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At least 181 records · Page 10

IEA Wind Task 32: Best Practices for the Certification of Lidar-Assisted Control Applications

Lidar-assisted control is a promising technology for reducing structural loads on wind turbines. Guidelines for certifying wind turbines with this technology are important for its widespread adoption. As a first step, an IEA Wind Task 32 workshop was held, bringing together wind turbine manufacturers, lidar suppliers, certifiers, consultants, and researchers to identify barriers to certification with lidar-assisted control and ideas for mitigating the barriers. Here this paper builds on the outcome of the workshop by providing an analysis of the areas affected and the remaining challenges. Further, initial best practices are given to address the challenges, covering the lidar system, control and protection systems, design loads, and type testing.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Microbial responses to long-term warming differ across soil microenvironments

Soil carbon loss is likely to increase due to climate warming, but microbiomes and microenvironments may dampen this effect. In a 30-year warming experiment, physical protection within soil aggregates affected the thermal responses of soil microbiomes and carbon dynamics. In this study, we combined metagenomic analysis with physical characterization of soil aggregates to explore mechanisms by which microbial communities respond to climate warming across different soil microenvironments. Long-term warming decreased the relative abundances of genes involved in degrading labile compounds (e.g. cellulose), but increased those genes involved in degrading recalcitrant compounds (e.g. lignin) across aggregate sizes. These changes were observed in most phyla of bacteria, especially for Acidobacteria, Actinobacteria, Bacteroidetes, Chloroflexi, and Planctomycetes. Microbial community composition was considerably altered by warming, leading to declined diversity for bacteria and fungi but not for archaea. Microbial functional genes, diversity, and community composition differed between macroaggregates and microaggregates, indicating the essential role of physical protection in controlling microbial community dynamics. Our findings suggest that microbes have the capacity to employ various strategies to acclimate or adapt to climate change (e.g. warming, heat stress) by shifting functional gene abundances and community structures in varying microenvironments, as regulated by soil physical protection.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Protection schemes used in North American microgrids

This study reviewed existing conventional and nonconventional protection schemes for grid-connected and islanded mode operations in North American microgrid projects. The microgrid projects investigated in this study used different types of distributed energy resources (DERs) and integrated hydropower/diesel generators, gas/steam/wind turbines, and photovoltaic systems with energy storage. In this work, conventional protection schemes were defined as those within the IEEE Standard C37.2-2008, whereas nonconventional schemes were those not defined within this standard. The pros and cons of conventional and nonconventional protection schemes were discussed in detail. The overvoltage, undervoltage, and frequency elements were the most common conventional protection schemes applied in microgrid projects in North America. These protection elements were used to detect the islanded conditions and faults that could not be sensed by overcurrent relays because of small fault currents contributed by low-inertia DERs and power-electronic sources. Directional overcurrent elements were used to distinguish between external (grid) and internal (microgrid) faults. Adaptive protection was the most popular nonconventional protection scheme applied to the microgrid projects. In conclusion, different types of DERs and operational modes must be considered in order to address the protection and control challenges of each microgrid and to obtain the best technical and economical solution.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Accessing protected data by a high-performance computing cluster

A data protection system is provided that allows applications to access protected data in a way that restricts applications from outputting to unauthorized targets any unprotected data derived from the protected data and that ensures that the applications do not have access to a key that allows access to the unprotected data. The data protection system provides a policy server that may execute on a service node of a high performance computing system and a data encryption process that may execute on each compute node that is allocated to an application or batch job. The policy server maintains policies of entities specifying access control for protected data. The data encryption process generates a secure execution environment for an application process and interfaces with the policy server to retrieve keys for decrypting protected data in accordance with a policy, and it decrypts and provides the decrypted data to the application process.

