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NASA NTRS2014

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from More than Three Decades of Decommissioning and RAW Management in Slovakia - 20074

The purpose of this paper is to describe utilization of experience of JAVYS Company acquired while acting as the Slovak national decommissioning and radioactive waste management entity. JAVYS manages both the decommissioning of A1 NPP (shut down after series of accidents) and V1 NPP (shut down after standard operation) and related radioactive waste management. Besides JAVYS is responsible for management of institutional radioactive waste in Slovakia. The paper is focusing on selected successfully completed projects and related lessons learned from development of special procedures and implementation of activities within decommissioning and management of generated waste streams from cradle to grave. Recently, experience and lessons learned from all aforementioned activities are used internationally to provide assistance to other countries in order to overcome difficulties and to successfully implement various projects dealing with decommissioning and radioactive waste management. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cleared for Launch - Lessons Learned from the OSIRIS-REx System Requirements Verification Program

Requirements verification of a large flight system is a challenge. It is especially challenging for engineers taking on their first role in space systems engineering. This paper describes our approach to verification of the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) system requirements. It also captures lessons learned along the way from developing systems engineers embroiled in this process. We begin with an overview of the mission and science objectives as well as the project requirements verification program strategy. A description of the requirements flow down is presented including our implementation for managing the thousands of program and element level requirements and associated verification data. We discuss both successes and methods to improve the managing of this data across multiple organizational interfaces. Our approach to verifying system requirements at multiple levels of assembly is presented using examples from our work at instrument, spacecraft, and ground segment levels. We include a discussion of system end-to-end testing limitations and their impacts to the verification program. Finally, we describe lessons learned that are applicable to all emerging space systems engineers using our unique perspectives across multiple organizations of a large NASA program.

Requirements Verification↗

NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRS2015

CloudSat Anomaly and Return to the A-Train: Lessons Learned for Satellite Constellations

In April 2011, CloudSat suffered a severe battery anomaly, leaving the space-craft in emergency mode without the ability to command or maneuver the spacecraft. Before the team was able to recover spacecraft operability, CloudSat passed close to the Aqua satellite in the A-Train and then exited the A-Train. A new mode of operations, termed Daylight Only Operations (DO-Op) mode was developed to enable CloudSat to resume science operations in an orbit under the A-Train by November 2011, and in July 2012 CloudSat re-entered the A-Train. This paper describes challenges and lessons-learned during the anomaly, the exit from the A-Train and the return to the A-Train. These lessons-learned may ap-ply to other current and future satellite constellations in Earth orbit.

formation-flying↗

NASA NTRS2016

Thermal Design, Tvac Testing, and Lessons Learned for Critical GSE of ATLAS and the ICESat-2 Mission

This presentation describes the thermal design of the three main of optical components which comprise the Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE) for the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument, which is flying on the ICESat-2 mission. Thermal vacuum testing of these components is also described in this presentation, as well as a few lessons learned. These BCE components serve as critical GSE for the mission; their purpose is to verify ATLAS is performing well. It has been said that, in one light, the BCE is the most important part of ATLAS, since, without it, ATLAS cannot be aligned properly or its performance verified before flight. Therefore, careful attention was paid to the BCEs thermal design, development, and component-level Tvac testing prior to its use in instrument-level and spacecraft-level Tvac tests with ATLAS. This presentation describes that thermal design, development, and testing, as well as a few lessons learned.

Thermal ATLAS BCE↗

NASA NTRS2021

Lessons Learned in Remote Participant Concurrent Engineering Concept Development Studies

Team-X was born from a need to perform rapid space mission design for principal investigator-led competed proposals in the mid-1990s. Throughout the last 25 years, Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has expanded its application of the collaborative, concurrent study approach into every facet necessary to win competed proposals. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 created an immediate and new constraint on these studies – the need to conduct them with remote participants, both on the client side requesting the study, but also on the provider side producing the study. This paper provides lessons learned from dozens of design studies run by Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory during the COVID-19 pandemic. These lessons span all aspects of the information infrastructure: the people, processes, procedures, methods, tools, and “facilities”. These lessons learned will have applicability post-pandemic, as they have shown how best to incorporate participants, both on the provider side, and on the client side, who cannot travel or otherwise be co-located during collaborative, concurrent study sessions.

