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At least 181 records · Page 10

HOW MIGHT INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION

Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include 1) the nuclear industry, 2) dual-use industries, and 3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that, ultimately, broad engagement of global industry leaders in self regulation is needed to result in the greatest nonproliferation benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Flux Estimation of a PuBe source using Delayed Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis

For handling and storage of a highly radioactive source, it is necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the radioactive source as well as the neutron flux. Recently, due to radiation safety requirements, a PuBe alpha-neutron source at an activation facility at IIT-Kanpur had to be taken out of its original damaged howitzer and placed inside a new shielded container. While, this effort was successful in reducing the radiation dose, and making the setup safe for laboratory measurements, the new source moderator configuration left the new Pu-Be source spectrum unknown. Therefore, in this work we have used delayed gamma neutron activation analysis (DGNAA) of aluminum, copper, iron, manganese (found in iron), and silver for thermal neutron flux estimation of the Pu-Be neutron source. A series of DGNAA measurements with different samples were carried out to find the value of the average thermal neutron flux of a Pu-Be neutron source at Indian Institute of Technology-Kanpur. The order of the thermal neutron flux is found to be nearly 1.64 x 10{sup 5} excluding aluminum. Upon including aluminum, the value of thermal neutron flux decreases to 1.57x10{sup 5}. We have used common metals (like aluminum, silver, copper and iron) to calculate the thermal neutron flux. The calculated value of the thermal neutron flux is consistent for all the metals except for iron. Iron is giving a value almost four times larger than the average calculated value of the thermal neutron flux using other six samples. The reason is currently being investigated. The DGNAA technique came out to be a very useful technique. Now that we know the thermal neutron flux of the Pu-Be source, our future work will include improving the safety and shielding calculations for our activation facility at IIT-Kanpur. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A high-speed one-dimensional detector for time-resolved small -angle X-ray scattering : design and characterization.

A high-speed one-dimensional detector for time-resolved small-angle x-ray scattering has been designed and built for experiments at the Advanced Photon Source of Argonne National Laboratory. This detector is made from a 500-?m thick by 150-mm diameter ultra-high-purity n-type silicon wafer. The electrodes, which are a series of concentric rings that are deposited in the wafer, integrate the scattered x-rays over the azimuthal angle and, thereby, produce a one-dimensional detector. This design yields 128 rings, which allows parallel processing of the signal from each ring. The readout electronics consist of transimpedance front-end amplifiers, one for each ring, followed by active pulse-shaping filters. The amplifier signals are digitized using 12-bit analog-to-digital converters, one per ring, which operate at 20 MHz. The frame rate of the system is 271 kHz. Up to 220 - 1 scattering profiles may be stored on a random access memory chip and transferred to a data file at a rate of 16 x 103 profiles/sec. For X-ray energies between 3.5 and 13.2 keV the efficiency exceeds 80%. The resolving time of the electronics is 300 ns, which is sufficient to isolate electronically a single pulse of scattered x-rays when the synchrotron is operated in a hybrid or asymmetric fill pattern. Therefore, laser-pump/x-ray-probe experiments can be performed without a mechanical shutter. Examples of time-resolved speckle and the kinetics of the formation of sodium chloride particles are presented. This detector is capable of acquiring small-angle x-ray scattering profiles over multiple time scales, which are needed to characterize many chemical, physical, and biological processes. In addition, this detector may be tested and calibrated before experimental runs, without access to an intense beam of x-rays, with alpha particles from a radioactive source such as 241Am.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Spent Sealed Sources Management in Switzerland - 12011

Information is provided about the international recommendations for the safe management of disused and spent sealed radioactive sources wherein the return to the supplier or manufacturer is encouraged for large radioactive sources. The legal situation in Switzerland is described mentioning the demand of minimization of radioactive waste as well as the situation with respect to the interim storage facility at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). Based on this information and on the market situation with a shortage of some medical radionuclides the management of spent sealed sources is provided. The sources are sorted according to their activity in relation to the nuclide-specific A2-value and either recycled as in the case of high active sources or conditioned as in the case for sources with lower activity. The results are presented as comparison between recycled and conditioned activity for three selected nuclides, i.e. Cs-137, Co-60 and Am-241. (author)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Thermal Modeling Study for Geologic Borehole Conceptual Design - 17148

Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN-CNEN/SP) is developing a strategy for safe, permanent disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) from industrial and medical applications within Brazil. The Institute is proposing modifications to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Borehole Disposal of Sealed Radioactive Sources (BOSS) concept originally developed by the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa. The current Brazilian modified design differs from the IAEA design in that the disposal zone is below 300 m versus 30 m of the boss concept, and will be used to dispose of a much larger number of DSRS. These modifications result in a considerable departure from the generic safety case established by IAEA. Therefore, a new safety case is required to assess radiological and thermal impacts among other considerations. Predictive modeling and simulations were performed to address impacts of the proposed borehole concept at the early design stage in order to provide timely improvements to the concept and a traceable rationale for decisions made throughout the program as required by the safety case. Preliminary objectives of the modeling effort were focused on evaluating the mechanical and thermal loads anticipated within the current Brazilian borehole disposal concept in order to assess potential material and design issues. This paper presents the thermal modeling predictions and performance results for the proposed BOSS design. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sealed and Disused/Orphan Sources in Ukraine - German Contribution - 13359

Within the scope of 'Nuclear Security of Radioactive Sources', the German government implemented the modernization of Ukrainian State Production Company's transport and storage facility for radioactive sources (TSF) in Kiev. The overall management of optimizing the physical protection of the storage facility (including the construction of a hot cell for handling the radioactive sources) is currently carried out by the German Federal Foreign Office (AA). AA jointly have assigned Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany's leading expert institution in the area of nuclear safety and waste management, to implement the project and to ensure transparency by financial and technical monitoring. Sealed radioactive sources are widely used in industry, medicine and research. Their life cycle starts with the production and finally ends with the interim/long-term storage of the disused sources. In Ukraine, IZOTOP is responsible for all radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. IZOTOP's transport and storage facility (TSF) is the only Ukrainian storage facility for factory-fresh radioactive sources up to an activity of about 1 million Ci (3.7 1016 Bq). The TSF is specially designed for the storage and handling of radioactive sources. Storage began in 1968, and is licensed by the Ukrainian state authorities. Beside the outdated state of TSF's physical protection and the vulnerability of the facility linked with it, the lack of a hot cell for handling and repacking radioactive sources on the site itself represents an additional potential hazard. The project, financed by the German Federal Foreign Office, aims to significantly improve the security of radioactive sources during their storage and handling at the TSF site. Main tasks of the project are a) the modernization of the physical protection of the TSF itself in order to prevent any unauthorized access to radioactive sources as well as b) the construction of a hot cell to reduce the number of transports of radioactive sources within the city of Kiev. In future, the new established hot cell at IZOTOP's transport and storage facility will be useful for identification and characterization of orphan/disused radioactive sources. The projects implemented are performed in accordance with international recommendations (e. g. IAEA) and national normative documents and will make a crucial contribution towards an improved safety and security management of radioactive sources in Ukraine. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of New or Modified Radioactive Air Emission Sources

This Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC), Compliance Programs (CP) Quality Procedure (QP) describes the process for review and evaluation of new and modified sources of radioactive air emissions to determine the requirements for pre-construction approval, stack monitoring, stack sampling system upgrade, ambient air monitoring, and the implementation of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principles. These requirements are specified in 40 CFR 61 Subpart H and by DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Physics Potential of a Future Large n Detector in Korea

The demand for underground labs for neutrino and rare event search experiments has been increasing over the last few decades. Yemilab, constructed in October 2022, is the first deep (1~km) underground lab dedicated to science in Korea, where a large cylindrical cavern (D: 20~m, H: 20~m) was excavated in addition to the main caverns and halls. The large cavern could be utilized for a low background neutrino experiment by a liquid scintillator-based detector (LSC) where a 2.26 kiloton LS target would be filled.It's timely to have such a large but ultra-pure LS detector after the shutdown of the Borexino experiment so that solar neutrinos can be measured much more precisely. Interesting BSM physics searches can be also pursued with this detector when it's combined with an electron linac, a proton cyclotron (IsoDAR source), or a radioactive source. This talk discusses the concept of a candidate detector and the physics potential of a large liquid scintillator detector.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Design, Development and Operational Experience of Demonstration Facility for Cs-137 Source Pencil Production at Trombay - 13283

