Lessoned learned deploying space planning systems
This article describes a number of lessons learned in deploying automated planning and scheduling systems for space applications at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
acquisition validation↗
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Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned
When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis (CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks, planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but workarounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues in the future.
Erica E. Bruno↗
Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned
When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis(CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks,planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but work-arounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues.
ERICA E. BRUNO↗
MODIS On-Orbit Performance and Lessons Learned
MODIS is a key instrument for the NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) and has successfully operated for more than 11 and 9 years, respectively, on-board the Terra and Aqua spacecraft. MODIS collects data in 36 spectral bands, covering wavelengths from visible (VIS) to long-wave infrared (LWIR). To date, both Terra and Aqua MODIS have produced an unprecedented amount of data products and significantly contributed to the earth remote sensing studies and applications. MODIS was developed with stringent calibration requirements and was, consequently, designed and built with a set of on-board calibrators (OBC), which include a solar diffuser (SD), a solar diffuser stability monitor (SDSM), a blackbody (BB), and a spectroradiometric calibration assembly (SRCA). This presentation briefly reviews MODIS instrument operation and various calibration and characterization activities, It demonstrates both the instrument and the OBC on-orbit performance and discusses lessons learned, particularly focusing on on-orbit changes in sensor responses, optics degradation, and major challenging issues. As expected, Terra and Aqua MODIS on-orbit performance and lessons learned will continue to benefit the operation and calibration of future sensors, such as NPP/JPSS VIIRS and GOES-R ABI.
Xiong, Xiaoxiong↗
Lessons Learned From Atomic Oxygen Interaction With Spacecraft Materials in Low Earth Orbit
There have been five Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) passive experiment carriers (PECs) (MISSE 1-5) to date that have been launched, exposed in space on the exterior of International Space Station (ISS) and then returned to Earth for analysis. An additional four MISSE PECs (MISSE 6A, 6B, 7A, and 7B) are in various stages of completion. The PECs are two-sided suitcase to size sample carriers that are intended to provide information on the effects of the low Earth orbital environment on a wide variety of materials and components. As a result of post retrieval analyses of the retrieved MISSE 2 experiments and numerous prior space experiments, there have been valuable lessons learned and needs identified that are worthy of being documented so that planning, design, and analysis of future space environment experiments can benefit from the experience in order to maximize the knowledge gained. Some of the lessons learned involve the techniques, concepts, and issues associated with measuring atomic oxygen erosion yields. These are presented along with several issues to be considered when designing experiments, such as the uncertainty in mission duration, scattering and contamination effects on results, and the accuracy of measuring atomic oxygen erosion.
Banks, Bruce A.↗
Lessons Learned In Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station
The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The "pieces" are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.
Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
Lessons Learned in Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station
The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The pieces are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.
Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
GPS lessons learned
Global geodesy has improved dramatically over the past decade starting with the GPS for IERS and Geodynamics demonstration campaign in 1991 (GIG 91). At the time it took over a week of CPU time to process a network solution based on 21 global receivers and orbit overlaps were in the 40 cm range. Today it is possible to process a network solution based on 80 global receivers in less then one day of CPU time and orbit overlaps are in the 4 cm range. Special methods are under development for efficient processing of increasingly large regional networks which may contain hundreds or thousands of GPS receivers. Along the way there have been many lessons learned about GPS satellites, receivers, monuments, antennas, radomes, analysis, reference frames, error sources, and interpretation. A wide range of scientific disciplines have been impacted including studies of plate motion, post-glacial rebound, seasonal loading, deformation in plate boundary zones, coseismic displacements due to major earthquakes, postseiemic relaxation, and interseismic strain accumulation related to assessment of seismic hazards. Lessons learned will be presented in the context of new dense networks such as the Plate Boundary Observation (PBO).
GPS satellites↗
ACTS Ka-Band Earth Stations: Technology, Performance, and Lessons Learned
The Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) Project invested heavily in prototype Ka-band satellite ground terminals to conduct an experiments program with the ACTS satellite. The ACTS experiment's program proposed to validate Ka-band satellite and ground station technology. demonstrate future telecommunication services. demonstrate commercial viability and market acceptability of these new services, evaluate system networking and processing technology, and characterize Ka-band propagation effects, including development of techniques to mitigate signal fading. This paper will present a summary of the fixed ground terminals developed by the NASA Glenn Research Center and its industry partners, emphasizing the technology and performance of the terminals (Part 1) and the lessons learned throughout their six year operation including the inclined orbit phase of operations (Full Report). An overview of the Ka-band technology and components developed for the ACTS ground stations is presented. Next. the performance of the ground station technology and its evolution during the ACTS campaign are discussed to illustrate the technical tradeoffs made during the program and highlight technical advances by industry to support the ACTS experiments program and terminal operations. Finally. lessons learned during development and operation of the user terminals are discussed for consideration of commercial adoption into future Ka-band systems. The fixed ground stations used for experiments by government, academic, and commercial entities used reflector based offset-fed antenna systems ranging in size from 0.35m to 3.4m antenna diameter. Gateway earth stations included two systems, referred to as the NASA Ground Station (NGS) and the Link Evaluation Terminal (LET). The NGS provides tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) network control functions. The LET supports technology verification and high data rate experiments. The ground stations successfully demonstrated many services and applications at Ka-band in three different modes of operation: circuit switched TDMA using the satellite on-board processor, satellite switched SS-TDMA applications using the on-board Microwave Switch Matrix (MSM), and conventional transponder (bent-pipe) operation. Data rates ranged from 4.8 kbps up to 622 Mbps. Experiments included: 1) low rate (4.8- 1 00's kbps) remote data acquisition and control using small earth stations, 2) moderate rate (1-45 Mbps) experiments included full duplex voice and video conferencing and both full duplex and asymmetric data rate protocol and network evaluation using mid-size ground stations, and 3) link characterization experiments and high data rate (155-622 Mbps) terrestrial and satellite interoperability application experiments conducted by a consortium of experimenters using the large transportable ground stations.