Nash, Alfred↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from Performance Testing of Humans in Spacesuits in Simulated Reduced Gravity

Introduction: The overarching objective of the Integrated Suit Test (IST) series is to evaluate suited human performance using reduced-gravity analogs and learn what aspects of an EVA suit system affect human performance. For this objective to be successfully achieved, the testing methodology should be valid and reproducible, and the partial-gravity simulations must be as accurate and realistic as possible. Objectives: To highlight some of the key lessons learned about partial-gravity analogs and testing methodology, and to suggest considerations for optimizing the effectiveness and quality of results of future tests. Methods: Performance testing of suited and unsuited subjects was undertaken in different reduced-gravity analogs including the Space Vehicle Mockup Facility s Partial Gravity Simulator (POGO), parabolic flight on the C-9 aircraft, underwater environments including NASA s Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO) and the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL), and in field analogs including Desert Research and Technology Studies (RATS), the Haughton Mars Project (HMP), and the JSC Rock Pile. Subjects performed level walking, incline/decline walking, running, shoveling, picking up and transferring rocks, kneeling/standing, and task boards. Lessons Learned Analogs: No single analog will properly simulate all aspects of the true partial-gravity environment. The POGO is an ideal environment from the standpoint that there are no time limits or significant volumetric constraints, but it does have several limitations. It allows only 2 translational degrees of freedom (DOF) and applies true partial-gravity offload only through the subject s center of gravity (CG). Also, when a subject is doing non-stationary tasks, significant overhead inertia from the lift column seems to have a negative impact on performance. Parabolic flight allows full translational and rotational DOF and applies offload to all parts of the body, but the simulation lasts less than 30 seconds. When this is coupled with the volumetric constraints of the plane, both task selection and data collection options are significantly limited. The underwater environments also allow all 6 DOF and allow off-loading to be applied throughout the body, but the data collection capabilities are limited to little more than subjective ratings. In addition, water drag negatively affects performance of tasks requiring dynamic motion. Field analogs provide the ability to simulate lunar terrain and more realistic mission-like objectives, but all of them operate at 1-g, so suited human performance testing generally must utilize a reduced-mass or "mockup" suit, depending on study objectives. In general, the ground-based overhead-suspension partial-gravity analogs like POGO allow the most diverse data collection methods possible while still simulating partial gravity. However, as currently designed, the POGO has significant limitations. Design of the Active Response Gravity Offload System (ARGOS) has begun and is focusing on adding full x,y,z translational DOF, improved offload accuracy, increased lift capacity, and active control of the x and y axes to minimize offload system inertia. Additionally, a new gimbal is being designed to reduce mass and inertia and to be able to work with different suits, as the current gimbal only supports suited testing with the Mark III Technology Demonstrator Suit (MKIII).

Norcross, Jason R.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Design, Certification, and Operation of the Space Shuttle Integrated Main Propulsion System (IMPS)

The Space Shuttle Integrated Main Propulsion System (IMPS) consists of the External Tank (ET), Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS), and Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). The IMPS is tasked with the storage, conditioning, distribution, and combustion of cryogenic liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LO2) propellants to provide first and second stage thrust for achieving orbital velocity. The design, certification, and operation of the associated IMPS hardware have produced many lessons learned over the course of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP). A subset of these items will be discussed in this paper for consideration when designing, building, and operating future spacecraft propulsion systems. This paper will focus on lessons learned related to Orbiter MPS and is the first of a planned series to address the subject matter.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

ISS Solar Array Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) Bearing Failure and Recovery: Technical and Project Management Lessons Learned

The photovoltaic solar panels on the International Space Station (ISS) track the Sun through continuous rotating motion enabled by large bearings on the main truss called solar array alpha rotary joints (SARJs). In late 2007, shortly after installation, the starboard SARJ had become hard to turn and had to be shut down after exceeding drive current safety limits. The port SARJ, of the same design, had been working well for over 2 years. An exhaustive failure investigation ensued that included multiple extravehicular activities to collect information and samples for engineering forensics, detailed structural and thermal analyses, and a careful review of the build records. The ultimate root cause was determined to be kinematic design vulnerability coupled with inadequate lubrication, and manufacturing flaws; this was corroborated through ground tests, metallurgical studies, and modeling. A highly successful recovery plan was developed and implemented that included replacing worn and damaged components in orbit and applying space-compatible grease to improve lubrication. Beyond the technical aspects, however, lie several key programmatic lessons learned. These lessons, such as running ground tests to intentional failure to experimentally verify failure modes, are reviewed and discussed so they can be applied to future projects to avoid such problems.

DellaCorte, Christopher↗

NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned From the Development, Operation, and Review of Mechanical Systems on the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and Payloads

The Mechanical Design and Analysis Branch at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is responsible for the technical oversight of over 30 mechanical systems flying on the Space Shuttle Orbiter and the International Space Station (ISS). The branch also has the responsibility for reviewing all mechanical systems on all Space Shuttle and International Space Station payloads, as part of the payload safety review process, through the Mechanical Systems Working Group (MSWG). These responsibilities give the branch unique insight into a large number of mechanical systems, and problems encountered during their design, testing, and operation. This paper contains narrative descriptions of lessons learned from some of the major problems worked on by the branch during the last two years. The problems are grouped into common categories and lessons learned are stated.

