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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Effective Use of Metrics in Space Life Support System Trade-Offs

Engineering metrics are useful in space life support technology selection, but they must be carefully used. Metrics are only part of a complete system trade-off. Metrics do harm if they cause neglect of other important technical, organizational, or intuitive decision factors. Two metrics have damaged space life support, closure and Equivalent Systems Mass (ESM). Closure measures the fraction of the required system inputs that are produced by recycling system outputs. Increasing closure produces diminishing returns and becomes increasingly expensive. Increasing closure does not directly contribute to providing better life support. ESM measures the total launch mass required to provide life support. ESM includes the mass of the system hardware and of its power, cooling, pressurized volume, spares, and logistics. ESM predicts launch costs, but recently launch costs have been reduced by a factor of 20 or more. System development cost for space hardware is often much greater than launch cost. The past nearly exclusive use of ESM has led to the neglect of Life Cycle Cost (LCC), reliability, cost, and the other engineering factors. Closure and ESM have misguided space life support technology selection for more than twenty years and have adversely affected the expenditure of 100’s of millions of dollars. Metrics can be effectively used three ways in space life support technology selection: 1. A small set of key engineering metrics for preliminary screening. 2. A full set of engineering to guide technical selection. 3. Combining engineering metrics with organizational, political, and intuitive decision factors to understand technology selection. The past emphasis on closure and ESM served to support recycling life support over resupply and built on the intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRS2022

Event Report for The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a powerful emerging technology area which requires special attention to using it ethically. AI ethics is still an emerging field, and the partners for this workshop and report seek to move AI ethics discussion ahead by experimenting with ways to measure AI ethics criteria. The following document describes the outcomes and learnings from The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop held at the National Institute for Aerospace (NIA), Hampton, Virginia on May 12th, 2022. The purpose of the workshop was for participants to evaluate and experiment-with the methodology and process presented by AIEthics.World in cooperation with Intel Corporation. The meeting participants learned about the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™ and applied the methodology to selected notional AI systems. The workshop facilitated the evaluation of the maturity of the AI system according to ethical considerations relevant to NASA, NIA and other participants. The workshop consisted of three main phases. The first phase focused on understanding and summarizing NASA’s ethical approaches, mission and values based on published documentation, discussions and individual insights & opinions of participants. This information was prioritized, weighted, ordered, and quantified in phase two, to formulate an alignment between human values (ethics) and their applicability to AI systems during all lifecycle phases. The first two phases were summarized as a form of ethical genealogy for artificial intelligence, specific to NASA’s ethical approaches. In the third and last phase of the workshop the participants evaluated notional examples of artificial intelligence to qualify and quantify its ability to adhere to the organizational ethics approaches, using the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™. The workshop uses the concept of genealogy, in the traditional sense: the study and traceability of lines of ancestors in the process of evolutionary development from earlier forms. However, as it is applied to an Ethical AI definition, it is providing the insights to the necessary and mandatory traceability of content, data, metrics, telemetry, elements, and structures which are used in the AI’s lifecycle to foster and measure AI ethics in all steps of its lifecycle. The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop provided NASA with the opportunity to apply the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™, in combination with existing and well-known decision-making and quality control methods to identify the metrics and measurements for an Ethical AI and assess its ethical condition and quality aligned with NASA ethics approaches. The result of the workshop is the capacity for NASA to apply the maturity model assessment to its AI Systems as desired and if necessary, publish the ability of these AI Systems to adhere to the organizational ethical goals. AI ethics frameworks need to be customized for each application domain, for example, individual NASA Mission Directorates. General principles that work in one area such as AI/Machine Learning-based text analysis (the ethics of information-extraction) may need to be adapted for another such as sense-and-avoid decision-making in a flight environment. The workshop was conducted among approximately twenty NASA subject matter experts, so the elements noted above should be considered examples, not definitive NASA ethical AI principles, genealogy, etc. Generating a definitive AI ethics framework for an organization as diverse as NASA would require far more discussion, debate, review, etc. However, the workshop provided valuable insight into mechanisms and processes for quantifying AI ethical qualities.

Artificial Intelligence↗
NASA NTRS2022

Atmospheric Research 2020 Technical Highlights

Welcome to the 2020 Atmospheres Highlights report. Here we summarize research and scientific communication/outreach accomplishments from the portion of atmospheric science activities at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) that comprises the Earth Science Division’s Atmospheres organization. As in previous years, this report is intended for a broad audience, including colleagues within NASA, scientists outside the Agency, science graduate students, and members of the public. Organizationally, the report covers research activities under the Office of Deputy Organizationally, the report covers research activities under the Office of Deputy Director for Atmospheres (610AT), which is within Earth Sciences Division (Code Director for Atmospheres (610AT), which is within Earth Sciences Division (Code 610) in the Sciences and Exploration Directorate (600). Laboratories and office within 610) in the Sciences and Exploration Directorate (600). Laboratories and office within 610AT include: Mesoscale Atmospheric Processes Laboratory (612), Climate and 610AT include: Mesoscale Atmospheric Processes Laboratory (612), Climate and Radiation Laboratory (613), Atmospheric Chemistry and Dynamics Laboratory (614), Radiation Laboratory (613), Atmospheric Chemistry and Dynamics Laboratory (614), and the Wallops Field Support Office (610.W). As of this writing, the 277 personnel and the Wallops Field Support Office (610.W). As of this writing, the 277 personnel in Code 610AT consist of 53 civil servants and 224 cooperative agreement associates, in Code 610AT consist of 53 civil servants and 224 cooperative agreement associates, postdoctoral fellows and contractors, postdoctoral fellows and contractors.

