NASA's Space Launch System Begins Moving to the Launch Site
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Bruce Askins↗
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The Space Launch System: Powerful New Launch Capability for Exploration
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Robert W Stough↗
NASA Space Launch System Integrated, Preparing for Launch
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Bruce R Askins↗
NASA Space Launch System Integrated, Preparing for Launch
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Bruce R Askins↗
A Geometric Analysis to Protect Manned Assets from Newly Launched Objects - COLA Gap Analysis
A safety risk was identified for the International Space Station (ISS) by The Aerospace Corporation following the launch of GPS IIR-20 (March 24, 2009), when the spent upper stage of the launch vehicle unexpectedly crossed inside the ISS notification box shortly after launch. This event highlighted a 56-hour vulnerability period following the end of the launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) process where the ISS would be unable to react to a conjunction with a newly launched object. Current launch COLA processes screen each launched object across the launch window to determine if an object's nominal trajectory is predicted to pass within 200 km of the ISS (or any other manned/mannable object), resulting in a launch time closure. These launch COLA screens are performed from launch through separation plus I 00 minutes. Once the objects are in orbit, they are cataloged and evaluated as part of routine on-orbit conjunction assessment processes. However, as the GPS IIR-20 scenario illustrated, there is a vulnerability period in the time line between the end of launch COLA coverage and the beginning of standard on-orbit COLA assessment activities. The gap between existing launch and on-orbit COLA processes is driven by the time it takes to track and catalog a launched object, identify a conjunction, and plan and execute a collision avoidance maneuver. For the ISS, the total time required to accomplish an of these steps is 56 hours. To protect human lives, NASA/JSC has requested that an US launches take additional steps to protect the ISS during this "COLA gap" period. The uncertainty in the state of a spent upper stage can be quite large after all bums are complete and all remaining propellants are expelled to safe the stage. Simply extending the launch COLA process an additional 56 hours is not a viable option as the 3-sigma position uncertainty will far exceed the 200 km miss-distance criterion. Additionally, performing a probability of collision (Pc) analysis over this period is also not practical due to the limiting effects of these large orbit state uncertainties. An estimated upper bound for Pc for a typical spent upper stage if nominally aligned for a direct broadside collision with the ISS is only on the order of 10-6. For a smaller manned object such as a Soyuz capsule, the risk level decreases to an order of 10'8 . In comparison, the Air Force Range policy (AFI 91-217) for launch COLAs would only eliminate launch opportunities when conjunctions with objects exceed a Pc of 10'5 This paper demonstrates a conservative geometry-based methodology that may be used to determine if launch opportunities pose a threat to the ISS during the COLA gap period. The NASA Launch Services Program at Kennedy Space Center has developed this COLA gap analysis method and employed it fQr three NASA missions to identify potential ISS conjunctions and corresponding launch window closures during the 56-hour at-risk period. In the analysis, for each launch opportunity, the nominal trajectory of the spent upper stage and the orbit state of the ISS are propagated over the 56 hour period. Each time the upper stage crosses the orbit plane of the ISS, the relative radial and argument of latitude separations are calculated. A window cutout is identified if these separation differences fall within a mission-specific violation box, which is determined from the evaluation of a Monte Carlo dispersions analysis that quantifies the potential variation in the upper stage radial and argument of latitude differences. This paper details the results of these analyses and their impacts to each mission.