Dinsel, Alison↗

NASA NTRS2009

Inflatable Habitat Health Monitoring: Implementation, Lessons Learned, and Application to Lunar or Martian Habitat Health Monitoring

NASA's exploration mission is to send humans to the Moon and Mars, in which the purpose is to learn how to live and work safely in those harsh environments. A critical aspect of living in an extreme environment is habitation, and within that habitation element there are key systems which monitor the habitation environment to provide a safe and comfortable living and working space for humans. Expandable habitats are one of the options currently being considered due to their potential mass and volume efficiencies. This paper discusses a joint project between the National Science Foundation (NSF), ILC Dover, and NASA in which an expandable habitat was deployed in the extreme environment of Antarctica to better understand the performance and operations over a one-year period. This project was conducted through the Innovative Partnership Program (IPP) where the NSF provided the location at McMurdo Station in Antarctica and support at the location, ILC Dover provided the inflatable habitat, and NASA provided the instrumentation and data system for monitoring the habitat. The outcome of this project provided lessons learned in the implementation of an inflatable habitat and the systems that support that habitat. These lessons learned will be used to improve current habitation capabilities and systems to meet the objectives of exploration missions to the moon and Mars.

Rojdev, Kristina↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Thermal Performance Comparison and Lessons Learned for the Thermal Infrared Sensor Instruments 1 & 2

The Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS-1) is one of two instruments on the Landsat-8 Mission, which launched in February of 2013 and remains operational. The TIRS-2 instrument was developed for the Landsat-9 Mission, which is scheduled to launch in September of 2021. The TIRS-2 instrument design was adjusted to account for requirements changes and to include key lessons learned from its predecessor. The overall thermal subsystem design of the TIRS Sensor Unit remained comparable from mission to mission, but there were some areas that needed modifications. The general design is comprised of five thermal zones which range in temperature from less than 43 Kelvin to 320 Kelvin. Most zones are proportional heater controlled. A two-stage cryocooler provided by Ball Aerospace is used to cool the cryogenic subsystem, and excess power dissipation is rejected via ammonia transport heat pipes to a dedicated cryocooler radiator with embedded ammonia heat pipes. The cryogenic subsystem includes a series of shells used to radiatively and conductively isolate the cold stage from the warmer surroundings. The Optical System (telescope) is passively cooled to 180-195 Kelvin using a dedicated radiator with embedded dual-bore ethane heat pipes. The warmer end of the instrument includes a Scene Select Mechanism, an on-board Black Body Calibrator with a dedicated radiator, and a Focal Plane Electronics Box, all of which are attached to the Sensor Unit primary structure. The TIRS-1 thermal subsystem design was successfully verified during an extended testing campaign and during more than 8years of on-orbit operations. The TIRS-2 thermal subsystem design was successfully verified during months of ground testing prior to delivery in August of 2019and at the Observatory level in the Spring of 2021. A detailed comparison of the thermal performance of the two instruments has been made with a focus on key lessons learned during each instrument development, and with the benefit of on-orbit data acquired for the TIRS-1 instrument.

Veronica Otero↗

NASA NTRS2010

Space Station Control Moment Gyroscope Lessons Learned

Four 4760 Nms (3510 ft-lbf-s) Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscopes (DGCMG) with unlimited gimbal freedom about each axis were adopted by the International Space Station (ISS) Program as the non-propulsive solution for continuous attitude control. These CMGs with a life expectancy of approximately 10 years contain a flywheel spinning at 691 rad/s (6600 rpm) and can produce an output torque of 258 Nm (190 ft-lbf)1. One CMG unexpectedly failed after approximately 1.3 years and one developed anomalous behavior after approximately six years. Both units were returned to earth for failure investigation. This paper describes the Space Station Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscope design, on-orbit telemetry signatures and a summary of the results of both failure investigations. The lessons learned from these combined sources have lead to improvements in the design that will provide CMGs with greater reliability to assure the success of the Space Station. These lessons learned and design improvements are not only applicable to CMGs but can be applied to spacecraft mechanisms in general.