Annual Report↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Outside Influences as Latent Factors to Risk in Human Performance

During the Acquisition Life Cycle for a program, there are several opportunities for the system in design to be adjusted in accordance with its changing landscape as it is being shaped by evolving policy and organizational culture. Human Systems Integration is integral to identifying these opportunities of change as there are a set number of activities that may account for altered operational states, human performance deviations, and overall component engagement if HSI is enacted early enough in the life cycle. Some changes that occur in the operational environment may not be accounted for since the organizational culture and practices are not currently a part of the HSI focus. Likewise, policy changes themselves from a top-to-bottom analysis may not have the appearance of effecting human performance until having gone through a trail-and-error period. Workarounds to adjust for unforeseen policy affects become the system's solution that usually includes changes in the training and education of the operators, maintainers, and support personnel. A system full of workarounds and off-normal practices, that cause operators to disregard the purpose of the design, coupled with the false notion that these activities are proven for successful system operation, is the very definition of “an accident waiting to happen”. Unforeseen changes in policies and practices that cause new and unusual activities to successfully and keep the system running, should be considered latent factors that may cause a potential mishap, and not part of the resilience that humans provide to the successful operation of the system. This presentation will explore how latent factors may find their way into system operations and how they can be identified and addressed.

Human Systems Integration↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 1

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0. NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Uncertainty↗
NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership↗
NASA NTRS2001

Shift changes, updates, and the on-call architecture in space shuttle mission control

In domains such as nuclear power, industrial process control, and space shuttle mission control, there is increased interest in reducing personnel during nominal operations. An essential element in maintaining safe operations in high risk environments with this 'on-call' organizational architecture is to understand how to bring called-in practitioners up to speed quickly during escalating situations. Targeted field observations were conducted to investigate what it means to update a supervisory controller on the status of a continuous, anomaly-driven process in a complex, distributed environment. Sixteen shift changes, or handovers, at the NASA Johnson Space Center were observed during the STS-76 Space Shuttle mission. The findings from this observational study highlight the importance of prior knowledge in the updates and demonstrate how missing updates can leave flight controllers vulnerable to being unprepared. Implications for mitigating risk in the transition to 'on-call' architectures are discussed.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1995

Mars Pathfinder Mission Operations Concept

Mars Pathfinder is one of NASA s new low-cost planetary missions developed to meet a $150 million cost cap. This paper describes the operations philosophy, requirements, organizational structure, and ground data system.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2023

Cracking the Code: An Integrated Approach to Meeting Client Needs at NASA’s Langley Research Center

Organizational development (OD) is an interdisciplinary field that encourages the integration of many different concepts and theories in meeting client requirements. However, OD practitioners often maintain a significant amount of knowledge and lack specific guidance on how to combine concepts into a unified approach to drive change, thus making the selection and integration of disparate approaches challenging. To assist OD practitioners in navigating these challenges, a theory synthesizing approach is used to demonstrate the incremental insights that can be gained through the innovative integration of concepts, rather than being restricted to one perspective. More specifically, a novel Integrated Approach Decision-Making Tool is presented that offers specific steps to take to reach an effective, innovative solution. To further illustrate how this tool can be used in practice, an example is provided that details how this tool was used to achieve project success at NASA’s Langley Research Center through integrating three common OD models. Taken together, this paper will inform change agents operating in a similar capacity at any organization by providing a roadmap for how to meet client requirements and achieve increased project success through creating integrated, novel OD interventions.

Interdisciplinary↗
NASA NTRS2023

The Impact (Influence) of Stakeholder Participation in the Logic Modeling Process: A Case Study from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

This is a three-paper dissertation that responds to a call for empirical research on stakeholder influence in the implementation of evaluation recommendations. The literature is consistent but mostly theoretical: stakeholder participation should positively influence and increase the probability of implementation (see e.g., Christie, 2011; Cousins and Earl, 1992); Fetterman, 2004). In response, I use two Goddard Space Flight Center engineering technical training and development programs to build a causal pathway argument supporting my proposition that stakeholder influence in the logic modeling process impacts organizational decision-making and change. I first introduce the logic modeling process as a tool to involve stakeholders in program and evaluation design (paper 1), then use the data collection process to implement the collaboratively constructed logic model outcomes (paper 2), and finally, I triangulate the data using the Toal (2009) Evaluation Involvement Scale (paper 3). I do this to “increase the validity of the findings” (Noble & Heale, 2019, p. 67) and to garner potential mechanisms. I found that stakeholder participation in the logic modeling process positively influenced the use of data to inform recommendations which in turn positively influenced implementation of evaluation recommendations. I identified the process itself as the mechanism and the key decision points as links or influencers. Potential factors included power and interest (measured by role) and time-on-job.

Organizational Decision-Making↗