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The Fall 2020 edition of Physics Flash includes article briefs on: Patrick Younk, Fusing concepts, technology to past performance of nuclear explosives; LANL inertial confinement fusion programs aims to develop burning plasma for weapons science; Lab's high energy nuclear physics explored at international conference; and, Novel study reveals new details on the impact of thermal interfaces in dynamic compression experiments.
We fit standard power-law models for ground acceleration and particle velocity using scaled ground motion observations from underground nuclear explosions at Aqueduct Mesa on the Nevada National Security Site. The models are then validated using small-scale high-explosive (HE) test data from nearby Rainier Mesa. The comparison between model predictions and observations is good and can be made more favorable if the assumed yield for the HE tests are doubled. Further validation is made with a numerical experiment that additionally shows a transition in ground motion attenuation to elastic propagation (1 = r). An extended model is provided to incorporate the long-range transition in attenuation, which results in increased ground motions at farther range. We then make predictions for the field experiment, Physical Experiment One (PE1), to take place in P-tunnel on Aqueduct Mesa, and suggest that the models could be used in planning various operations for PE1.
A recent chemical explosive test in P-Tunnel at the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, USA, was conducted to better understand how signals propagate from explosions in the subsurface. A primary signal of interest is the migration of gases that can be used to differentiate chemical from nuclear explosions. Gas migration is highly dependent on the rock permeability which is notoriously difficult to determine experimentally in the field due to a potentially large dependence on the scale over which measurements are made. Here, we present pre-explosion permeability estimates to characterize the geologic units surrounding the recent test. Permeability measurements were made at three scales of increasing size: core samples (≈2 cm), borehole packer system tests (≈1 m), and a pre-shot cavity pressurization test (> 10 m) across ten tuff units. Permeability estimates based on core measurements showed little difference from borehole packer tests. However, permeability in most rock units calibrated from cavity pressurization tests resulted in higher permeability estimates by up to two orders of magnitude. Here, we demonstrate that the scale of the measurement significantly impacts the characterization efforts of hydraulic properties in volcanic tuff, and that local-scale measurements (< 10 m scale) do not incorporate enough heterogeneity to accurately predict field-scale flow and mass transport.
Recent discovery of an unexpectedly large number of low-mass binary pulsars (LMBPs) in globular clusters has instigated active discussions on the evolutionary origin of binary pulsars. Prompted by the possibility that at least some of LMBPs originate from accretion-induced collapse (AIC) of white dwarfs, a reexamination is conducted as to whether or not AIC occurs for the new models of O + Ne + Mg white dwarfs and solid C + O white dwarfs that can ignite explosive nuclear burning at significantly lower central densities than in the previous models. Even with low critical densities, AIC is still much more likely than explosion for both types of white dwarfs. Possible regions for AIC are presented in a diagram of mass accretion rate vs initial mass of the white dwarfs.
Accurate subsurface characterization is crucial for all subsurface energy exploration. Accurate characterization of uncertain subsurface properties is also critical for monitoring storage of CO 2 , estimating pathways of subsurface contaminant transport, and monitoring potential nuclear explosions for treaty verification. This research will advance our world-leading subsurface sensing capabilities that are crucial for LANL missions in energy security (geothermal energy, oil/gas resource exploration, geologic carbon storage) and nuclear security (facility monitoring, detonation detection).
The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.
The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.
A nuclear explosion screening exercise in 2023 (Maurer et al., 2023) found challenges with discerning anomalous radioxenon activity concentrations relative to elevated background concentrations. Research has continued into methods to detect anomalous radioxenon concentrations by comparing samples to estimates of atmospheric radioxenon background concentrations caused by releases at nuclear reactors or medical isotope production facilities. A new approach estimates the sample concentrations using time-varying radioxenon release rates obtained using optimization techniques that constrain the facility release rates to plausible amounts based on historical data or facility knowledge. The purpose of the optimization is to determine whether any combination of plausible release rates from emitting facilities can explain a series of radioxenon measurements at one or more sampling stations. A case study uses radioxenon data collected at three locations in western Europe for a month in 2021 and considers releases from 77 locations. Fewer samples are identified as being anomalous using a simplistic flagging rule than from an application of the current International Monitoring System (IMS) activity concentration-level rule.