Barnes, Peter↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Photonic topological phase transition on demand

On-demand, switchable phase transitions between topologically nontrivial and trivial photonic states are demonstrated. Specifically, it is shown that the integration of a two-dimensional array of coupled ring resonators within a thermal heater array enables unparalleled control over topological protection of photonic modes. Importantly, auxiliary control over a spatial phase modulation opens up a way to guide topologically protected edge modes along generated virtual boundaries. The proposed approach can lead to practical realizations of topological phase transitions in many photonic applications, including topologically protected photonic memory/logic devices, robust optical modulators, and switches.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Reconfigurable Real-Time Power Grid Emulator for Systems With High Penetration of Renewables

Novel power system control and new utility devices need to be tested before their actual deployment to the power grid. To assist with such a testing need, real-time digital emulators such as RTDS and Opal-RT can be used to connect to the physical world and form a hardware in the loop (HIL) emulation. However, due to the limitations of today's computational resources, the accuracy and fidelity suffer from different levels of model reductions in purely digital simulations. CURENT has developed a reconfigurable electric grid hardware testbed (HTB) to overcome the limitations of digital emulators. The HTB has been used to develop measurement, control, modeling, and actuation techniques for a national grid with a high penetration of renewables. The power electronic-based system includes emulators for synchronous generators; photovoltaics with grid-interfacing inverter; wind turbines; induction motor loads, ZIP loads, power electronic loads; batteries; ac and dc transmission lines; short circuit faults and grid relay protection; and a multiterminal HVDC overlay including power electronics interfaces. The system contains real elements of power flow, measurement, communication, protection, and control that mimic what would be seen in an actual electric grid. This paper presents an overview of the HTB and several scenarios that have been run to determine control and actions needed for the future power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Building Protection Against External Ionizing Fallout Radiation

A nuclear explosion has the potential to injure or kill tens to hundreds of thousands of people through exposure to fallout (external gamma) radiation. Existing buildings can protect their occupants (reducing external radiation exposures) by placing material and distance between fallout particles and indoor individuals. This protection is not well captured in current fallout risk assessment models and so the US Department of Defense is implementing the Regional Shelter Analysis methodology to improve the ability of the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) model to account for building protection. This report supports the HPAC improvement effort by identifying a set of building attributes (next page) that, when collectively specified, are sufficient to calculate reasonably accurate, i.e., within a factor of 2, fallout shelter quality estimates for many individual buildings. The set of building attributes were determined by first identifying the key physics controlling building protection from fallout radiation and then assessing which building attributes are relevant to the identified physics. This approach was evaluated by developing a screening model (PFscreen) based on the identified physics and comparing the screening model results against the set of existing independent experimental, theoretical, and modeled building protection estimates. In the interests of transparency, we have developed a benchmark dataset containing (a) most of the relevant primary experimental data published by prior generations of fallout protection scientists as well as (b) the screening model results.

42 ENGINEERING↗

"Defense-in-Depth" Laser Safety and the National Ignition Facility

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the largest and most energetic laser in the world contained in a complex the size of a football stadium. From the initial laser pulse, provided by telecommunication style infrared nanoJoule pulsed lasers, to the final 192 laser beams (1.8 Mega Joules total energy in the ultraviolet) converging on a target the size of a pencil eraser, laser safety is of paramount concern. In addition to this, there are numerous high-powered (Class 3B and 4) diagnostic lasers in use that can potentially send their laser radiation travelling throughout the facility. With individual beam paths of up to 1500 meters and a workforce of more than one thousand, the potential for exposure is significant. Simple laser safety practices utilized in typical laser labs just don't apply. To mitigate these hazards, NIF incorporates a multi layered approach to laser safety or 'Defense in Depth.' Most typical high-powered laser operations are contained and controlled within a single room using relatively simplistic controls to protect both the worker and the public. Laser workers are trained, use a standard operating procedure, and are required to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as Laser Protective Eyewear (LPE) if the system is not fully enclosed. Non-workers are protected by means of posting the room with a warning sign and a flashing light. In the best of cases, a Safety Interlock System (SIS) will be employed which will 'safe' the laser in the case of unauthorized access. This type of laser operation is relatively easy to employ and manage. As the operation becomes more complex, higher levels of control are required to ensure personnel safety. Examples requiring enhanced controls are outdoor and multi-room laser operations. At the NIF there are 192 beam lines and numerous other Class 4 diagnostic lasers that can potentially deliver their hazardous energy to locations far from the laser source. This presents a serious and complex potential hazard to personnel. Because of this, a multilayered approach to safety is taken. This paper presents the philosophy and approach taken at the NIF in the multi-layered 'defense-in-depth' approach to laser safety.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A generic method for interfacing IEDs using low voltage interfaces to real-time simulators with hardware in the loop