Radioactive waste management is a vital aspect of any nuclear program. The commercial feasibility of the nuclear program largely depends on the efficiency of the waste management techniques. One of such techniques is the separation of high yield radio-nuclides from the waste and making it suitable for medical and industrial applications. This will give societal benefit in addition to revenue generation. Co-60, the isotope presently being used for medical applications, needs frequent replacement because of its short half life. Cs-137, the major constituent of the nuclear waste, is a suitable substitute for Co-60 as a radioactive source because of its longer half life (28 years). Indian nuclear waste management program has given special emphasis on utilization of Cs-137 for such applications. In view of this a demonstration facility has been designed for vitrification of Cs-137 in borosilicate glass, cast in stainless steel pencils, to be used as source pencils of 300 Ci strength for blood irradiation. An induction heated metallic melter of suitable capacity has been custom designed for the application and employed for the Cs-137 pencil fabrication facility. This article describes various systems, design features, experiments and resulting modifications, observations and remote handling features necessary for the actual operation of such facility. The layout of the facility has been planned in such a way that the same can be adopted in a hot cell for commercial production of source pencils. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Disposal Process for High Activity Sources by a University through the U.S. Dept. of Energy's Off-Site Source Recovery Project - 12076

Sealed radioactive sources are used in a wide variety of applications by a large number of license holders in the Unites States. Applications range from low-activity calibration sources to high-activity irradiators for engineering, research, or medical purposes. This paper describes and evaluates the safety and security measures in place for disused sealed sources, in particular of high activity sealed sources at the end of their operational life-time. The technical, radiation protection, and financial challenges for licensees and the Competent Authorities are reviewed from the point of view of the license holder. As an example, the waste management processes and the chain of custody for disused research irradiator sources are followed from extraction from the irradiator facility to the source disposal or recycling contractor. Possible safety and security concern in the waste disposal process are investigated in order to identify improvement potential for radiation protection or source security. Two shipments of disused sealed sources from Colorado State University (CSU) have been conducted through the CSU Radiation Control Office (RCO) in the last two years, with a third shipment expected to be completed by the end of November 2011. Two of the sources shipped are considered 'high' activity and exceed the U.S. NRC limits requiring increased controls for security purposes. Three sources were shipped in 2009 and ten more are expected in 2011. A total activity of 117.3 GBq was shipped in 2009. Nine sources were recently shipped in October 2011 through a third party waste broker where the total activity was 96.34 GBq. The last source is scheduled for shipment no later than 30 November 2011 and contains an activity of 399.96 GBq. Radiation waste disposal of high activity sources in large shields with unknown manufacturers, serial numbers, or model numbers is an arduous process requiring multiple contacts with various state and federal agencies. DOE's OSRP has made it possible for CSU to dispose of older unused sources in an economically viable way. Disposal of multiple sources all at once was not an option prior to the establishment of the SCATR program. While CSU was able to dispose of sealed sources when funds were available, the cost to the University would have been prohibitive for this type of mass removal and disposal of radiation sources initiated within this initiative. Where we estimate a cost of about $130 k to ship these sources otherwise, CSU's contribution of $21 k realized a significant savings in what would have been an impossible disposal cost. Removing unused radiation sources from CSU has realized a cost savings while removing a potential security threat. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

XRD Analysis of Cement Paste Samples Exposed to the Simulated Environment of a Deep Repository - 12239