A numerical study of the response of aircraft wings to atmospheric gusts and to nuclear explosions when flying at subsonic speeds is presented. The method is based upon unsteady quasi-vortex lattice method, unsteady suction analogy and Pade approximant. The calculated results, showing vortex lag effect, yield reasonable agreement with experimental data for incremental lift on wings in gust penetration and due to nuclear blast waves.
A numerical study of the response of aircraft wings to atmospheric gusts and to nuclear explosions when flying at subsonic speeds is presented. The method is based upon unsteady quasi-vortex-lattice method, unsteady suction analogy, and Pade approximate. The calculated results, showing vortex lag effect, yield reasonable agreement with experimental data for incremental lift on wings in gust penetration and due to nuclear blast waves.
Small near-Earth objects (NEOs) approximately 50-150 m in size are far more numerous (hundreds of thousands to millions yet to be discovered) than larger NEOs. Small NEOs, which are mostly asteroids rather than comets, are very faint in the night sky due to their small sizes, and are, therefore, difficult to discover far in advance of Earth impact. Furthermore, even small NEOs are capable of creating explosions with energies on the order of tens or hundreds of megatons (Mt). We are, therefore, motivated to prepare to respond effectively to short warning time, small NEO impact scenarios. In this paper we explore the lower bound on actionable warning time by investigating the performance of notional upgraded Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to carry Nuclear Explosive Device (NED) payloads to intercept and disrupt a hypothetical incoming NEO at high altitudes (generally at least 2500 km above Earth). We conduct this investigation by developing optimal NEO intercept trajectories for a range of cases and comparing their performances. Our results show that suborbital NEO intercepts using Minuteman III or SM-3 IIA launch vehicles could achieve NEO intercept a few minutes prior to when the NEO would strike Earth. We also find that more powerful versions of the launch vehicles (e.g., total delta V of approximately 9.5-11 km/s) could intercept incoming NEOs several hours prior to when the NEO would strike Earth, if launched at least several days prior to the time of intercept. Finally, we discuss a number of limiting factors and practicalities that affect whether the notional systems we describe could become feasible.
Small near-Earth objects (NEOs) is approx. 50-150 m in size are far more numerous (hundreds of thousands to millions yet to be discovered) than larger NEOs. Small NEOs, which are mostly asteroids rather than comets, are very faint in the night sky due to their small sizes, and are, therefore, difficult to discover far in advance of Earth impact. Furthermore, even small NEOs are capable of creating explosions with energies on the order of tens or hundreds of megatons (Mt). We are, therefore, motivated to prepare to respond effectively to short warning time, small NEO impact scenarios. In this paper we explore the lower bound on actionable warning time by investigating the performance of notional upgraded Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to carry Nuclear Explosive Device (NED) payloads to intercept and disrupt a hypothetical incoming NEO at high altitudes (generally at least 2500 km above Earth). We conduct this investigation by developing optimal NEO intercept trajectories for a range of cases and comparing their performances. Our results show that suborbital NEO intercepts using Minuteman III or SM-3 IIA launch vehicles could achieve NEO intercept a few minutes prior to when the NEO would strike Earth. We also find that more powerful versions of the launch vehicles (e.g., total deltaV is approx. 9.5-11 km/s) could intercept incoming NEOs several hours prior to when the NEO would strike Earth, if launched at least several days prior to the time of intercept. Finally, we discuss a number of limiting factors and practicalities that affect whether the notional systems we describe could become feasible.