This study presents an interface method (IM) to interconnect real-time simulators (RTSs) without amplifiers for different intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), such as protective relays, smart meters, and other devices. It is a significant topic for the power systems protection community because there are many protection devices with different requirements. These protection devices have pinouts that measure bus voltages/currents and breaker pole states and generate trip/close pulse signals. Most of the emulation test beds with RTSs and HIL need amplifiers to connect IEDs from different product manufacturers because the low-voltage interface levels are not available in some instruction manuals. Additionally, commercial amplifiers have cutoff frequency limitations and have an excessive cost when several IEDs are wired onto test beds. Then, the validation of protection and control systems with RTSs and IEDs in the loop from different vendors without amplifiers results in an unfeasible alternative. In this paper, the IM was based on using an interface box, power source, and RTS to identify IED inputs/outputs. Here, the sequence to recognize IED pinouts and calculate the current/voltage scaling factors is described. The IM was validated satisfactorily with RTS and a protection device (with unknown pinouts) in the loop.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Grid Parameters and Voltage Estimation Approach Integrating Data-Driven Converter Model

With Measurements of grid voltage and current are essential for the optimal operation of the grid protection and control (P&C) systems. Grid parameters vary through time during the faults and especially in the converter interfaced resources (CIRs) rich power grid, and thus accurate estimation is critical to avoid the mis-operation of the P&C systems. In this paper, a moving horizon estimation (MHE) as an observer is devised and applied to estimate the grid line parameters and grid voltages for protection enhancement. Due to the proprietary and confidentiality of CIRs, the proposed approach uses the black-box model to represent their dynamics. Leveraging the easily accessible measurements of output current from the black-box model of CIR and voltage at the point of common coupling, the proposed method estimates the grid impedance and grid voltage during normal and faulty operating conditions. The performance shows that the optimization-based observer was able to closely observe the accurate states and parameters, which can be utilized by the P&C systems.

Subedi, Sunil↗

A High-Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed-Based Benchmarking Dataset For Testing Operational Technology Specific Intrusion Detection Systems

Quality datasets serve a critical purpose in cyber security research. Data is needed to understand system behavior and develop security controls to protect critical systems. However, for critical infrastructure operational environments there is a lack of available datasets to study because of the high cost and specialized capabilities necessary to generate them. This paper documents the development of a dataset of high fidelity hardware in the loop laboratory simulated models of electric and natural gas distribution systems with real cyber attack test cases. A deep dive discussion for the experimental setup and controls for generating the data is provided along with observations from using the data in evaluating intrusion detection approaches.

Ashok, Aditya↗

Impact Studies and Cooperative Voltage Control for High PV Penetration

The drastically increasing penetration of photovoltaic (PV) has posed tremendous challenges in operation, control, and protection in distribution networks. The over-voltage issue is one of major concerns for extremely high PV penetration (e.g. 100%). It is critical to identify the most sensitive locations to high PV penetration and apply effective methods to mitigate the over-voltage issue. This paper introduced a novel greedy search algorithm to locate worst-case scenarios of over-voltage in both distributed and centralized PV configurations, as well as a cooperative voltage control method to mitigate over-voltage. The search algorithm has the computational advantage over existing stochastic approach and provides more insights in impact studies. The cooperative control method relies upon reactive power compensation to converge system voltage to a predefined value within standard limits. Moreover, a clustering strategy is applied to divide the network into several clusters, within which all nodes share information with neighboring nodes following a scalable communication architecture. The control algorithms and communication hierarchies presented in this paper have been implemented into OpenDSS to form the Multi Agent (MA) OpenDSS package, which has been made available to the reader. The effectiveness of developed methods are demonstrated through simulation studies on the IEEE 123-node test feeder under four different load levels.

