Results for “Failure mode and effect analysis” — Page 10

NASA NTRS2019

Achieving Improved Reliability with Failure Analysis

Reliability is the ability of a product to properly function, within specified performance limits, for a specified period of time, under the life cycle application conditions. Failure analysis is a vital tool in the effort to ensure reliability of electronic products and systems throughout their product lifecycle. Today, organizations involved in activities within the electronics supply chain are facing new challenges, not just from complex assembly styles, harsher lifecycle environments, and sophisticated supply chains, but also from customers who are demanding a quicker turn-around. Unfortunately, root cause failure analysis is often performed incompletely, leading to a poor understanding of failure mechanisms and causes and, customer dissatisfaction due to recurring failures. The PDC (Professional Development Course) starts with an introduction to reliability concepts, physics of failure and an overview of failure mechanisms that affect PCBs (Printed Circuit Boards), PCBAs (Printed Circuit Board Assembly) and components. The PDC then dives into root cause hypothesizing techniques (Pareto, FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), fishbone (Cause-And-Effect Diagram), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)), non-destructive and destructive analysis and, materials characterization will be discussed. Numerous failure analysis case studies will be used to illustrate the techniques and analysis principles to arrive at the root cause(s) of field failures on printed circuit boards, active components, and assemblies. What Attendees will Learn: Topics include: Overview of Reliability Concepts Failure mechanisms of electronic products Root cause analysis Failure analysis techniques -Non-destructive techniques (optical, CSAM (Confocal Scanning Electron Microscopy) etc.) -Destructive analysis (DPA (Destructive Physical Analysis), Decap (Decapsulation), FIB (Focused Ion Beam) etc.) -Materials characterization (XRF (X-Ray Fluorescence) , EDS (Error Detection Sequential), TMA/DSC (Thermal Mechanical Analysis/Differential Scanning Calorimetry) etc.)

PCB quality↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Data requirements for improving the Quantitative Risk Assessment of liquid hydrogen storage systems

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) supports the development of risk-informed safety codes and standards which are employed to enable the safe deployment of hydrogen technologies essential to decarbonize the transportation sector. System reliability data is a necessary input for rigorous QRA. Here, the lack of reliability data for bulk liquid hydrogen (LH 2 ) storage systems located on site at fueling stations limits the use of QRAs. In turn, this hinders the ability to develop the necessary safety codes and standards that enable worldwide deployment of these stations. Through a QRA-based analysis of a LH 2 storage system, this work focuses on identifying relevant scenario and probability data currently available and ascertaining future data collection requirements regarding risks specific to liquid hydrogen releases. The work developed consists of the analysis of a general bulk LH 2 storage system design located at a hydrogen fueling station. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and traditional QRA modeling tools such as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are employed to identify, rank, and model risk scenarios related to the release of LH 2 . Based on this analysis, scenario and reliability data needs to add LH 2 -related components to QRA are identified with the purpose of improving the future safety and risk assessment of these systems.

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 4 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis: Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure at the Advanced Technology Development Center

This viewgraph presentation provides information on Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA). HF PFMEA includes the following 10 steps: Describe mission; Define System; Identify human-machine; List human actions; Identify potential errors; Identify factors that effect error; Determine likelihood of error; Determine potential effects of errors; Evaluate risk; Generate solutions (manage error). The presentation also describes how this analysis was applied to a liquid oxygen pump acceptance test.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Uncovering Hazards Using a Multi-Objective Optimization to Explore the Faulty State-Space