Portland cement materials are widely used as engineered barriers in repositories for radioactive waste. The capacity of such barriers to avoid the disposed of radionuclides to entering the biosphere in the long-term depends on the service life of those materials. Thus, the performance assessment of structural materials under a series of environmental conditions prevailing at the environs of repositories is a matter of interest. The durability of cement paste foreseen as backfill in a deep borehole for disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources is investigated in the development of the repository concept. Results are intended to be part of the body of evidence in the safety case of the proposed disposal technology. This paper presents the results of X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) Analysis of cement paste exposed to varying temperatures and simulated groundwater after samples received the radiation dose that the cement paste will accumulate until complete decay of the radioactive sources. The XRD analysis of cement paste samples realized in this work allowed observing some differences in the results of cement paste specimens that were submitted to different treatments. The cluster analysis of results was able to group tested samples according to the applied treatments. Mineralogical differences, however, are tenuous and, apart from ettringite, are hardly observed. The absence of ettringite in all the seven specimens that were kept in dry storage at high temperature had hardly occurred by natural variations in the composition of hydrated cement paste because ettringite is observed in all tested except the seven specimens. Therefore this absence is certainly the result of the treatments and could be explained by the decomposition of ettringite. Although the temperature of decomposition is about 110-120 deg. C, it may be initially decomposed to meta-ettringite, an amorphous compound, above 50 deg. C in the absence of water. Influence of irradiation on the mineralogical composition was not observed when the treatment was analyzed individually or when analyzed under the possible synergic effect with other treatments. However, the radiation dose to which specimens were exposed is only a fraction of the accumulated dose in cement paste until complete decay of some sources. Therefore, in the short term, the conditions deemed to prevail in the repository environment may not influence the properties of cement paste at detectable levels. Under the conditions presented in this work, it is not possible to predict the long term evolution of these properties. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Maximum Likelihood Source Localization Using Elpasolite as a Dual Gamma Neutron Directional Detector

The problem of accurately detecting extremely low levels of nuclear radiation is rapidly increasing in importance in nuclear counter-proliferation, verification, and environmental and waste management. Because the 239Pu gamma signature may be weak, for instance, even when compared to the natural terrestrial background, coincidence counting with the 239Pu neutron signature may improve overall 239Pu detection sensitivity. However, systems with sufficient multiple-particle detectors require demonstration that the increased sensitivity be sufficiently high to overcome added cost and weight. We report the results of measurements and calculations to determine sensitivity that can be gained in detecting low levels of nuclear radiation from use of a relatively new detector technology based on elpasolite crystals. We have performed investigations exploring cerium (Ce3+)-doped elpasolites Cs2LiYCl6:Ce3+0.5% (CLYC) and Cs2LiLa(Br6)90%(Cl6)10%:Ce3+0.5% (CLLBC:Ce). These materials can provide energy resolution (r(E) = 2.35σ(E)/E) as good as 2.9% at 662 keV (FWHM). The crystals show an excellent neutron and gamma radiation response. The goals of the investigation were to set up the neutron/gamma pulse shape discrimination electronics for elpasolite detectors; perform limited static source benchmarking, testing, and evaluation to validate system performance; and explore application of a maximum likelihood algorithm for source location. Data were measured and processed through a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm, providing a direction to the radioactive source for each individual position. The estimated directions were good representations for the actual directions to the radioactive source. This paper summarizes the maximum likelihood results for our elpasolite system.

maximum likelihood, radiation detectors, neutron d↗

WIPP Certification of the Retrieval Box Assay System at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant, Idaho - 16241

The Retrieval Box Assay System (RBAS) at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) is an Imaging Passive Active Neutron system supplemented with a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma system for the quantification of Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) and transuranic (TRU) alpha activity of waste containers of various sizes up to 249 cm x 149 cm x 198 cm (Length x Width x Height). The system was originally calibrated in 2002 (with a range of surrogate matrices and radioactive sources in a 213 cm x 122 cm x 122 cm FRP box) and has been operational for over a decade. As of August 2015, the RBAS has measured approximately 18,000 boxes (50,000 m3 of waste) which has subsequently been fed into the facility's treatment process. Its success, and the wide envelope of waste that it can characterize, has led AMWTP to extend the RBAS mission to include WIPP certification. As part of this new project, the instrument must be capable of meeting WIPP's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) which include reporting activities and masses of the 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclides. The system will be required to assay sludge and debris waste streams, shredded waste and large metal items. The container size includes Standard Waste Box (SWBs), Fiberglass Reinforced Plywood (FRPs) and large Shredder Boxes. Sludge matrices will be loaded into 210-liter (55-gallon) drums and placed inside an SWB. After assay, boxes will be over-packed into SLB-II's for shipment to WIPP. The target waste streams will contain mixtures of Weapons Grade plutonium, Heat Source plutonium (high in Pu-238 content) and Mixed Oxide (MOX). The activity of the waste is expected to encompass a wide dynamic range of activity from low-level waste (LLW) to TRU with up to several hundred grams of plutonium. Some packages will have high gamma activity associated with fission and activation products such as Cs-137 and Co-60. The existing RBAS hardware (detectors, electronics, assay chamber etc.) was retained for this project. Two lead filters were provided and installed on the existing filter wheels to attenuate the gamma ray flux from the highest activity boxes to avoid overload of the HPGe detectors. The new software suite includes PC-FRAM (Version 5), which is used for the isotopic analysis of the gamma spectra. Integration of FRAM and neutron results is performed using a software package known as RBAS WIPP Analysis Reporting Software (RWARS). This package also performs matrix dependent background adjustments. Other upgrades provided include automated tests that identify when assay parameters fall outside a predetermined range and a new Quality Checking (QC) application. Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) values were determined for the active and passive neutron modes as a function of measured matrix correction indices. The resulting Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) has been demonstrated to be less than 3700 Bq/g alpha activity (100 nCi/g). Modifications were performed to update the system TMU parameters to accommodate assay of non-standard size boxes and a wider range of matrix materials. A series of calibration confirmation, measurements were performed on site in 2014 using a representative range of surrogate boxes and radioactive sources including Pu. The WIPP WAC performance criteria were successfully demonstrated up to 157 g Pu and the system passed its first Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) cycle in the Spring of 2015. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Imaging method for monitoring delivery of high dose rate brachytherapy