Hametz, Mark E.↗
Environmental Conditions and Threatened and Endangered Species Populations near the Titain, Atlas, and Delta Launch Complexes, Cape Canaveral Air Station
Launches of Delta, Atlas, and Titan rockets from Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) have potential environmental effects. These could occur from direct impacts of launches or indirectly from habitat alterations. This report summarizes a three-year study (1995-1998) characterizing the environment, with particular attention to threatened and endangered species, near Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch facilities. Cape Canaveral has been modified by Air Force development and by 50 years of fire suppression. The dominant vegetation type around the Delta and Atlas launch complexes is coastal oak hammock forest. Oak scrub is the predominant upland vegetation type near the Titan launch complexes. Compositionally, these are coastal scrub communities that has been unburned for greater than 40 years and have developed into closed canopy, low-stature forests. Herbaceous vegetation around active and inactive facilities, coastal strand and dune vegetation near the Atlantic Ocean, and exotic vegetation in disturbed areas are common. Marsh and estuarine vegetation is most common west of the Titan complexes. Launch effects to vegetation include scorch, acid, and particulate deposition. Discernable, cumulative effects are limited to small areas near the launch complexes. Water quality samples were collected at the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch complexes in September 1995 (wet season) and January 1996 (dry season). Samples were analyzed for heavy metals, chloride, total organic carbon, calcium, iron, magnesium, sodium, total alkalinity, pH, and conductivity. Differences between fresh, brackish, and saline surface waters were evident. The natural buffering capacity of the environment surrounding the CCAS launch complexes is adequate for neutralizing acid deposition in rainfall and launch deposition. Populations of the Florida Scrub-Jay (Aphelocoma coerulescens), a Federally- listed, threatened species, reside near the launch complexes. Thirty-seven to forty-one scrub-jay territories were located at Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch complexes between 1995 and 1997. No direct impacts to scrub-jays were observed as a result of normal launches. The explosion of the Delta rocket in January 1997 caused direct impacts to the habitat of several scrub-jays families, from fire and debris; however, no scrub-jay mortality was observed. Mortality exceeded reproductive output at all areas over the course of the study. Populations of the southeastern beach mouse (Peromyscus polionotus niveiventris) populations, a Federally listed, threatened species, reside near all the launch complexes. Hurricane Erin and several other tropical storms impacted several areas at the inception of the study in 1995 causing coastal habitat alterations as a result of salt-water intrusion. Both the habitat and the beach mice populations recovered during the course of the study. No direct impacts to southeastern beach mice were observed as a result of normal launch operations. Direct impacts were observed to the habitat as a result of the explosion of the Delta rocket in January 1997. This alteration of the habitant resulted in a shift in use with the mice moving on to the newly burned part of the site. Waterbirds use wetlands and aquatic systems near the launch complexes. Species include the Federally-listed, endangered Wood Stork (Mycteria americana) and several state-listed species of special concern including the Snowy Egret (Egretta thula thula), Reddish Egret (Egretta rufescens rufescens), White Ibis (Eudocimus albus), Roseate Spoonbill (Ajaia ajaja), Tricolored Heron (Egretta tricolor ruficolis), and Little Blue Heron (Egretta caerulea). No impacts to these populations resulting from any launch operations were observed. Gopher tortoises (Gopherus polyphemus) also occur around the launch complexes. Most of those observed appeared to be in good condition; however, upper respiratory tract disease is known to occur in the population. Cape Canaveral Air Station, including areas near active launch complexes, remains important habitat for a variety of native plants and animals including threatened and endangered species. Direct negative effects of current launch systems appear limited. Additional monitoring of these populations and habitats is required to determine if subtle, long-term changes are occurring, to determine if new launch systems and facilities cause other effects, and to determine the effects of habitat restoration and management.