Small near-Earth objects (NEOs) 50150 m in size are far more numerous (hundreds of thousands to millions yet to be discovered) than larger NEOs. Small NEOs, which are mostly asteroids rather than comets, are very faint in the night sky due to their small sizes, and are, therefore, difficult to discover far in advance of Earth impact. However, even small NEOs are capable of creating explosions with energies on the order of tens or hundreds of megatons (Mt).We are, therefore, motivated to prepare to respond effectively to short warning time, small NEO impact scenarios. In this paper we explore the lower bound on actionable warning time by investigating the performance of notional upgraded Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to carry Nuclear Explosive Device (NED) payloads to intercept and disrupt a fictitious incoming NEO at high altitudes (generally, at least 2500 km above Earth). We conduct this investigation by developing optimal NEO intercept trajectories for a range of cases and comparing their performances.Our results show that suborbital NEO intercepts using Minuteman III or SM-3 IIA launch vehicles could achieve NEO intercept a few minutes prior to when the NEOwould strike Earth. We also find that more powerful versions of the launch vehicles (e.g., total V 9.511 kms) could intercept incoming NEOs over a day prior to when the NEO would strike Earth, if launched at least several days prior to the time of NEO intercept. Finally, we discuss a number of limiting factors and practicalities that affect whether the notional systems we describe could become feasible.
Advanced instruments and methods are under development to allow direct alpha spectrometry of nuclear fallout debris near the point of collection, to support nuclear forensics (NF). New approaches are needed to support NF in order to accelerate the process for data generation and reduce the overall timeline for decision making. Fallout debris at short time periods following detonation can be difficult to work with for alpha spectrometry, due to the presence of intense beta radiation originating from significant quantities of high-activity fission products. Intense beta radiation can challenge traditional silicon-based high-resolution alpha spectrometers. Addressing this, single-crystal (sc) chemical vapor deposition (CVD) produced diamond semiconductors have been studied for use for alpha spectrometry for assaying nuclear fallout debris. Tests have been performed using scCVD sensors to assay a variety of actinide-bearing samples. Sample preparation, when done, has been limited to pulverization using a mechanical ball mill. To reduce measurement times, multi-chip arrays of scCVD diamond semiconductor have been developed in form factors suitable for field deployment in support of NF objectives. These arrays have been tested using high-beta-activity sol gel surrogate nuclear explosive debris (SNED) containing varying concentrations of uranium and plutonium. Results from the use of scCVD detectors with sol gel SNED will be presented.
Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.
Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are gaining support as many countries look for ways to increase power generation and replace aging nuclear energy production facilities. MSRs have inherently safe designs, are scalable in size, can burn transuranic wastes from traditional solid fuel nuclear reactors, can store excess heat in thermal reservoirs for water desalination, and can be used to produce medical isotopes as part of the real-time liquid-fuel recycling process. The ability to remove 135 Xe in real time from the fuel improves the power production in an MSR because 135 Xe is the most significant neutron-absorbing isotope generated by nuclear fission. Xenon-135, and other radioactive gases, are removed by sparging the fuel with an inert gas while the liquid fuel is recirculated from the reactor inner core through the heat exchangers. Without effective abatement technologies, large amounts of radioactive gas could be released during the sparging process. This work examines the potential impact of radioxenon releases on samplers used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions. Here, atmospheric transport simulations from seven hypothetical MSRs on different continents were used to evaluate the holdup time needed before release of radioxenon so IMS samplers would register few detections. Abatement technologies that retain radioxenon isotopes for at least 120 d before their release will be needed to mitigate the impacts from a molten salt breeder reactor used to replace a nuclear power plant. A holdup time of about 150 d is needed to reduce emissions to the average level of current nuclear power plants.
Waveform cross-correlation is a sensitive phase-matched filtering technique that can detect seismic events for nuclear explosion monitoring. However, there are outstanding challenges with correlation detectors, most notably a direct dependence on the completeness of the waveform template library. To ameliorate these challenges, we investigate how dynamic time warping (DTW) may make waveform correlation more robust. DTW analyzes the differences between two time series and attempts to “warp” one time series relative to another in a recursive manner. We apply DTW to synthetic earthquake and recorded explosion templates to expand the capability of correlation detectors. We explore what conditions (e.g., source, station distance, frequency bands) and/or DTW algorithms generate stronger correlation scores. We show that DTW performs well on noisy signals and can dramatically improve the cross-correlation coefficient between a template and data-stream waveform. We conclude with recommendations on how to utilize DTW in nuclear monitoring detection.