to detailed studies of the magnetic excitations of iron-based superconductors (iron pnictides and chalcogenides), a class of materials discovered in 2008. This research is yielding new insights into the relationship between magnetism and superconductivity and has established several key features of this family of high-temperature superconducting (HTS ) materials: the maximum magnetic field at which they can function, the nature of the electrons involved in the superconductivity, the dependence of the properties upon chemical substitution, and the character of the magnetic fluctuations in the material. The results suggest that despite important differences between these materials and the HTS copper oxides, a universal mechanism may be responsible for the unconventional superconductivity. (4) Coal Sequestration Research: A New Home for Greenhouse Gases - One possibility for slowing down the increasing levels of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) in the atmosphere is to capture the gas in natural underground features such as coal seams. Critical to the feasibility of this technology is determining how much CO{sub 2} can be stored, no method for which has been found - until now. (5) Accelerator Reliability Passes 92% - In December 2010, SNS set a new record for itself when the accelerator ran at 1 MW with 100% reliability. Target Performance Exceeds All Expectations - The mercury target used at SNS is the first of its kind. During the design and planning for SNS, many people were skeptical that the target would work. In 2010, it was confirmed that the target was working not only well but much better than anyone would have imagined. (6) Changing the World of Data Acquisition - Researchers at SNS are starting to benefit from event-based data analysis. Event data mode captures and stores an individual data set for every single neutron that strikes a detector - precisely when and where the neutron is detected. This technique provides numerous advantages over traditional methods. Event data mode allows researchers to process their data at the highest resolution possible with no loss of data. This method of data collection provides a much more efficient way for users to gather data and get the most from their beam time. (7) New Laboratories for Users - The HFIR and SNS user communities continue to grow dramatically. In 2010, HFIR hosted 862 users and SNS 796, outpacing projections for both facilities. To meet the needs of those users, a new complex of 13 laboratories is now open for users at SNS. (8) Innovative Detectors Provide Relief from Helium-3 Shortage - Helium-3 ({sup 3}He) has been the gas of choice for gaseous detectors since the early days of neutron science. About two years ago, detector scientists worldwide faced the reality that stockpiles of {sup 3}He are dwindling rapidly, while demand for it has risen by a factor of five. The Neutron Sciences Detectors Group has developed two new types of detectors that don't rely on {sup 3}He: the Anger camera and the wavelength shifting fiber neutron detector, both of which use lithium ({sup 6}Li).

High Flux isotope reactor↗

BAZAAR DIPLOMACY: Examining Iran's Nuclear Bargaining Tactics

Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Procurement of 100 kg of Enriched Xenon for the EXO Prototype and for its Installation at WIPP