Oddy, Donna M.↗
Environmental Conditions and Threatened and Endangered Species Populations near the Titan, Atlas, and Delta Launch Complexes, Cape Canaveral Air Station
Launches of Delta, Atlas, and Titan rockets from Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) have potential environmental effects. These could occur from direct impacts of launches or indirectly from habitat alterations. This report summarizes a three-year study (1 995-1 998) characterizing the environment, with particular attention to threatened and endangered species, near Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch facilities. Cape Canaveral has been modified by Air Force development and by 50 years of fire suppression. The dominant vegetation type around the Delta and Atlas launch complexes is coastal oak hammock forest. Oak scrub is the predominant upland vegetation type near the Titan launch complexes. Compositionally, these are coastal scrub communities that has been unburned for > 40 years and have developed into closed canopy, low-stature forests. Herbaceous vegetation around active and inactive facilities, coastal strand and dune vegetation near the Atlantic Ocean, and exotic vegetation in disturbed areas are common. Marsh and estuarine vegetation is most common west of the Titan complexes. Launch effects to vegetation include scorch, acid, and particulate deposition. Discernable, cumulative effects are limited to small areas near the launch complexes. Water quality samples were collected at the Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch complexes in September 1995 (wet season) and January 1996 (dry season). Samples were analyzed for heavy metals, chloride, total organic carbon, calcium, iron, magnesium, sodium, total alkalinity, pH, and conductivity. Differences between fresh, brackish, and saline surface waters were evident. The natural buffering capacity of the environment surrounding the CCAS launch complexes is adequate for neutralizing acid deposition in rainfall and launch deposition. Populations of the Florida Scrub-Jay (Aphelocoma coerulescens), a Federally-listed, threatened species, reside near the launch complexes. Thirty-seven to forty-one scrub-jay territories were located at Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch complexes between 1995 and 1997. No direct impacts to scrub-jays were observed as a result of normal launches. The explosion of the Delta rocket in January 1997 caused direct impacts to the habitat of several scrub-jays families, from fire and debris; however, no scrub-jay mortality was observed. Mortality exceeded reproductive output at all areas over the course of the study. Populations of the southeastern beach mouse (Peromyscus polionotus niveiventris) populations, a Federally listed, threatened species, reside near all the launch complexes. Hurricane Erin and several other tropical storms impacted several areas at the inception of the study in 1995 causing coastal habitat alterations as a result of salt-water intrusion. Both the habitat and the beach mice populations recovered during the course of the study. No direct impacts to southeastern beach mice were observed as a result of normal launch operations. Direct impacts were observed to the habitat as a result of the explosion of the Delta rocket in January 1997. This alteration of the habitat resulted in a shift in use with the mice moving on to the newly burned part of the site. Waterbirds use wetlands and aquatic systems near the launch complexes. Species include the Federally-listed, endangered Wood Stork (Mycferia americana) and several state-listed species of special concern including the Snowy Egret (Egretfa thula fhula), Reddish Egret (Egreffa rufescens rufescens), White Ibis (Eudocimus albus), Roseate Spoonbill (Ajaia ajaja), Tricolored Heron (Egreffa tricolor ruficolis), and Little Blue Heron (Egreffa caerulea). No impacts to these populations resulting from any launch operations were observed. Gopher tortoises (Gopherus polyphemus) also occur around the launch complexes. Most of those observed appeared to be in good condition; however, upper respiratory tract disease is known to occur in the population. Cape Canaveral Air Station, including areas near active launch colexes, remains important habitat for a variety of native plants and animals including threatened and endangered species. Direct negative effects of current launch systems appear limited. Additional monitoring of these populations and habitats is required to determine if subtle, long-term changes are occurring, to determine if new launch systems and facilities cause other effects, and to determine the effects of habitat restoration and management.