Gurrisi, Charles↗

NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned from Daily Uplink Operations during the Deep Impact Mission

The daily preparation of uplink products (commands and files) for Deep Impact was as problematic as the final encounter images were spectacular. The operations team was faced with many challenges during the six-month mission to comet Tempel One of the biggest difficulties was that the Deep Impact Flyby and Impactor vehicles necessitated a high volume of uplink products while also utilizing a new uplink file transfer capability. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Multi-Mission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Mission Planning and Sequence Team (MPST) had the responsibility of preparing the uplink products for use on the two spacecraft. These responsibilities included processing nearly 15,000 flight products, modeling the states of the spacecraft during all activities for subsystem review, and ensuring that the proper commands and files were uplinked to the spacecraft. To guarantee this transpired and the health and safety of the two spacecraft were not jeopardized several new ground scripts and procedures were developed while the Deep Impact Flyby and Impactor spacecraft were en route to their encounter with Tempel-1. These scripts underwent several adaptations throughout the entire mission up until three days before the separation of the Flyby and Impactor vehicles. The problems presented by Deep Impact's daily operations and the development of scripts and procedures to ease those challenges resulted in several valuable lessons learned. These lessons are now being integrated into the design of current and future MGSS missions at JPL.

uplink↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Cutoff System (ECO) Anomalies

The Space Shuttle Orbiter's main engine cutoff (ECO) system first failed ground checkout in April, 2005 during a first tanking test prior to Return-to-Flight. Despite significant troubleshooting and investigative efforts that followed, the root cause could not be found and intermittent anomalies continued to plague the Program. By implementing hardware upgrades, enhancing monitoring capability, and relaxing the launch rules, the Shuttle fleet was allowed to continue flying in spite of these unexplained failures. Root cause was finally determined following the launch attempts of STS-122 in December, 2007 when the anomalies repeated, which allowed drag-on instrumentation to pinpoint the fault (the ET feedthrough connector). The suspect hardware was removed and provided additional evidence towards root cause determination. Corrective action was implemented and the system has performed successfully since then. This white paper presents the lessons learned from the entire experience, beginning with the anomalies since Return-to-Flight through discovery and correction of the problem. To put these lessons in better perspective for the reader, an overview of the ECO system is presented first. Next, a chronological account of the failures and associated investigation activities is discussed. Root cause and corrective action are summarized, followed by the lessons learned.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Astrobee Operations on the International Space Station

Since its launch in 2019, NASA has been operating three Astrobee free-flying robots providing an autonomous and adaptable research platform aboard the International Space Station (ISS). These robots have not only facilitated a myriad of national and international research endeavors in microgravity but have also served as a STEM outreach platform for student competitions aboard the ISS. Amidst its extensive operational tenure, spanning over five years and exceeding 1200 hours of cumulative free-flyer operation as of April 2024, the Astrobee robots have encountered software and hardware anomalies. Despite its inherent design for on-orbit repair or replacement, certain anomalies have proven to be complex, necessitating remote resolution via software and firmware updates or, in extreme cases, hardware replacements or the return of faulty units to NASA's ground facilities for repair. Such challenges underscore the delicate balance between the autonomous functionality of Astrobee and the occasional need for human intervention to maintain optimal performance. One recurring point of failure identified during Astrobee's operational lifespan has been the SD card, a critical component utilized by the different Astrobee processors and the Dock Station. The occurrence of SD card anomalies, both on orbit and within ground units, has provided invaluable insights into the improvement of Astrobee's systems and mitigation to future faults. This presentation will focus on four key areas: 1. Overview of Faults and Anomalies: A comprehensive examination of the diverse array of faults and anomalies encountered by Astrobee and its associated systems both in orbit and on the ground. From software glitches to hardware malfunctions, this section provides insights into the challenges faced during Astrobee's operational tenure. 2. Resolution Processes and Procedures: An in-depth discussion of the methodologies and procedures implemented to resolve the encountered anomalies. This includes remote troubleshooting, software patches, firmware updates, and, when necessary, the logistics involved in hardware replacements or down-massing for repair. 3. Implementation of Software Updates and Hardware Upgrades: A detailed exploration of the strategies employed to mitigate the risk of recurring anomalies through the implementation of software updates and hardware upgrades. This section highlights the iterative nature of Astrobee's development, emphasizing the continuous pursuit of robustness and reliability. 4. Lessons Learned and Future Directions: Reflecting on the insights gained from addressing anomalies, this section examines the lessons learned and outlines future directions for enhancing Astrobee's robustness and resilience. It underscores the iterative nature of space exploration and the importance of adaptability and continuous improvement in the pursuit of scientific discovery. Through a nuanced examination of Astrobee's operational challenges and the strategies employed to overcome them, this presentation sheds light on the complexities of operating autonomous robotic systems in the ISS environment. It underscores NASA's commitment to pushing the boundaries of exploration and innovation while navigating the inherent challenges of space exploration.

Astrobee↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Astrobee Operations on the International Space Station

Astrobee↗