This grant supported the enriched xenon procurement, detector construction and initial operation of the EXO-200 double beta decay experiment at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The period of performance was Aug 15, 2002 to Dec 31, 2014. The primary goal of the experiment is to search for the very rare (and to date not observed) neutrino-less double beta decay. Such decay, if observed, would shed the light of the quantum-mechanical structure of neutrinos, and the origins of elementary particle masses. Another goal of the detector is to serve as prototype of a larger neutrino-less double beta decay experiment, currently being considered by DOE-OS. EXO-200 has already been extremely successful in both areas and is, in fact, leading the way world-wide in this area of fundamental physics. In the initial part of the grant the EXO-200 collaboration acquired 200kg of xenon enriched to 80% in the isotope 136 that is a candidate for double beta decay. At the time this was the largest isotope separation program carried out for fundamental science. The enrichment was done in Russia, providing a rare and valuable opportunity for US scientists to work alongside Russian colleagues, in some cases from the former closed cities of their military complex. By now the EXO-200 collaboration include institutions from the US, Canada, South Korea, China, Germany, Switzerland and Russia. Many collaborating scientists from these countries have taken shifts at WIPP or at the various remote monitoring sites world-wide. EXO-200 detector construction was completed in early 2010, with the time projection chamber (TPC) installation in the cleanrooms already placed in NeXA. Detector commissioning at WIPP followed, with the last phase, the filling of the TPC with liquid Xenon, occurring in the spring 2011. EXO-200 is described in [1]. Low background data taking started on Jun 1, 2011 and within the first month of data the 2-neutrino double beta decay of 136Xe was discovered, as reported in [2]. More data provided the best half-life measurement of any 2-neutrino double-beta decay modes [3]. Until Feb 2014 the detector ran continuously producing some of the world leading results in the field and, in particular, two of the most sensitive searches for neutrinoless double beta decay [4,5]. These measurements show that the half life of this decay is longer than 1015 times the age of the universe. This is one of the leading results in this field world-wide and succeeded to put the DOE-funded research on the world stage in a very cost-effective way. Other results from EXO-200 include a search for exotic double-beta decay modes [6], a detailed report on the state of the art background levels achieved in the detector [7], the study of rare ion and neutral atom motion and neutralization rates in liquid Xenon [8], a study of the cosmogenic backgrounds in the detector at WIPP’s depth [9], a search for Lorentz and CPT symmetries violation [10] and a search for double-beta decay to excited states [11]. In Feb 2014 the EXO-200 detector was severely disrupted by the accidents in the WIPP underground (unrelated to EXO-200). The EXO-200 operations team was able to recover the unique stockpile of enriched Xenon to high pressure cylinders and warm-up the detector to room temperature without damaging the very delicate equipment. This was a very impressive achievement as no plan had been made to complete these operations entirely from remote. This validates the robustness of well-designed liquid xenon detectors for this and other measurements in particle and nuclear astrophysics. The operations team re-gained almost regular access to the WIPP underground and the EXO-200 detector in Jan 2015 and spent calendar 2015 cleaning up the soot from the WIPP fire, assessing the damage to the EXO-200 infrastructure, correcting such damage and restarting the detector. This process was successfully carried out and culminated in the re-filling of the detector with liquid xenon, in Jan 2016. As of late Jan 2016 EXO-200 is taking data again. The collaboration is in the process of upgrading the readout electronics and restarting a radon abatement system that had been commissioned just before the Feb 2014 events. The upgraded electronics will provide lower readout noise and, in turn, better signal to background discrimination. The radon abatement system will further reduce the radon in a small air-gap between the EXO-200 cryostat and the lead shielding. In a review in Jun 2015 DOE-OS approved EXO-200 for 2.5 more years of running at the end of which we expect to improve the sensitivity to the neutrino-less double-beta decay by a factor two or three. For the last 5 years the EXO-200 detector, located in the WIPP underground, has been at the center of the hunt for new physics beyond the Standard Model of particle physics!

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Space and the Third Offset Symposium - Summary Report

The Third Offset Workshop explored the nature of the challenges and opportunities facing the United States as it is increasingly forced to integrate space into defense strategy as well as deterrence and strategic stability frameworks. Participants broadly agreed that Washington’s deep ties to allies and partners, as well as its history of leveraging an innovative U.S private sector, will be enduring competitive advantages against potential rivals into the foreseeable future. Yet panelists also highlighted key challenges from Russia and China’s rapid integration of space capabilities into conventional and nuclear warfighting, the pronounced growth in Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities, and tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Standoff Over the LRSO: Assessing the long-range stand-off missile's impact on strategic stability.

Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads? Workshop Summary August 2018

In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Russian Model of Internet Control and Its Significance

Russia has emerged as an exemplar of an innovative and experimental – though not always completely consistent or successful – alternative approach to information manipulation and control that differs significantly from the more-often discussed Chinese “Great Firewall” system and other approaches with an emphasis on systemic technical censorship. The Russian model relies on a mix of less overt, more plausibly deniable, legalistic, and often non-technical mechanisms to manipulate online information flows, narratives, and framings, to affect and shape public opinion without resort to universal censorship. The government uses surveillance, a panoply of vague laws, the prosecution or censorship of exemplars, proxy actors and hard to track extra-legal pressures, hacking and leaks, and a heavy emphasis on content production and manipulation to influence narratives and shape public opinion. This model for the domestic control of information not only fits with Russia’s own political system, but is likely to prove more resonant and easier to emulate across many other countries in which a systematic-censorship approach is not technologically or politically feasible. The learning and experimentation involved in this type of domestic information manipulation also has direct applicability to the use of information operations in international political and military competition. The future of this model will likely depend on continuing innovation, not least on the leveraging of advances in artificial intelligence and big data analysis. If successful, however, this might look very different from the future of information control in China – and have significantly different repercussions for democracies and the international system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