Cooperative control↗

A comprehensive data acquisition and management system for an ecosystem-scale peatland warming and elevated CO 2 experiment

Ecosystem-scale manipulation experiments represent large science investments that require well-designed data acquisition and management systems to provide reliable, accurate information to project participants and third party users. The SPRUCE project (Spruce and Peatland Responses Under Climatic and Environmental Change, http://mnspruce.ornl.gov ) is such an experiment funded by the Department of Energy's (DOE), Office of Science, Terrestrial Ecosystem Science (TES) Program. The SPRUCE experimental mission is to assess ecosystem-level biological responses of vulnerable, high carbon terrestrial ecosystems to a range of climate warming manipulations and an elevated CO 2 atmosphere. SPRUCE provides a platform for testing mechanisms controlling the vulnerability of organisms, biogeochemical processes, and ecosystems to climatic change (e.g., thresholds for organism decline or mortality, limitations to regeneration, biogeochemical limitations to productivity, and the cycling and release of CO 2 and CH 4 to the atmosphere). The SPRUCE experiment will generate a wide range of continuous and discrete measurements. In order to successfully manage SPRUCE data collection, achieve SPRUCE science objectives, and support broader climate change research, the research staff has designed a flexible data system using proven network technologies and software components. The primary SPRUCE data system components are the following; 1. data acquisition and control system – set of hardware and software to retrieve biological and engineering data from sensors, collect sensor status information, and distribute feedback to control components; 2. data collection system – set of hardware and software to deliver data to a central depository for storage and further processing; and 3. data management plan – set of plans, policies, and practices to control consistency, protect data integrity, and deliver data. This publication presents our approach to meeting the challenges of designing and constructing an efficient data system for managing high volume sources of in situ observations in a remote, harsh environmental location. Finally, the approach covers data flow starting from the sensors and ending at the archival/distribution points, discusses types of hardware and software used, examines design considerations that were used to choose them, and describes the data management practices chosen to control and enhance the value of the data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Numerical Simulation of Measurements during the Reactor Physical Startup at Unit 3 of Rostov NPP

The results of numerical calculations and measurements of some reactor parameters during the physical startup tests at unit 3 of Rostov NPP are presented. The following parameters are considered: the critical boron acid concentration and the currents from ionization chambers (IC) during the scram system efficiency evaluation. The scram system efficiency was determined using the inverse point kinetics equation with the measured and simulated IC currents. The results of steady-state calculations of relative power distribution and efficiency of the scram system and separate groups of control rods of the control and protection system are also presented. The calculations are performed using several codes, including precision ones.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Qualified display system architecture - 246

There is a need in the nuclear industry for a Qualified Display System (QDS) architecture as described in this paper. The function of the QDS is to process and display Regulatory Guide 1.97 post accident monitoring parameters. The QDS is implemented on the Lockheed Martin Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based Nuclear Protection and Control (NuPAC) digital platform, coupled with a Qualified Display Controller (QDC) and a Safety Display Unit (SDU). The QDS is designed to meet the requirements of IEEE 603-1991 (endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.153, Rev. 1), IEEE 497-2002 (endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 4), and IEEE 7-4.3.2- 2003 (endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.152, Rev. 3). The QDS is designed with flexibility such that it can be implemented in an advanced reactor design, Small Modular Reactor (SMR) with any cooling medium, or digital upgrade project for an operating nuclear plant. The QDS has four independent and redundant divisions. Each division has five layers in the architecture: Process variable input signals; Process Protection Logic (PPL); Algorithm Logic (AL), Interface Panel (IP); and Safety Display Unit (SDU). The QDS meets the following design criteria: redundancy, independence, predictability and repeatability, and diversity capability. The QDS architecture also meets the simplicity design principle. The QDS architecture design provides flexibility in the implementation in a plant. The QDS can be implemented in the design of a new advanced plant or as a digital upgrade in an operating plant. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