Oddy, Donna M.↗
Space Shuttle Day-of-Launch Trajectory Design Operations
A top priority of any launch vehicle is to insert as much mass into the desired orbit as possible. This requirement must be traded against vehicle capability in terms of dynamic control, thermal constraints, and structural margins. The vehicle is certified to specific structural limits which will yield certain performance characteristics of mass to orbit. Some limits cannot be certified generically and must be checked with each mission design. The most sensitive limits require an assessment on the day-of-launch. To further minimize vehicle loads while maximizing vehicle performance, a day-of-launch trajectory can be designed. This design is optimized according to that day s wind and atmospheric conditions, which increase the probability of launch. The day-of-launch trajectory design and verification process is critical to the vehicle s safety. The Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) is the process by which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Shuttle Program tailors the vehicle steering commands to fit that day s environmental conditions and then rigorously verifies the integrated vehicle trajectory s loads, controls, and performance. This process has been successfully used for almost twenty years and shares many of the same elements with other launch vehicles that execute a day-of-launch trajectory design or day-of-launch trajectory verification. Weather balloon data is gathered at the launch site and transmitted to the Johnson Space Center s Mission Control. The vehicle s first stage trajectory is then adjusted to the measured wind and atmosphere data. The resultant trajectory must satisfy loads and controls constraints. Additionally, these assessments statistically protect for non-observed dispersions. One such dispersion is the change in the wind from the last measured balloon to launch time. This process is started in the hours before launch and is repeated several times as the launch count proceeds. Should the trajectory design not meet all constraint criteria, Shuttle would be No-Go for launch. This Shuttle methodology is very similar to other unmanned launch vehicles. By extension, this method would likely be employed for any future NASA launch vehicle. This paper will review the Shuttle s day-of-launch trajectory optimization and verification operations as an example of a more generic application of day-of-launch design and validation. With Shuttle s retirement, it is fitting to document the current state of this critical process and capture lessons learned to benefit current and future launch vehicle endeavors.
Harrington, Brian E.↗
Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I
Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.
Debris↗
Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches
For the last 30 years, the United States's human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After nearly 50 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either of the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return to the home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent as to how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort. Key Words: PRA, space launches, human space program, ascent abort, spacecraft, launch vehicles
Bigler, Mark↗
NASA Lewis Launch Collision Probability Model Developed and Analyzed
There are nearly 10,000 tracked objects orbiting the earth. These objects encompass manned objects, active and decommissioned satellites, spent rocket bodies, and debris. They range from a few centimeters across to the size of the MIR space station. Anytime a new satellite is launched, the launch vehicle with its payload attached passes through an area of space in which these objects orbit. Although the population density of these objects is low, there always is a small but finite probability of collision between the launch vehicle and one or more of these space objects. Even though the probability of collision is very low, for some payloads even this small risk is unacceptable. To mitigate the small risk of collision associated with launching at an arbitrary time within the daily launch window, NASA performs a prelaunch mission assurance Collision Avoidance Analysis (or COLA). For the COLA of the Cassini spacecraft, the NASA Lewis Research Center conducted an in-house development and analysis of a model for launch collision probability. The model allows a minimum clearance criteria to be used with the COLA analysis to ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. If, for any given liftoff time, the nominal launch vehicle trajectory would pass a space object with less than the minimum required clearance, launch would not be attempted at that time. The model assumes that the nominal positions of the orbiting objects and of the launch vehicle can be predicted as a function of time, and therefore, that any tracked object that comes within close proximity of the launch vehicle can be identified. For any such pair, these nominal positions can be used to calculate a nominal miss distance. The actual miss distances may differ substantially from the nominal miss distance, due, in part, to the statistical uncertainty of the knowledge of the objects positions. The model further assumes that these position uncertainties can be described with position covariance matrices. With these, and some additional simplifying assumptions, a closed-form solution for the probability of collision is obtained. This solution provides clear insights into how each of the independent parameters affects the probability of collision. It shows that for a given maximum probability of collision and prior knowledge of the objects position uncertainties and sizes, only knowledge of the nominal closest approach distance is required to make the launch/no launch decision. The model was completed and used for the mission assurance COLA analysis for the Cassini spacecraft, which was launched on a Titan IV/Centaur rocket on October 15, 1997. Although the model was specifically developed for the Cassini mission, it is clearly applicable for other launches as well. The effect of COLA closures on the launch window is shown. The bar represents the entire 140-min launch window on October 15, 1997; the blackened areas represent the loss of launch opportunities due to the potential for a collision with an orbiting object.