Reinhart, Richard C.↗
LCROSS Lunar Impactor - Lessons Learned from a Small Satellite Mission
The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science function of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the operational purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned.
Andrews, Daniel R.↗
Lcross Lunar Impactor - Lessons Learned from a Small Satellite Mission
The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science purpose of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the functional purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned.
Andrews, Daniel↗
Thermal Design for the New Era of Lunar Instruments: Lessons Learned from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s Instrument Design Laboratory
As NASA enters the Age of Artemis, the resurgence of interest in the Moon has not only contributed to rapid development of crewed vehicles and habitats, it has also inspired a design renaissance for robotic and astronaut-deployed instrumentation for the lunar surface. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s Instrument Design Laboratory (IDL) has been at the forefront of lunar instrument concept design, and in recent years has used its collaborative and concurrent process to design instruments ranging from small devices held or worn by astronauts to large lander- or rover-mounted instruments with multiple scientific or technical functions. This paper explores the wide spectrum of lunar instruments studied by the IDL within the past few years and their thermal design nuances. A series of lessons learned will be used to categorize the general trends prevalent across lunar-specific design and the thermal and systems-level drivers for instrumentation on the surface of the Moon. While the instruments investigated in this work are not named due to their competition sensitivity and proprietary nature, it is hoped that the lessons learned captured here will help identify specific design drivers and areas of focus for the thermal and systems engineers designing the next generation of lunar instrumentation.
Lunar, instrument, artemis, design, IDL, Goddard↗
Human Systems Integration in Practice: Constellation Lessons Learned
NASA's Constellation program provided a unique testbed for Human Systems Integration (HSI) as a fundamental element of the Systems Engineering process. Constellation was the first major program to have HSI mandated by NASA's Human Rating document. Proper HSI is critical to the success of any project that relies on humans to function as operators, maintainers, or controllers of a system. HSI improves mission, system and human performance, significantly reduces lifecycle costs, lowers risk and minimizes re-design. Successful HSI begins with sufficient project schedule dedicated to the generation of human systems requirements, but is by no means solely a requirements management process. A top-down systems engineering process that recognizes throughout the organization, human factors as a technical discipline equal to traditional engineering disciplines with authority for the overall system. This partners with a bottoms-up mechanism for human-centered design and technical issue resolution. The Constellation Human Systems Integration Group (HSIG) was a part of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) organization within the program office, and existed alongside similar groups such as Flight Performance, Environments & Constraints, and Integrated Loads, Structures and Mechanisms. While the HSIG successfully managed, via influence leadership, a down-and-in Community of Practice to facilitate technical integration and issue resolution, it lacked parallel top-down authority to drive integrated design. This presentation will discuss how HSI was applied to Constellation, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers. This presentation will discuss how Human Systems Integration (HSI) was applied to NASA's Constellation program, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers on how to accomplish this critical function.
Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis↗
Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures
NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.
Additive Manufacturing↗
NASA Ares I Launch Vehicle Roll and Reaction Control Systems Lessons Learned
On April 15, 2010 President Barak Obama made the official announcement that the Constellation Program, which included the Ares I launch vehicle, would be canceled. NASA s Ares I launch vehicle was being designed to launch the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, returning humans to the moon, Mars, and beyond. It consisted of a First Stage (FS) five segment solid rocket booster and a liquid J-2X Upper Stage (US) engine. Roll control for the FS was planned to be handled by a dedicated Roll Control System (RoCS), located on the connecting interstage. Induced yaw or pitch moments experienced during FS ascent would have been handled by vectoring of the booster nozzle. After FS booster separation, the US Reaction Control System (ReCS) would have provided the US Element with three degrees of freedom control as needed. The lessons learned documented in this paper will be focused on the technical designs and producibility of both systems along with the partnership between NASA and Boeing, who was on contract to build the Ares I US Element, which included the FS RoCS and US ReCS. In regards to partnership, focus will be placed on integration along with technical work accomplished by Boeing with special emphasis on each task order. In summary, this paper attempts to capture key lessons learned that should be helpful in the development of future launch vehicle RCS designs.
Butt, Adam↗
Lessons Learned from the Kepler Mission and Space Telescope Management
This paper presents lessons learned over the course of several space telescope mission and instrument developments spanning two decades. These projects involved astronomical telescopes developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and were designed to further our understanding of the Universe. It is hoped that the lessons drawn from these experiences may be of use to future mission developers.
GALEX↗
Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space
Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDRs approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.
radio equipment↗
Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned
The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.
Thermal Design↗