A method for in-situ monitoring both the balloon/cavity and the radioactive source in brachytherapy treatment utilizing using at least one pair of miniature gamma cameras to acquire separate images of: 1) the radioactive source as it is moved in the tumor volume during brachytherapy; and 2) a relatively low intensity radiation source produced by either an injected radiopharmaceutical rendering cancerous tissue visible or from a radioactive solution filling a balloon surgically implanted into the cavity formed by the surgical resection of a tumor.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Consistency of vendor-specified activity values for {sup 192}Ir brachytherapy sources

A long-term comparison was done between the manufacturer-stated {sup 192}Ir activity and the measured {sup 192}Ir activities determined with a well-type ionization chamber. Sources for a Nucletron Micro Selectron high-dose-rate (HDR) unit were used for this purpose. The radioactive sources reference activities were determined using a PTW well-type ionization chamber traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology Primary Calibration Laboratory. The measurements were taken in a period of 56 months with 17 different radioactive sources. The manufacturer stated activities were taken from the source calibration certificate provided by the manufacturer. These values were compared with the measured activities. The results have shown that both the percentage deviation of the monthly control measurements with the well-type chamber and the ratio between the measured activities to the manufacturer-stated value lie within {+-} 2.5%. These results were compared with similar published data and with uncertainty level (3% of the mean and 5% maximum deviation from mean) for brachytherapy sources calibration recommended by the AAPM. It was concluded that a threshold level of {+-}2.5% can be used as a suitable quality assurance indicator to spot problems in our department. The typical {+-}5% uncertainty as provided by the manufacturers may be tightened to {+-}3% to be more in line with published AAPM reports.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Calibration of X-ray imaging devices for accurate intensity measurement

National Security Technologies (NSTec) has developed calibration procedures for X-ray imaging systems using NIST traceable sources. The X-ray sources that are used for calibration are both diode type and diode/fluorescer combinations. Calibrating the X-ray detectors is the key to accurate calibration of the X-ray sources. Both energy dispersive detectors and photodiodes measuring total flux were used. We have developed calibration techniques for the detectors using radioactive sources that are traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The German synchrotron at Physikalische Technische Bundestalt (PTB) is used to calibrate silicon photodiodes over the energy range from 50 eV to 60 keV. The measurements on X-ray cameras made using the NSTec X-ray sources have included the quantum efficiency averaged over all pixels, the camera counts per photon per pixel, and response variation across the sensor. The instrumentation required to accomplish the calibrations is described. X-ray energies ranged from 720 eV to 22.7 keV. The X-ray sources produce narrow energy bands, allowing us to determine the properties as a function of X-ray energy. The calibrations were done for several types of imaging devices. There were back illuminated and front illuminated CCD (charge coupled device) sensors, and a CID (charge injection device) type camera. The CCD and CID camera types differ significantly in some of their properties that affect the accuracy of X-ray intensity measurements. All cameras discussed here are silicon based. The measurements of quantum efficiency variation with X-ray energy are compared to models for the sensor structure. Cameras that are not back-thinned are compared to those that are.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