Bollenbacher, Gary↗
Evaluation of Dual-Launch Lunar Architectures Using the Mission Assessment Post Processor
The National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) Constellation Program is currently designing a new transportation system to replace the Space Shuttle, support human missions to both the International Space Station (ISS) and the Moon, and enable the eventual establishment of an outpost on the lunar surface. The present Constellation architecture is designed to meet nominal capability requirements and provide flexibility sufficient for handling a host of contingency scenarios including (but not limited to) launch delays at the Earth. This report summarizes a body of work performed in support of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Committee. It analyzes three lunar orbit rendezvous dual-launch architecture options which incorporate differing methodologies for mitigating the effects of launch delays at the Earth. NASA employed the recently-developed Mission Assessment Post Processor (MAPP) tool to quickly evaluate vehicle performance requirements for several candidate approaches for conducting human missions to the Moon. The MAPP tool enabled analysis of Earth perturbation effects and Earth-Moon geometry effects on the integrated vehicle performance as it varies over the 18.6-year lunar nodal cycle. Results are provided summarizing best-case and worst-case vehicle propellant requirements for each architecture option. Additionally, the associated vehicle payload mass requirements at launch are compared between each architecture and against those of the Constellation Program. The current Constellation Program architecture assumes that the Altair lunar lander and Earth Departure Stage (EDS) vehicles are launched on a heavy lift launch vehicle. The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is separately launched on a smaller man-rated vehicle. This strategy relaxes man-rating requirements for the heavy lift launch vehicle and has the potential to significantly reduce the cost of the overall architecture over the operational lifetime of the program. The crew launch occurs first, four days prior to the optimal trans-lunar injection (TLI) departure window. This is done to allow for launch delays in the Altair/EDS launch. During this time, the Orion vehicle is required to conduct orbit maintenance while loitering in low Earth orbit (LEO). The alternative architectures presented aim to eliminate the need for costly orbit maintenance maneuvers while loitering in LEO. In all of the alternative architectures considered, it is assumed that the Altair and Orion vehicles are nominally launched 90 minutes apart, depart the Earth separately, and complete the rendezvous and docking sequence at the Moon. In this lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) strategy, both the Altair and Orion vehicles will require separate EDS stages, and each will be required to perform lunar orbit insertion (LOI). This has the effect of balancing payload requirements between the two launch vehicles at the Earth. In this case, the overall payload mass is increased slightly, but the increased mission costs could potentially be offset by requiring the construction of two rockets similar in size and nature, unlike the current Constellation architecture. Three dual-launch architecture options with LOR were evaluated, which incorporate differing methodologies for mitigating the effects of launch delays at the Earth. Benefits and drawbacks of each of the dual-launch architecture options with LOR are discussed and the overall mission performance is compared with that of the existing Constellation Program lunar architecture.
Stewart, Shaun M.↗
Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials
The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.
Calle, Luz M.↗
Space Shuttle Launch Probability Analysis: Understanding History so We Can Predict the Future
The Space Shuttle was launched 135 times and nearly half of those launches required 2 or more launch attempts. The Space Shuttle launch countdown historical data of 250 launch attempts provides a wealth of data that is important to analyze for strictly historical purposes as well as for use in predicting future launch vehicle launch countdown performance. This paper provides a statistical analysis of all Space Shuttle launch attempts including the empirical probability of launch on any given attempt and the cumulative probability of launch relative to the planned launch date at the start of the initial launch countdown. This information can be used to facilitate launch probability predictions of future launch vehicles such as NASA's Space Shuttle derived SLS. Understanding the cumulative probability of launch is particularly important for missions to Mars since the launch opportunities are relatively short in duration and one must wait for 2 years before a subsequent attempt can begin.