Considering resilience when designing complex engineered systems is crucial to ensure the system is safe under unexpected hazardous scenarios. Traditional risk-based approaches, such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are useful for designing the system to mitigate hazardous scenarios that can be identified by the designer, but often require experience or prior knowledge of system failures to generate. More recently, researchers have developed simulation tools that enable the designer to model large sets of hazardous scenarios (driven by both internal faults and external factors) through simulation. While these tools enable a wider scope of fault modes to be evaluated (e.g., by injecting combined set of fault modes or injecting modes at different times), the resulting assessments (like FMEA) still require knowledge of the specific modes to be evaluated. However, failure to analyze a wide variety of fault scenarios can lead to an incomplete picture of the system resilience, especially to "surprise events'' which may be difficult for the designer to identify and predict beforehand. To overcome this challenge, previous work developed a fault sampling approach for resilience simulations which would procedurally-generate a wide variety of potential faults by systematically perturbing the health states of the system. While the resulting fault modes generated covered a much larger space hazards than would be otherwise considered (and identified many unique failure trajectories which would not have otherwise been identified), it also significantly increased the computational cost of the analysis and resulted in the simulation and analysis of a large set of essentially duplicate scenarios. Additionally, as the number of dimensions in the faulty state-space increases, the full elaboration of possible modes becomes computationally infeasible, justifying the use of a more targeted search. To resolve this limitation, this work proposes the use of a multiobjective optimization algorithm to search the health state space for potential fault modes that are both (1) hazardous and (2) unique. To solve this type of problem, this work proposes the use of a cooperative co-evolutionary algorithm. To demonstrate this approach, it will be applied to a model of an autonomous rover which uses line markings to navigate, focusing on potential hazards in the drive system which could cause the rover to crash. To determine the merit of the approach, it will further be compared with the previously-presented range elaboration approach and a random mode generation approach on the basis of computational efficiency and found modes.

Resilience↗

NASA NTRS1996

An Independent Evaluation of the FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis Alternative Study

The present instruments of safety and reliability risk control for a majority of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs/projects consist of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Critical Items List (CIL), and Hazard Report (HR). This extensive analytical approach was introduced in the early 1970's and was implemented for the Space Shuttle Program by NHB 5300.4 (1D-2. Since the Challenger accident in 1986, the process has been expanded considerably and resulted in introduction of similar and/or duplicated activities in the safety/reliability risk analysis. A study initiated in 1995, to search for an alternative to the current FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis methodology generated a proposed method on April 30, 1996. The objective of this Summer Faculty Study was to participate in and conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed alternative to simplify the present safety and reliability risk control procedure.

Ray, Paul S.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Detecting Hidden Failure Modes in Critical, Embedded Software

This experience report describes a method that has been used successfully to detect hidden failure modes in critical, embedded spacecraft software. The method is an adaptation of an earlier, controversial approach called failure modes and effects analysis. The adapted method was found to be well-suited to identifying latent software design weaknesses involving complex system interactions and dependencies in the two applications described here. This experience may be useful for other high-integrity software systems in which the possibility of hidden failure modes is a major concern.

detecting software failure design analysis↗

NASA NTRS1989

Model 0A wind turbine generator FMEA

The results of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) conducted for the Wind Turbine Generators are presented. The FMEA was performed for the functional modes of each system, subsystem, or component. The single-point failures were eliminated for most of the systems. The blade system was the only exception. The qualitative probability of a blade separating was estimated at level D-remote. Many changes were made to the hardware as a result of this analysis. The most significant change was the addition of the safety system. Operational experience and need to improve machine availability have resulted in subsequent changes to the various systems which are also reflected in this FMEA.

Klein, William E.↗

NASA NTRS1980

Orbiter subsystem hardware/software interaction analysis. Volume 8: AFT reaction control system, part 2

The orbiter subsystems and interfacing program elements which interact with the orbiter computer flight software are analyzed. The failure modes identified in the subsystem/element failure mode and effects analysis are examined. Potential interaction with the software is examined through an evaluation of the software requirements. The analysis is restricted to flight software requirements and excludes utility/checkout software. The results of the hardware/software interaction analysis for the forward reaction control system are presented.

Becker, D. D.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Task Analysis Technologies at KSC

Project objective: (1) Form an integrated team of NASA. USA, Boeing, and Dynacs researches. (2) Create a user friendly software prototype that assists an analyst in performing a human factors process failure modes and effects analysis (HF-PFMEA). (3)Perform four task analyses on center: cargo late access task analysis (NASA/Boeing team); payload test and verification system task analysis (NASA/Boeing team); slammer cover installation operations task analysis (NASA/USA team); ATDC LOX pump acceptance test procedure task analysis (NASA/Dynacs team).

Carstens, Deborah S.↗