Cates, Grant R.↗
The Wallops Flight Facility Model for an Integrated Federal/Commercial Launch Range
Historically, the federal government has been the predominant purchaser of space launches in the United States. The government met its needs through purchase of hardware and services. It also provided the infrastructure necessary to conduct launch operations through federal launch ranges, both military and NASA. Under this model, the government had the complete ownership, responsibility, liability, and expense for launch activities. As the commercial space sector grew, there emerged a corresponding growth in demand for launch range services. However, the expense and complexity of activities has thus far deterred a rapid rise in the establishment of purely commercial launch sites. In this context, purely commercial is defined as "without benefit of capabilities provided by the federal government." Consistent with the Commercial Space Launch Act, in recent years NASA and the Air Force have supported commercial launches from government launch ranges on a cost-reimbursable, non-interference basis. In this mode the commercial launch service providers contract with the government to provide services including use of facilities, tracking and data services, and range safety. As the commercial market projections began to show significant opportunities for economic development, several states established spaceports to provide the services necessary to meet these projected commercial needs. In 1997, NASA agreed to the establishment of the Virginia Space Flight Center (VSFC) at the Wallops Flight Facility. Under this arrangement, NASA agreed to allow Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) to construct facilities on NASA property and agreed to provide services in accordance with the Space Act of 1958 and the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (as amended) to support VSFC launch customers. The relationship between NASA and VCSFA, however, has evolved beyond a customer supplier relationship. A partnership relationship has emerged which pairs the strengths of the established NASA test range and the state-sponsored, commercial launch facility provider, in an attempt to satisfy the needs for flexible, low-cost access to space. Furthermore, the future of the NASA/Wallops Test Range is closely linked with the success of VCSFA in promoting commercial launches from Wallops. This paper will describe the changing paradigm of the federal launch range and the unique aspects of the NASA/Wallops Facility relationship with VCSFA. Discussion will include institutional cost-sharing, business development and marketing, joint educational programs, and strategic planning.
Underwood, Bruce E.↗
Use of Smoothed Measured Winds to Predict and Assess Launch Environments
Since many of the larger launch vehicles are operated near their design limits during the ascent phase of flight to optimize payload to orbit, it often becomes necessary to verify that the vehicle will remain within certification limits during the ascent phase as part of the go/no-go review made prior to launch. This paper describes the approach used to predict Ares I-X launch vehicle structural air loads and controllability prior to launch which represents a distinct departure from the methodology of the Space Shuttle and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) programs. Protection for uncertainty of key environment and trajectory parameters is added to the nominal assessment of launch capability to ensure that critical launch trajectory variables would be within the integrated vehicle certification envelopes. This process was applied by the launch team as a key element of the launch day go/no-go recommendation. Pre-launch assessments of vehicle launch capability for NASA's Space Shuttle and the EELV heavy lift versions require the use of a high-resolution wind profile measurements, which have relatively small sample size compared with low-resolution profile databases (which include low-resolution balloons and radar wind profilers). The approach described in this paper has the potential to allow the pre-launch assessment team to use larger samples of wind measurements from low-resolution wind profile databases that will improve the accuracy of pre-launch assessments of launch availability with no degradation of mission assurance or launch safety.
Cordova, Henry S.↗
Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches
For the last 30 years, the United States' human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After over 40 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent and how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort.
Bigler, Mark↗
Orion Launch Abort System Performance During Exploration Flight Test 1
The Orion Launch Abort System Office is taking part in flight testing to enable certification that the system is capable of delivering the astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment during both nominal and abort conditions. Orion is a NASA program, Exploration Flight Test 1 is managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched on a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. Although the Launch Abort System Office has tested the critical systems to the Launch Abort System jettison event on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. During Exploration Flight Test 1, the Launch Abort System was to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. Exploration Flight Test 1 was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. This was the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. Exploration Flight Test 1 provides critical data that enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The Exploration Flight Test 1 separation event occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff. The separation of the Launch Abort System jettison occurs once Orion is safely through the most dynamic portion of the launch. This paper will present a brief overview of the objectives of the Launch Abort System during a nominal Orion flight. Secondly, the paper will present the performance of the Launch Abort System at it fulfilled those objectives. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.
McCauley, Rachel↗